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EU integration has been argued to enhance a process of “de-parliamentarization” (Maurer 
and Wessels 2001) of political decision-making procedures and to contribute to a “waning 
of opposition” (Kirchheimer 1957). This thesis sets out to critically test these assumptions 
by empirical analysis of opposition parties’ parliamentary EU scrutiny activities. It 
addresses two desiderata in research on national parliaments and EU affairs: First, it 
investigates the practice of EU scrutiny and second, the political dynamics between 
government and opposition as drivers for these activities. The aim is to answer the 
following research question: Which factors explain opposition parties’ EU scrutiny 
activities in national parliaments? 
This study builds on the ontological background of rational choice institutionalism. The 
theoretical chapter conceptualizes two main strategies for opposition parties reflecting their 
reactive nature: cooperation and competition towards the governing parties. Cooperation is 
linked to the goal of short-term policy influence and could enhance legitimacy in terms of 
the inclusion of the interest of minorities. The strategy of competition in form of publicly 
challenging the government could, on the other hand, enhance the politicization of EU 
issues. The study develops a theoretical model of opposition to EU affairs in national 
parliaments, which is sensitive to the temporal aspect of cooperation and conflict. It 
concentrates on two essential steps of parliamentary scrutiny: the legislative scrutiny at 
committee level and the justifications towards the electorate at the plenary level. The study 
expects that the party type (anti-establishment or regular) and positional distance to the 
government explain variation in oppositions’ EU scrutiny activities. 
A small-n comparative research design deems most appropriate for the explorative nature 
of this study. Austria and Germany are chosen for analysis, as their institutional setting and 
political party systems comply with the logic of the most-similar system design. The study 
investigates the activities of the six party groups in opposition in the two lower chambers in 
the time period from 2009 to 2013. The analysis triangulates a quantitative assessment of 
the scope of EU scrutiny activities with qualitative methods in form of content analysis and 
interviews.  
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The empirical investigation finds a surprisingly little effect of the party type of an anti-
establishment party on EU scrutiny activities at committee level. At the same time, the anti-
establishment parties compete strongly in plenary debates on those EU-related topics 
conducive to criticize the elite. The second hypothesis on the role of positional distance 
found clear support in content analysis on plenary debates in this study. The results show 
that the framing on EU affairs is clearly dependent on the topic under debate. For the 
cultural dimension, the correspondence of positional distance to EU framing activities was 
disrupted by the overemphasis of certain topics by the two anti-establishment parties.  
Overall, the study does not find an “opposition deficit” in parliaments in times of the Euro 
crisis. The results are linked back to the broader question of national parliaments’ role in 
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1. Introduction 
“Because we cannot mobilize opposition in Europe, and because we are denied an 
appropriate political arena in which to hold European governance accountable, we are 
almost pushed into organizing opposition to Europe.”  
Peter Mair (2007): Political Opposition and the European  
Union, in: Government and Opposition 42(1): 12) 
 
Democracy in the European Union is a contentious topic of debate in public and scientific 
domain and has become increasingly contested. EU integration has developed over decades 
as elite-project away from the public eye. The impact of EU decision-making on citizens’ 
lives has continuously increased with the deepening and widening of EU integration. The 
dramatic effects of the Euro crisis have woken up the “sleeping giant” (van der Eijk and 
Franklin 2004) of a more sceptical public opinion. The “permissive consensus” among 
European citizens seems to have turned into a “constraining dissensus” towards EU 
integration (Hooghe and Marks 2009). These developments raise the question of the 
responsiveness of the EU decision-making processes to citizens’ interests. Opposition to 
EU integration and EU policymaking should be channelled through parliamentary 
representation at national and EU level. Yet, mainstream parties are slow to respond to the 
more EU-sceptical views of their voters and leave the field to extreme parties who use anti-
EU sentiments to sharpen their profile (Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2016). 
Political scientists, like Peter Mair (2007), argue that the de-politicization1 of EU 
policymaking by mainstream parties undermines the acceptance of supranational 
governance (see also Kirchheimer 1957, Dahl 1965, Schapiro 1965). According to this 
argument, the lack of opposition on policy content within the EU decision-making process 
leads to opposition towards the system. Political opposition is essential for a well-
functioning liberal democracy. Dahl (1966: xiii) defines the establishment of legal, orderly 
and peaceful opposition as the third milestone of democratic institution building. Ionescu 
and Madariaga (1968: 12) see the existence of institutionalized opposition as indicator for 
categorizing a system as liberal or dictatorial, democratic or authoritarian. A lack of 
                                                 
1 Politicization is defined by the salience and polarization around a policy issue (de Wilde 2011). 
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institutionalized opposition towards policy contents within the institutional structures of the 
EU consequently raises fundamental questions on its democratic legitimacy.  
Parliaments – as living symbols of democracy and direct representatives of citizens’ 
interests – are the most important official forums for critical debate and legislative control 
of EU decision-making. The EU has two channels of electoral legitimation: citizens are 
represented directly in the European Parliament and indirectly via national parliaments 
control over their governments’ activities in the Council of Ministers (Art. 10 (2) TEU). 
Opposition in the European Parliament has been researched intensely in its direction 
towards policy content (Hix 2001, Hix et al. 2006) and in its direction against the political 
system (McElroy and Benoit 2007). Parliaments at the national level, however, also possess 
the institutional capacity to perform oppositional functions to EU legislation. In fact, 
national parliaments are the “gate-keepers of European integration” (Raunio 2011), as they 
control the allocation of competences through ratification of EU treaty reform and the 
review of subsidiarity. 
This study tests Mair’s (2007) argument on a deficit of opposition to the EU within existing 
institutional structures. In how far do opposition parties use their prerogatives in national 
parliaments to voice opposition towards EU issues and EU integration? Opposition party 
groups are assumed to be the “natural” agent to publicly criticize and tightly scrutinize their 
national governments’ activities at the EU level. Ironically, by actively challenging EU 
legislation and communicating different options of future EU integration paths, parliaments 
would provide the kind of democratic legitimacy most urgently lacking in the EU. 
“Classic” opposition to EU legislative proposals would make policy alternatives accessible 
to citizens and provide a choice on different policy approaches.  
This study contributes to research on national parliaments by focussing on opposition 
parties. Research on national parliaments has by now accumulated significant knowledge 
on their institutional capacity for EU scrutiny (Bergman 1997, Raunio 2005, Winzen 2012, 
2013) and gathered first quantitative evidence on the practices of EU scrutiny (de Ruiter 
2013, Jensen et al. 2013, Auel et al. 2015a, 2015b, Gattermann and Hefftler 2015). 
Nevertheless, there are still two desiderata in the study of national parliaments and the EU. 
First, research has long focused on institutional procedures, not the actual activities in 
parliament. Second, many contributions have treated parliaments as “black boxes”. We still 
need a better understanding of the political dynamic in the domain of EU affairs within 
parliaments.  
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This study addresses these gaps by researching opposition parties’ EU scrutiny activities. 
The focus is on the political motivation of opposition to engage in EU affairs in order to 
answer the following research question:  
Which factors explain opposition parties’ EU scrutiny activities in national 
parliaments?  
Based on rational choice institutionalism, the theoretical part develops two key strategies 
for opposition parties’ behaviour in the parliamentary arena: competition or cooperation 
with the governing parties. I assume that competition leads to more public visibility of EU 
affairs and, in turn, to more politicization. The thesis integrates approaches from party and 
opposition studies to research on national parliaments and the EU in order to develop two 
central hypotheses on the motivation for EU scrutiny. On the one hand, the party type (anti-
establishment versus regular parties) should influence the level of competition with the 
government. On the other hand, opposition’s positional distance to governing parties should 
impact the choice of strategy. The empirical analysis investigates two country cases that 
have similar institutional structures for EU scrutiny (Austria and Germany). The opposition 
parties under investigation vary significantly in terms of party type and position on the left-
right and pro-anti EU dimensions. The empirical analysis gathers new quantitative and 
qualitative data on the legislative scrutiny activities, the communicative action and inter-
parliamentary cooperation in the EU. The encompassing approach of this study covers three 
channels of parliamentary influence. With this rare approach of analysing the legislative 
scrutiny at committee level as well as the public justification in plenary debates it is in a 
unique position to develop a better understanding of opposition to EU affairs in national 
parliaments.  
The period of investigation is the legislative terms from 2009 to 2013.2 In this time period 
the financial and debt crises posed a major challenge for EU integration and for the role of 
national parliaments. European governments were under massive pressure to provide a 
credible commitment to the common currency when Greece was unable to refinance itself 
at the markets. This led to a debate on the nature of the EU community in the dilemma of 
solidarity, inter-dependence and national autonomy (Crum 2013). National parliaments saw 
their “crown jewel” of budgetary control at stake. The rescue mechanisms (EFSF and ESM) 
render national budgets vulnerable to the risk of debt (un)sustainability of the other Euro 
zone member states. The period of investigation allows to analyse both, regular legislative 
                                                 
2 The legislative term in Austria started in September 2008. In Germany the term started in September 2009. 
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activity of national parliamentarians as well as crisis management. The study thereby 
focuses on oppositions’ activities within parliamentary procedures. It does not cover the 
appeals to constitutional courts that occurred during the Euro crisis. The unique situation of 
the Euro crisis may affect the generalizability of the results. Nevertheless, crises are 
“normal” in the sense that urgent matters of high impact appear time and again. The 
parliamentary reactions to the Euro crises might inform us on how MPs will react to future 
crisis situations.  
The purpose of this introduction is to argue for the relevance of researching opposition in 
national parliaments and locating this study in the universe of existing research. The 
following Chapter 1.1 reviews the debate on EU democratic legitimacy to understand the 
potential contribution of national parliaments. Chapter 1.2 develops the state of the art and 
points out existing gaps in the literature. Chapter 1.3 explains how this thesis addresses 
these gaps, before Chapter 1.4 lays out the roadmap of how the book will proceed. 
1.1. The relevance of studying opposition to the EU in national 
parliaments  
The overall starting point for studying parliaments is the desire to gain a better 
understanding of democratic legitimacy of a political system. Effective parliamentary 
control over executive actors is essential for a well-functioning representative democracy at 
the national as well as at the supranational level. The EU has two channels of electoral 
legitimation: a) citizens vote for national parliamentarians who control the own government 
in the Council and b) they may vote for the European Parliament. The two levels of 
parliament each have specific functions for the control of the EU decision-making process. 
Fossum and Crum (2009) argue that research on democratic legitimacy of the EU needs to 
understand the “multi-level parliamentary field” at all levels. This Chapter 1.1 places 
national parliaments in the “bigger picture” of the EU institutional setting and explains the 
potential contributions of the lower level of parliamentary bodies to EU legitimacy.  
The democratic legitimacy of the European Union has been debated controversially since 
the 1990s. The views on democracy in the EU vary significantly due to the complex nature 
of the EU political system and the theoretical challenge to define a standard of democratic 
legitimacy for this international integration project (Fossum 2016). This chapter proceeds in 
three steps, in order to define the role of national parliaments for EU democratic legitimacy. 
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First, Section 1.1.1 outlines the EU modes of governance to sketch the complexity of the 
multi-level system. It also briefly outlines the functions of national parliaments within the 
EU. Second, the chapter derives an analytical framework for democratic legitimacy in 
Section 1.1.2. Based on this framework, Section 1.1.3 reviews the debate on the democratic 
deficit of the EU. It explains national parliaments potentials to contribute to EU legitimacy 
and the focus on opposition as a motor of active EU scrutiny at the domestic level.  
1.1.1. The complex system of EU multi-level governance 
This Section 1.1.1 presents the EU multi-level governance system to show the potential 
channels of influence of opposition in national parliaments. 
Though under critique, the EU is still the most developed regional integration project 
worldwide (Börzel and Risse 2009). Policy areas under EU competence touch upon the 
core of state sovereignty, as in the common currency and border protection. Over decades, 
the EU has continuously deepened (covering more policy areas and moving to more 
supranational decision-making modes) and widened (integrating new member states) (see 
Wessels 2008: 22–25). While integration is considerable in some domains, the member 
states have remained in control over the allocation of competences and of the most salient 
policy areas with strong redistributive aspects like taxation, social welfare and foreign 
policy. Member states governments can exercise veto powers – formally or informally3 – in 
many areas of EU legislation and national parties control the candidacies to the European 
Parliament and other high-level political offices. This unique situation of blending 
supranational and intergovernmental features has made it notoriously difficult to categorize 
the EU with traditional concepts of political systems (Wessels 1997). With a fully-fledged 
international parliamentary body, the European Parliament, and a strong Court at EU level, 
integration goes beyond a traditional international organization. However, the strong veto 
position of the member states along with primarily national communication spheres and 
national social and political identification prevents the EU from being a proper federal 
order. The EU cannot easily be compared with models derived from the nation states or 
federations. Concepts from other areas of political science, such as Comparative Politics or 
International Relations, can only with caution be transferred to the study of the EU (Kaiser 
2002: 446).  
                                                 
3 The Council often decides by consensus, even when qualified majority is formally possible (Hayes-Renshaw 
and Wallace 2006). 
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Besides the “sui generis” nature, a second aspect adds to the complexity of the EU: The 
decision-making procedures vary across policy areas. Scharpf (2002) defines different 
modes of governance, which can be ordered along their degree of supranationalization (see 
also Wessels 2008, Tömmel 2014). The Lisbon Treaty ascribes the allocation of 
competences to EU and/or member state level in a catalogue of competences (Art. 2, 
TFEU).4 The differentiation by exclusive, shared or supportive EU competences roughly 
corresponds to the modes of governance defined by Scharpf (2002). The different logics of 
decision-making have implications for the involvement of parliamentary bodies. The two 
channels of electoral legitimation, the European and the national parliaments, have different 
functions in each decision-making mode.  
The most supranationalized mode is the area of exclusive competences of the EU (see Art. 
3, TFEU). In the policy areas of the completion of the internal market, monetary and 
commercial policy, the customs union as well as the conservation of marine biological 
resources, the member states have transferred the competences to initiate legislation 
entirely to the EU. Scharpf (2002) points out that in many federal systems a federal 
parliament and elected ministers and chief executives would handle the competences 
located exclusively at federal level (see also Majone 1998). In the EU, independent agents 
deal with the exclusive rights: the European Central Bank, the Court of Justice of the EU 
(CJEU) and the Commission (see also Majone 1998). Neither the European Parliament nor 
the national parliaments have a role in controlling the activities of these supranational 
agencies or institutions. Parties in minority, in consequence, do not have any means of 
influence through their parliamentary representation. 
In the domain of shared competences either the EU or member state governments can 
become active. The member states may only exercise their competences, if there is no 
existing EU legislation.5 The Ordinary Legislative Procedure (former co-decision) applies 
to all policy areas of the shared competences. Here the European Commission initiates a 
legislative proposal. The Council of the EU decides on the proposal with qualified 
                                                 
4 Art. 3 and 4, TFEU define the exclusive and shared competences. Art. 6, TFEU defines the areas where the 
Union may support, coordinate or supplement member state actions and Art. 352, TFEU contains the 
flexibility clause. 
5 The list of shared competences in the catalogue in the Lisbon Treaty is not conclusive. All competences not 
specified in Article 3 (on exclusive EU competences) or 6 (on supportive EU competences) fall into this 
category. Main policy areas are the internal market, social policy, economic cohesion, agriculture and 
fisheries, environment, consumer protection, transport, trans-European networks, energy, the area of freedom, 
security and justice as well as matters of safety concerns in public health. 
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majority6 and the European Parliament by simple majority in up to three readings. Qualified 
majority vote implies that some member states could be outvoted in the Council. Even 
though actual voting does not take place often, the possibility to do so creates pressure to 
compromise. Scharpf termed this mode interlocking politics (“Politikverflechtung”) to 
underpin the close interaction of supranational actors and member state governments within 
this decision-making mode (Scharpf 2002: 79). Both channels of parliamentary 
representation interact in the Ordinary Legislative Procedure: the European Parliament in 
its direct involvement and national parliaments indirectly through their control over their 
minister in the Council. If the own national government is, however, outvoted in the 
Council even the strongest control over the own ministers remains without consequences on 
the final result (Auel 2007: 499). The influence of national opposition parties depends on 
the room of manoeuvre of the domestic legislature and the rules of minority protection 
therein. 
The principles of subsidiarity and proportionality apply for shared competences (Art. 5, 
TEU).7 These principles guide the decision where the supranational level may become 
active, as competences are not clearly allocated to one single level of governance. The 
Lisbon Treaty installed national parliaments as “watchdogs” (Cooper 2006) over 
subsidiarity with the Early Warning Mechanism (Protocol on the application of the 
principals of subsidiarity and proportionality, TEU).8 National parliaments are considered 
the “natural” agents to critically review the allocation of competences to EU level, as they 
loose influence when a policy issue is removed from their direct control at national level 
(Groen and Christiansen 2015). National parliaments have, in consequence, a twofold role 
in Ordinary Legislative Procedure. They can control policy content in contact with their 
own government and subsidiarity questions in contact to the Commission. Opposition has 
                                                 
6 Qualified Majority is achieved when 55% of member states (currently 15) and 65% of the population of the 
EU are represented in favour of a decision (see Art. 16 (4) TEU). 
7 Subsidiarity means that problems should be solved at the lowest level possible. The EU should only become 
active, if an issue „cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional 
and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at 
Union level“ (Protocol on the application of the principals of subsidiarity and proportionality, TEU). The 
principle of proportionality says that “the content and form of Union action shall not exceed what is necessary 
to achieve the objectives of the Treaties“(Protocol on the application of the principals of subsidiarity and 
proportionality, TEU). 
8 Each parliament has two votes within the Early Warning Mechanism, which they may issue in form of 
”reasoned opinions” within eight weeks after publication of a legislative proposal from the EU Commission. 
In case of bicameralism, each chamber is assigned one of these votes. National parliaments can issue a 
“yellow card” with one third of their collective votes, which requires the Commission to repeal, revise or 
better justify its legislative draft. 
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limited access to the subsidiarity procedure, as parliaments usually require a majority vote 
for issuing a reasoned opinion.  
The third mode of governance listed by Scharpf is intergovernmental negotiations. Here, all 
member states maintain their veto power. This applies for the Common Security and 
Defence Policy (see Art. 24 (1), TEU) and the revision of EU treaties (Art. 48, TEU). The 
European Parliament remains without any formal influence in intergovernmental 
negotiations. For national parliaments the consensus mode of decision-making in 
intergovernmental negotiations increases their potential policy impact. National parliaments 
have a strong role in proper EU treaty reform, as treaties need to be ratified at national 
level. The only occasion of treaty change in the past years occurred in reaction to the Euro 
crisis. Yet, for the case of the crisis mechanisms (EFSF, ESM and Fiscal Compact), treaties 
were negotiated outside of the EU framework in a purely intergovernmental mode. This 
makes parliamentary control more difficult, as EU scrutiny rights do not apply (Rittberger 
and Winzen 2015). Nevertheless, domestic opposition parties have better opportunities to 
influence the outcome of decision-making in intergovernmental negotiations, if their 
parliaments provide some leverage for them. Where treaty change requires a super majority 
in the ratification process, parties in minority have the power to negotiate a compromise in 
exchange of the supportive votes. Opposition has at several instances used this influence to 
achieve stronger EU scrutiny rights (Miklin 2015). 
This brief overview demonstrates that national parliaments have two key functions in the 
EU political system: legislative scrutiny of EU policy contents and the control over the 
allocation of competences in the polity. Opposition parties’ access to the EU level depends 
on the institutional prerogatives of the domestic legislature. The two functions of national 
parliaments can be performed through four channels of influence: control over the own 
government, communication to the citizens, the subsidiarity review as well as ratification of 
treaty reform. The cooperation with other parliaments represents a fifth avenue, which 
however serves information exchange more than a direct influence on policymaking. Figure 



















Figure 1: Five channels of influence for national parliaments. 
The first channel of influence concerns the control over the own government’s position in 
the Council of Ministers. The scrutiny of EU policymaking in the Ordinary Legislative 
Procedure is in principle in line with the classic function of legislatures of influencing or 
controlling the content of new policy proposals (see Bagehot 1867, Norton 1993). The two 
strongest parliamentary powers in the domestic context – voting on legislation and the vote 
of confidence – nevertheless only partially apply to control of EU affairs (Auel 2007: 13). 
EU legislation can take the form of regulations or directives. Regulations from EU level 
apply directly at national level and do not involve national parliaments. For directives, 
parliaments are responsible for transposing them into national law. It is not an option to 
straight out veto the transposition, as the Commission can sanction a member states’ non-
compliance to EU legislation. It is only a question of how to adapt national legislation in 
order to achieve the goal defined at EU level. One way to compensate for this lack of 
influence in the ex-post stage is a stronger pre-decisional parliamentary involvement (Auel 
and Benz 2005).  
Parliaments have several instruments of how to influence the own government prior to 
Council meetings (Rozenberg and Hefftler 2015). Legislatures can issue statements on the 
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parliamentary position, request information, ask questions to the government and debate 
EU affairs in the plenary. Some legislatures have the power to mandate the national 
position in EU negotiations to the government. The literature considers “mandating power” 
as one of the strongest prerogatives for the control over the government (Winzen 2012). 
Other parliaments, however, use the second channel of influence. They pressure the 
government in question time or plenary debates. Public debates are a powerful means of 
parliaments, as governing and opposition parties have to make their positions transparent 
and to justify their actions to the voters and fellow MPs. Once committed to a certain 
position in public, any deviation from that position is transparent for the voters.  
Besides the control of the own government and communication to the citizens, legislatures 
may use the additional path of networking with their counter-parts throughout the European 
Union. National parliaments use this cooperation to exchange information with other 
parliaments: either in the member states or the European Parliament. MPs of different 
specializations meet in various meetings of parliamentarians in the European Union 
(Hefftler and Gattermann 2015). This form of exchange could complement the scrutiny 
activities directed to the own government and be especially promising for MPs in 
opposition (Miklin 2013). 
As a fourth channel of influence, the Lisbon Treaty established the Early Warning System 
(EWS) for review of the principle of subsidiarity within the Ordinary Legislative Procedure 
(Art. 6, Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, 
TEU). Each member state’s parliament (or chambers) holds two votes in the EWS. National 
parliaments can issue a “yellow card” in this procedure with one third of their votes, which 
requires the Commission to review, revise or withdraw its policy proposal. This Early 
Warning Mechanism is paired with the right of parliaments to file petition to the CJEU 
after legislation is agreed at EU level (Art. 8, Protocol on the application of the principles 
of subsidiarity and proportionality, TEU). 
The fifth channel of influence is connected to the second function of national parliaments 
for the EU: the revision of EU treaties. In the ordinary treaty revision procedure national 
parliamentarians participate in a convention leading up to the final decision and in ex-post 
ratification at national level. For the case of simplified treaty reform parliaments need to 
ratify the European Council decision (Art 48 (6, 7) TEU). For the use of “passerelle 
clauses” the Lisbon Treaty gives each national parliament a veto option for six month (Art. 
48 (7) TEU). The exact rules of treaty ratification are defined at national level and vary 
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from referendums, simple or qualified vote in parliament and the right for legal review by 
constitutional courts.  
This brief overview of the EU institutional framework and national parliaments’ channels 
of influence demonstrates the complexity of the system. Different levels of governance – 
regional, national and supranational – interact in various modes of decision-making 
depending on the policy area. The complexity of the decision-making process and the open-
ended finalité of EU integration present a challenge for the analysis of EU democratic 
legitimacy.  
The aim of this Chapter 1.1 is to define how national parliaments could alleviate the EU 
democratic deficit through these channels of influence. To do so the following Section 1.1.2 
develops a definition of democratic legitimacy that can serve as a benchmark, before 
Section 1.1.3 reviews the EU democratic deficit debate.  
1.1.2.  Types of democratic legitimacy  
The complexity and “sui generis” nature of the EU gives leeway to many different 
perspectives on its democratic credentials. Puchala (1971) compares integration studies to 
the metaphor of blind men and the elephant. 
“Several blind men approached an elephant and each touched the animal in an effort to discover 
what the beast looked like. Each blind man, however, touched a different part of the large animal, 
and each concluded that the elephant had the appearance of the part he had touched.” (Puchala 1971: 
267) 
This seems to be especially true for the debate on EU legitimacy. Authors apply different 
approaches of democratic theory to the European Union. In consequence, each provides 
different measures of a “good” political order and highlights different aspects of the object 
under study. To find a common ground for the varying approaches, this Section 1.1.2 
provides an analytical framework for democratic legitimacy that accounts of two 
dimensions of legitimacy (input versus output and inclusion versus alteration).  
Legitimacy is a key concept in political science. As central as it is in many political 
theories, as manifold is the use of this term. Only a clear concept will allow assessing the 
effect of opposition in parliaments’ contribution to EU legitimacy in the remainder of this 
study. As a starting point, legitimacy can be defined as a quality whereby something or 
someone is recognized as “being reasonable and acceptable” (Cambridge Dictionary 2017). 
The legitimacy of a political system describes the quality of the relationship between a rule 
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or ruler and its subjects. The alternative to legitimate rule is coercion, the exercise of power 
by force and fear. At the core of legitimate rule lie rightfulness of authority and acceptance 
by the citizens (Rawls 1985, Wimmel 2009). As the concept refers, in essence, to the 
affective relationship of an individual level to the political system, it is difficult to grasp in 
theoretical and empirical terms.  
Justifications of legitimacy of a polity derive their arguments from shared ideals and beliefs 
within that society (Simmons 1999). In the modern Western world, democracy is the 
normative reference point for arguments about legitimacy (see Fukuyama 2006: argument 
on the end of history). While legitimacy could be derived from tradition or the charisma of 
a leader (see Weber 1922/1988), we speak of democratic legitimacy where democratic 
values serve as reference point (Sprungk 2013). Unfortunately, democracy is a term equally 
vague and multi-facetted as legitimacy itself. Theories follow the logic of direct, 
representative, liberal, republican, majoritarian, consensual, cosmopolitan and deliberative 
democracy. Each theory stresses different values or ideals as most important democratic 
values. For the purpose of this study it is sufficient to identify exemplary a few core 
democratic values that matter in all democratic theories (though to a different extent). Three 
key principles are recurrent in most normative democratic theory are equal rights for all 
citizens, the sovereignty of the people and the protection of personal liberties.9 In sum, 
democratic legitimacy is acceptance of a ruler or rules based on democratic principles. 
This definition serves as a framework for assessing political theories about democratic 
systems. The two dimensions of democratic legitimacy serve to identify different 
approaches to EU democratic legitimacy, which are defined by a) the stages in the policy 
process (input and output legitimacy) and b) the degree of (de)centralization of power 





                                                 
9 The literature on democracy can be divided in a normative and an empirical branch. Normative democratic 
theory developes concepts of an ideal political order in social or moral terms. The empirical branch derives 
possible conceptions of democracy from existing political systems. Their goal is to define a good political 
order that is practicable under real world conditions. Both schools of thought embody democratic ideals. 










Figure 2: Analytical framework of democratic legitimacy. 
Scharpf (1999) introduced the concept of input and output legitimacy to EU studies. Input 
legitimacy consists of participation of the citizens, procedures and institutions of the 
decision-making process. Output legitimacy is defined by the quality of the results the 
political system produces for its citizens. These two elements of legitimacy are considered 
as interdependent but separate. The democratic quality of input and output legitimacy can 
be evaluated in relation to the three key democratic principles defined above. For input 
legitimacy the crucial measure is the ideal of equal rights of all citizens: In how far do all 
citizens have equal opportunities to participate in elections, public debates and organized 
interest groups? Input legitimacy is largely defined by the setup of institutional procedures 
within the legislature, the executive and judicative. In relation to the three democratic 
principles defined above, the benchmark is institutions that maximize the equality and 
autonomy of the people, e.g. by general elections and majority rule. It can also mean 
protecting civil liberties by avoiding the abuse of power.  
In the ex-post stage of output legitimacy, authoritative rule making is justified by the 
quality of the results (Scharpf 1999, Schmidt 2006). Equality of the citizens can be 
interpreted in this case as an equal right for the respect of one’s interests and preferences 
(Dahl 1998). Thus, the output as best practicable solution for the citizens could legitimize a 
political system irrespective of the participation and procedures (Wimmel 2009: 191). Both 
variables – input and output – can be used to argue for a “good” political order, which 
should have the acceptance by the people for the exercise of authority. The relevance of 
input and output legitimacy is judged differently depending on the school of democratic 
theory. 
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On the input side, the two types of legitimization become relevant for the study of the 
European Union, which are derived from either majoritarian or consensus democratic 
theory (Lijphart 2012). In a majoritarian system, the logic of alteration of government 
serves as primary legitimizing force. In a consensus system it is the broad scope of 
inclusion of citizens’ interests that legitimizes the decision-making process. A majoritarian 
democratic system is characterized by a pluralitarian electoral system of first-past-the-
post.10 This allows a relatively small group of voters who changes its priorities from one 
election to the next to alter the balance of power in parliament and government. In a 
pluralitarian or majoritarian electoral system the seat share in parliament does not 
necessarily mirror the relative political positions of society. However, elections in a 
majoritarian system give voters the option to “throw the rascals out” (see for example Crum 
2003). In majoritarian systems the elected officials hold the highest decision-making power 
and are little constrained by independent agencies, such as a constitutional court or central 
bank (Lijphart 2012). In consequence, there are fewer veto players that would hinder 
government from “effective” governance.  
Consensus democracies, on the other hand, install a number of brakes on majority rule. In 
line with liberal democracy approaches, which fear the “tyranny of the majority”, 
consensus democracy derives its legitimacy on the input side from power sharing. 
Participation is inclusive by means of proportional electoral systems where the vote shares 
translate closely to parties’ seat share in parliament. Alteration and inclusion can be seen as 
two poles of one dimension (see Kaiser 2002: 448). 
In a nutshell, legitimacy refers in its essence to the acceptance of authority by its subjects. 
Democratic legitimacy is justified by the orientation towards democratic principles in the 
political system. These democratic values can be realized via participation and democratic 
decision-making procedures (input) or results that are in citizens’ best interest (output). The 
input side can be designed to allow for regular alteration of government and an emphasis on 
majority rule or through inclusion of a broad range of citizens interests in a consensual 
system.  
Based on this definition and analytical framework of legitimacy, the chapter now turns to 
the debate on the EU democratic deficit. 
                                                 
10 This study follows the terminology of Kaiser (2002: 448) according to which a first-past-the-post electoral 
system is plutalitarian. A plurality of the votes is sufficient to win elections here, which do not even need to 
represent a majority. Majoritarian electoral systems require at least 50% plus one vote to win an election. 
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1.1.3. The democratic deficit of the EU 
This Section 1.1.3 introduces the EU democratic deficit debate. The potential causes of a 
lack of EU legitimacy justify the investigation of opposition in national parliaments. 
The debate on the democratic legitimacy of the EU is a debate on the “question of 
standards” (see Majone 1998) with which to measure EU democracy. The normative ideal, 
which is applied to assess a democratic order, will significantly affect the results of the 
analysis. This explains why opinions on EU legitimacy differ to the extent that some 
authors do not even see a problem. Some argue that democratic standards developed at 
national level can hold for supranational governance, while others contend that we need 
new measures to explain the legitimacy of the EU (Banchoff and Smith 1999, Heritier 
1999, Grant and Keohane 2005, Kohler-Koch and Rittberger 2007).  
This Section 1.1.3 does not review the entire, multifaceted EU democratic deficit debate 
(for an overview see Jensen 2009). It uses the lens of the analytical framework on 
democratic legitimacy with the aim to identify the potential contributions of national 
parliaments and opposition parties. The goal is to show how research on opposition in 
national parliaments can contribute to a better understanding of EU legitimacy. The chapter 
assesses two lines of the debate on an EU democratic deficit. The first one discusses 
whether standards of in- or output legitimacy should be applied. Thus, should parliaments 
have any role at all in holding EU-executive actors to account? This study sides with those 
authors who deem input legitimacy a necessary element for the EU. The second branch of 
the debate considers decision-making in the EU in light of consensus versus majoritarian 
democracy. The dimensions of inclusion or alternation and the role of opposition parties 
become relevant for this section.  
Democracy versus efficiency 
One way to conceive of democracy in Europe is in terms of a “chain of delegation” (Müller 
2000). In representative democracies, citizens delegate authority to parliaments whom in 
turn delegate power to executive actors. The executive again outsources some tasks to 
independent agents and involves its administration in the implementation process. In order 
to assure that the outcome is continuously in citizens’ best interest, a “chain of 
accountability” should run in the opposite direction from the executive actors to the citizens 
(Strøm 2000, Auel 2007).  
Within this logic of delegation every democratic system is confronted with the question, 
which tasks can and should be delegated to independent experts and what to maintain in a 
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political decision-making mode (Schäfer 2006: 187). Delegation to bureaucracy can 
potentially increase the efficiency and effectiveness of decision-making of a political 
system. Well-designed policy results provide legitimacy through output. However, 
decision-making by independent experts is shrouded from political debate and electoral 
competition.  
The question of political decision-making versus delegation is especially delicate for the 
EU. The EU institutions can be considered an additional step in the “chain of delegation” 
(Bergman 2000). Executive power is diffuse within this political system and involves 
multiple actors as the Commission, the Council, the European Council, the ECB and 
various EU agencies (Crum 2003: 297). The supranational actors, Commission and CJEU, 
are quite independent in the mode related to exclusive EU competences. The EU therefore 
walks a thin line between efficient technocratic problem-solving and “delegative 
overstretch” (Crum 2003).  
A measure for adequate delegation to independent actors could be derived from the 
practices in modern nation states. Delegation to independent experts is common where it 
serves the purpose to safeguard long-term interests or where high-level expertise is required 
in the decision-making process (Thatcher 2002). The relatively short legislative cycles 
threaten to undermine long-term interest of a democratic system. Self-interest maximizing, 
elected politicians would sacrifice long-term interests of society for the own benefit of re-
election (Schäfer 2007: 189). Monetary policy is a good example for this reasoning behind 
delegation. Central banks watch over monetary stability as independent agents, since they 
are not compromised by other short-term goals that could motivate elected officials to 
sacrifice this policy goal. The judicial branch is a good example for expertise as motivation 
for delegation to independent agents. Judges enter the court system without public 
elections, yet are often accepted as legitimately ruling on difficult legal questions due to 
their extensive legal expertise.  
At national level, political systems combine different sources of input and output 
legitimacy. In majoritarian democracy, power is more focused on elected officials, while 
independent central banks and constitutional courts often characterize consensus 
democratic systems. Compared to the standards of national democracies, the EU lacks 
behind in terms of input legitimacy. Before the Euro crisis hit Europe, several researchers 
argued that legitimation of the EU could be derived primarily through output (Majone 
1998, Scharpf 1999, Moravcsik 2002). Majone (1998) and Moravcsik (2002) used to be the 
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strongest defenders of better policy results as source of legitimacy for the EU. They adapted 
the two key arguments for output legitimacy – safeguarding long-term interests and 
efficiency – to the EU system. Importantly, they defined certain conditions under which 
delegation to independent agents is adequate. For Moravcsik, delegation to supranational 
agents is an effective tool for national governments to show credible commitment in the 
establishment of the common market. He argues that supranational actors have little 
autonomy as intergovernmental decision-making modes prevail. Majone (1998: 10) 
differentiates adequate decision-making modes depending on the effect of the act: Pareto-
efficient decisions can be dealt with by delegation to independent agents, whereas 
redistributive measures need to be based on majoritarian procedures. He conceptualized the 
EU as regulatory regime as EU measures used to be first and foremost pareto-efficient 
decisions. It is seen as a system of limited competences with no general taxing and 
spending powers. 
The argument on output legitimacy as sole source of legitimacy has always been contested 
and has come under stress in the past years with the (lack of) solutions to the various crises 
in Europe. First, authors contend whether the EU has the preconditions for a focus on 
output legitimacy and whether these normative ideals are still adequate. Second, it is argued 
that delegation should be accompanied by stronger accountability mechanisms in the EU.  
It is questioned whether EU competences are limited to pareto-efficient issues. While some 
regulatory practices can arguably produce pareto-efficient outcomes, there have always 
been redistributive effects of EU rule making. The support for structurally weak regions or 
for farmers and the research and development sector produce clear winners and losers 
(Føllesdal  and Hix 2006). Since the outbreak of the financial and debt crisis in 2010 as 
well as the uncoordinated reactions to the migration crises in 2015, the theoretical 
approaches defending the system of EU governance via pareto-efficiency and output 
legitimacy have come under stress (Armingeon et al. 2015, Scharpf 2015, Majone 2016). 
The Euro crisis has brought the redistributive effects of the common currency to the fore 
(Armingeon et al. 2015). The bail-out of Greece exemplifies how the rule by “technocracy” 
can contradict democratic legitimacy in the input sense. The European Central Bank and 
the German Consitutional Court were key players in the decision-making on the Greek debt 
crisis. Despite the tremendous political relevance and extreme redistributive effect 
significant parts of the decision were made by actors, which are removed from electoral 
control (Mény 2012: 156).  
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Majone’s approach from 1998 was suited to describe the supranational mode of decision-
making as it focuses on justifying the independent regulators at EU level: the European 
Central Bank, the Court of Justice of the EU and the Commission.1 The legitimation 
through output alone for the entire polity and all its decision-making modes has, however, 
been criticized as justifying “benevolent dictatorship” (Katz and Mair 2002, Bellamy 2010). 
While experts may in the best case comply with normative goals of the society, regulatory 
institutions are not responsive to change in citizens’ preferences (Dahl 1998, Føllesdal  and 
Hix 2006). Authors argue that only elections provide the incentive for the elite to 
continuously adapt to changing preferences. Elections assure that policy options are 
debated in public and provide an opportunity of opinion formation. While rational choice 
theories usually assume that preferences are endogenous and pre-determined, Hix and 
Follesdal (2006) argue that preferences of voters are shaped thorough public discourse. This 
study sides with the view that EU legitimacy cannot primarily be based on output 
legitimacy.  
Furthermore, delegation to EU level is contested as it alters the balance of power at 
domestic level. Schäfer (2006: 194) argues that delegation to independent actors at EU 
level is only legitimate as long as decisions are reversible or policy goals consensual. One 
reason for the lack of public political conflict around decision-making can be seen in the 
pre-agreements of the acqui communautaire. The EU treaties define the finalization of the 
internal market as key priority. As the goal of the four market freedoms (capital, goods, 
people and services) is now inscribed in an international treaty, parties have effectively lost 
the policy space around the question of economic liberalization in Europe (Mair 2007):13). 
Also, the delegation of competences to independent agents as the CJEU, ECB, Europol or 
the other EU regulatory agencies reduces the scope of political choice for elected 
representatives in these policy areas. The rule by “technocracy” contradicts democratic 
legitimacy in the input sense. EU treaties and secondary legislation are difficult to reform. 
The norm of consensual decision-making favours the status quo (Scharpf 1998). Even a 
unilateral exit of the Union proves difficult in the current “Brexit” negotiations. Where 
contested policy decisions are fixed over time by delegation to the EU, governments can 
manifest their preferences beyond their time in power. Hix and Lord (1997) argue that 
governments use the EU level to constitutionalize their party political preferences (see also 
Schäfer 2006: 195). Mainstream parties most frequently hold majorities in the (European) 
Council, de facto side lining representation through parties on the fringes of the political 
spectrum at EU level. The opportunities and power of opposition is significantly limited in 
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this reading of EU decision-making processes. In this, legitimacy suffers as majority 
decisions become less acceptable for minorities where they do not have the prospect to 
design policy decisions according to their own preferences in the future. 
Finally, for national parliaments the classic principal-agent problem of an information 
advantage of the agent strengthens the power of the executive (Auel and Benz 2005). Only 
executive actors have direct access to EU negotiations and gain a strategic advantage over 
other domestic actors. This makes it difficult for parliaments to control their minister in the 
Council and much more to keep the prime minister or president under control in the 
European Council (Wessels et al. 2013). As parliaments do not participate directly in the 
negotiation situation, they can only with difficulties understand the win-set in the 
negotiations. How can MPs know if an unfavourable result emerged from a difficult 
negotiation situation or the lack of genuine approach by the government actor (Crum 
2003)? The internationalization of governance has been argued to trigger a process of de-
parliamentarization at the national level. Parliaments are confronted with the output from 
EU negotiations as fait accompli and decline to mere rubber-stamping bodies in the ex-post 
phase. There are two potential solutions to this problem: the strengthening of the European 
Parliament or stronger involvement of national parliaments in the ex-ante phase to decision-
making.  
In principle, the European Parliament could act as legitimacy source for EU legislation. It is 
a directly elected body representing European citizens’ interests. However, two main 
problems limit the capacity to fully substitute the national channel of legitimacy. First, the 
elections to the European Parliament are of “second order” nature (Reif and Schmitt 1980, 
Hassing Nielsen and Franklin 2017). National issues dominate the election campaigns why 
the results do not neatly represent citizens’ preferences towards EU policy. Second, the EU 
citizenry is so heterogeneous that it cannot be defined as a single European demos. 
Researchers have coined the term demoi-cracy to account for the multiple nationalities that 
are integrated in the European space (Nicolaidis 2013). The multi-lingual national traditions 
result in a fragmented institutional structure of the media landscape and multiple – at best 
inter-related – national public spheres. This makes it difficult for a single supranational 
parliament to communicate the upcoming policy choices to their electorates and to present 
the broad variety of citizens’ interests. Instead of strengthening the supranational 
parliamentary branch in the EU, authors have argued that national parliaments should 
become more internationalized in order to better scrutinize their own government’s EU 
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activities. The domestic parliaments are well-established institutions that can “translate” EU 
developments to their national political debates.  
These “sleeping beauties” have slowly woken up to the challenges of EU decision-making. 
All parliaments installed specified procedures for better scrutiny of EU affairs, such as 
committees on EU issues and information or mandating rights (Bergman 1997). Some 
researchers argue that national parliaments are the “losers” of EU integration (Maurer and 
Wessels 2001). Other authors see domestic parliaments as “fighting back” to re-assure their 
influence (Hix and Raunio 2000, Auel et al. 2015a). As again, the normative measure for 
“good” parliamentary scrutiny is debatable, the question of de- or re-parliamentarization is 
still a matter of dispute (Rozenberg and Hefftler 2015: 17).  
This study cannot address the over-arching question on the adequacy of delegation to 
independent experts in the European Union. Much more, it takes the argument on 
“delegative overstretch” as a starting point. The study of parliaments and of opposition 
addresses the question of executive dominance in EU affairs and potential remedies. The 
focus is on parliaments at the lower level of governance, where the pre-constitutional 
requirements of democracy are less problematic than for the European Parliament. The 
analysis of legislative scrutiny and public debate of EU affairs by national parliaments 
addresses the debate on the balance of power between government and parliaments. The 
main question in this regard is: how much do national parliaments engage in EU affairs? 
One element to evaluate national parliaments’ contribution to EU legitimacy is their 
awareness and ability to cope with EU developments. Here, their institutional capacity and 
involvement as an institution matter.  
This thesis goes beyond the “two-body image” of parliament versus government. The main 
political cleavage does not run between the institution of parliament and government, but 
between the governing majority and opposition. The executive dominance in EU affairs 
diminishes the influence and future opportunity structures especially for parties in minority 
(see Schäfer 2006). The focus on activities by opposition is therefore justified by the need 
to understand the political dynamic and lines of conflict between government and 
opposition in the realm of EU affairs.  
Consensus or majoritarian democratic perspective 
The prior section has considered the dimension of output versus input legitimacy as a trade-
off between efficiency and formal democratic procedures. This section focuses on the side 
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of input legitimacy and assesses different concepts on how legitimacy should work in terms 
of participation and procedures. Here the question is not just how much should parliaments 
and opposition be involved, but also what kind of parliamentary opposition activity 
contributes to EU legitimacy? This sections draws on the dimension of legitimacy ranging 
between alteration (majoritarian democracy) and inclusion (consensus democracy) as 
defined in Section 1.1.2. 
Prior research has analysed the EU in light of consensus democratic models and assessed in 
how far the EU political system complies with the institutional and procedural indicators of 
this democratic ideal (Gabel 1998, Schmidt 2000, Kaiser 2002: 42-47, Lijphart 2012). The 
European Union complies in many respects with the logic of a consensus democracy. We 
can see that on the vertical level, the heterogeneous citizenry of the EU is accounted for by 
a federal and decentralized structure. The member state governments maintain a strong 
position in the EU decision-making procedure. Much more, the lower level of governance 
is stronger than the supranational one. Especially, parties are dominated by the national 
level of party leaderships. Nominations to EP candidacy and other EU offices are largely 
dependent on the national party group (Hix 2010: 230). The supranational and 
intergovernmental institutions are intertwined closely in the Ordinary Legislative 
Procedure. In formal setup and informal practice, the legislative procedure involves 
multiple veto players who agree by means of elite bargain and a cooperative style (Marks 
and Hooghe 2004). In the consensus model, legitimacy results from the inclusion of 
multiple veto players. The complicated EU decision-making process that requires 
agreement by many different actors is valued positively. From this theoretical lens, national 
parliaments should be involved ideally with mandating power and potentially stronger 
rights in the EWS, e.g. through a reduced threshold for “yellow cards” (Kreilinger 2018).  
Despite this positive evaluation, the democratic legitimacy comes into question due to a 
weakness well known in all consensual democratic systems: The risk that multiple veto 
players and cooperative decision-making results in stagnation and blockage. It favours the 
status quo since drastic changes in policy direction are difficult to achieve under inclusion 
of multiple veto players as proven in reactions to the Euro crisis11, the migration crisis or 
the post-Brexit situation. The logic of decision-making does not allow EU leaders to 
impose drastic reforms, at times hindering effective governance. This incapability to act 
potentially reduces the “output legitimacy” of the political system (Scharpf 2015, Majone 
                                                 
11 The ESM and Fiscal Compact were installed in form of intergovernmental treaties outside of the EU 
treaties. 
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2016: 271). Due to the logic of power sharing, a consensus democracy relies on negotiating 
compromises among elites, which are often negotiated behind closed doors. Compared to a 
model of democracy that centres on the driving force of party conflict and public 
deliberation, the decision-making process is removed from public attention. This leads to an 
alternative analysis of EU legitimacy from the point of view of majoritarian democracy. 
Competition between parties is considered a key factor for producing legitimate outcomes 
in majoritarian democratic theory. Scholars agree that a certain homogeneity among 
citizens is a necessary precondition for purely majoritarian systems. Majority voting is 
perceived problematic where it creates permanent minorities that do not have a chance to 
get into power themselves one day. This model of democracy is characterized by a 
concentration of power in the hands of the elected majority (Lijphart 2012). There are two 
logics of how party competition contributes to democratic legitimacy of a majoritarian 
system. Under the pressure of competition, parties need to constantly readjust their policy 
programmes to the citizens’ interests and remain reliable and responsive (Downs 1957, 
Budge 1994). For economic theories of democracy this is the main legitimating function. 
Approaches incorporating deliberative elements of democratic theory, point to a second 
logic. Here, party competition serves to spark public debates. One key strategy for 
opposition parties is to publicly voice criticism of the government and present their own 
positions on current policy issues to win votes in the next election. Public deliberation 
influences the formation of preferences of the citizens (see Føllesdal and Hix 2006). 
Following theories of deliberative democracy the representation of minority views in public 
debate is crucial for the acceptance of a policy decision (and in the long run, of the polity) 
for the ones outvoted (see (Eriksen and Fossum 2000). While the model will never be 
applicable as such to the EU where citizens are very heterogeneous, an assessment of this 
form of democracy may help to point out weak spots in the current system. 
One criticism from majoritarian logic regards the electoral system of the EU: The impact on 
the party political composition of the EU executive is close to inexistent. First, the Council 
is determined by national elections and does not give voters much influence on the overall 
political direction of this body. Second, the link of the European Parliament’s seat share to 
the political affiliation of the Commission cabinet is weak. Even after introduction of the 
“Spitzenkandidaten” procedure, negotiations among the heads of state or government in the 
European Council co-determine the choice of candidates for Commission posts (Höing and 
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Müller Goméz 2014). In a nutshell, the votes have only limited impact on the formation – 
and alternation – of government. 
A main point of critique of the EU political system from a majoritarian perspective is what 
Vivienne Schmidt termed “policy without politics” (Schmidt 2006). This school of thought 
argues that EU issues are often dealt with in technical terms or behind closed doors. This 
de-politicization of decision-making at EU level causes a fundamental lack of public debate 
and political competition about the content and direction of EU policies. Føllesdal and Hix 
(2006) see the key problem of EU democratic legitimacy in a lack of political contestation 
of rival candidates in elections who would present credible policy alternatives. 
Politicization means that policy issues become salient in the public sphere and are contested 
among the political parties or in public debates (de Wilde 2011). Thus, voters gain 
awareness of the issue at stake and understand their choice among policy alternatives.  
Mair (2007) argues that de-politicization is furthermore a result of political parties 
addressing the wrong electoral arena. Despite the fact that the transfer of competence to the 
EU is exclusively determined by national governments and parliaments, the national 
electoral campaigns do not address EU integration (Mair 2007, Senninger and Wagner 
2015). Questions of “more or less Europe” are instead discussed in election campaigns to 
the European Parliament, which does not hold any competences on the design of the polity. 
The elections to the European Parliament are of “second order” nature because national 
topics dominate the campaigns (Reif and Schmitt 1980). As a consequence of the confusion 
of the two electoral arenas, the vote and seat share of the European Parliament does not 
necessarily represent the policy positions of the electorate towards EU policymaking. And 
it is assumed that national parliaments do not sufficiently represent citizens’ views on EU 
integration.  
In a similar vein, Hooghe and Marks (2009) see mainstream parties as the agents who de-
politicize EU policymaking. They argue that mainstream parties keep Europe off the 
political agenda due to a mismatch of traditional cleavage structures with party positions on 
EU integration. The authors demonstrate how the party positions on support or criticism of 
EU integration run counter to the left-right cleavage in politics. Thus, mainstream parties 
risk internal divide when debating EU issues. Moreover, parties often are more favourable 
of EU integration than the electorate (“citizen-elite-gap”) (Hooghe 2003). Both 
discrepancies are avoided, if EU decision-making is kept off the agenda. From the 
perspective of majoritarian democratic theory, the depoliticized nature of the EU decision-
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making process causes the democratic deficit. The communicative function of parliaments 
matters most to address this legitimacy deficit.  
This study tests Mair’s (2007) argument that political actors keep EU issues off the agenda. 
Parliaments are the official forum for political debate at elite level. The governing parties 
may exercise important control functions over the executive, but avoid public conflict with 
the own party leadership in government. In so far, this study considers opposition as the 
driving force for critical debate on EU issues: What explains the extent of competition by 
national opposition parties? Under what circumstances does opposition attack governing 
parties on issues of EU integration and EU policymaking? Research has investigated the 
presence of EU issues at national election campaigns (de Vries 2007, Senninger and 
Wagner 2015). This study asks about the time in-between elections.  
1.1.4. Summary 
This Chapter 1.1 developed an analytical framework for EU legitimacy and reviewed the 
literature in view of two lines of discussion of the EU democratic deficit: on input versus 
output legitimacy as well as a consensus versus majoritarian approach. Researching 
opposition in national parliaments can contribute to both debates. In view of EU democracy 
as “chain of delegation”, it is debated whether parliaments at national level exercise 
effective oversight. To better understand the role of national parliaments in the EU, the 
empirical analysis of this study should show in how far domestic legislatures are involved 
in EU affairs. Some form of involvement is precondition for any contribution to EU 
legitimacy through input. However, it remains debatable what kind of EU scrutiny 
parliaments and opposition should exercise. This chapter considered the two approaches of 
consensus versus majoritarian democracy. 
In the perspective of consensus democracy, multiple veto players are valued positively as 
they contribute to legitimacy in form of inclusion. From perspective of majoritarian 
democracy, the main deficit of the EU is the lack of public political competition and 
politicization of the decision-making process. A choice for the electorate requires 
contention among political elite and a public debate of alternatives. This study takes this 
approach as a starting point for an investigation of opposition parties’ EU scrutiny activities 
in national parliaments. 
Opposition party groups are the “natural agent” to politicize EU issues within the domestic 
arena. The logic of party competition should incentivize them to actively challenge the 
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government and provide alternative policy solutions to the electorate on EU affairs. Control 
of the governing majority within parliament will mostly take place behind closed doors, as 
the governing party needs to present a coherent position towards their voters. Opposition 
parties are therefore the most likely actors to enhance EU legitimacy in the most urgent 
form of politicization. 
1.2.  State of the art: National parliaments and the EU 
This thesis sets out to understand the role of national parliaments in the EU by focussing on 
opposition parties’ EU scrutiny activities. This Chapter 1.2 gives an overview of the 
developments in researching national parliaments and the EU to explain this focus.12  
National parliaments role in the EU gained attention in the 1990s with the new 
competences and revised EU decision-making modes introduced by the Maastricht Treaty. 
National parliaments were considered the “losers” (Maurer and Wessels 2001) of the EU 
integration process. Competences delegated to EU level are removed from the legislative 
power of national parliaments in the sense of a zero-sum game between the national and the 
EU level. Whereas governments maintain control through their (quasi-)veto position in the 
Council,13 parliaments do not participate directly in EU decision-making. Some authors 
argue that this loss of influence can be compensated by early information on upcoming EU 
legislation and by ex-ante scrutiny rights prior to Council negotiations (see Auel and Benz 
2005). Up until today research is divided on whether we witness a de- or re-
parliamentarisation of EU affairs (Norton 1996, Hix and Raunio 2000, Maurer and Wessels 
2001, Auel and Benz 2005, O'Brennan and Raunio 2007). 
Over time national parliaments have developed different channels of influence on EU 
affairs accompanying the continuing EU integration. Research on domestic parliaments has 
become more specialized mirroring this real world development. National parliaments’ 
tasks have been differentiated by political system shaping or day-to-day policymaking. In 
the following I will assess research on each channel of parliamentary influence.  
First, the legislative control functions of national parliaments are reviewed. Active and 
effective parliamentary control over EU policymaking could address the EU democratic 
                                                 
12 For complementary overviews of the literature: Goetz and Meyer-Sahling (2008), Raunio (2009) and 
Winzen (2010), Rozenberg and Hefftler (2015). 
13 Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace (2006: ) have shown that the Council decides in most cases unanimously, 
even when policy areas fall under the decision-making mode of qualified majority vote.  
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deficit in terms of better inter-institutional checks (see Section 1.1.3). Studies on this 
dimension ask how well parliaments are informed and how strong they are vis-à-vis their 
government. Second, the literature review addresses the communicative function of 
national parliaments on EU issues. With public debate of EU affairs, domestic parliaments 
could reduce the EU democratic deficit through politicization (see Section 1.1.3). Research 
investigates the salience and polarization of EU issues in plenary debates.  
While research of national parliaments has been focused on institutional adaptations, some 
recent studies started to investigate the political dynamic driving the use of EU scrutiny 
instruments (Raunio 2009, Auel et al. 2015a, b, Finke and Dannwolf 2013). For each 
channel of influence I assess the explanatory factors towards the political motivation to use 
the parliamentary instruments and I assess studies accounting for the government-
opposition logic therein.  
The focus of this study and in this literature review is the role of opposition parties. 
Research on national parliaments addressed the direct access to EU level through the “Early 
Warning System” and inter-parliamentary cooperation that the Lisbon Treaty 
strengthened.14 This study does not investigate these channels of influence, as they are not 
relevant for the competition between governing and opposition parties. The Early Warning 
System is not available to opposition, as issuing reasoned opinions requires majority vote. 
The descriptive analysis of oppositions’ EU scrutiny activities in Chapter 4.2 demonstrates 
that opposition parties do not use this channel of influence to compete with the government. 
Inter-parliamentary cooperation has been argued to be of special relevance for opposition 
party groups (Miklin 2013). Empirical analysis of participation and motivation for 
opposition MPs does not show a strategic approach of opposition towards inter-
parliamentary cooperation (Hefftler 2015). There is limited variation between opposition 
party groups, why this channel of influence cannot be analysed within this research design.  
This study does not investigate the relationship between parties in minorities and the 
constitutional courts either. Some countries provide the opportunity of reviewing the 
constitutionality of EU treaty making. In the period of investigation, the reform of the Art. 
136 TFEU that enabled to install the ESM triggered appeals to constitutional courts in 
                                                 
14 In 2006, Barroso initiated the political dialogue between the Commission and national parliaments. In 
informal statements (opinions) parliaments can formulate their position. This channel remains without any 
formal influence. Parliaments see this contact to the Commission rather critical as replies come in late and an 
impact of the parliamentary opinions is questionable (COSAC reports). Research on the political dialogue is 
limited and not covered in this literature review. 
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several countries. The dynamic on the interplay of parliament, executive and constitutional 
courts during the Euro crisis has been investigate comprehensively in prior studies (see for 
example Höing 2015). This study is focuses on the opposition party activities within 
parliamentary procedures. 
 
1.2.1. Legislative scrutiny of EU affairs 
Research on the legislative control over EU affairs has started out by studying the 
institutional adaptations of parliaments to control EU decision-making. How did national 
parliaments react to the challenges of EU scrutiny and how much influence can they exert 
in this multilevel setting? Three elements of parliamentary institutional structures are 
deemed relevant for a good disposition to scrutinize EU affairs: information access, the 
ability to write resolutions or mandates and the committee structure (see for example 
Bergman 1997, Winzen 2013).  
The first element, information access, is the precondition for any meaningful parliamentary 
control. Studies that have applied the principal agent approach to the relation between 
parliament (as principal) and government (as agent) emphasize the problem of information 
asymmetry between the two actors (Bergman 2000, Auel 2007, Sprungk 2010). One 
innovation of the Lisbon Treaty was that the EU Commission forwards legislative 
proposals, Green and White books to national parliaments directly (Art. 12 (a) TEU). It has 
alleviated the information asymmetry between government and parliament to a certain 
extent. However, only the government can inform on the member states’ position on an EU 
proposal. Sprungk (2010) argues that in EU affairs both, government and opposition 
parties, have to rely more on the information from third parties to stay in control over the 
own government’s activities behind the closed doors of the Council. Still, formal 
information rights are of special relevance for the opposition in parliament (Powell 2000). 
The majority parties will most likely receive some relevant information from the 
government through the party channel. The opposition does not have this form of access to 
the governmental branch.  
In regard of the second element of institutional capacity, all parliaments in the EU possess 
the right to formulate resolutions expressing the parliamentary position on an upcoming EU 
decision (Bergman 1997). Yet, they vary significantly in the degree of authoritative power 
over the national position. Resolutions can have either judiciary power or are politically 
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(that is, informally) binding. Some parliaments, as Austria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Rumania, Slovenia, Slovakia and Sweden hold the right to issue 
mandates on the government position in Council negotiations (see Hefftler et al. 2015). 
Mandates are often considered a very powerful tool for national parliaments control over 
EU issues (Bergman 1997, Maurer 2002, Winzen 2013). However, this instrument lies in 
the hands of the majority parties. Resolutions and mandates are usually decided upon by 
simple majority in parliament. This may explain why resolutions and mandates are rare 
under single party or coalition governments and, if issued, often rather supportive of the 
government position or general in nature (see Miklin 2015: 395).15 Pollak and Slominski 
(2009: 195) point to the intrinsic difficulty of mandates at the example of Austria. As 
parliament does not participate in the negotiations directly and might not have enough 
information on the “win-set” in the EU process, a very specific mandate can produce a 
negative outcome for the member state. 
The third element of institutional capacity is the internal processing of EU affairs. Elected 
officials in parliaments face the challenge to stay informed on an ever more complex 
globalized and technically advanced environment. Parliaments have built own 
administrative structures that provide expertise and developed committee systems where 
MPs hold expert knowledge on a certain policy field. Most parliaments acknowledge the 
complexity of EU decision-making by employing a higher number of staff to support the 
European Affairs Committee than for other specialized committees (Högenauer and 
Christiansen 2015: 128). From a normative point of view, it can be seen critical that these 
supporting administrators are entrusted with some politically sensitive tasks when 
parliaments gain more responsibilities in EU affairs (Högenauer and Neuhold 2015). For 
example, most parliamentary administrations pre-select incoming EU documents for 
committee debate and gain significant agenda-setting influence. 
An important part of legislative work takes place at committee level. It is often the place 
where motions, resolutions or mandates are formulated which will be a matter of vote in the 
plenary. All parliaments have established committees specialized on EU affairs by the 
1990s (see Bergman 1997).16 The advantage of the European Affairs Committees (EAC) is, 
that its members possess the knowledge on the complex proceedings of EU decision-
                                                 
15 Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden are often governed by minority governments. Under this 
circumstance mandates represent a regular tool of EU scrutiny (see Auel et al. 2015: 81). 
16 Member states that accessed the EU usually installed committees that scrutinized the accession process and 
would turn into full EU affairs committees thereafter.  
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making. In the past years, some parliaments have however opted to “mainstreaming” 
(Gattermann et al. 2015) EU affairs to all specialized committees. The other specialized 
committees might lack the EU background, but are better able to estimate the impact of EU 
legislation on the respective policy area in the context of existing and upcoming domestic 
policies. 
A number of cross-country comparisons engaged in ranking and explaining the institutional 
strength on all three dimensions of information access, resolutions or mandates and internal 
processing of EU affairs (Bergman 1997, 2000, Raunio 2005, Saalfeld 2005, Karlas 2011, 
Winzen 2013). Though these comparative analyses vary in territorial scope and time period, 
results converge on the relevance of domestic institutional strength as main explanatory 
factor. The stronger the position of parliament in the national political system, the better a 
legislature is equipped for EU scrutiny.17 The relevance of public and party Euro-scepticism 
on parliaments’ EU institutional capacity has been more controversial (Raunio 2005, Karlas 
2011).  
A more recent comparative analysis faced the challenge of integrating the active use of 
scrutiny instruments in EU-wide cross-country comparison. Auel et al. (2015a) collected 
data on the frequency of resolutions or motions, committee meetings, plenary debates and 
(reasoned) opinions. The institutional prerogatives on EU affairs turn out to be the strongest 
predictor for a frequent use of resolutions or mandates, longer plenary debates on EU 
affairs and EAC meetings.18 Interestingly, only for salience of EU issues in plenary time, 
did the presence of Euro-sceptic parties and the involvement in the EMU matter (Auel et al. 
2015b: 296). Other political factors, as government-opposition dissent and public Euro-
scepticism, do not show an effect on legislative work or plenary time.  
The pan-European comparative analyses of institutional prerogatives on EU affairs and 
their use have made an important contribution in explaining variation among national 
parliaments. First, they have shown that there are strong asymmetries in the parliamentary 
EU scrutiny at domestic level. This incoherence puts in question whether domestic 
legislatures can in fact “substitute” the European Parliament. Speaking of one EU 
                                                 
17 Focussing on crisis related activities, Auel and Höing (2015) also find support for the relevance of 
institutional prerogatives. Two recent contributions have used the method of Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis (QCA) to explain the institutional prerogatives towards the crisis mechanisms (especially the ESM). 
In line with the studies on overall EU institutional prerogatives, they find that prior EU-related institutional 
strength is the strongest explanatory factor for strong control rights on the ESM (Rittberger and Winzen 2016, 
Höing 2015a). 
18 This finding justifies the intense study of institutional capacity of national parliaments. 
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democratic deficit possibly overestimates the coherence of this polity, much more we can 
see many different national EU-related democratic deficits. Second, the quantitative 
analysis of scrutiny activities demonstrates the path-dependence for strong (or weak) 
parliaments, as prior institutional prerogatives were the best explanatory factor in all 
analyses. However, the study on parliamentary practice covering a large scope of up to 28 
countries necessarily remains superficial. The aggregate number of activities does not 
consider content or quality of individual contributions. In so far, it does not inform much on 
the impact on EU policy, the level of contestation or the degree of control over the own 
government. This might be the reason why most of the political factors taken into account, 
such as government-opposition dissent as well as public and party Euro-scepticism showed 
no or very limited effect (Auel et al. 2015b: 296).  
A few studies have addressed the government-opposition logic for EU scrutiny in more 
detail.19 Auel and Benz (2005) theorize the different roles of majority and opposition in 
parliaments for the realm of EU affairs. They argue that both are in a dilemma of the need 
for additional scrutiny (as EU negotiations are more remote) and the loyalty to the own 
government (for the majority) or the danger to undermine national interests (for the 
opposition). Holzhacker (2002, 2005) studies the scope of influence of opposition parties 
on EU affairs in Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK. He shows that the type 
of government (minority, coalition or single party majority) is crucial for the strength of 
opposition parties in EU affairs. Finke and Dannwolf (2013) explain the initiation of EU 
scrutiny at committee level in the Czech and German parliaments in the EU multilevel 
setting. They show that opposition MPs initiate scrutiny more frequently, if their 
counterpart in the European Parliament is strong.20 In an extension of this approach on eight 
parliaments, Finke and Herbel (2015) found that scrutiny at committee level is initiated 
more frequently, if the positional distance is larger between governing and opposition 
parties; especially in the case of a weak government.21  
These findings point to the relevance of the political dynamic in scrutiny of EU affairs and 
that it is worth further investigation. More in-depth small-n studies can help refine existing 
hypotheses and generating new insights. These can account for the quality of parliamentary 
                                                 
19 This literature review deliberately ignored legal approaches, monographs and the grey literature. For 
collections of monographs see Barrett (2008), Maurer and Wessels (2001), Norton (1996), O’Brennan and 
Raunio (2007), Tans et al. (2007).  
20 Inversely, Proksch (2010) shows that MEPs direct more questions to the Commission, if their domestic 
party holds opposition status.  
21 The study covered Finland, Slovakia, Ireland, Germany, Poland, Italy, the UK and France for the time 
period of 2000 to 2013. 
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scrutiny activities and for better understanding of the political dynamic behind the scrutiny 
activity. This study investigates EU scrutiny of opposition parties at committee and plenary 
level. Beyond the mere frequency of scrutiny activities, it accounts for the policy topics 
addressed as well as the degree of contestation to better understand the intensity of political 
conflict around EU issues. Domestic matters are included in the empirical analysis as they 
serve as a reference frame for the intensity of EU scrutiny. 
1.2.2. Debating EU affairs in national parliaments 
A recent strand of research on parliaments in the EU argues that the communicative 
function forms an important, but understudied, contribution to EU legitimacy (Auel and 
Raunio 2014b). Public debates are a forum for majority parties to explain and defend their 
parties’ approach and an opportunity for the opposition to voice their criticism and to point 
to alternative solutions. The debates have an important function in justifying the policy 
decisions and to make the allocation of responsibilities transparent for the electorate (see 
Closa and Maatsch 2014: 830). The presence of EU issues in domestic plenary debates has 
been investigated in terms of their salience and their polarization. In this branch of research 
on national parliaments, the party political dynamics are prominent explanatory factors. 
One assumption relevant for this study is the role of Euro-sceptic challenger parties for 
political contestation. Studies on polarization often account for the classic government-
opposition divide on the left-right dimension of political conflict and the division between 
mainstream and challenger parties from the political extremes. 
Research on parliamentary communication has investigated the salience of EU issues in 
plenary debates studying selected countries (Auel and Raunio 2014a, Auel 2015, Rauh 
2015). Auel and Raunio (2014a) have analysed how much time MPs devote to EU-related 
plenary debates in Germany, Finland, the UK and France from 2002 to 2010. They do not 
find support for the expectation on more EU salience for parliaments with a Euro-sceptic 
party. Much more the German Bundestag, where party groups hold a pro-European 
consensus, devotes most plenary time (as share of total debating time) to EU issues. 
However comparing seven countries, Auel (2015) shows that Austria – who has a strong 
Euro-sceptic challenger in parliament – debates EU issues to the same extent as Germany 
and Finland.22 Rauh (2015) studies the presence of EU references in statements by MPs 
                                                 
22 The Bundestag nevertheless spends twice as many hours in absolute terms debating EU issues than the 
Nationalrat (Auel 2015: 3–4). The share of EU issues of total plenary time ranges range around 12 to 14 per 
cent both countries. 
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within the German Bundestag from 1991 to 2013 using automated content analysis. In this 
longitudinal analysis he shows that EU-related statements in the plenary increase with 
every treaty revision and increased use of authority (number of directives) by EU 
institutions. On the party group level, the results point to stronger involvement of governing 
parties. Surprisingly, none of the indicators that identify Euro-sceptic challenger parties 
(small constituency and higher number of EU references in election manifestos) show 
significant results. However, the German parliament to date does not have a truly extreme 
EU-sceptic challenger party as other European countries do. In terms of salience, 
institutional factors show an effect in comparative analyses. The current state of research 
does not deliver positive results on an effect of challenger parties on more plenary time of 
EU issues. If the quantitative scope is not clearly influenced by these party dynamics, it 
might however show in the quality of debate on EU issues. 
In the EU democratic deficit debate publications stress the relevance of politicization of EU 
issues (see above Section 1.1.3). A few studies have investigated the political contestation 
of EU issues in plenary debates to understand national parliaments’ contribution to 
informing the citizens on alternative policy solutions (Closa and Maatsch 2014, Maatsch 
2014, Miklin 2014b, Wendler 2014, Wonka 2016). In debates on treaty revision, Wendler 
(2014) finds a stronger contestation on the left-right axis and between government and 
opposition parties than for mainstream versus challenger parties. In the four countries under 
investigation (Austria, France, Germany and the UK) in the period from 2005 to 2009, the 
traditional logic of political conflict prevails over the “new” dimension of mainstream 
versus extreme – often Euro-sceptic – parties. Other studies on politicization in plenary 
debates concentrate on crisis mechanisms.23 
Closa and Maatsch (2014) investigate the support of the European Financial Stability 
Facility (EFSF) in eleven countries. Contrary to Wendler’s findings on treaty revision 
debates the strongest conflict is , here, between Euro-sceptic parties versus the mainstream. 
For the installation of the EFSF mainstream opposition parties supported the government 
parties, why the government-opposition divide is blurred. The left-right dimension has 
some relevance, yet is not predominant. This finding is supported by Puntscher Riekmann 
and Wydra’s (2013) argument on a “European rescue discourse”: For Austria, Germany and 
                                                 
23 Wendler (2014) also finds interesting differences in the types of argumentation. Governing parties justify 
their EU activities by arguments on efficiency and economic benefit. Mainstream opposition mainly addresses 
socio-economic aspects of classic left-right dimension. Challengers attack the mainstream’s ideas on EU 
legitimacy. 
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Italy the authors show that mainstream parties strongly linked saving the Euro to the rescue 
of EU integration as a whole in the period form 2010 to 2012. Only exceptions were the 
parties on the fringes of the political spectrum (the German Left party, the Austrian FPÖ 
and BZÖ and the Italian Lega Nord). Miklin (2014) focuses on debates in Austria and 
Germany in reviewing existing studies to point out the relevance of a EU-sceptic challenger 
party in parliament. Whereas German plenary debates on the crisis allow for contestation 
on the left-right dimension,24 Austrian mainstream parties do not differ in their justification 
of crisis measures. According to Miklin (2014) the lack of left-right contestation results 
from the dominance of the pro-anti EU conflict in the Austrian parliament why mainstream 
parties together defend the EU project against the challenger.  
In sum, the salience of EU affairs does not differ between Austria and Germany (Auel 
2015), but the quality of debates seems to change drastically under presence of extreme, EU 
sceptic party groups. In contrast to research on the legislative control of national 
parliaments, the investigations on the communicative function accounts much more for the 
political dynamic. Yet, in debates on treaty reform the traditional conflict lines prevailed, 
while the main conflict lines in debates on the Euro crisis is between the mainstream and 
EU-sceptic challengers. Is this a result of the time frame, country specific or were the crisis 
debates unique? Future research should extent the scope of studying communicative action 
by national parliaments. 
This study intends to investigate the driving factors for opposition parties’ communicative 
competition. In this it contributes to a better understanding of the impact of the 
government-opposition logic on EU scrutiny. It compares the level of contestation in 
plenary debates in Austria and Germany. It thereby addresses the still unclear issue of 
different lines of political conflict in the two chambers to better understand whether a 
utilitarian or value dimension of conflict predominates.  
1.2.3. Summary 
This Chapter 1.2 reviewed research on national parliaments and opposition parties towards 
the EU in their functions of legislative control (1.2.1) and communication of EU affairs 
(1.2.2). Research on national parliaments and the EU faces two central demands: First, 
future research should go beyond institutional analysis and integrate the study of 
                                                 
24 Wonka’s (2016) study of German plenary debates supports this argument. Overall, German opposition 
parties were more critical of austerity measures than the governing parties. The more ideologically distant the 
stronger was the critique. 
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parliamentary activities (Raunio 2009, Rozenberg and Hefftler 2015). Second, Auel (2007) 
and Sprungk (2010) demand that research “opens the black box” of parliaments to 
understand the political dynamics behind the use of the channels of influence. While the 
institutional capacity of national parliaments is well explained, we still lack an 
understanding of the motivation of party groups to use these structures (see Raunio 2009, 
Rozenberg and Hefftler 2015: 26–27).  
While large-n quantitative analysis does not support the relevance of political motivation 
for scrutiny activities (Auel et al. 2015b), more specified studies show an impact of 
political competition on EU scrutiny. In view of the government-opposition logic, recent 
contributions show how conflict between these actors affects the legislative EU scrutiny 
and the communicative channel. Finke and Dannwolf (2013) demonstrate that positional 
distance of opposition parties from the government makes the initiation of scrutiny in 
committees more likely. In studies on plenary debates, polarization occurs along the 
traditional left-right (government-opposition) cleavage in treaty debates (Wendler 2014) 
and among pro-/anti-EU (mainstream-challenger) dimension for the crisis related debates 
(Closa and Maatsch 2014, Wonka 2016). The positional distance is reflected in the 
difference between “classic” opposition and new challenger parties on the fringes of the 
political spectrum. Thus, for both, legislative scrutiny and debating activities, the 
consensual or conflicting party positions play a role. While these first studies on parties’ 
motivation for EU scrutiny indicate the relevance of the topic, there remain many open 
questions.  
1.3. Approach of this thesis 
This Section 1.3 outlines the approach of this study and links it to the state of the art. This 
thesis contributes to a better understanding of national parliaments’ role in the EU political 
system. The goal is to explain national parliaments’ EU scrutiny activities by 
conceptualizing opposition party groups’ motivation. The study addresses two demands 
towards researching national parliaments and the EU. It goes beyond a merely institutional 
analysis and investigates the use of formal opportunity structures. And it “opens the black 
box” of parliament and analyses the political dynamics within the institution.  
One option to study party politics in parliament would be to analyse the intra-party mode of 
the majority party that refers to the conflict between backbenchers and party leadership in 
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government (see King 1976). Majority MPs are in a strong position to scrutinize their 
ministers’ activity in the Council in parliament, as they can threaten to withdraw their 
power of the vote. Some studies were able to show that parliamentary scrutiny instruments 
are used to control ministerial drift (Finke and Dannwolf 2013, Miklin 2014a, Finke and 
Herbel 2015). However, intra-party control takes place behind closed doors. Parties are 
careful not to display internal conflict to the public. Public contestation is much more likely 
to stem from the opposition who often publicly attack government’s policy proposals and 
argue for their alternative solutions. One strand of the democratic deficit debate argued that 
the public debate and elite contestation matters for more legitimate EU decision-making 
(see 1.1.3). The inter-party mode between government and opposition is largely 
understudied in relation to EU affairs (Holzhacker 2002, 2005, Finke and Dannwolf 2013). 
It remains an open question for what reasons and which type of opposition party groups 
become involved in EU affairs. In view of this research lacuna, this thesis poses the 
following research question: 
Which factors explain opposition parties’ EU scrutiny activities within the national 
parliamentary arena? 
To answer this question I integrate theoretical approaches from party and opposition 
research to the realm of EU studies. Similar to legislative studies, research on opposition 
parties has long focused on institutional conditions. Only some recent approaches assess 
political factors driving opposition activity (Kaiser 2008, Steinack 2011, de Giorgi 2015, 
Moury and de Giorgi 2015). With the topic of opposition party activities towards EU 
affairs, this study enters uncharted territory. The research design therefore follows the logic 
of an explorative study. Focussing on two hypotheses, it employs an x-centred research 
design. The results of the empirical analysis are intended to lead to a refinement of the 
hypotheses (Levy 2008). The deductive and focused approach promises the best gain in 
knowledge. Though parliamentary opposition on EU affairs has not been addressed 
specifically, there is a range of theoretical approaches available that can be adapted to this 
specific topic. The topic could be addressed from a social constructivist perspective asking 
about MPs roles, norms and values, the social background of parties or political culture 
(Steinack 2011). Researching parliamentary opposition could set a focus on re-election by 
analysing the influence of public opinion or the salience of certain EU issues. Structural 
factors, as the party system, prior coalition arrangements and the type of government could 
serve as explanatory factors.  
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This study chooses the ontological background of rational choice institutionalism. The 
simple assumptions of rational choice provide a clear structure for a first investigation of 
opposition parties’ EU scrutiny activities. The institutional structures of formal and 
informal rules matter, but are simply conceptualized as the rules of the game. Actors’ 
motivation is determined by self-interest maximization. Utility maximization is defined as 
the goals of office- and policy-seeking as driver for party groups’ activities (Müller and 
Strøm 1999). With focus on opposition party groups, the goals of office and policy can be 
achieved by two key strategies: cooperation or competition (Steinack 2011, Moury and de 
Giorgi 2015). The dependent variable of this study is opposition parties’ parliamentary 
activities that are allocated to one of the two strategies of cooperation or competition. The 
strategies differ in how they contribute to EU legitimacy: cooperation increases the 
inclusion of societal actors on the input side, while competition contributes to the 
politicization of EU issues. 
The theoretical part develops two hypotheses on the causal link between the motivation of 
party groups and competitive or cooperative scrutiny activity. The first assumption is 
derived from Sartori’s (2005) definition of blackmail potential of parties and the 
differentiation of anti-establishment and mainstream parties (Abedi 2002). A party with an 
anti-establishment stance is expected to act more competitive towards the governing 
parties. The second hypothesis follows Blondel’s (1997) argument on positional distance 
for the likeliness for cooperation among parties. Opposition parties, whose party positions 
are more distant to the governing parties, should be more competitive. This should hold true 
for the traditional left-right as well as the cultural dimension of political conflict 
(traditional-authoritarian-nationalist versus green-alternative-libertarian; TAN-GAL). With 
inclusion of the party type and the two dimensions of political conflict, the study is 
sensitive to a potential difference between content-related and principled opposition 
(Sartori 1966). This differentiation does not only play a prominent role in classic 
contributions to opposition research, but also in recent studies on communicative activities 
in national parliaments (Closa and Maatsch 2014, Miklin 2014a, Wendler 2014). It 
therefore addresses the current problem of increasingly prominent Euro-sceptic and 
populist or anti-elite parties. 
The empirical analysis employs a case study approach. For a first test and refinement of the 
theory-guided hypotheses, selected case studies deem most appropriate (Levy 2008). The 
limited scope allows a more in-depth analysis that is better able to identify potential causal 
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mechanisms. Research objects are opposition parties of Austria and Germany in the 
legislative period after the enforcement of the Lisbon treaty (2008/9 to 2013). The case 
selection thereby holds institutional factors largely constant and provides sufficient 
variation on the independent variables. Whereas the party system of Austria is characterized 
by the presence of a strong Euro-sceptic anti-establishment party (the FPÖ and BZÖ), there 
is not a counter-part to this party present in the Bundestag during the period of 
investigation.  
With this focus on party political motivation for parliamentary scrutiny, this study advances 
the state of the art in two aspects. First, it addresses the demand to go beyond institutional 
analysis and investigate the actual practice of parliamentary scrutiny. To do so, it opens the 
“black box “of parliament as institution and investigates the motivation of different groups 
of actors within a chamber. It integrates research on party groups’ motivation and on 
opposition parties into the realm of EU studies. It develops theory-guided hypotheses on the 
strategies of different types of opposition parties on EU issues. Especially, studies on the 
communicative dimension have shown the relevance of mainstream versus challenger 
opposition parties. How can we better explain what type of conflict opens up through what 
type of scrutiny instrument? 
This leads to the second main contribution of this study to research on parliaments and the 
EU. The work of MPs is twofold. On the one hand, policy decisions are hammered out 
behind closed doors and legislative scrutiny proceeds at committee level. On the other 
hand, the final positions have to be justified in public debate. Research on national 
parliaments and the EU has so far treated the different channels of influence separately 
from each other. As different studies treat various countries and time periods and use 
differing methods, it is difficult to relate the results to each other. Is it the same party 
groups that emphasize legislative control that criticize EU issues in plenary debates? Are 
MPs from opposition party groups apt to address EU issues in committee work? This study 
encompasses both dimensions of legislative scrutiny and public justification thereof. In the 
discussion of the results it links the findings of all types of activity. 
With the theory-guided and integrated approach on different channels of parliamentary 
influence and the in-depth empirical study of opposition’s motivation for EU scrutiny, this 
study can contribute to a better understanding of national parliaments’ role for the 
legitimacy of EU decision-making. The following section explains the structure of this 
thesis. 
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1.4. Structure of this thesis  
To answer its research question on opposition behaviour in EU scrutiny, the study proceeds 
in the following steps.  
This introduction has located national parliaments’ potential contribution to legitimacy in 
the complex system of EU decision-making. It reviewed the EU democratic deficit debate 
in order to argue for the relevance for studying opposition parties in domestic parliaments.  
The following Chapter 2 of this work develops the theoretical approach. Rational choice 
institutionalism forms the ontological background of the study. The theoretical part 
integrates findings from research on opposition parties to the realm of EU studies. It argues 
that opposition – as reactionary force vis-à-vis the government – can employ a competitive 
or cooperative strategy. The chapter develops two key hypotheses that intend to account for 
the differences among opposition parties. The party type of anti-establishment parties and 
an increased positional distance between government and opposition are expected to lead to 
more competitive EU scrutiny behaviour. While the distance on the left-right dimension 
should matter, even more so should the pro-anti EU cleavage lead to a conflictive approach 
on EU scrutiny.  
Chapter 3 argues the case selection and explains the methods of the empirical analysis. 
Austria and Germany are chosen according to the logic of a most-similar system design. 
Though different in size, the two member states share many institutional factors. The party 
groups, however, differ significantly on the two independent variables (party type and 
positional distance).  
Chapters 4 and 5 present the findings of the empirical analysis. The first chapter of the 
results section presents the findings on the committee work (Chapter 4). It explains the 
frequency and quality of motions and voting behaviour of all opposition party groups in the 
two parliaments. Chapter 5 investigates the degree of political conflict in plenary debates. It 
uses a framing analysis and a measure for anti-elitism to understand competition from 
opposition parties in the debates. 
Chapter 6 summarizes the findings from the two empirical chapters and links them back to 




2. Theorizing domestic opposition to EU affairs  
 
Opposition is an important element of a functioning democracy (Dahl 1971). It is vital to 
voice critique, control the government and propose alternative policies (Helms 2002: 24). 
Political science has discussed the “waning of opposition” since the 1960s (Kirchheimer 
1957). Formal democratic institutions become hollow without a choice of different policy 
programmes at election times. Party programmes of so called “catch-all” (Kirchheimer 
1966) or “cartel parties” (Katz and Mair 2009) converge towards the median voter so that 
they offer rather similar party programmes to the electorate. One reason is seen in EU 
integration that forces national governments towards convergence across borders. Once 
competences have been delegated to the EU level, it is difficult to reverse this development. 
The four freedoms of the internal market, four example, have become quasi-
constitutionalized and are removed from political competition. A new government cannot 
fundamentally change course after taking over office (Neunreither 1998, Mair 2007).25 This 
reduced scope of policy alternatives affects the role of national parliaments in the EU 
member states. Policy areas under EU competence are removed from national parliaments’ 
direct influence. National parliaments have therefore been termed the “losers” of EU 
integration (Norton 1996, Maurer and Wessels 2001, Weiler et al. 2007). Other authors 
argue that legislatures “fight back” through active scrutiny ex-ante to decision-making at 
EU level (Auel et al. 2015a). 
This thesis contributes to the literature on the role of national parliaments and their 
opposition parties in EU democracy. It is interested in the political dynamics that inspire 
active parliamentary control over EU issues. The study investigates in how far domestic 
parliamentary opposition challenges the government on its EU-related activities. The study 
aims at answering the research question: Which party political factors explain opposition 
party groups’ EU scrutiny activities in national parliaments? With the empirical analysis of 
opposition activities on EU affairs, it tests the assumptions on “de-parliamentarization” and 
“the waning of opposition”. Both have been convincingly argued from a theoretical 
standpoint, but experienced limited empirical testing (Raunio 2009, Andeweg 2013, Auel et 
al. 2015a, Loxbo and Sjölin 2016).  
                                                 
25 “Brexit” demonstrates the difficulties of reversing the integration of a member state into the EU. 
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This Chapter 2 develops the conceptual approach on domestic parliamentary opposition to 
EU affairs. The focus is on the scope of activities within the formal institution of 
legislature. Thus, it excludes opposition parties’ activities outside of parliament and other 
oppositional actors such as protest movements from analysis.26 The study follows the logic 
of legislative research that considers party strategies within the legislature to explain 
parliamentary scrutiny (Martin and Vanberg 2004, Finke and Dannwolf 2013, Finke and 
Herbel 2015). Studies on domestic parliamentary opposition on EU affairs are limited and 
addressed institutional aspects only (Holzhacker 2002, Holzhacker 2005). To develop a 
model on domestic opposition on EU affairs, this thesis turns to research on opposition 
parties with an actor-centred perspective.  
Early studies on the role of opposition date back to the 1960s (Dahl 1965, Sartori 1966, 
Ionescu and Madariaga 1968, Steffani 1968). The research field is still criticized by a lack 
of a coherent theory of opposition that would explain the types and nature of opposition 
across political systems around the world (Blondel 1997, Helms 2008b, Brack and 
Weinblum 2011). The most important comparative studies date back to the 1970s to 1990 
(Schapiro 1972, Dahl 1973, Norton 1990). Studies on opposition parties have explored the 
impact of institutional factors on the room of manoeuvre (Dahl 1966, Oberreuter 1975, 
Blondel 1997, Helms 1997, 2002, 2008a). It is considered a central element in explaining 
the role of opposition whether the political system is geared towards conflict or 
compromise among rivalling actors (Lijphart 2012).  
In the study of opposition, actor-centred perspectives are rare. Most research is focussed on 
institutional conditions for the forms and functions of opposition. Only variation below the 
institutional level can explain within country variation (see Helms 2008b, Norton 2008, 
Brack and Weinblum 2011, Andeweg 2013). A few recent studies have taken up this 
criticism and investigated within country variation with actor-centred explanatory factors 
(de Giorgi 2007, Kaiser 2008, Steinack 2011, Andeweg 2013, Moury and de Giorgi 2015). 
The actor-centred studies point out that the differentiation of conflictive or cooperative 
behaviour also appears as qualifying marker of oppositions’ roles and strategies (de Giorgi 
2015, Moury and de Giorgi 2015, Christiansen and Seeberg 2016, Loxbo and Sjölin 2016).  
The divide of conflict and cooperation is firmly established in research on institutional and 
behavioural aspects of opposition. The centrepiece of this theoretical chapter links to this 
                                                 
26 For better readability of the text, I use the terms “opposition” and “opposition party” in the sense of 
“opposition party group”, thus, a group of MPs belonging to a party in opposition who hold a parliamentary 
seat. 
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body of literature and conceptualizes the oppositional strategies of cooperation and 
competition in EU affairs (Chapter 2.2). The reactive nature of opposition – already implied 
in the etymology of the word (lat: opponere: stand against something or someone) – allows 
to either challenge the government in view of long-term re-election benefits or to cooperate 
to advance short-term policy goals. While most studies focus on specific activities at either 
committee or plenary level, this thesis conceptualizes a model covering the committee and 
plenary stage. Cooperation and competition are linked to the procedural structures in 
parliament to assess the temporal aspect of the two strategies (2.2.3). 
This study assesses independent variables that explain variation in the level of 
competitiveness among opposition party groups (Chapter 2.3). The chapter integrates 
research on challenger parties and on positional competition among party groups to the 
study of opposition. These two bodies of literature can be linked to typologies of opposition 
classics (Dahl 1966, Sartori 1966, Blondel 1997). It provides a sound base for 
hypothesizing domestic opposition to EU affairs. The first expectation is derived from 
theories on anti-establishment parties. Anti-establishment parties are expected to pursue 
more outright and intense competition with the governing party(s). The second expectation 
borrows from research on positional and issue competition of party groups (Blondel 1997, 
Green-Pedersen 2010). The stronger the positional difference of an opposition party group 
and the government, the more competitive it should be.  
The contribution of this study is two-fold, as it integrates two bodies of literature to 
research on national parliaments and EU affairs: that on parliaments and EU with research 
on opposition and party competition. In view of national parliaments and the EU, this study 
mainly intends to arrive at a better understanding on parliamentary EU scrutiny activities 
(Raunio 2009, Rozenberg and Hefftler 2015). It opens the “black box” of the institution of 
parliament to analyse the drivers of oppositional actors.  
Chapter 2.1 defines the ontological background of rational choice institutionalism for this 
study. The second part of this Chapter 2.2 develops the model on competition and 
cooperation by parliamentary opposition actors. Chapter 2.3 assesses the independent 
variables and argues for two key explanatory factors (party type and positional distance). 
The final Chapter 2.4 summarizes and concludes. 
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2.1. Rational choice neo-institutionalism 
This Chapter 2.1 develops the theoretical background that leads to a model of opposition to 
EU affairs in national parliaments. It starts out from the ontological background of neo-
institutionalism, lays out three schools within this theory (2.1.1) and argues for a “thick” 
version of rational choice as appropriate for this thesis (2.1.2).  
2.1.1. Neo-institutionalism 
With their seminal article “The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political 
Life” March and Olsen (1984b) heralded the “institutionalist turn” in political science. The 
basic assumption that “institutions matter” – that they affect political actions and outcomes 
– has by now become mainstream (Hall and Taylor 1996, Aspinwall and Schneider 2000: 
3). The new institutionalism evolved in critique of political science theory of the 1960s and 
1970s. Political science had built on concepts of sociology and economics focusing on 
behavioural aspects of the individual while largely ignoring the social embeddedness – the 
“glue” – connecting single actors to society (Shepsle 1989: 134, Hall and Taylor 1996). The 
new institutionalism integrates ideas from earlier works in political science that can be 
labelled as “old” institutionalism with the behavioural approaches of the 1960s and 1970s 
(March and Olsen 1984a: 738, Shepsle 1989: 132). In consequence, institutions are 
understood to form a “corridor” that limits and structures the scope of action of individuals 
motivated by norms, values or self-interest (see North 1990). Both, the institutional 
framework and motives of political actors are relevant to explain an outcome.  
Following Hall (1986: 19) institutions are here defined as “the formal rules, compliance 
procedures and standard operating practices that structure the relationship between 
individuals in various units of the polity and economy”. Thus, they can be of formal or 
informal nature (see also Shepsle 2006: 27-32). Formal institutions in form of structure or 
procedures are defined at constitutional level, in secondary legislation or rules of procedure. 
In terms of structure, the type of government, the power of the legislature vis-à-vis the 
government or the organization of the committee system in parliament are examples of 
important formal institutional features. The procedural aspect of institutions can be 
manifest in agenda setting rights or the process of voting in committee and plenary. The 
procedural setup has an important effect on actors’ strategies and future decision outcomes, 
as it determines the sequence of events. Institutions as informal rules (termed “standard 
operating practices” in Hall’s definition above) are more difficult to grasp from a scientific 
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perspective, but not less relevant in their impact on the process and outcome. The 
predominance of consensual decision-making in the Council of the EU, despite the formal 
possibility of qualified majority voting, provides a good example of the practical and 
theoretical relevance of an informal rule (Aspinwall and Schneider 2000: 4, Hayes-
Renshaw and Wallace 2006). 
The literature distinguishes three schools of neo-institutionalist theory, which are termed 
historical, sociological and rational choice (Hall and Taylor 1996, Aspinwall and Schneider 
2000). While all three schools share the basic premises explained above, they vary in their 
assumptions on the motivations of human behaviour and in their research objective.  
Historical institutionalism intends to explain institutional change or continuity over time 
(for an overview see Steinmo and Thelen 2002). Often inspired by functionalism, a core 
concept is path-dependency in that once established institutions shape future procedures 
and structures in a political system (see Pierson 2000). In this case institutions appear as the 
dependent variable whose structure is to be explained. In historical neo-institutionalism, 
either self-interest or rule following may be conceptualized as the driving force of human 
action. Its key characteristic is the relevance of temporality as the name “historical” 
indicates. This branch of neo-institutionalism does not appear as an adequate theoretical 
base for this study, as institutional change is not the key interest. In this thesis, institutions 
serve primarily as independent variables. They are potential explanatory factors for the 
level of activity of opposition parties.  
Sociological neo-institutionalism defines institutions very broadly encompassing not only 
formal and informal rules but also cultural aspects that shape human behaviour. Individuals 
are understood as social beings whose actions are largely determined by the “logic of 
appropriateness” (March and Olsen 1984b). Rule following to formal and informal 
institutions is motivated by living up to social expectations. While the historical approach 
looks at the evolution of institutions, sociological neo-institutionalist studies often 
investigate the opposite dimension of explaining how institutions shape norms and 
identities of actors (see for example Powell and DiMaggio 1991). The constructivist school 
is further interested in how ideas, beliefs and values shape actors’ goals or interests. Ideas 
are considered explanatory factors for actors’ beliefs and for social outcomes (Woll and 
Jacquot 2010, Saurugger 2013). 
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The rational choice variant, in contrast, assumes individual utility maximization as 
motivation for action (see for example Riker 1980). Rational choice institutionalism 
searches to explain outcomes “in terms of individual goal-seeking under constraints” 
(Snidal 2002: 74). It is characterized by three assumptions. First, the approach chooses 
individuals as basic units whose activities are aggregated to explain social outcomes 
(methodological individualism). Second, choice theory assumes individual actors to 
maximize utility. With this “logic of consequentialism” it differs from constructivist and 
sociological approaches who embrace the “logic of appropriateness” and deliberative 
approaches who argue for the relevance of a “logic of arguing” in decision-making (Pollack 
2006: 32). Third, actors’ choices are limited by their strategic context. Formal or informal 
rules define clear “corridors” of potential actions (Frieden 1999, Auel and Christiansen 
2015). In the rational choice conception, individual actors are more independent from the 
institutional context and inter-changeable than in the sociological school. Formal and 
informal rules are simply conceptualized as the “rules of the game” (North 1990: 3). They 
define the opportunity structure for political actors and affect their strategies. The impact of 
institutions on norms and identities does not form part of analysis. Institutions can serve as 
dependent variables whose evolution is explained by the search of rational actors to 
promote their self-interests (see for example Moravcsik 1998). More often actors’ strategic 
behaviour within a fixed institutional setup serves to explain a political outcome (see Peters 
2000: 13, Weingast 2002, Shepsle 2006: 24-25).  
This study choses the rational choice version of neo-institutionalism as its ontological 
background. Its simple action-logic appears most adequate for a first attempt to explain 
opposition parties’ EU scrutiny activities. The focus on utility maximization deems most 
appropriate for “opening the black box” of parliament. It allows me to focus on very clear 
assumptions on opposition activity on EU affairs at national level. Since research on 
opposition parties’ scrutiny of EU issues is very limited so far, this study aims at 
identifying basic mechanisms of opposition MPs motivation to engage in EU scrutiny in a 
parsimonious model. 
This thesis does not intend to explain change at institutional level. Institutions appear as the 
fixed structures that provide a scope for potential action (Auel and Christiansen 2015). The 
aim is to explain MPs EU scrutiny activities within these predefined structures. The 
institutional setting at two levels forms a relevant contextual factor: at the European and the 
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national level. Whereas the EU formal rules are coherent for all member states, national 
rules can be alternative explanations for explaining variation among opposition parties.  
So far this Chapter 2.1 has argued for rational choice neo-institutionalism in opposition to 
the sociological and historical versions of this theory. The next Section 2.1.2 develops the 
assumptions of the rational choice school in more detail. 
2.1.2. A “thick” understanding of rational choice  
The rational choice paradigm has been an important feature in political science in the past 
five decades. The concept was transferred from classical neo-economic theory to political 
science (Aspinwall and Schneider 2000: 10). At its core stands the assumption that 
individuals act efficiently to maximize their utility. The aim of this theoretical school is to 
explain developments at the macro level through parsimonious assumptions at individual 
level. Early proponents of rational choice argued against the correlational assumptions on 
two variables at macro level that do not specify causal mechanisms. The methodological 
individualism enables to link several macro level variables through precise assumptions of 
individual actors’ choices (Coleman 1990: 1–26). Despite its success, the rational choice 
approach is often discussed critically for its over-simplistic assumptions on human nature 
(see for example Simon 1979). This Section 2.1.2 defines the basic assumptions of this 
meta-theoretical framework. It reflects and accommodates the criticism from constructivists 
in a “thicker” version of rational choice.  
The core of the rational choice paradigm is the definition of a clear “action mechanism” at 
individual level. An actor is understood to hold fixed preferences that may be derived from 
his structural position (exogenous preferences). Within a certain context the actor identifies 
different political outcomes assuming he has complete information on the setting and on 
other actors preferences. He orders these potential outcomes in relation to his preferences 
(ends) and develops a strategy (means) of how to best achieve the favoured outcome 
(Frieden 1999). Thus, rationality is defined as a cost-benefit calculation with an economic 
or political purpose where an individual maximizes output while minimizing input (Downs 
1957: 5). These assumptions can be reduced to a simple mathematical formula since 
interests are predefined and subjective factors based on norms, beliefs or values are 
excluded from analysis. The approach gains its strength through this theoretical parsimony.  
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The narrowly defined rational choice approach has been criticized heavily for the lack of 
realism on the complexity of decision-making and the cognitive capability of human 
beings. It has been argued that real humans lack the cognitive capacity to understand and 
rank all their options before a decision. The Nobel Prize laureates Kahnemann and Tversky 
argue for “bounded rationality” (see Kahnemann et al. 1982, Simon 1982, Kahnemann 
2003). Facing limited cognitive means and resources, especially in form of information 
access, decision-making does not always follow the search for the optimal solution. Actors 
would aim for “satisficing” (a neologism based on the terms “satisfactory” and “suffice”), 
instead of optimizing. The authors identify a number of heuristics that allow actors for 
simple and quick decision-making (Kahnemann et al. 1982).  
Scholars of rational choice do not negate that real world persons have complex personalities 
and follow emotional needs, norms and values. Tsebelis (1990: 40) explains that the 
paradigm does not assume individuals would use the mathematical formulas of formal 
models of rational choice in their decision-making process, but that they arrive at the same 
outcome (see also Downs 1957: 6–7). Jones (2003) and Hedström and Swedberg (1996: 
129) argue that the rational choice assumptions describe an ideal type. Though a concrete 
person might deviate from rational decision-making, the assumption should hold true for an 
ideal-typical person in an ideal typical situation. Other aspects are excluded from theory 
building in order to develop parsimonious models. This study maintains the focus on 
individual goal-seeking as central driving force of actors. 
The exact properties of rationality have been a point of contention in the debate on rational 
choice. Max Weber distinguishes instrumental (Zweck-) and substantive rationality 
(Wertrationalität) (cited after Kalberg 1980). Rationality in the instrumental sense is a 
goal-oriented means-end calculation. The concept of instrumental rationality is limited to 
an actor’s ability to evaluate and rank cause-effect relationship to achieve a purpose. It does 
not say anything about the quality of that purpose. Substantive rationality, on the other 
hand, concerns a value-oriented evaluation of the choice at hand. Here normative questions, 
such as moral or social desirability, come into play. There are two versions of rational 
choice, which differ in how they relate to these two versions of rationality of Weber. 
In a “thin” version of rational choice, actors aim for self-interest maximization (Tsebelis 
1990). In the economic domain, utility is defined as maximization of wealth and material 
well-being; for the political realm, the single driver of rational actors is the search for 
power (Riker 1962, Woll 2008). This simple assumption of the driver of human action has 
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the advantage of clarity and parsimony. For formal modelling, the single goal of self-
interest maximization is important as it translates well to mathematical formulas.  
A second “thick” version of rational choice defines rationality more openly as “logically 
consistent” behaviour (Elster 2016 (1983): 11). If actors were to behave haphazard it would 
not be possible to develop any clear theoretical assumption with individuals as basic units. 
In the “thick” conception of rational choice, the goals may contain aspects of both forms of 
Weber’s definition of rationality: instrumental and substantive. In this it addresses the 
critique of scholars of psychology towards the strict assumption of self-interest 
maximization. Their laboratory experiments at times display altruistic or irrational 
behaviour falsifying the paradigm of material utility maximization (see for example Simon 
1979).  
The “thick” version of rational choice partially accommodates the criticism voiced by 
constructivist and sociological scholars towards rational choice. Constructivism criticizes 
the “blind spot” of rational choice in view of norms, beliefs and ideas for explanation of 
social outcomes. If the definition of rationality is limited to “logically consistent 
behaviour”, it can, however, accommodate values and norms as abstract goals of an 
individual actor. In this it is close to the actor-centred constructivism, which searches for a 
bridge between rationalistic and sociological approaches (Woll and Jacquot 2010, 
Saurugger 2013). The actor-centred constructivism adapts to the methodological 
individualism and goal-oriented behaviour of rational choice; some authors argue for a 
“constructed rationality” (Woll and Jacquot 2010) or “strategic constructivism“ (Jabko 
2006). They differ from rational choice in the understanding of the role of ideas for the 
definition of actors’ interests. For constructivists, the formation of preferences needs to be 
explained (endogenous preferences).  
The definition of the origin of interests forms the thin line between the “thick” version of 
rational choice and actor-centred “strategic” constructivism. In rational choice, preferences 
are conceptualized as exogenous, that is they are predefined and derived from the structural 
position of an actor. Blyth (2003) argues that the attempts of rational choice scholars to 
integrate the role of ideas in shaping interests have failed:  
“Yet if acquiring a new idea means changing one’s conception of self-interest rather than 
just reordering one’s preferences, and if different agents can hold different mental models 
regardless of the similarities of their structural positions, then the hard core of rationalist 
theory comes up for grabs.“ (Blyth 2003: 697). 
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On the other hand, the actor-centred constructivism still faces serious methodological 
challenges. The mutual consistency of ideas and interests can hardly be distinguished 
methodologically. How can we know whether the formulation of an idea influences an 
actors interest or is merely used strategically for advancing the own interest (Saurugger 
2013)?  
This study builds on the “thick” version of rational choice, where individuals are 
understood to act logically consistent by following cost-benefit analysis of options that lead 
to a goal. Where rational choice is used for formal modelling, assumptions need to be very 
strict so that they can be transformed to mathematical formulas. For this more qualitative 
study, it is not necessary to integrate the very limited and determined assumptions of the 
narrow rational choice approach. The “thick” version of rational choice can further 
accommodate the possibility of incomplete information. Rational choice studies usually 
start out from the assumption of complete information of actors about the potential and 
limits of their action. The assumption on complete information delimits the validity of 
rational choice based theories, the more the institutional context at stake differs from a 
perfectly competitive market (Ostrom 1991: 241). Uncertainty over the outcome of own 
actions and the lack of complete information are conditions that challenge the rationality of 
actors and alter the logic of the strategic inter-action (see also Downs 1957: 82–95). Where 
information is incomplete, it is difficult for an actor to rank options in a clear hierarchy. 
Upon new information the priorities may change. Real life actors are often confronted with 
uncertainty. They need to decide at what point they have sufficient information, as 
acquiring information can be costly. In consequence, rational actors might not always 
search for the optimal, but for a way to achieve their purpose (Elster 2016 (1983): 3). 
Institutions matter as constraints for the strategic choices available for achieving a 
predefined interest. The “thick” version of rational choice acknowledges “ideas” as 
strategic instruments that may be used to enhance the own goals. Yet, it excludes the role of 
ideas in the construction of actors’ interests from analysis.  
This study builds on the “thick” version of rational choice as its theoretical background. It 
accounts for multiple competing goals of actors who behave “logically consistent” in a 
world that is at times characterized by uncertainty.  
As a paradigm, rational choice depicts a certain concept of human nature and a general 
starting point of research. It is not a theory (see Ostrom 1991: 234, Note 001, Eriksson 
2011: 8). Only the link to the context and the hypotheses derived from this ontological 
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perspective can be tested in empirical research. These are falsifiable, not the paradigm itself 
(Pollack 2006: 33). The rational choice paradigm is in essence (just) an “action 
mechanism” that links preferences and opportunities to a choice of action (Hedström and 
Swedberg 1996: 129). The explanation for actors’ choices through rational intention can be 
applied to practically any situation. Hedström and Swedberg (1996: 132) argue with Karl 
Popper for a situational analysis, “individual’s actions should be explained with reference 
to the logic of the situation in which they occur”. The rational choice paradigm is therefore 
paired with neo-institutionalism in this thesis that provides the structure for the situational 
analysis. To account for this demand, the following Chapter 2.2 develops a model of 
opposition party strategy by taking into account the strategic context of actors. 
 
2.2. Developing a model on opposition to EU affairs in national 
parliaments 
This section conceptualizes strategies of opposition for parliamentary EU scrutiny. The 
overall aim of this study is to understand what political factors drive opposition’s EU 
scrutiny activities. This Chapter 2.2 first identifies the goals of parties as rational actors 
independent of their status as governing or opposition party (2.2.1). Once the goal of the 
actor is defined clearly, the analysis can turn to the potential means to achieve them. In 
view of the reactive nature of opposition, the chapter develops two strategies: competition 
and cooperation (2.2.2). Section 2.2.3 contextualizes these strategies within the 
parliamentary formal structures to develop a model of opposition to EU affairs in national 
parliaments. 
When theorizing about opposition parties’ motivation, my focus is largely on the domestic 
context and less about the EU multi-level logic. Some studies aim at explaining the 
interactions among the different levels of the EU multi-level parliamentary field (Proksch 
and Slapin 2010, Finke 2014). For this thesis, the focus is on the motivation of opposition 
parties for EU affairs due to the political dynamic at domestic level. Checkel (2006: 68) 
makes a strong case for integrating the domestic level to analysis of EU decision-making. 
Many classic EU integration theories neglected the role of domestic politics. The EU 
context is relevant for the definition of the opportunity structures for opposition MPs. 
National parliaments can become involved in the ex-ante or ex-post stage to EU decision-
making. Yet, at both points in time, the domestic rules define the scope of influence for 
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opposition. Furthermore, parties first and foremost address a domestic audience and depend 
on re-election by their national electorate, where they compete with other national parties 
(Hix 2008). In so far, I assume that the predominant driving force – also for EU scrutiny – 
has to be derived from party competition at domestic level.  
2.2.1. Party preferences: Policy and office  
The methodological individualism of the rational choice paradigm presents a certain 
challenge to the study of parties. Strictly speaking rational choice derives actors’ motives 
from the individual level (Schumpeter 1908: 88-98). Most models on party competition, 
however, treat parties as unitary actors as though they had a “single brain” (Benoit and 
Laver 2006: 41). This study follows the logic of Downs (1957) who defines parties as 
teams of individual actors who hold the same preferences. While the individual preferences 
are conceptually still at the core, their alignment allows defining party groups as unit of 
analysis.27  
Within the rational choice approach, the preferences of parties are a point of contention. In 
the strict sense of rational choice, political actors are motivated by their own utility 
maximization in terms of prestige, income and power that office provides for them (Downs 
1957). In the “thin” understanding of rational choice self-interest in form of maximizing 
power is the single goal of parties (Riker 1962, Woll 2008). Often vote maximization is 
considered the key interest of parties. Yet, votes are always instrumental for access to the 
political forum and influence on policy or power. Budge and Laver (1986) consider the 
intrinsic motivation for policy a rational choice goal of party members. Other scholars 
argue for a self-less interest in the public good motivating political actors (Burke 1790: 
213). 
This study focuses on two central goals of parties: policy and power. I do not include vote-
seeking as an independent third preference. Winning votes is the first necessary 
requirement for any form of participation of a party in the political life. The regular 
repetition of elections requires politicians to keep re-election constantly on their mind (see 
Downs 1957). However, vote seeking can barely be an end in itself; much more it is 
instrumental for winning office or implementing policy (Müller and Strom 1999: 9). 
Office- and policy-seeking are clearly distinguishable and well established in the rational 
                                                 
27 This is a conscious simplification of reality. Party group members de facto hold many divergent and 
conflicting views.  
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choice literature. They need to be treated separately, because they can be in conflict with 
each other. A party group can be confronted with the choice to enter a coalition government 
for which it needs to compromise on some of its policy contents (Müller and Strom 1999: 
7).  
The relationship between policy and office is tricky. Policy could be a means to achieve 
power or vice-versa power could be instrumental to realize a policy agenda. In the “thin” 
understanding of rational choice the willingness to design policy is instrumental to gaining 
votes and office (Downs 1957, see also Budge and Laver 1986: 494-497). Policy, in 
economic theories of democracy, is considered the “product” that political parties offer to 
their electorates. Rational voters elect the party, which offers policy positions closest to 
their material benefit and presents the ability to implement them. In this line of thinking, 
policy is a means to achieve re-election and incumbency. At the other extreme, power could 
be instrumental to implement policy. Where policy is defined as altruistic goal motivated 
by a certain worldview of a “good” society, a party would still strive for power. However, 
power would be a means to an end. 
This study does not intend to find an answer to this “hen-and-egg” question. For a formal 
rational choice model, it is preferable to define one single goal to an actor (see 2.1.2). As 
this study is built on a “thick” understanding of rationality, it may conceptualize several 
competing preferences. In this, I follow Müller and Strøm (1999) who discuss the “hard-
choices” of parties when prioritizing one or the other goal. Both goals are acknowledged to 
play a role side by side.  
The preferences of party in parliament can be further specified through the representative 
function of its members. Shepsle (1985) argues that the goal of parliamentarians is to 
maximize the interests of their constituency. He defines constituency broadly as either the 
direct electorate or other groups of supporters of an MP. The legislator will try to maximize 
the benefits of her own constituency in a specific policy decision. In the rational choice 
terminology, the MP appears as the “agent” of her voters or supporters who are the 
“principal” (Laver and Shepsle 1999). Control over the agent occurs foremost at election 
times where voters may select or sanction their representative. This study is however 
interested in the inter-electoral period. The continuous monitoring of political 
representatives forms the link between elections and the legislative processes. Parties argue 
for their policy positions in public debate and justify their actions towards the 
constituencies. This representative logic links to the two party preferences of policy and 
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office. Representing the interests of the constituency advances the own re-election chances. 
When the voters or supporters are satisfied with the work of their MP, they are more likely 
to support him in the future again. Votes translate to access to power and potential policy 
influence. The principle agent approach emphasizes the relevance of communication in 
parliament (Auel 2007). Communicative action is a strategic tool to achieve the own 
preferences of policy and office.28 
If all parties share the same goals, how can we explain differences in party programmes? 
The answer differs depending on whether policy or power is considered a strategic means 
or genuine preference. Ideology plays a central role for both arguments about programmatic 
parties. Ideology can be defined as “logically coherent system of symbols” (Mullins 1974: 
235) or beliefs held by a group. Thus, it is mainly understood as a coherent party 
programme at abstract level. It serves to justify political actions, which can be motivated by 
long-term self-interest of a social group or abstract self-less goals (Gerring 1997). An 
ideology gives a general idea of the policy positions a party will defend in concrete 
situations. 
Where ideology is assumed to be self-interested, a party programme reflects the material or 
political interests of the social group, which could be derived from its relative position or 
potential disadvantages in the overall structure. If policy was the ultimate goal of a party, 
we can assume a party was established to propagate and implement the ideological 
convictions of its members. The party programmes vary in relation to the available 
worldviews and number of their supporters.  
In the “thin” version of rational choice where power is the single preference, the strategic 
context explains the various policy programmes. According to spatial theory different 
policy positions of parties stem from the heterogeneity of society (Downs 1957, Budge 
1994). Parties appeal to different social groups within a state (e.g. capital versus labour) and 
need to differ sufficiently from other opponents in order to attract voters (Downs 1957: 
101). Parties rely on ideology as a “label” under which voters can easily understand their 
“product”. Assuming that acquiring knowledge on a party’s programme and activities is 
costly for the voters in terms of time and resources, ideology is an instrument to reduce 
complexity (Budge 1994: 446). A coherent ideology that differs sufficiently from other 
                                                 
28 In contrast to social constructivism, language is not analysed in terms of their influence on the perception or 
“construction” of reality. It is merely one of several strategic tools to gain power or policy influence. 
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parties and its continuous implementation are in this sense rational for parties. In the “thin” 
version of rational choice policy (or ideology) serves as a means for power. 
Again, for this study the motivation behind the two preferences of policy and office and 
their relationship to each other does not need to be specified. Both, policy and office, can 
explain differences in party programmes and ideological premises. What matters here are 
the strategies that parties employ in order to reach these goals. The following Section 2.2.2 
develops two key strategies of opposition parties in the parliamentary arena. 
2.2.2. Opposition parties’ strategies: Competition or cooperation  
So far the theoretical expectations apply to party groups irrespective of their status as 
governing or opposition party. This Section 2.2.2 conceptualizes the strategic context of 
opposition parties in abstract terms. As explained above, the rational choice paradigm itself 
only describes an action-logic at individual level (2.1.2). Testable theoretical assumptions 
have to be derived from the context, the “rules of the game” of rational actors (North 1990: 
3). The aim of this section is to identify strategies of opposition to achieve their goals of 
policy or office in context of their structural position. 
A strategy forms a bridge between the abstract goals of policy- or office-seeking and 
specific policy positions and parliamentary activities. It allows translating the goals into 
observable behaviour. Strategy is defined as success-oriented construct of an overarching 
calculation, which considers the means that advance a goal in a certain environment 
(Raschke and Tils 2013: 127). A construct is further specified as a guiding principle for 
action. Thus, strategies are guiding principles for action that are based on a calculation of 
which means most efficiently lead to a goal in a certain context. Preferences of opposition 
parties have been defined as participation in government and policy influence (see 2.2.1).  
The definition of opposition in a political system delivers the basic elements of the strategic 
context. In his seminal work, Dahl (1966: xviii) defines opposition in its broadest sense as: 
“B is opposed to the conduct of government by A”.29 Some authors argue for a very broad 
understanding of “opposition” that includes all types of actors and activities in- and outside 
of parliament (Schapiro 1972: 3, Blondel 1997: 466, Brack and Weinblum 2009: 74). 
Oberreuter (1975: 10) on the other hand sees the danger of conceptual over-stretch of such 
                                                 
29 Similar definitions are brought forward by Norton (2008: 236): ”[…] standing in some form of 
disagreement to another body.” and Ionescu (1968: 1) ”[…] logically and morphologically […], the dialectic 
counterpart of power.” 
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a catch-all definition. This study focuses on opposition party groups. That is, parties in 
parliament who oppose – or at least do not form part of – the governing party(s) and 
continuously and systematically participate in the political process (see Oberreuter 1975: 
13). Two conclusions resolve from this definition of opposition. 
First, the situation of opposition party groups is characterized by its participation in a 
formal representative body. Opposition MPs have access to the institution of parliament, its 
resources and debating forums within committee and plenary. As they are not in power, 
access to government is limited and they do not hold veto power in the legislative process.  
Second, opposition is a dependent concept in so far as opposition cannot be without 
government, which it counter-acts (Blondel 1997: 463). Opposition is understood as a 
reactive force, as most of its actions relate to the agenda and activities of the government 
(Helms 2010: 233, see also Blondel 1997: 463). In parliamentary democracies, government 
largely determines the legislative agenda. The governing party groups hold veto power over 
legislative proposals from the government (Auel and Benz 2005). Opposition party groups 
do not have this “power of the vote”. They can voice own positions in relation to the 
government’s agenda. This basic logic leads to the key strategies at avail to opposition 
parties. Either they voice critique of the government position in the strategy of competition. 
Or they can search to influence the government proposal and partially realize their own 
policy ideals in the strategy of cooperation. A range of studies has investigated opposition 
parties or parliament in view of conflictive or cooperative inter-action patterns among 
governing and opposition parties (Steffani 1968, Oberreuter 1975, Blondel 1997, Helms 
1997, 2010, de Giorgi 2015, Moury and de Giorgi 2015, Christiansen and Seeberg 2016).  
The re-active nature of opposition party groups does not preclude that they can hold some 
agenda power. Döring (2001) classifies political systems by the extent of the influence of 
parties in minority on the parliamentary agenda. Especially, consensus democracies provide 
some institutionalized means of agenda-setting power for parties in minority. In all 
countries, oppositional actors can attempt to influence public debate outside of parliament, 
e.g. in direct contact to the media. The two broad strategies of competition and cooperation 
with the government still apply despite limited agenda power. The re-actions are 
complemented by competition over the agenda.  
The strategies of cooperation and competition are both forms of interaction between 
governing and opposition parties. They derive from or result in the status of consensus or 
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conflict (see Helms 1997: 48). The terms cooperation and consensus, or competition and 
conflict respectively, cannot be used interchangeably. Conflict and consensus capture the 
“snapshot” picture of diverging or coinciding party positions. Competition and cooperation 
are dynamic processes. If parties treat an issue consensually, there is no need to negotiate 
compromise or to escalate a conflict. Both strategies of cooperation and competition start 
out from the status quo ante of conflict among different parties.  
2.2.3. A model of opposition in national parliaments 
Section 2.2.2 derived competition and cooperation as two key strategies for opposition from 
its structural position as minority. This Section 2.2.3 extends the considerations on the 
strategic context to the parliamentary arena and EU affairs. What form do cooperation and 
competition take within the parliamentary setting? And how can we account of the temporal 
dimension of the two strategies throughout the legislative process? This chapter develops a 
model of opposition parties’ EU scrutiny activities. It is difficult to define a simple model 
for the EU scrutiny procedure in national parliaments. Legislatures differ in their procedural 
processes significantly, which makes it difficult to find a “one size fits all” definition that 
still has sufficient explanatory power. The following model reduces the complex 
parliamentary procedures to a two-step model of committee and plenary involvement. 
All parliaments in the EU operate to some extent through their committee system (Laundy 
1989). Committees consist of a limited number of legislators, which are responsible for 
preparing the parliamentary decision-making within a specific policy area. Committees 
allow parliaments a division of labour where MPs develop expertise on their area of 
responsibility. Committees are often understood to enable a more fact-oriented debate and 
to do the detailed work of legislative scrutiny (Strøm and Mattson 1995). One or several 
committees may be involved in preparing the parliamentary position or decision for the 
plenary.  
The plenary is usually the body that takes the final vote on draft legislation and other 
motions. The plenary may debate the issue at stake or accept the committee 
recommendation without a debate. Some parliaments involve the plenary even before a 
policy issue is assigned to a committee. For complex or contested matters, parliament may 
hold several readings at the plenary on a legislative draft. However, the basic logic of 
plenary assigning the detailed legislative scrutiny work to a committee, which prepares the 
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final decision, is valid, even if plenary debated before the committee stage or is involved 
several times. 
Even this simple model of parliamentary procedures does not apply in all legislatures and 
all cases. In some parliaments, the European Affairs Committee has the special right of 
voting in place of the plenary. The plenary does not get involved in the scrutiny of day-to-
day EU policymaking in this case. All parliaments have some form of involvement of the 
plenary on EU affairs, even if some only focus on high politics issues (Wessels et al. 2013, 
Auel and Raunio 2014). The precise conditions for the strategy of competition or 
cooperation needs to be defined for each member state individually. However, the 
procedural logic of the negotiation process, which is represented by this model holds true in 
abstract form. 
Section 1.1.1 of the introduction to this thesis has discussed the modes of governance of the 
EU and the two functions of national parliaments therein: control over policymaking and 
over the allocation of competences to EU and national level. Both functions can be 
conceptualized by the two-step process of committee and plenary involvement within 
parliament. Parliamentary decision-making with different instruments usually involves a 
committee stage and a plenary stage. This basic two-step logic is applicable to ex-ante as 
well as ex-post EU scrutiny activities as well as the Early Warning Mechanism and 
simplified treaty ratification (see Section 1.1.1). These different channels of influences, 
however, produce different kinds of output: In the phase prior to (European) Council 
meetings national parliaments may issue resolutions or mandates. In the ex-post stage 
parliament transposes directives to national legislation. Within the EWS, they produce 
reasoned opinions. In general, the committee stage is understood as more fact-oriented, 
legislative scrutiny work and the plenary as public justification of these results.  
The two stages of committee and plenary involvement are sufficient to grasp a temporal 
aspect, which matters to specify the strategy of competition and cooperation in the 
parliamentary context. The decision-making process may – especially on EU affairs – take 
month or even years. The strategy of competition or cooperation could be adapted over the 
course of time. Competition and cooperation are reiterative processes of action and reaction 
among party groups. The extent to which an opposition party chooses to challenge the 
government is in its own hands. The success of the strategy of cooperation depends on the 
reaction of the governing parties (Louwerse et al. 2016). Cooperation and competition can 
be adapted throughout the parliamentary process. The institution of parliament is meant to 
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solve societal conflicts throughout its procedures. Early on opposition criticism can be 
accommodated by the government. Christiansen and Seebers (2016) study on the “trade-
off” between public criticism and policy influence in Denmark supports this argument. 
Spreitzer and Timmermans (2014) show for the Low countries (Belgium, Luxembourg and 
the Netherlands) that conflict at committee stage can be resolved through cooperation 
before the issue enters the plenary. 
The two strategies and two stages of parliamentary processing are integrated to a model of 
opposition in national parliaments (see Figure 1). The status of consensus and conflict is 
conceptualized as start and end point of the legislative process. Parties have predefined 
positions on a policy issue before it appears on the political and parliamentary agenda. 
Section 2.2.2 has defined compromise and competition as dynamic processes that start out 













Figure 3: Model of opposition strategies in national parliaments. 
The model identifies four kinds of opposition activity in the parliamentary process. First, if 
an issue is consensual among all party groups, it is unlikely that MPs will devote much time 
or attention to it in the parliamentary process. It requires neither compromise nor 
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competition and should be moved through the legislative process smoothly (see Figure 3, 
arrow 1). In this case, the legislative process is characterized by the status of consensus as 
its starting and end point.  
The process is more complex where an issue is characterized by conflict between party 
groups when it enters the legislative procedure. As second approach, opposition can opt of 
cooperation at the committee stage (see Figure 3, arrow 2). Cooperation is associated with 
short-term policy influence (Russell et al. 2016: 7). By means of “co-governance” (Sebaldt 
1992) an opposition party can realize parts of its policy ideas despite its non-governing 
status. In general, cooperation can take place behind closed doors in negotiations between 
the party groups before actual committee meetings (Steinack 2011: 10). Committee work is 
also generally seen as more fact-oriented and a space to enable pragmatic compromise than 
the plenary (Damgaard and Mattson 2004). If cooperation is successful before or during 
committee sessions, the issue will most likely pass the plenary stage without much attention 
or controversy. Christiansen and Seebers (2016: 3) show how public criticism can be a 
commodity of opposition parties which they “trade” for compromise behind closed doors. 
Where government provided the opportunity for cooperation with policy influence in their 
case study of Denmark, it reduced the public critique of the government on the respective 
issue. Cooperation at the committee stage will foremost be indicated by either a lack of 
voting on issues, as the committee arrived at consensus in its discussions (Mattson and 
Damgaard 2004). Or it is indicated by support in votes on government drafts, in legislatures 
where committee voting is common. The price of cooperation is the blurring of 
responsibilities between governing and opposition parties. It is difficult for opposition to 
remain distinguishable from the parties in power, if they support government initiatives too 
frequently (Moury and de Giorgi 2014: 2, Stecker 2011: 4).  
Third, the opposition can use the strategy of competition at committee stage (see Figure 3, 
arrow 3). The strategy of competition is associated with the long-term goal of office 
(Steinack 2011: 10, Moury and de Giorgi 2015, Russell et al. 2016: 7). Through public 
criticism and other forms of conflict, opposition leaders can advertise their policy 
programme to the voters and hope to gain their support in future elections. The strategy of 
competition is characterized by challenging the government. Competition means in this 
context that opposition criticizes the government and proposes alternative solutions. 
Damgaard and Mattson (2004) consider motions by opposition at committee level an 
indicator for competition. Other studies use the support in opposition votes on government 
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proposals to operationalize cooperation (Stecker 2011, Louwerse et al. 2016). Again, 
depending on the government reaction, competition at the committee stage could lead to 
compromise by the time the issue arrives in the plenary or further escalate (Spreitzer and 
Timmermans 2014). 
This leads to the fourth approach (see Figure 3, arrow 4). The strategy of competition is 
carried over to the plenary stage. A critical opposition voice in plenary debates might be the 
most effective form of competition, as it draws public attention to the alternative view of 
opposition. Steinack (2011: 11) shows in her qualitative study of the Bavarian parliament 
that plenary debates, parliamentary questions and contact to the media (press releases) are 
used to compete with governing parties. Opposition has significant leverage to initiate 
political controversy through agenda setting in- and outside of parliament (Green-Pedersen 
2010, Christiansen and Seeberg 2016). The result of the strategy of competition will be 
documented in the voting behaviour and criticism and alternative proposals in public 
debates. 
This Chapter 2.2 developed an abstract model of opposition party strategies in parliament. 
Based on the rational choice literature Section 2.2.1 identified policy and office as 
preferences of parties. In the “thick” understanding of rational choice it is not necessary to 
specify whether policy is a strategic or genuine interest of political actors. The search for 
power and for policy influence is conceptualized as two competing goals side by side. Two 
strategies of opposition resolve from these preferences and its structural position. Parties in 
minority may employ competition with the government to catch the voters’ attention and 
enhance their re-election chances. Or they can compromise with the government to achieve 
short-term policy influence – most likely at the expense of office due to the blurring of 
responsibilities. Section 2.2.3 extended the strategic context to parliament further 
specifying the room of manoeuvre for opposition parties. The legislative process serves for 
opposition to communicate critique (strategy of competition) or negotiate compromise 
(strategy of cooperation). The model identifies two steps: the committee stage and the 
plenary stage. The strategies of opposition may vary throughout the process. The activities 
related to either strategy form the dependent variable of this study. 
Chapter 2.3 develops assumption on the conditions under which opposition choose conflict 
or compromise.  
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2.3. Explaining variation among opposition party groups 
The independent variables of this study are actor-centred explanations for EU scrutiny 
activities of opposition parties. The study assumes exogenous preferences directed towards 
policy and office within the strategic context of parliament and the EU. Which 
characteristics of a party group can explain whether it will employ a competitive or 
cooperative strategy? First, this chapter reviews the potential explanations for the role of 
opposition in parliament (2.3.1). Second, it develops the two key hypotheses that will guide 
the empirical analysis of this thesis (2.3.2). 
There are three dimensions on which to locate potential explanatory variables for 
opposition parties’ behaviour: institutional factors, actor-related factors and issue-based 
factors (Moury and de Giorgi 2015: 4). Classic studies on opposition as well as the 
literature on national parliaments and the EU largely focus on institutional factors to 
explain differences across countries (Dahl 1966, Oberreuter 1975, Blondel 1997, Helms 
1997, 2002, 2008b, Raunio 2009, Rozenberg and Hefftler 2015). Institutional and issue-
based explanations are control variables in the research design of this study. This studies’ 
research focus is on actor-centred explanations. With this emphasis, the thesis reacts to a 
gap that prior studies identified for research on opposition as well as legislatures. On the 
one hand, research on national parties and the EU argued to go beyond an analysis of 
formal structures (Raunio 2009, Finke and Dannwolf 2013, Rozenberg and Hefftler 2015). 
On the other hand, studies of opposition have asked to consider characteristics and 
motivation of political actors to explain opposition’s role in the political system (Kaiser 
2008, Steinack 2008, Brack and Weinblum 2011, Steinack 2011, Moury and de Giorgi 
2015). 
To do so I integrate two theoretical approaches from research on parties to explain the 
parliamentary behaviour. For the first hypothesis I turn to research on anti-establishment 
parties who should employ much more competitive strategies than mainstream parties. The 
second hypothesis builds on classic opposition theory and considers positional distance 
between governing and opposition parties to explain competition or cooperation. Based on 
cleavage theory it considers two dimensions of political conflict among parties: a socio-
economic (left-right) and a cultural (TAN-GAL) one.  
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2.3.1. Explanations for competition and cooperation 
This Section 2.3.1 discusses potential explanations for variation in opposition parties’ EU 
scrutiny activities. It reviews the literature of opposition parties to identify possible 
independent variables. The focus is on opposition in parliament, thus, excluding opposition 
on the street or in other formalized structures. Research on opposition often investigates the 
role of opposition actors in toto. Authors investigate, for example, the coherence and 
overall influence of parties not in government (Blondel 1997). The intention of this study is 
to explain variation of the behaviour of single opposition party groups. Interactions among 
different oppositional actors are secondary. 
The focus of this study is further on explaining the choice for cooperation or competition 
by an opposition party group. Not all attributes of opposition are relevant for the choice of 
one of these strategies. The strategies of conflict and cooperation address the relation of any 
single opposition party group and the governing party(s). The differentiation of the two 
strategies is well established (Steffani 1968, Oberreuter 1975, Blondel 1997, Helms 1997, 
2010, de Giorgi 2015, Moury and de Giorgi 2015, Christiansen and Seeberg 2016). 
However, only few studies have addressed an explanation of actual parliamentary activities 
through the lens of conflict and cooperation (Steinack 2008, 2011, de Giorgi 2015, Moury 
and de Giorgi 2015).  
Finally, the limitation of potential independent variables in this thesis occurs in view of 
their relevance for EU affairs. The multi-level system of governance challenges 
oppositional actors due its complexity and the necessary additional expertise on the 
decision-making structure as well as the political developments at EU level. 
Actor-centred explanatory factors 
In line with Kaiser (2008: 37, Note 7) I consider actor-centred explanations in terms of 
parties’ policy positions and inter-actions. The characteristics of political actors can be 
assessed in view of a rational choice or a constructivist perspective. This section considers 
the following potential independent variables: the size of an oppositional party group, its 
willingness to participate in government and the relative positions in the party system or 
towards the government. Constructivist studies have furthermore pointed to the relevance 
of the historical roots of a party, its party political culture and socio-demographic factors at 
individual level. The constructivist factors are included in this review to give a complete 
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overview, even though these factors are not relevant for the rational choice approach of this 
study (see 2.1.2). 
An obvious starting point for the role of opposition could be its size in terms of seat share. 
The strength of an opposition party has a significant effect on its potential influence in the 
parliamentary arena. A larger number of MPs shows a stronger presence in committees for 
their party group and has more resources in terms of staff and budget. Steinack (2011: 18) 
argues that a larger party group is able to develop more expertise among its members and 
can therefore “afford” to propose more solid alternative policy proposals (see also Jenny 
and Müller 2008). However, size does not matter for the choice of a cooperative or 
competitive strategy. Steinack (2011: 18) contains that size at the same time “fail[s] to 
justify why the [larger] party group did not develop an equally strong pattern of competitive 
behaviour“. The seat share and resources of a party group could lead to a more active 
search for compromise or more intense competition with government. The number of MPs 
does not affect the preference for cooperation or competition and is therefore not included 
in the analysis. 
Sartori (2005: 107-110) argues that size alone does not determine a parties’ relevance in a 
party system.30 Much more the relative power of a party group matters in the inter-action 
with other parties. This can take the form of “coalition potential”: Is a party potentially 
necessary to form a coalition and willing to participate in government? Alternatively, the 
relevance can be measured by a party’s “blackmail potential”: Does it alter the logic of 
party competition through its presence and actions? A party’s size and its position in 
relation to a minimal winning coalition form pre-conditions for relevance in both cases 
(Dumont and Caulier 2003: 11). The main difference between coalition and blackmail 
potential lies in a parties’ willingness to participate in government. Sartori (2005: 109) 
points out that parties with blackmail potential are often those of anti-system nature. For the 
study of opposition, the party type is more important than the seat share itself.  
The argument on the party type leads to a classic distinction of oppositional actors. Parties 
not in government who accept the “rules of the game” are considered “loyal opposition” 
(Kirchheimer 1966). “Her majesties Opposition” in the UK is the ideal type of a 
constitutionalized and loyal political actor. On the other extreme, a “disloyal” oppositional 
force criticizes the system itself and aims at disrupting the fundamental structures of a 
society. Sartori terms these two categories as “responsible” and “irresponsible” opposition 
                                                 
30 The problem only applies to party systems with more than two parties.  
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(Sartori 1966). Here, the link to the strategy of competition or cooperation becomes clearer. 
Responsible opposition is constituted by parties, which may “respond” to the task of 
governing in future elections (Sartori 1966: 150-153). A party with realistic future access to 
power will most likely formulate its policy positions more carefully and realistically than 
one for whom participation in government is out of reach or not of interest. Through 
cooperation they could demonstrate to the voter and other parties that they are responsible 
players in the political arena. 
The differentiation of “loyal” and “disloyal” or “responsible” and “irresponsible” 
opposition is reflected in more recent studies on parties that challenge the establishment. A 
number of parties, such as Green parties or extreme right parties, have entered the political 
party system in the past decades by challenging the mainstream consensus. This 
phenomenon has been titled with a range of terms including “niche party” (Adams et al. 
2006, Meguid 2008, Jensen and Spoon 2010, Meyer and Miller 2015), “challenger party” 
(de Vries and Hobolt 2012, Hino 2012, van de Wardt 2014), “populist party” (Mudde 2007, 
Kriesi 2014, Pauwels 2014), “new politics party” (Poguntke 1987) or “anti-establishment 
party” (Abedi 2002). Each concept uses a slightly different definition, which translates to 
different approaches of measurement. Yet, these concepts largely address the same political 
phenomenon. There is a strong overlap of the parties they include as their research objects. 
Schedler (1996) defines anti-establishment parties as “semi-loyal”. They accept the 
constitutional rules and democratic order of a state, yet, fundamentally oppose any actor of 
the existing political elite. The first hypothesis of this study addresses the difference 
between anti-establishment versus mainstream parties (see Section 2.3.2). 
The second aspect of Sartori’s definition of relevant parties is their “coalition potential”. 
This thesis does not further address “coalition potential” as an independent category. One 
could operationalize coalition potential as separate factor next to blackmail potential. 
Coalition potential is often operationalized by prior participation in government (de Vries 
and Hobolt 2012). Yet, a party that has never been in government before could still aspire 
future office responsibilities. Bolleyer (2008a: 25) specifies government relevance in 
contrast to government potential. The actual relevance of a party for governing would be 
indicated by the de facto participation in government in prior legislative periods. The 
potential to participate in government is based on the openness by other parties towards a 
new party. Their acceptance of the party in opposition to be a serious player and the 
consideration of coalitions determines this factor. This can be a mere aspiration for the 
future. The argument on government potential shows how close coalition and blackmail 
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potential are related to each other. For this case study approach, it does not seem plausible 
to differentiate these two factors.  
The work by Blondel (1997) forms a second starting point to discuss independent variables 
for cooperative or competitive parliamentary activities. He developed a typology of 
opposition that was intended to be applicable across countries, time and political regimes. 
Building on Dahl (1966), he identified two basic dimensions that characterize opposition in 
a country: the fragmentation of opposition (coherent or diffuse) and its political goals and 
strategies (close or distant to the government). The first dimension addresses the 
constellation of the party system, the second the individual position of opposition parties 
towards the government.  
Dahl’s (1996) second dimension of opposition’s distance in terms of policy goals and 
strategies can be applied at actor level. Blondel (1997) acknowledges that it would be 
difficult to identify the policy goals of opposition parties in abstract terms. What matters 
though is in how far opposition’s policy goals differ from the ones of the government. 
Recent research has applied this logic and investigated the role of positional differences to 
explain opposition parties’ behaviour in parliament (de Giorgi 2015, Finke and Herbel 
2015). This approach focuses on the inter-action of two groups – the governing and a single 
opposition group. This thesis understands the positional differences among party groups as 
an important explanatory factor for competition among party groups. This aspect in the 
relevance for conflict and cooperation is addressed Hypothesis 2 (see Section 2.3.2). 
The first dimension of Blondel’s typology of opposition has been taken up by more recent 
studies of opposition (de Giorgi 2007, Kaiser 2008, Maeda 2013). In the original concept, a 
strong single party in opposition exemplifies a cohesive approach. Opposition divided into 
two equally strong actors is less cohesive. Kaiser (2008) combines the argument on 
coherence with policy positions. He develops a model on the relative position of a 
governing party to two opposition groups in a one-dimensional policy space. If both 
opposition parties are either left or right from the government, they are likely to cooperate 
with each other. If government takes the middle position in between two oppositional 
actors, the opposition is less likely to join forces and less cohesive. A coherent opposition is 
considered stronger vis-à-vis the government. The dimension of opposition cohesiveness is 
useful to characterize a political system. It is less helpful for explaining variation among 
individual opposition parties and not further included in the analysis of this study.  
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A constructivist theoretical framework could accommodate further independent variables, 
as it emphasizes the influence of roles and informal norms. These factors are briefly 
reviewed here, despite the fact that they cannot be accommodated in a rational choice 
approach. Studies on oppositional actors have investigated the party political culture and 
individual level factors. Steinack (2011) has shown that the habits and culture within party 
groups influence their willingness to search for agreement with the government. She 
demonstrates that the Green party in Bavaria, a relatively young party born out of the social 
movements in the 1970s with a culture of openly discussing internal dissent, is much more 
competitive than the Social-Democratic Party. The latter is more established and more 
willing to compromise with the other “people’s party” in government. The aspect of a 
party’s history and culture will not be included in this thesis, as they exceed the rational 
choice framework.  
With regard to individual level factors, Steinack (2011) does not find support for the 
relevance of socio-demographic factors. Neither did her case study on the Bavarian state 
parliament render prior office experience at municipal level a relevant factor. She argues 
that age of MPs is significant, as younger MPs would compete more. However, the 
argument is formulated at aggregate level of party group and not a proper individual 
characteristic. It goes back to the political culture and lifespan of a party group. Jenny and 
Müller (2008) investigate MPs role in view of either constituency focus and/or engagement 
in parliamentary activities (committee work, plenary speeches and questions). The 
statistical testing for socio-demographic factors as explanation for the different roles of 
MPs did not deliver significant results. The authors explain the variation in MPs roles 
mainly through party size. MPs from large parties are less active or focus more on 
constituency work as a larger number of MPs shares the overall work load in parliament 
(Jenny and Müller 2008). Following this line of argument, the causal link is argued in terms 
of resources of party groups. As argued above, the seat share of a party should not have an 
influence on the choice of a cooperative or competitive strategy. 
The limited findings on individual level explanations for cooperation or conflict from 
opposition benches do not show a promising avenue for future research. Socio-
demographic factors did not render significant results either in the qualitative study or in 
quantitative analysis. Much more, the individual level factors seem to play into party level 
explanations. 
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In view of the existing alternative explanations, I argue that the two factors of party type 
and positional differences should have the strongest explanatory power among actor-
centred explanations. The alternative approaches will be taken into account in the 
discussion of the results of this study (Chapter 6). 
Control variables: Context and issue-based factors  
There are a number of factors that influence the role of cooperation and competition in 
parliament, which go beyond the actor-centred approach of this study. These can be located 
on the level of institutional or country factors or are issue-based factors. This section 
reviews the explanatory factors at institutional and issue-based level. However, factors on 
these two different levels have the role of control variables, not alternative explanations, in 
this study.  
Classic contributions of research on opposition mainly assess the impact of institutional 
differences on the room of manoeuvre for opposition (Dahl 1996, Blondel 1998, Oberreuter 
1975, see also Helms 1997, 2002, 2010). An early contribution of Oberreuter (1975) 
identified four features of a parliamentary system, which are still relevant for the role of 
opposition parties today: the electoral system, the party system, the rules on power sharing 
with minorities in parliament and the type of government. In a proportional electoral system 
and a party system with three or more parties, small parties have easier access to 
parliamentary representation, but a swing in voters is less likely to trigger a change in 
government. Parties are often required to coalesce to form a government. In political 
systems with elaborate minority protection, it is more likely that opposition parties will 
choose cooperative strategies.31 Due to the institutional features allowing them some policy 
influence the incentive to cooperate with government to achieve a partial realization of their 
policy programme is more effective than purely competitive strategies (von Beyme 1987: 
35, Helms 2010: 237). 
Holzhacker (2002, 2005) demonstrated that especially the type of government (minority, 
coalition or single party) affects the scope of influence of opposition of EU affairs. 
Louwerse et al. (2016) confirm the relevance of the type of government for explaining the 
support by opposition in voting in parliament. Why should government cooperate with 
                                                 
31 Helms (1997, 2002) lists six criteria: 1) the initiation of bills restricted to the majority or open to single MPs 
or minority groups, 2) a strong committee system in the sense of a “working parliament” (see Maeda 2013, 
Arter 2003), 3) opposition included in the body deciding organizational matters, as the agenda of the plenary, 
in the distribution of committee chairs, 4) opposition parties’ ability to call for an investigation committee, 5) 
requirement of super-majorities for specific decisions (e.g. constitutional revisions) and 6) right to bring a 
government policy to constitutional court for judicial revision.. 
 67 
parties in minority, if it has the “power of the vote” in the house? A basic argument for the 
need to cooperate with opposition is the strength of government in itself. A minority 
government needs to constantly search for support from other parties. A government with a 
one-seat majority is more vulnerable than one holding a two-third majority itself. Finke and 
Herbel (2015: 508) demonstrate that opposition is more likely to scrutinize EU affairs 
where government is weak in terms of seat share. The strength of government is also 
dependent on whether it is a single party or coalition government. A coalition government 
might be more vulnerable to opposition critique, where internally divided (Martin and 
Vanberg 2005). Finally, occasions where qualified majorities are required, as in 
constitutional amendments or EU treaty ratification, put government in a position where it 
requires opposition support. Going beyond the aspect of governments’ vulnerability, 
Louwerse et al. (2016) argue that cabinet ideology matters for broad majorities in 
parliamentary votes. A more centrist government is more willing to seek opposition 
support, than an ideologically extreme one.  
Finally, the availability of resources influences the role of opposition (Rommetvedt 2005, 
Green-Pedersen 2010). As a context factor, size of the member state and the resources of 
parliament (in form of number of seats and budget) should matter for the role of opposition. 
Resources should matter especially for EU scrutiny, which requires higher expertise due to 
the complex EU multi-level system. I argue that resources are a pre-condition for an active 
role for parliament and for opposition. They do, however, not explain the choice 
for competition or cooperation. The better access to information or higher number of 
administrative staff in a large parliament could be used to either challenge the government 
or to influence policy through cooperation. Resources are important to explain the overall 
influence of parliament, but do not play a role for explaining the choice of strategy of 
opposition.  
Another dimension of potential explanations lies in issue-based factors. I define these as 
factors derived from the nature of the legislative proposal. Issue-based explanations play an 
important role in research on interest groups (Lowi 1964, Mahoney 2007, Klüver 2013). 
The interest group literature discusses the role of issue salience, scope, the degree of 
conflict and technicality of an issue for the chance of success of lobbying activities. One 
could expect that similar logics could apply to parliaments who represent the interests of 
their voters. Issue-based explanations have some presence in legislative studies (Stecker 
2011, de Ruiter 2013, Gattermann and Hefftler 2015). In research of opposition activities 
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the role of salience and issue complexity has barely been investigated (Moury and de 
Giorgi 2015). The following paragraph discusses the role of issue salience and the initiator 
of a legislative proposal. 
First, oppositions’ willingness to invest their resources to EU scrutiny should be related to 
the overall salience or relevance of an issue (Moury and di Giorgi 2015: 4). The relevance 
can be indicated by the impact of a political decision on society, e.g. in terms of 
redistribution or identity. Salience on the other hand is measured by the attention of the 
public, media or parties (Warntjen 2012). Relevance and salience can coincide, but are not 
necessarily linked. For all party groups, salience and relevance should motivate to engage 
on the issue, as media presence is an important asset for re-election. Relevant and salient 
issues probably trigger more competitive behaviour by opposition. A decision with long-
term or strongly redistributive impact would most likely be more contested as they produce 
clear winners and losers. This study focuses on the actor-level for the explanation of 
variation in opposition parties’ EU scrutiny activities. However, the empirical analysis 
carefully points out the policy areas and issues under parliamentary review to assure 
transparency towards issue-based explanatory factors.  
Second, literature on committee work has considered the origin of a legislative proposal for 
the political outcome. Damgaard and Mattson (2004: 127) find more conflictive opposition 
strategies in committees when the government initiates the bill compared to all other 
initiators (party groups, individual, committee). De Giorgi (2011: 16) confirms this finding 
studying the Italian chamber in a more recent time span. Unfortunately neither of the two 
authors specifies whether bills introduced by other actors stemmed from governing or 
opposition parties. It would not come as a surprise, if opposition supported its own bills 
more frequently than those of the government (see also Stecker 2011). The initiator of 
legislative drafts and motions is always indicated clearly in this study.  
To sum up, this Section 2.3.1 has reviewed potential explanatory factors for competition 
and cooperation of opposition parties. The influence of institutional and country-level 
factors on the role of opposition has been researched in-depth. This study intends to go 
beyond this state of the art and focuses on actor-centred explanations.32 Institutions cannot 
account for the variation among individual parties within a country (see Steinack 2011: 2). 
This review identified the party type (anti-establishment or regular party) and the 
                                                 
32 The study intends to hold institutional factors constant by case selection (see Chapter 3.2). 
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ideological distance of opposition to the government as the two central explanatory 
variables at actor level. Institutional and issue-based factors serve as control variables in 
this study. A careful case selection and transparent research method assures that these 
control variables do not confound the results of the actor-centred explanatory variables. 
2.3.2. Hypotheses: The party type and positional distance  
The party type and positional difference between governing and opposition parties have 
been identified as the two most important explanatory factors at actor-level (2.3.1). This 
Section 2.3.2 develops the argument on the causal link of these two attributes to 
cooperative or competitive opposition activities and develops two hypotheses on opposition 
parties’ EU scrutiny activities. 
This study derives its first hypothesis from classic typologies of opposition parties and 
recent work on parties challenging the mainstream (Kirchheimer 1966, Sartori 1966, Abedi 
2002). For the purpose of this study, I am interested in the effect of party type on the extent 
of competition or cooperation with governing parties. Opposition research has argued for a 
categorization of oppositional actors according to their loyalty or responsibility towards the 
constitutional premises. More recent studies have investigated a party type that has been 
termed as “semi-loyal” (Schedler 1996). This research is inspired by the altered political 
competition since the 1980s. This study builds on the concept of anti-establishment parties 
as defined by Abedi (2002) and Schedler (1996), which is sensitive to qualitative difference 
of the party type. The term anti-establishment most precisely defines the attitude and 
strategy of this party type. In the following I review the concepts of “niche” party, populist 
party and challenger party to demonstrate that the concept of anti-establishment parties 
combines the structural and policy-oriented factors of these other approaches. 
The concept of “niche” parties is based on the party groups’ ideological programmes. 
According to Wagner (2012) “[n]iche parties are best defined as parties that compete 
primarily on a small number of non-economic issues.” Niche parties are defined in relation 
to the existing party system. They differ from traditional, mainstream parties who mainly 
compete over economic issues (left-right axis) and offer a whole range of policy proposals 
to their voters. Niche parties focus on a limited range of non-economic policy issues. In 
this, their issues often crosscut existing policy cleavages. The concept also implies that no 
other party is occupying this policy “niche”. Once the other parties pick up the issue 
promoted by the niche parties the issue becomes mainstream. The niche party loses its 
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unique position. A niche party does not need to be a new party; the distinctive policy 
position can be maintained over time, as traditional communist parties show (Wagner 2012: 
849). The concept of “niche” party is based on Meguid (2005). While Meguid (2005) 
measured niche parties through their affinity to certain party families, Wagner (2012: 850) 
argues for the ideological position measured by expert surveys and party programmes.  
The second approach focuses on the discursive strategies of parties, as defined through their 
populist stance. Mudde (2004: 543) defines populism as a thin ideology where the “pure 
people” are opposed to a “corrupt elite”. Müller (2016) specifies that a populist party 
presents itself as the only “true” representatives of the people. While all elected 
representatives claim to represent the citizens’ interest, the claim to be the only valid voice 
of the volonté generale undermines democratic principles. It tries to delegitimize all other 
political actors. The thin ideology of populism is expressed in the discursive strategy of 
contrasting people and elite. It can link to many different “thick” ideologies (Jagers and 
Walgrave 2007). Kriesi (2014) explains that the understanding of who belongs to the in-
group of “the people” needs to be specified through more profound ideological concepts. 
For example, a radical right version of populism identifies the in-group through ethnicity; a 
communist one through the working class. Similar to the concept of “niche” parties, the 
populist definition is applicable to parties across the political spectrum. Not all niche parties 
are populist and not all populist parties are niche parties; though there is some overlap. 
Populism cannot be identified through the ideological position only or in relation to other 
parties in a party system. It is primarily a discursive strategy that happens to often link to 
more extreme ideological positions. 
De Vries and Hobolt (2012) proposed a third approach to identify the party type, which 
they term “challenger parties” (see also van de Wardt 2014, Hobolt and Tilley 2016). 
Mainstream parties are characterized by repeated participation in government. A challenger 
party has never been part of a governing coalition or formed a single party government. 
They are confined to opposition benches or do not even hold parliamentary representation. 
The authors are close to Sartori’s (1966) differentiation of “responsible” and 
“irresponsible” opposition parties with their operationalization of challenger parties. The 
lack of participation is a way to identify an “irresponsible” opposition party looking back in 
time. The operationalization through non-participation in government is plausible for large-
n studies, as it provides a simple and clear-cut definition. For the qualitative small-n 
assessment of this thesis, I employ a more complex definition for parties challenging the 
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mainstream that combines several of the criteria of the concepts reviewed above. 
This study uses the concept of anti-establishment parties by Abedi (2002). He defines three 
criteria, which serve to identify an anti-establishment party:  
 it presents itself as a challenger to established parties,  
 it expresses a fundamental divide between the established parties and “the people” 
in its rhetoric and  
 the party challenges the status quo in terms of policy and political system issues.  
This definition combines policy, structural and discursive elements. Anti-establishment 
parties are understood to propagate a new policy issue on the political spectrum, as for 
example Green parties focus on environment or the new populist parties’ on migration. 
Their self-concept revolves around challenging established political actors. Similar to the 
definition of populist parties, they employ a communicative strategy where the “people” are 
juxtaposed to the “elite”. 
An anti-establishment party can be “established” according to the conceptualization of 
Abedi (2002).33 The definition of an established party differs in quality from that of an anti-
establishment party. The two qualities are not simply opposing poles of a dichotomy. A 
party is defined as established, if it either participated in government prior or where other 
parties with government potential consider it a suitable future partner (see also Abedi 2002: 
555-557, de Vries and Hobolt 2012). In consequence, this approach also accounts for the 
possibility that an anti-establishment party has become established. That is a party that 
employs the discursive strategy of people versus elite, which participated in government 
before. In several countries we have witnessed anti-establishment parties participating in 
governing coalitions, such as in Austria, Greece and Italy as well as supporting a minority 
government in Denmark, the Netherlands (Mudde 2012). Since Abedi combines the 
discursive, ideological and practical elements discussed above, his analytical concept 
allows grasping this real world complexity.  
I expect anti-establishment parties to be more competitive than regular parties. Existing 
research has shown that they follow different electoral and coalition strategies (Wagner 
2012). The literature has discussed the priority of policy and office for this party type 
critically. First, challenger parties are considered to be more policy oriented than 
established parties (Spoon 2011). Jensen and Spoon (2010) argue for a stronger policy 
                                                 
33 This differentiation becomes relevant in the empirical analysis of the Freedom Party in Austria. It is 
“established” as it has participated in coalition government with the SPÖ (1983-1986) and the ÖVP (2000-
2005), however, clearly complies to the party type of anti-establishment parties.  
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focus in view of their origin as a reaction to a lack of policy offers by mainstream parties on 
a specific issue. Green parties as well as niche parties have been shown to maintain a 
stronger focus on policy than on office (Adams et al. 2006, Dumont and Bäck 2006). 
Second, studies investigated the impact of populist radical right parties with parliamentary 
representation or government participation (Minkenberg 2001, Williams 2006). Even in 
office, their impact on actual immigration or EU integration policy is rather limited. 
Finally, the goal of office conflicts with re-election prospects for anti-establishment parties, 
especially in member states where coalition governments are common (Sitter 2001, van de 
Wardt 2014). A party that promised unrealistic policy contents risks re-election when 
taking over governing responsibility (assuming they must fail in realizing their policy). 
Several authors have shown that the electoral cost is high for anti-establishment parties first 
governing responsibility (Pedahzur and Brichta 2002, Bolleyer 2008b, van Spanje 2011).  
To sum up, anti-establishment parties are characterized by their discursive and positional 
challenger status towards the political elite. In this they address the voters who are 
dissatisfied with the status quo of the political system. The positional and rhetorical anti-
establishment strategy is expected to lead to less cooperation with parties in government. 
Some authors argue that the goal of policy-seeking is more pronounced for anti-
establishment parties. In consequence, I expect them to be less cooperative towards other 
mainstream political parties. 
H1) If an opposition party holds an anti-establishment stance, it is expected to use 
more parliamentary activities related to a competitive strategy. 
The strategy of competition is differentiated by one further aspect. The quality of the 
competition may be of relevance for the contribution to democratic legitimacy. This study 
derives two different types of conflict based on Sartori’s (1966) distinction of “responsible” 
and “irresponsible” opposition (see also Helms 2002, Brack and Weinblum 2009). 
According to the author, the (ir)responsibility has an effect on the type of competition an 
opposition party engages in. A “responsible” opposition party is able to respond to the 
challenges it would be confronted with when in office. It develops realistic policy 
alternatives in its motions and public statements. These inform the electorate on alternative 
policy programmes and increase the legitimacy of the democratic system. Sartori (1966) 
defines an “irresponsible” opposition party as unprepared to actually live up to the 
responsibility of government. Its priority is criticising the government or the existing 
political system as an end in itself. This outright criticism does not provide practicable 
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alternative policy programmes. It rather weakens the legitimacy of the political system. As 
anti-establishment parties have been categorized as “semi-loyal” (Linz 1978: 32-33, 
Schedler 1996: 303), they accept the constitutional boundaries of a democratic political 
system. However, they delegitimize all other political actors in the anti-elite attitude by 
ignoring the differentiation of opposition and government (Schedler 1996: 303). This form 
of competition is a principled criticism where government is attacked for the sake of 
competition and policy suffers a lack of argumentation on how to implement them under 
real world conditions.  
H1a) If an opposition party holds an anti-establishment stance, it is expected to use 
more parliamentary activities related to principled competition towards political 
elites. 
For the second hypothesis, I consider party positions of government and opposition on two 
dimensions of political conflict (a socio-economic and a cultural one). The argument builds 
on Blondel’s (1997) classic work on theorizing opposition and links to more recent studies 
on societal and political cleavages (Bartolini and Mair 1990, Kitschelt 2001, Kriesi et al. 
2006).  
Blondel (1997) identified two basic dimensions that characterize opposition in a country: 1) 
the fragmentation of opposition and 2) its political goals and strategies. The first dimension 
is useful to characterize a political system. It does not explain variation among opposition 
parties as intended in this study. The second dimension of policy goals and strategies of 
opposition can be applied at actor level. Blondel (1997) acknowledges that it would be 
difficult to identify the policy goals of opposition parties in abstract terms. What matters 
though is in how far opposition’s policy goals differ from the ones of the government. The 
more distant the positions are, the more the parties compete against each other.  
Blondel’s (1997) assumption can be linked to two important theories on party competition: 
spatial analysis and issue competition. Spatial models assume that party groups locate close 
towards citizens’ interests while maximizing the distance to their competitors (Downs 
1957). Thus, the positional distance between governing and opposition parties is an 
important factor for explaining party groups’ behaviour.  
Other scholars argue that parties increasingly compete about which issues to place on the 
political agenda (Budge and Farlie 1983, Green-Pedersen 2007, Guinaudeau and Persico 
2013). Issue competition is about advancing issues, like economics, environment or 
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migration that benefit the own party in electoral competition and are disadvantageous to 
other parties (Green-Pedersen 2007: 609). Green-Pedersen (2007: 609) explains how issue 
competition relates to positional competition among political parties. A difference in 
positions is a pre-condition for pushing the topic onto the political agenda. Research on 
issue competition strengthens the argument for the following Hypothesis 2: Strong 
positional differences should encourage to more competitive strategies of opposition parties 
in the parliamentary arena.34 Here, agenda setting within parliament, e.g. through motions 
and in debates, should play a role. 
More recent research on opposition has investigated the role of positional differences to 
explain opposition parties’ behaviour in parliament (see de Giorgi 2011, Kaiser 2008, Finke 
and Herbel 2015). Kaiser (2008: 7) argues for an actor-centred explanation of opposition in 
a study of opposition in Westminster style democracies. He shows that opposition parties 
whose policy positions are closer to the government are more likely to cooperate with the 
government. De Giorgi (2011: 12) develops theoretical considerations on supportive or 
adversarial voting behaviour of the opposition on government proposals. Among other 
factors, she finds that less distance in policy preference between governing and opposition 
party groups leads to more cooperative behaviour. Finke and Herbel (2015) demonstrate 
that policy preferences matter for the initiation of scrutiny on EU-related documents in a 
study of eight EU member states. The more governing and opposition parties differ on an 
EU policy proposal, the more likely it is for opposition to initiate scrutiny. This is 
especially relevant when the government is weak in terms of seat share (Finke and Herbel 
2015: 502). Building on this theoretical and empirical research this study hypothesizes that 
policy positions matter for cooperation and competition among parliamentary actors. 
H2: The more distant an opposition party group’s position is from the governing 
parties, the more it is expected to use parliamentary activities related to a 
competitive strategy. 
Though ideological distance is a simple criterion for predicting competition or cooperation 
in the parliamentary arena, the question remains how to measure this distance in party 
positions. This study builds on cleavage theory and empirical studies on West European 
party systems to find a measure for ideological distance that further specify Hypothesis 2. 
This thesis acknowledges two major cleavages in West European states. 
                                                 
34 Scholars operationalize ”issue-divisiveness” with party groups positional distance multiplied with a salience 
score (see Martin and Vanberg 2004: 20, de Giorgi 2011). 
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Cleavage theory argues that “critical junctures” in large-scale societal processes, such as 
nation building, secularization or industrialization, have a long-term impact on the structure 
of political conflict in a country (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). According to Bartolini and 
Mair (1990), a societal cleavage is constituted by three elements: a) a socio-structural one, 
such as class or religion, b) a collective identity of the respective social group and c) an 
organisational manifestation thereof. Bornschier (2009: 1) explains the appeal of cleavage 
theory by its ability to link specific micro level political behaviour to abstract macro level 
developments. It serves as a heuristic to reduce the complexity of social life.  
Cleavage theory mainly argues for permanence of social structure. Lipset and Rokkan 
(1967) argue in their “freezing hypothesis” that the societal conflicts of the 1920s continued 
to structure Western European party systems over time to the stability of cleavages. 
Whereas a party system may “freeze” – in other words become institutionalized or 
consolidated (Sartori 2005) – we can hardly assume that society itself does not 
continuously evolve. In consequence, consolidated parties become less representative of the 
social groups in their country where the “freezing hypothesis” is true. A de-alignment of 
voters and established parties provides room for new parties or position change of existing 
parties (Martin 2000, Lachat 2007). If new issues correspond to the existing cleavage 
structures, existing parties can fairly easily integrate them. However, if a new issue cuts 
across existing dimensions of political conflict, parties are internally divided and struggle to 
find a common position on the new issue. Globalization, including EU integration, is 
argued to trigger such a change in the cleavage structure in the past decades (Kriesi et al. 
2006). 
Lipset and Rokkan (1967) identified four dimensions of conflict in their seminal work: 
capital versus labour, centre versus periphery, rural versus urban and religion versus state. 
These evolved from two processes, industrialization and secularization, after the turn of the 
century. For this reason Kitschelt (1994: 230-234) argues that the four dimensions can be 
boiled down to two: class and religion. Whereas the class cleavage is linked to socio-
economic conditions (with issues like redistribution, taxation and the role of the 
government in the economy), the religious cleavage touches more upon values (with issues 
like abortion) (Otjes and Katsanidou 2017: 302). Scholars saw an issue termed New Politics 
(or “new value” or “new class”) affect the traditional cleavages in post-industrial societies 
since the late 1960s. Focusing on moral and lifestyle questions, the social movements of the 
1970s accentuated a value conflict between libertarian and authoritarian ideals (Kitschelt 
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1994, Flanagan and Lee 2003, Bornschier 2009). The religious cleavage transformed to a 
cultural one.  
Kriesi et al. (2006: 13) argue that globalization created a new line of conflict in recent 
decades between winners and losers of integration beyond national borders (see also 
Kitschelt 1994, 1995, Hooghe and Marks 2009). Especially the value-based dimension that 
spans between authoritarianism and liberalism since the 1970s changed due to globalization 
issues. Following Hooghe and Marks (2009), one pole is associated with traditional-
authoritarian-nationalist (TAN) values, whereas the other relates to green-alternative-
libertarian concepts (GAL). Migration and European integration are issues of high 
controversy within this cultural dimension, as they are manifestations of the permeability of 
national borders. This thesis follows those studies that conceptualize the political space as 
two-dimensional.  
How do these two dimensions of conflict impact party competition on EU affairs? The 
European Union holds competences in such a wide range of policy fields that EU affairs 
cannot be considered a single issue. EU competences cover diverse policy areas, such as 
agriculture, the common market and environment. Next to the broad range of “things the 
EU does”, conflict also revolves around “what the EU is”. The process of EU integration 
triggers controversies about the future of this polity. This study identifies scope conditions 
for the ideological distance on each dimension: It identifies which EU issues spark 
controversy on which of the two dimensions defined above (socio-economic and cultural).  
In general the issues that relate to questions of economy and redistribution (left-right axis) 
trigger most competition in parliament (Stecker 2011, Moury and de Giorgi 2015: 4). For 
EU affairs, the left-right dimension still structures competition to a certain extent though it 
is not the dominant one. For this dimension of conflict, it is most important to analyse 
“what the EU does”, its policy output. The traditional difference of the left aiming for 
regulation in form of protection of social and worker rights versus the right promoting 
deregulation translates to the EU level of governance (Kriesi et al. 2006). Hooghe and 
Marks (2009: 14-15) explain that the socio-economic conflict at EU level is less about 
redistribution than about (de)regulation. Parties left of centre demand market correcting 
measures at EU level or the protection of national social welfare systems. Conservative 
parties and economic liberal ones see deregulation as the goal of EU integration. Studies 
have shown that the left-right conflict structures decision-making within EU institutions 
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(see Hix 2008). In consequence, the left-right dimension should matter especially for the 
design of the common market and the economic policy areas.  
More recent studies also show a difference in the reactions of left or right parties in the 
Euro crisis that links to the classic socio-economic dimension of conflict. Closa and 
Maatsch (2014) show that a party’s position on the socio-economic dimension affects their 
stance towards crisis measures. They show that left extreme parties are strongly opposed to 
austerity measures. Miklin (2014: 1203) points out differences of centre-left and centre-
right parties (or mainstream parties) on how to solve the Euro crisis. Left-oriented parties 
demanded growth-stimulating instruments based on deficit spending, while right of centre 
parties promoted budget consolidation and financial stability (see also Wendler 2012: 20-
24).  
In sum, ideological distance of opposition and governing parties on the left-right dimension 
is expected to translate into conflict about the social and economic policy design within the 
EU.  
H2a) The more distant an opposition party group’s position is from the governing 
parties, the more it is expected to use a competitive strategy towards EU issues 
concerning the economic and social policy areas. 
How does the cultural dimension (TAN versus GAL) of political conflict link to 
compromise or competition on EU affairs? Most research on party positions towards 
European integration has argued that the integration issue (“what the EU is”) stands 
orthogonal to the left-right dimension (Lord and Hix 1997, Hooghe and Marks 1999). The 
post-Maastricht EU triggers opposition from both ends of the socio-economic dimension 
(inverted U-curve) (Lord and Hix 1997, Hooghe et al. 2002, Lubbers and Scheepers 2010). 
Left and right extreme parties are most critical of EU integration. The basic identity-related 
question of more or less integration in Europe cuts across the socio-economic dimension. 
For this dimension of conflict it matters most “what the EU is”, the aspect of European 
integration in terms of polity building. For parties in opposition who conflict with the 
governing parties on the cultural dimension, this study expects them to use a more 
competitive approach on the political nature of the EU integration project, e.g. migration, 
further integration (deepening and widening) and identity-related issues. During the Euro 
crisis questions of cross-border solidarity and transnational redistribution are most likely 
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linked to identity matters and can be explained by the cultural dimension of political 
conflict.  
H2b) The more distant an opposition party group’s position is from the governing 
parties, the more it is expected to use a competitive strategy towards issues 
concerning EU integration and identity matters. 
 
2.4. Summary 
Opposition to EU affairs at domestic level is – despite its relevance for EU democratic 
legitimacy – an understudied topic. This chapter has developed a model for analysing 
opposition to EU issues at the national level in the parliamentary arena. Based on rational 
choice institutionalism, this study defines office- and policy-seeking as goals of parties. 
Opposition can achieve these goals by the strategies of competition or cooperation with 
governing parties. The model of opposition in national parliaments contextualizes these 
strategies within two steps of parliamentary procedures, the committee and the plenary 
stage, to grasp the temporal dimension of cooperation and competition in parliament. This 
two-step model applies to different channels of influence on EU affairs, including 
policymaking or oversight to the allocation of competences. Opposition can attempt to 
cooperate or compete at each stage of parliamentary scrutiny. Cooperation allows for partial 
policy influence negotiated behind closed doors, e.g. in committees, and is documented by 
the voting behaviour in parliament. Competition is expressed by agenda setting and public 
criticism in plenary debates. 
The theoretical part of this thesis reviewed explanatory factors for the motivation of 
opposition parties to actively scrutinize EU affairs. It developed two hypotheses integrating 






H1 If an opposition party holds an anti-establishment stance, it is expected to use 
more parliamentary activities related to a competitive strategy. 
H1a If an opposition party holds an anti-establishment stance, it is expected to use 
more parliamentary activities related to principled competition towards political 
elites. 
H2 The more distant an opposition party group’s position is from the governing 
parties, the more it is expected to use parliamentary activities related to a 
competitive strategy. 
H2a The more distant an opposition party group’s position is from the governing 
parties, the more it is expected to use a competitive strategy towards EU issues 
concerning the economic and social policy areas. 
H2b The more distant an opposition party group’s position is from the governing 
parties, the more it is expected to use a competitive strategy towards issues 
concerning EU integration and identity matters. 
Table 1: Overview of the hypotheses. 
This study sets out to investigate the political motivation for parliamentary EU scrutiny. It 
contributes to recent development in study of national parliaments and EU affairs, which 
analyses the actual use of parliamentary scrutiny rights. The theoretical model provides a 
sound framework for the empirical analysis. The following Chapter 3 explains the 












3. Methodological framework and case selection 
 
The overall aim of this thesis is to explain EU scrutiny activities of opposition parties in 
national parliaments. Chapter 2 has developed a theoretical approach on the role and 
strategies of opposition parties in EU affairs. It addresses the demand that studies open the 
“black box” of national parliaments in this research area (Raunio 2009). Most existing 
studies focus on formal rules not the actual scrutiny practices. The theoretical approach of 
this thesis conceptualizes the motives of opposition actors for EU scrutiny within 
legislatures. The two central hypotheses expect that anti-establishment parties and 
ideological distance towards the governing parties motivate more critical EU scrutiny 
activities. The model on opposition differentiates a two-step scrutiny process of the 
committee and plenary stage that applies to various channels of influencing EU affairs (see 
2.2.3). For the empirical investigation of the theoretical approach, the study uses the 
comparative method in a small-n design. The analysis covers party groups in opposition in 
Austria and Germany in the legislative period from 2008, or 2009 respectively, to 2013. 
The investigation is of explorative nature since the topic has rarely been addressed by prior 
research.  
The study covers the legislative work at committee level as well as the communicative 
practice at plenary debates. The empirical investigation combines three methodological 
approaches for an in-depth analysis of the overall six opposition parties in Austria and 
Germany. First, the scope of activities is measured in form of quantitative analysis, e.g. on 
EU-related initiatives at committee level or voting behaviour. Second, the quality of 
opposition parties’ scrutiny activities is investigated through content analysis of initiatives 
and plenary speeches. Third, the motivation and actual organisation of parliamentary EU 
scrutiny is assessed through interviews with members of both parliaments. 
Period of investigation are the legislative periods from September 2008 to September 2013 
in Austria and September 2009 to September 2013 in Germany. Covering a similar time 
period in both countries assures that the input from EU level and of the political 
developments in general is similar for each political system. Looking at a time period, 
which is less recent, allows better access to information and better evaluation of the 
developments in view of their outcome. The empirical analysis focuses on the time period 
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after the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. This way the larger institutional context 
at EU level is stable within the period of investigation. The Lisbon Treaty has repeatedly 
been termed the “treaty of parliaments” (see Lammert 2009) as it has strengthened 
parliamentary participation at both levels: national and European. National parliaments, for 
the first time, have gained an opportunity of direct influence at EU level with the Early 
Warning Mechanism. The new treaty is by the time of writing in place for seven years so 
that it allows covering a sufficiently long period of time to understand the parliamentary 
logic under this new setting.  
This Chapter 3 proceeds to present the general methodological framework of the 
comparative method (3.1). An important element of this method is the case selection. This 
study applies the most-similar system design. Chapter 3.2 argues that the institutional 
setting in Austria and Germany are quite similar and explains the parliamentary scrutiny 
procedures in more detail (3.3). The opposition parties are, at the same time, divers on the 
two independent variables (party type and ideological distance, see Chapter 3.4). Chapter 
3.5 lays out the methodological approach of the empirical analysis. It remains at an abstract 
level, as the analysis needs to be adapted to each channel of influence (committee work and 
plenary debates). Each empirical chapter (Chapters 4 and 5) first presents the precise 
methods and data sources, before it presents the results.  
3.1. The comparative method 
The comparative method is a “systematic analysis of a small number of cases” comparing 
two or more cases on clearly defined criteria (Collier 1993: 105). It implicitly builds on the 
assumption that patterns of behaviour exist in social reality which scientific inquiry can 
detect (Faure 1994: 308). In terms of scope versus depth of study, the comparative method 
is located in between a case study (n = 1) and a statistical large-n approach (n > 20) 
(Lijphart 1971, 1993). It allows a more in-depth analysis of the cases than statistical 
analysis, yet is more generalizable than a case study through the comparison of a number of 
incidents. Both, the statistical and the comparative method, look for co-variation between 
independent and dependent variables (Jahn 2013: 179). The comparative method 
distinguishes itself from the statistical one through conscious case selection by the 
researcher instead of random sampling from a universe of cases (Faure 1994: 312).  
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A much discussed problem of this method appears when the number of variables outweighs 
the number of cases, which Lijphart (1971: 686) termed the “many variables, small n” 
problem. Where this happens, the dependent variable will be over determined so that it is 
impossible to identify the explanatory power of a single variable (Przeworski and Teune 
1970: 34). Ideally, the comparative method should lead to a clear falsification or support of 
hypotheses.35 The aim of this study is to test and the hypotheses that were deduced from 
literature on parties and adapted for analysis of parliamentary behaviour, especially through 
the focus on formal parliamentary scrutiny in the inter-electoral period. Lijphart (1971: 
686–690)listed three remedies to the “many variables, small n” problem: first, to increase 
the number of cases; second, to reduce the number of variables through theoretical 
parsimony and third, to match cases where control variables coincide. The last solution 
stands in conflict to the first, as cases, which hold many similar attributes, are rare (Lijphart 
1975). This study addresses the “many variables, small n” problem through the parsimony 
of the rational choice theory. It reduced the number of independent variables to two key 
factors: party type and positional distance. The empirical analysis covers two member states 
with overall six opposition parties to increase the number of cases and validity of the 
results. The case selection uses the most similar system design in order to exclude 
institutional factors from the empirical analysis.  
The comparative method aims at the analysis of co-variation in order to detect causal 
relationships (see Skopcpol and Somers 1980). This method roots in the principles defined 
by John Stuart Mill (1890). Mill’s “method of difference” is best represented in an 
experimental setting, where all factors are similar except the manipulated independent 
variable. The most similar system design of the comparative method resembles this setup. 
Cases should be selected as similar as possible in all aspects except the independent 
variable(s) (Lijphart 1971: 687). The effect of the independent variable on the outcome can 
effectively be tested.  
The method of difference applies only to dichotomous variables which are either present or 
absent. Mill’s method of concomitant variations further accounts for gradual variation of 
variables: “Whatever phenomenon varies in any manner whenever another phenomenon 
varies in the same particular manner, is either a cause or an effect of that phenomenon, or is 
connected with it through some fact of causation.” (Mill 1890: 287) The two methods of 
                                                 
35 Alternatively, the comparative method can be used inductively to find new hypotheses (Scopkol and 
Somers 1980, Collier 1993). 
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difference and of concomitant variations complement each other and may be combined. 
They represent the basic logic behind the comparative method of this study. 
Most social science research problems are confronted with probabilistic, not deterministic, 
relationships among variables (Gschwend and Schimmelfennig 2007: 12). A single case 
that contradicts the theoretical expectations does not overthrow a theory in a probabilistic 
setting. In so far, Mill’s conclusion rules cannot be applied strictly. For the actual research 
design, one often needs to conceptualize more complex relationships allowing for gradual 
variation and more or less likely outcomes. The statistical method has clear agreements on 
levels of significance (e.g. the one or five per cent confidence intervals, see Fields 2012: 
51); For the comparative method, there is no predetermined standard for the intensity with 
which two variables should be linked in order to be significant. The researcher needs to 
decide herself about the cut-off point (Jahn 2013: 179).  
The limited number of cases and countries of the comparative method have two crucial 
advantages over a statistical large-n approach: It allows a more in-depth analysis and avoids 
conceptual overstretch (Collier 1993: 108). According to Sartori (1970) the original 
meaning of theoretical concepts can be distorted when applied to a large number of cases. 
In turn, concepts designed as one-size-fit-all risk to be superficial. They may be unable to 
grasp all important aspects necessary to understand a case. Collier (1993: 106) argues that 
the comparative method with a small number of cases is most adequate for a first 
assessment of a theory. It gives room to account for detailed analysis of the independent 
variables of interest and to be aware of alternative explanatory variables. A small-n study 
can be designed for the purpose of hypotheses testing through careful case selection. This 
study intends to refine hypotheses (Levy 2008). Where the new theory and its hypotheses 
find support in the small-n study, future research can extend the scope of empirical 
analysis. 
3.2. Case selection 
The conscious selection of cases in a small-n comparative approach serves as substitute for 
statistical control of intervening variables or control over context factors in an experimental 
setting (Collier 1993: 106). George and Bennett (2005: 234) argue that case selection is 
“the most difficult step in developing a case research design.” Due to the rational choice 
neo-institutionalist framework, this study faces the additional challenge to consider factors 
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at the system- and at the actor-level. The institutional factors that have been shown to 
impact opposition parties’ roles are located at country level (see Section 2.3.1). The utility 
maximizing incentives derived from the goal of policy- and office-seeking vary at party 
group level. The case selection needs to account for these two levels and their possible 
interaction. 
3.2.1. The most similar system design 
The case selection of this study is guided by the logic of a most-similar system design 
(Lijphart 1971, 1975, Faure 1994). The general idea of the most-similar system design is to 
keep all system-level factors constant except for the independent variable(s) of interest. 
Most-similar system designs are often used for the study of system level factors. However, 
Przeworski and Teune (1970: 33–34) point out that there is no abstract reason for excluding 
sub-system level factors as variables. The logic of the most-similar system level is adapted 
to the purpose of this study: It keeps the system level factors (as) constant (as possible), 
while the independent variables vary at the actor level. With this research design the study 
can focus on the strategies of opposition parties and largely disregard institutional factors.  
This leads to a second challenge of case selection. There is a range of EU member states 
that could be matched according to the most-similar case selection. For example the 
Scandinavian countries with the Netherlands or more majoritarian democracies, such as 
Ireland, UK and Poland, could be sensible groups of countries to study. To make an 
adequate choice of countries within these options, this study uses the least likely principle. 
In which type of political system can we expect the least amount of competition by 
opposition parties?  
The classic literature on opposition has defined a number of institutional criteria that 
influence the role for opposition, such as the type of government, electoral system and 
degree of centralization (see Section 2.3.2). These different political system attributes 
relevant for the role of opposition are linked to the dichotomy of consensus versus 
majoritarian models of democracy (Lijphart 2012). Lijphart (2012) argues that the 
concentration or dispersion of power in a political system influences the type of legitimacy 
of a democracy. Where power is concentrated in the hands of the majority, as in 
Westminster systems, opposition has few options but to exert public criticism (see Maeda 
2013). Its influence within the formal process of legislation is very limited. A consensus 
democracy gives parties in minority better opportunities to influence policy outcome. In 
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consequence, the stronger institutional rights make cooperation more effective and 
attractive for opposition parties (Maeda 2013).  
The introduction of this thesis has argued that competition by opposition parties should 
advance the democratic legitimacy or EU policymaking through more active politicization 
of the decisions at supranational level (see Section 1.1.3). For the empirical analysis, I 
choose to study consensus democracies. Here competition among party groups is less likely 
than in majoritarian systems. Should the analysis find a competitive approach on EU issues 
by opposition in these consensual democracies, the effect should be even stronger in a 
political setting that encourages competitive behaviour of opposition parties. 
I chose Austria and Germany for empirical study since they are both consensus 
democracies, have similar institutional structures and show variation on the independent 
variables. First, Lijphart’s (2012) study “Patterns of democracy” has located Austria and 
Germany both on the consensus side of the scale. Their institutional settings are very 
similar in cross-national comparison (see this Section 3.2.1 and Section 3.2.2). Their 
geographical proximity assures that the two countries share one language, similar historical 
experiences and culture (Gschwend and Schimmelfennig 2007). Thus, the political system 
factors and other potential undetected explanatory factors can be excluded from the analysis 
of different opposition strategies in EU affairs. Second, the party groups in opposition in 
the two member states vary in size, ideological position, party type and their attitude 
towards the EU (see Section 3.4.3). In so far, the selection of opposition parties in these two 
countries provides enough variation on the independent variables to test the hypotheses.  
The following section explains the political system attributes of Austria and Germany to 
underpin the most similar system logic and the parliamentary rules and procedures on 
domestic and EU affairs. While the argument focuses on their similarities in cross-national 
comparison, the chapter also carefully points out differences that might affect the role of 
opposition and need to be taken into consideration in the evaluation of the results. 
3.2.2. The political systems of Austria and Germany 
This Section 3.2.2 presents an overview of the political system factors of the two countries 
under investigation. Austria and Germany have similar features on most of the political 
system factors that the literature identified relevant for the role of opposition (see Table 2). 
Furthermore, the two countries are long established democracies with relatively stable party 
systems and have been EU members for several decades. Germany is a founding member of 
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the EU and Austria joined in 1995, thus, over 20 years ago. Both participate in the common 
currency. They vary significantly in size of population and, in consequence, in the size of 
their parliamentary chambers. The size of a legislature affects its administrative support 
structure and resources. However, resources should not affect the strategies of opposition in 
EU affairs much. The remainder of this chapter assesses the political system features in 
detail. This information is necessary to justify the case selection. 
Table 2: Political system features of Germany and Austria in the time period from 2009 to 2013. 
The current political system of Austria is based on the constitution of 1920 (reformed in 
1929), which was installed after the fall of the Habsburg monarchy. Austria is known as 
classic case of consociationalism (Pelinka 2006). The pillar structure is not installed in the 
constitution, but rooted solely in political arrangements. The constitution defines a semi-
presidential system. The directly elected president formally holds the power to veto the 
installation of a new government and to dissolve parliament (§ 70 (1) and § 29 (b) B-VG). 
As up to date Austrian presidents have never used their powers, the country is considered a 
de facto parliamentary system (Pelinka 2006: 522). The state is organized in a federal 
structure with nine states. The parliament has two chambers with an asymmetric federalism. 
The Bundesrat is a weak second chamber and holds veto power only on constitutional 
reforms on the allocation of competence to state or federal level. Regarding all other 
legislation it merely has the ability to delay a decision for up to two month (Fallend 2006, 
Müller 2006).36 Delegates from state parliaments form the second chamber, the Bundesrat. 
As party affiliation of members of the Bundesrat depends on state-level elections, it is 
possible that the opposition holds the majority in this body or gains it throughout the 
                                                 
36 One third of the MPs in the Nationalrat can call for appeal at the constitutional court for abstract norm 
control on new legislation. This minority tool is not used frequently, however,  
 Germany Austria 




Centralisation  Federalism Asymmetric federalism 
No. of chambers Bicameral Bicameral 
Electoral system Proportional Proportional 
Effect. No. parties  4.83 4.24 
Type of government Coalition Grand coalition 





Size (population in 2014) 80.9 mio. 8.5 mio. 
Year of EU accession 1952 1995 
Euro zone membership Yes Yes 
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legislative period (Helms 2002: 62). Within the legislative period investigated here, the 
coalition government of ÖVP and SPÖ held the majority in the Bundesrat continuously. 
The political system of Germany, in its current form, dates back to the foundation of the 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland and formulation of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) in 1949. 
Whereas the traditional federal order of the country was reinstalled, the Basic Law revised 
many elements of the Weimarer Republik that had enabled the coming into power of the 
NS-Regime in 1933. The lower chamber of parliament, the Bundestag, is the only directly 
elected body at federal level. Power is dispersed by means of federalism and separation of 
powers. 
The chamber representing the states, the Bundesrat, has a strong voice in the political 
system. The strong upper chamber is the main difference to the Austrian political system 
within the generally similar structure. Federal legislation requires the support of the 
Bundesrat in case of revision of the Basic Law and where legislation has an impact on the 
finances or administrative organization of the states.37 The vote shares of parties in the 
Bundesrat are constantly changing with each state level election. The strong position of this 
chamber gives parties in opposition significant leverage in the case of holding the majority 
in this house (Helms 2002: 52). Only towards the very end of the period of investigation 
did the elections in Niedersachsen on 20 January 2013 result in a majority of votes for the 
three opposition parties in the Bundesrat (Wahlrecht 2016). 
The power of a constitutional court and the opportunity for minorities to call for judicial 
review are a key factor in the separation of powers. Both countries institutionalized the 
principle of power sharing through independence of the constitutional court, which holds 
the power of judicial review of legislation. The responsibility of a highest court for the 
interpretation of the constitution is termed the Austrian/German-model (Kneip 2008: 624). 
This indicates the strong similarities of the two systems and their unique position. The 
constitutional courts in both countries are among the ones with the highest independence 
and institutional strength in international comparison (Kneip 2008: 648). The courts may 
review the norm conformity of legislation with the constitution in specific or abstract form. 
Thus, the constitutional courts can recall legislation that parliament has voted upon. This 
                                                 
37 Despite a reform of the allocation of competences to federal or state level in 2006, 38.3 per cent of 
legislation still required the consent of the Bundesrat in the legislative period from 2009 to 2013 (prior 41.8 
per cent in 2005–2009). The Bundesrat has 69 seats and consists of delegates of state governments. See 
Gesetz zur Änderung des Grundgesetzes (Artikel 22, 23, 33, 52, 72, 73, 74, 74a, 75, 84, 85, 87c, 91a, 91b, 93, 
98, 104a, 104b, 105, 107, 109, 125a, 125b, 125c, 143c), in: Bundesgesetzblatt Jahrgang 2006 Teil I Nr. 41, 
ausgegeben zu Bonn am 31. August 2006. 
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stands in stark contrast with Westminster systems, where parliament is the highest 
sovereign. As the appeal to court for norm conformity control requires only one third of 
MPs of the lower chambers of both countries, it can be used as strategic tool of opposition 
(Rudzio 2011, Stüwe 2001: 215ff). The shadow of anticipation of legal review may have an 
impact on negotiations among governing and opposition parties (Abromeit 1995). 
Both electoral systems present a personalized form of proportional systems where the party 
remains highly relevant for MPs re-nomination (Saalfeld 2006: 219). The electoral system 
of Austria, since its reform in 1992, is a proportional system, which only mildly distorts the 
vote share to the seat share in parliament (Gallagher 1991). Thus, it is on the proportional 
end of other real world proportional systems (Müller 2006: 17). The electoral system 
consists of a complex three-tier procedure combining party lists with preference vote. In 43 
regional electoral districts (1st tier) and nine state level districts (2nd tier), the voters have a 
vote for a party and a preference vote for individual candidates. In the third tier at national 
level all votes are calculated using the d’Hondt method to allocate the final seat share in 
parliament. Up to the period of investigation, the number of individual seats for MPs from 
the first and second tier was always lower than the vote share allocated in the third tier. So, 
the system works (so far) as a de facto proportional system of one national district with 183 
seats. There is a threshold of four per cent or of one seat at first tier regional level by 
preference vote for a party to enter parliament (Müller 2006: 18). 
The electoral system of Germany follows the logic of a mixed-member proportional system 
(Scarrow 2001: 55). Voters determine the allocation of 299 seats by personal vote for 
candidates in a plurality voting system of single-member districts. A second vote is 
allocated in proportional vote with closed party lists. The number of direct mandates from 
the personal votes is deduced from the relative seat share that the party gained in 
parliament.38 A five per cent threshold or a minimum of three seats for a party by personal 
vote avoids fragmentation of the party system.  
Austria and Germany have similar party systems. The effective number of parties at the 
parliamentary level is very close with 4.83 for Germany and 4.24 for Austria (Laakso and 
Taagepera 1979, Gallagher and Mitchell 2008). The effective number of parties excludes 
the presence of very small or irrelevant parties. What matters for this study, is that the party 
                                                 
38 For the case that a party receives more direct mandates than relative seat share by second votes, excess 
mandates are added to the overall number of parliamentary seats in the Bundestag. 
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systems are similar enough to not impact on the strategies of opposition parties in the two 
chambers.  
The type of government varies slightly in the period of investigation. Austria was governed 
by a grand coalition among the two former “pillar parties”, SPÖ and ÖVP, from 2008 to 
2013. The coalition government in Germany consisted of the liberal party as junior 
coalition partner and the CDU/CSU. Yet, this slight difference is outweighed by the 
institutional similarities. It should not interfere with the logic of party competition that the 
two hypotheses expect.  
To conclude, both countries have similar institutional structures. They follow the logic of 
parliamentary systems and have a federal order with two parliamentary chambers. A strong 
constitutional court, proportional electoral systems and strong minority protection within 
the legislative process classify them clearly as consensus democracies. The most significant 
difference between the two political systems is the power of the second chambers – both 
termed Bundesrat. The much more frequent participation and voting power of the German 
Bundesrat in the legislative process gives the opposition significant influence in case of its 
majority in the second chamber. Within the period of investigation, opposition through the 
second chamber is relevant only for the last nine month of the legislative terms.  
In the following section I assess the rights of parties in minority in more detail, which 
further justifies the case selection. 
3.3. Similar parliamentary procedurs in Austria and Germany 
This section explains the processing of legislation and government control at domestic and 
EU level in the Austrian and German parliaments. This section strengthens the argument on 
the case selection of Austria and Germany. In view of cross-country comparison, a number 
of important procedural similarities of both lower chambers underpin the most-similar 
system design. Focus of this study is the lower chambers towards which government is 
directly responsible. A clear picture of the parliamentary procedures is important 
background information for the specification of the dependent variable of opposition 
activities. 
Key interest is the room of manoeuvre for opposition parties. What parliamentary 
instruments do opposition party groups have available? Helms (1997: 53–54) defines 
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minority rights within parliament as an additional institutional indicator for the potential 
influence of opposition. He names the right to initiate legislation and influence the 
parliamentary agenda as important means of policy influence for parties in opposition. 
Special attention will thus be dedicated to minority rights within the parliamentary process. 
This Chapter 3.3 first presents the procedures in the domestic legislative process (3.3.1), 
before it turns to the specificities of EU scrutiny (3.3.2). 
3.3.1. The domestic legislative process 
This Section 3.3.1 explains the regular legislative process in the two chambers under study 
in chronological order of the procedure. 
The initiation of legislation  
The initiation right for legislation is intimately related to agenda setting in parliament. 
Laver and Shepsle (1994: 295) argue that the determination of the agenda has an important 
influence on what is decided in parliament. Issues that are kept off the agenda cannot 
possibly be addressed. The legislative process is most often initiated by a government bill.39 
The resources of ministerial administrations put the executive in much more favourable 
position of drafting legislation than parliament itself. In Austria a legislative draft of a 
ministry is subject to a consultation process with stakeholders before it is forwarded to 
parliament. In Germany legislation originating from the government enters the Bundesrat 
first, which has six weeks to formulate a position (Stellungnahme). The original draft from 
the government and the position paper of the Bundesrat are then submitted to the 
Bundestag.40  
The initiation of legislation is also open to parliamentary party groups, a certain quota of 
MPs or the upper chambers (voting by majority). In both countries, parties in minority also 
have the opportunity to formulate a legislative initiative. The rules of procedure of the 
Bundestag define that a parliamentary party group or a minimum of five per cent of MPs 
(currently 31) may initiate a motion (Antrag) or bill (Geschäftsordnung des Bundestages 
(GO-BT § 76-1). For the Nationalrat the requirements are even more favourable to 
minorities as a group of five parliamentarians (that is 2.7 per cent) suffices to issue an 
independent proposal (Selbstständiger Antrag, see Geschäftsordnungsgesetz des 
                                                 
39 In Germany, 80% of legislative proposals stem from the government (Bundestages 2016). 
40 In both countries, the upper houses receive the legislative proposal after the lower chamber has made a 
decision and may vote where its competences are touched upon. The position paper of the German Bundesrat 
allows the Bundestag to anticipate lines of conflict with the upper chamber. The Austrian Bundesrat is less 
powerful than the German upper house and rarely preforms as a veto player. 
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Nationalrates (GOG-NR) § 26) or committees may take initiative (Entschließung, see 
GOG-NR § 28). Though the opposition is unlikely to gain majority support for a legislative 
draft or motion, it allows them to state their position on the issue or to set an issue on the 
committee or plenary agenda. These initiatives are not restricted to the initiation of 
legislation, but may also concern a request from the government or a statement on the 
position of parliament. In cross-country comparison, both parliaments show a rather strong 
position for minorities for legislative initiative (Helms 2002). 
First reading in the plenary 
A legislative bill passes through three readings in the lower chambers until a final decision 
is made. A cross-party body determines the schedule of the plenary where consensus 
among all party groups is achieved: the Presidential Conference (Präsidialkonferenz) in the 
Nationalrat and the Council of Elders (Ältestenrat) in the Bundestag.41 This procedure does 
not allow the governing parties to dominate the timetable. However, at the beginning of a 
plenary session the chamber may overrule the suggested timetable of the Presidential 
Conference or Council of Elders by majority vote. The two chambers under investigation 
range in the middle compared to the UK and Ireland where the plenary schedule is under 
complete control of the government on the one hand, or the Netherlands where the chamber 
has complete autonomy over its agenda on the other hand (Döring 1995: 225). 
When a legislative proposal arrives in parliament a first reading in the plenary may take 
place to outline the general points of discussion. In both parliaments the first reading 
usually remains without deliberation of the issue. A debate at this point in time in the 
Bundestag may be tabled for important legislation by decision of the Council of Elders or if 
five per cent of MPs demand a deliberation. Most often, the plenary just formally delegates 
the item to one or more committees following the recommendation of Council of Elders. In 
the Nationalrat of Austria a first reading takes place, only if decided so by the chamber or 
explicitly requested by MPs’ legislative proposal (Initiativantrag) (GOG-NR § 69). 
Elsewise the president of the parliament delegates the issue to a committee (GOG-NR § 13 
(4)). In general, the committee stage can be considered to de facto take place before the in 
both countries. Committee work as first step makes it more likely that an issue is dealt in 
                                                 
41 The Ältestenrat in the Bundestag consists of the parliamentary president and his six substitutes and 23 MPs 
including the parliamentary managing directors of the party groups (Parlamentarische Geschäftsführer). The 
Präsidialkonferenz in the Nationalrat is compound by the presidents of the parliament and the parliamentary 
party group leaders. 
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fact-oriented consensual way, than if the parties’ battle lines are fought out in the plenary 
first (see Döring 1995: 234–235). 
The committee stage 
The committee level presents the backbone of parliamentary work. Woodrow Wilson 
(1885, cited after Shane 2014: 352) is famously cited with the “Congress in session is 
Congress on public exhibition, whilst Congress in its committee-rooms is Congress at 
work”. Committees are internal subunits of parliament where a reduced number of MPs 
meet and hold some authority over issues of a certain jurisdiction. In the two chambers 
under investigation the committee membership is proportional to the seat share of party 
groups in the full house. Following Lees and Shaw (1979: 4) these small face-to-face sub-
groups present the ideal organizational form for fact-oriented deliberation and 
accommodation of different positions. In so far, these specialized bodies allow opposition 
parties better access to information and legislative influence than floor debates.  
In the legislative period from 2008 to 2013, the Austrian lower chamber had one main 
committee, 29 specialized committees and eight permanent sub-committees (Nationalrat 
2016). The Bundestag had 22 permanent committees (Bundestag 2016). In both parliaments 
the jurisdictions of the committees broadly correspond to the structure of ministries (Strøm 
and Mattson 1995: 261). Olson and Mezey (1991) argue that the correspondence of 
committee and ministerial areas of responsibility facilitates the oversight function and 
building of personal networks of MPs (see also Strom 1990: 71). Committee agendas are 
pre-determined by the bills and motions referred to them. For each legislative proposal or 
motion the president of the Nationalrat or Council of Elders in the Bundestag assign a 
committee with main responsibility. In the Bundestag, other committees may be assigned 
advisory capacity. The committee chair assorts the agenda of a committee (GO-BT §61). In 
the Nationalrat, the secretaries of the party groups (Klubsekretäre) further elaborate the 
timing and order of the committee agenda (Pollak and Slominski 2003: 721). The order of 
day may be changed by majority vote at the beginning of the committee session in the 
Bundestag or by a two-thirds majority in the Nationalrat.42  
The committees discuss and vote on motions, reports and legislative proposals. They may 
invite ministers, experts or stakeholders to their sessions to gain a better picture of the 
                                                 
42 Committee chairs are assigned in proportion of party groups’ seat share in the Bundestag, which is an 
important tool of protecting minority interests. In the Nationalrat committee chairs are voted upon within the 
committee. However, the majority parties do not completely dominate chairing committees, but share some 
with opposition parties (check Helms 1997!) 
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situation.43 Hearings can be especially relevant for parties in minority, which have less 
access to the government expertise than the majority. Austrian and German committees 
usually formulate and vote on recommendations for decision-making for the plenary. As 
the committees reflect the relative share of party groups in parliament, votes are taken by 
majority, if not prescribed differently by law or rules of procedure. Committees in the 
Nationalrat and the Bundestag both have the right to rewrite a government bill. The power 
to revise provides some influence on the plenary agenda compared to parliaments where 
ministers may block any alteration from parliament or only amendments are possible 
(Strøm and Mattson 1995: 286). 
Second and third reading in the plenary 
After the committee stage, a legislative draft or motion is scheduled for the plenary. For a 
legislative draft this so called second reading is usually opened by a debate (GO-BT § 81 
and GOG-NR § 71–73). Single MPs or party groups may move motions for amendments in 
the second reading at the plenary. Thus, after the committee stage changes to the bill are 
still possible. The legislative draft and eventual motions for an amendment are voted upon 
by simple majority in the second reading. In both countries alterations to the constitution 
require broader majorities of two-thirds of the votes. Where the governing parties rely on 
votes from the opposition to achieve this qualified majority, these occasions give 
opposition parties a strong negotiation position. As constitutional changes in Austria and 
Germany happen with some frequency, this minorities right can be an important leverage 
for opposition parties in the legislative procedure.44 
In the third reading the chamber makes the final decision on a legislative draft. Where no 
changes were introduced in the second reading the third reading may follow directly in the 
Bundestag (GO-BT § 84). In Austria the third reading takes place immediately after the 
second unless requested elsewise by the president or MPs. Usually, the third reading is not 
accompanied by a debate.  
When the legislative draft has been decided upon by the lower chambers it is forwarded to 
the respective upper chamber, which may vote upon it, if the issue concerns competences of 
                                                 
43 The committees of the Nationalrat have the power to compel any citizens of the country to appear before 
the committee. The Bundesrat may invite individuals for hearings (Mattson and Strom 1995: 287-288) 
44 The revisions of parliamentary EU scrutiny rights required constitutional changes in Austria. As the 
governing parties relied on votes from the opposition to achieve the two-third majority, parties in minority 
were able to significantly strengthen their rights in future EU scrutiny activities (see Miklin 2015: 291, 
Hegeland and Neuhold 2002: 2). Similarly, the opposition was able to achieve concessions from the 
government in the decisions on the ESM in Germany (Höing 2015) Pp. 203–205. 
 94 
the states (Länder). The procedure is finalized by signature of government representatives 
and the president of the country and publication in the official journals (Bundesgesetzblatt). 
In sum, the legislative processes in the Austrian Nationalrat and in the German Bundestag 
provide a significant influence for minorities. The power of majority is limited by sharing 
agenda setting power with opposition parties (Döring 1995). In both chambers, opposition 
parties may initiate legislation (Austria slightly more favourable to minorities with only 2.7 
per cent of MPs necessary for initiation of legislation compared to 5 per cent in Germany) 
and influence the plenary agenda (and committee assignments in the Bundestag) through 
the cross-party bodies of the Präsidialkonferenz or Ältestenrat. The strong committee 
systems create a further advantage for parties in minority as committees often function 
more fact-oriented than along conflicts of party lines and might enable opposition parties 
some influence over legislative output. 
3.3.2. The process of EU scrutiny 
EU affairs were initially part of foreign affairs, known as the classic area of executive 
dominance (Wessels et al. 2013: 23). With the increasing relevance of the European Union, 
parliaments established stronger scrutiny rights over EU affairs, such as special information 
rights on EU initiatives, the establishment of European Affairs committees (EACs) and a 
stricter accountability of the minister’s activities in the Council towards parliament. In so 
far, today EU affairs usually range somewhere in between domestic and foreign affairs in 
terms of parliamentary control rights. 
The introduction of the Lisbon Treaty has led to profound revision of parliamentary 
scrutiny of EU affairs in both countries – though for different reasons. In Austria, the 
adaptation of legislative processes to the Lisbon Treaty required a Constitutional change 
and thus the support of a two-thirds majority in parliament. This exceptional situation gave 
the opposition significant leverage in negotiations with the government. The Green party 
and the Liberal Forum used their “power of the vote” to negotiate for better minority rights 
on EU affairs (Hegeland and Neuhold 2002: 4). Three pillars of legal rules were revised: 
the constitution, the EU Information Law (EU Informationsgesetz, EU-InfoG) and the rules 
of procedure of parliament (Miklin 2015: 396). Agenda setting and information access were 
revised in favour of parties in minority. In Germany, the ruling of the Constitutional Court 
on the Lisbon Treaty in June 2009 significantly strengthened parliament vis-à-vis the 
executive (Bundesverfassungsgericht 2009). The law regulating parliamentary EU scrutiny 
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rights (Gesetz über die Zusammenarbeit von Bundesregierung und Deutschem Bundestag in 
Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union, EUZBBG) had to be revised in reaction to the 
court judgement (Kiiver 2010: 198). Parliament achieved better access to information and a 
stronger prerogative to formulate resolutions e.g. before Council meetings (Höing 2015a: 
194). Information access is an important factor for parties in opposition.  
The remainder of this Section 3.3.2 gives a detailed depiction of the information rights, 
statements towards the national government and the EU Commission, the involvement of 
the plenary in Austria and Germany.  
Information access 
Since the introduction of the Lisbon treaty, parliaments receive all EU legislative proposals, 
green and white books and communications directly from the European Commission 
(Protocol No. 1, Art. 1 and 2, TEU). This makes MPs less reliant on cooperation of the 
government. However, for effective scrutiny they may still require the more informal 
documents from the EU level and information about the government position towards an 
EU proposal. Formal information rights primarily benefit the opposition, as government 
parties can use the party channel to achieve timely information (Höing 2015a: 198). 
Austria and Germany both have very formalized and strong information rights on EU 
affairs. In both countries basic principles on informing parliament are prescribed in 
constitutional law: government has to provide comprehensive information without any 
delay on all proceedings at EU level (B-VG, Art. 23 (e) and GG Art. 23 (2)). Detailed 
information requirements are specified at the level of secondary law, which were revised in 
the aftermath of the Lisbon Treaty (EU-InfoG, in 2012 for Austria and EUZBBG, § 3-6 in 
2013 for the Bundestag). The information laws specify the types of EU and government 
documents and the necessity of government to inform parliament on all meetings of the 
Council, the European Council and preparatory bodies. Both parliaments can receive 
informal EU documents upon request from their governments. In Austria, the EU-InfoG (§ 
1) prescribes that the parliamentary administration feeds all EU-related documents into a 
national database for easy accessibility by all MPs. In both parliaments, the respective 
ministers are asked to inform regularly about the upcoming Council agenda (biannually in 
the Nationalrat, EU-InfoG § 5, every three month in the Bundestag, EUZBBG § 4 (2)). 
Furthermore, the laws specify the timing and expected content of explanatory memoranda 
on the impact of EU legislation on Austria or Germany and the position of the government 
on the matter (EU-InfoG § 6, EUZBBG § 6). 
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Formal information rights strengthen the position of parliament, but may not be a valid 
indicator of well-informed MPs. Even with very specific formal information rights, 
government may deliver superficial or partial information. For Austria, several studies have 
discussed the problem of information overflow and the difficulty for parliament to filter 
relevant information from the 20.000 to 25.000 EU-related documents it receives every 
year (see Pollak and Slominski 2009: 203). Miklin (2015: 392) explains that the quality of 
the Austrian EU database and the explanatory memoranda the government sends for all 
items on the EAC since 2003 have helped to partially overcome this problem.  
Ex-ante control of the government  
In line with the strong information rights, both parliaments have strong institutional 
prerogatives to control the government on EU affairs. In the OPAL institutional strength 
score, the Bundestag ranks second (with 0.74 points) of the then 40 chambers of EU 
parliaments (see Auel et al. 2015: 70). The Nationalrat is in the mid-range of this ranking 
with 0.51 of a potential 1.0 points (highest score is 0.84 for the Finnish parliament). It has 
repeatedly been pointed out that the Austrian mandating rights are exceptionally strong in 
EU-wide comparison. All national parliaments may issue resolutions to the government 
before (European) Council meetings defining the position on the issue at stake. Austria is 
one of the few countries in the EU, which has a full out mandating system with legally 
binding resolutions (Stellungnahme) (B-VG § 23 (e), (k)). Government may deviate from 
this position only after consultation with parliament45 and for imperative reasons of 
integration or foreign policy (B-VG § 23 (3)). It needs to justify why it was not able to 
maintain the parliamentary position ex-post. The parliament may also issue non-binding 
resolutions (Ausschussfeststellung).  
The Bundestag can issue resolutions (Stellungnahmen), which are not legally binding as the 
Austrian mandate, but should be “taken into account” (“die Bundesregierung berücksichtigt 
die Stellungnahme”, GG Art. 23 (3)). However, official resolutions create political 
pressure. The government is also asked to deviate only for imperative reasons of EU 
integration or foreign policy. Any deviation needs to be justified afterwards, publicly, if 25 
per cent of MPs request so (EUZBBG § 8 (4), see also Höing 2015a: 194). 
                                                 
45 To make it possible that the chancellor in a European Council meeting get a fast response from parliament, 
the main committee may install a ”Fire-fighting committee” (Feuerwehr-Ausschuss) consisting of one 
representative of each party groups and the chair of the standing EU-subcommittee. This mini-committee is 
on call during (European) Council meetings in order not to achieve flexibility and accountability of the 
minister during negotiations in Brussels (see Miklin 2015: 393). 
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Committee stage 
In both chambers, the EU affairs committees have the power to issue resolutions and 
(reasoned) opinions to the Commission in name of the parliament (see Höing 2015a: 195, 
Miklin 2015: 393).46 All other committees need the approval of the plenary for issuing 
official opinions or statements. The formal rule to circumvent the plenary endangers EU 
issues to be dealt without any public attention and less information for MPs who are not 
members of the EACs (Auel 2007, Auel and Raunio 2012). The EU affairs committees hold 
responsibility for the ex-ante control of EU issues, thus, before legislation at EU level is 
decided upon. The transposition of EU directives is in the domain of the other specialized 
committees. The implementation of EU directives into national law follows the same 
process as the normal legislative process described in this section. 
In the Nationalrat, the main committee (Hauptausschuss with 26 members), meeting as 
“Main Committee on EU Affairs”, is responsible for questions of EU integration and holds 
government to account for its activities in European Council meetings and Euro zone 
summits (Pollak and Slominski 2009: 196). The rules of procedure list three tasks of the 
main committee: issuing mandates to ministers, reasoned opinions to the Commission and 
opinions to EU institutions (Mitteilungen) (GOG-NR § 31 (d)). The control of ministers in 
the Council of the EU is, however, delegated to a sub-committee (§ 31 (e) GOG-NR, see 
also Miklin 2015: 392). This permanent sub-committee on EU affairs (Ständiger EU-
Unterausschuss, with 16 members and 16 substitute members) covers the upcoming 
legislation at EU level (Pollak and Slominski 2003: 723). Other specialized committees are 
not involved in terms of advisory capacity towards the EAC. However, MPs from other 
specialized committees may serve as substitute in the EU sub-committee when an issue 
from their area of expertise is on the agenda. In this way, they can contribute the perceived 
future impact on their policy areas in the debates of the EU sub-committee. Furthermore, 
specialized committees have the opportunity to demand committee debates with ministers 
that are focused on topical EU issues (EU Aussprachen) (Miklin 2015: 394). Before a 
meeting of heads of state or government, the Austrian chancellor appears in the Main 
Committee on EU Affairs to discuss the position of Austria. As debates on EU issues take 
place mainly at committee level (not the plenary), meetings of both EACs in the 
                                                 
46 In Austria, the European Affairs committees by default decide without plenary involvement. A 
parliamentary party group or minimum of five MPs can request to table an issue for the plenary (GOG-NR § 
27). In the Bundestag, a parliamentary party group or minimum of 5 per cent or MPs can request that the EAC 
issues a resolution in the name of parliament. Or the EAC may decide so by itself, if no other committee 
rejects the request (GO-BT §92(5).  
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Nationalrat are public, if not decided differently (Hegeland and Neuhold 2002: 15). In so 
far, EU issues are assembled in two committees; the other sectoral committees are not 
directly involved in ex-ante EU scrutiny. The Austrian Main Committee on EU affairs 
meets at least four times a year as preparation of European Council meetings. The sub-
committee on EU affairs sits about once per month (Miklin 2015: 393).47  
In the Bundestag, the European Affairs Committee (35 members) holds responsibility of 
EU integration issues (EU enlargement, EU treaty revision, the use of the passerelle clause 
and subsidiarity issues) and has a coordinative function on EU policy issues states (Auel 
2006: 253). The control of the EU policymaking process is “mainstreamed” to the regular 
specialized committees (Auel 2006: 253, Gattermann et al. 2015). The EAC is only in main 
charge of treaty changes and enlargement (federführend). All policy issues discussed in the 
Council are under main responsibility of other sectoral committees; the EAC coordinates 
and can give an opinion on these issues (mitberatend). The ex-ante control of the European 
Council takes place at the plenary level. The EAC recommends to the president which 
incoming EU document should be referred to which committee (GO-BT § 93 b (2)).48  
Involvement of the plenary 
While statements and resolutions formulated by the EU affairs committees may be kept off 
the agenda (if the committees issue the resolution without plenary involvement), other 
instruments allow pressing for plenary debates on EU affairs.  
First of all, the party groups can agree on topics for debate in the Council of Elders or the 
Presidential Conference, which decides about the plenary agenda. In a regular plenary 
debate or following a government declaration topical EU issues may be tabled for debate. 
The consensual decision mode of the Council of Elders or Presidential Conference allow 
for some influence of minorities. Here Council or European Council meetings can be 
addressed ex-ante or ex-post. In the Bundestag it has become common practice that the 
chancellor gives a government declaration before or after a European summit in the 
plenary. In Austria, European Council meetings are debated in the Main Committee not the 
plenary. Yet the rules of procedure request the government to appear in the plenary at least 
                                                 
47 Since accession, the EU Sub-Committee was intended to meet monthly. In the time before 2010 meetings 
were less frequent though; Pollak and Slominski (2009: 196) for example indicate that the committee met five 
times per year for their period of investigation from 1999 to 2008. 
48 In both parliaments, the MEPs of the own member state may participate in the EAC meetings with speaking 
rights. 
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twice a year for a declaration before or after a European Council meeting (Miklin 2015: 
394, GOG-NR § 74 (b)).  
EU issues may also be addressed in questions addressed to the government in plenary 
sessions. A session of the Nationalrat may always begin with a question hour 
(Fragestunde), if a sufficient amount of individual oral requests (mündliche Anfragen) 
came in from MPs. Questions are directed towards government members and should be 
formulated within the time span of one minute (GOG-NR § 94). In the Bundestag has a 
weekly question hour, which takes place on Wednesdays at 13h where members of 
government answer questions on their cabinet meeting of that day. Furthermore, certain 
types of questions, such as a Große Anfrage require an oral answer by the government on 
the floor and a subsequent debate of the issue.49  
In both chambers a single party group or minority of MPs (5 per cent in the Bundestag, 5 
MPs in Nationalrat) can demand a “topical debate” (Aktuelle Stunde, GOG-NR § 97 (a); 
GO-BT § 106) that focuses on a specific issue. For the Bundestag, EU issues could be 
tabled for this 60 minutes discussion with government members. In the Nationalrat, the 
rules of procedure provide that four times per year “topical EU debates” takes place 
(Aktuelle Europastunde, GOG-NR § 74 (b)). 
Finally, parties in opposition can formulate initiatives to influence the plenary agenda: in 
the Bundestag the initiator of a motion (Antrag) may request a plenary debate before the 
motion is allocated to a committee; in the Nationalrat urgent motions or requests 
(Dringliche Anfrage or Dringlicher Antrag) give a minimum of five MPs the opportunity to 
set a question or request (Entschließung) on the plenary agenda of that same day (GOG-NR 
§ 74 (a), § 93). 
The ordinary EU scrutiny of committee work does not automatically bring EU issues to 
plenary debate. Yet, through their influence in the Council of Elders or the Presidential 
Conference on the plenary agenda, their question rights for oral questioning in the plenary 
and initiatives requesting plenary involvement opposition parties have significant room of 
manoeuvre to potentially push EU issues on the floor debates. It requires the interest and 
initiative of a parliamentary party group to request public debate in parliament. 
                                                 
49 In the German Bundestag’s plenary debates there is however the option of speeches and answers not 
actually being performed, but only taken up in the minutes. 
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Legal control over subsidiarity infringements 
The Lisbon Treaty has provided national parliaments with the opportunity to call for appeal 
on an EU legislative act at the CJEU, if it infringes the principle of subsidiarity. In Austria 
a number of five MPs can initiate a motion to call for appeal at the CJEU, which then needs 
to be approved in the plenary by simple majority (Miklin 2012) (see also Art 23 (h) B-VG 
and § 26 GOG-NR). In Germany, this is a minority right and only one fourth of the 
members of the Bundestag suffice to call for action (Höing 2012) (see also 
Integrationsverantwortungsgesetz, § 12 (1)). However, no chamber in the EU has to date 
made use of this tool. While this formal right may have relevance by its “shadow of 
anticipation”, this tool is disregarded in the empirical analysis of this thesis due to lack of 
activity. 
Summary 
The Austrian and German parliament benefit from strong parliamentary scrutiny and 
control rights vis-a-vis the government. Following the logics of consensus democracies (see 
Lijphart 1999), both parliaments provide significant influence for parties in minorities as in 
initiation of legislation and agenda control. Strong information rights on EU affairs and 
strong committee systems further benefit opposition parties in the scrutiny of EU issues.  
Studies on parliamentary scrutiny of EU affairs have shown that formal provisions and their 
actual use can differ significantly from each other (see Auel et al. 2015). For the 
Nationalrat, Pollak and Slominski (2003, 2009) and Miklin (2015) argue that the strong 
formal rules stand in contrast to their rare use – especially in the case of mandating. The 
dominance of the parliamentary majority makes it unlikely that parliament will contradict 
the government in public on a regular basis. This makes the study of their practical use as 
opposition tool for EU scrutiny even more relevant.  
3.4. Variation in political parties’ attributes 
The logic of case selection of this study intends to hold system factors constant. The 
institutional setup and parliamentary procedures were explained in Chapters 3.2.2 and 3.3. 
Equally important is the variation on the explanatory factors at actor-level for the logic of 
case selection. This Chapter 3.4 describes how the opposition party groups in parliament 
differ in terms of party type and ideological positions (see Hypothesis 1 and 2, Section 
2.3.2).  
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In order to delineate the position of opposition parties on the independent variables the 
study has to describe each party group in relation. Section 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 review the 
historical development of the party systems and parties’ ideological backgrounds. As 
explained above, the lack of experimental or statistical control in the small-n comparative 
method makes it important to be conscious of potential hidden factors that influence the 
results. The information on the historical roots and context of the party systems enables the 
reader to detect other potential explanatory factors that may also influence party strategies.  
3.4.1. The party system of Austria 
The political system of Austria in the post-war period (1945–1966) has been characterized 
as “classic” consociationalism (Pelinka 2006). Society was structured in so-called pillars 
(Lager), which consisted of social groups with high internal cohesion, own sub-cultures, 
associations, cultural clubs as well as party representation. The two most important pillar-
parties were the Austrian People’s Party (Österreichische Volkspartei, ÖVP) and Social 
Democratic Party of Austria (Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs, SPÖ). The ÖVP 
represented the catholic-conservative Lager with strongholds in rural areas of Austria. The 
SPÖ had its support in the urban proletariat promoting a left-oriented political message and 
anti-clerical stance. Both were mass parties and received strong, continuous electoral 
support over decades. The strong, mutually exclusive identities of each Lager resulted in 
highly stable voting behaviour.  
The social fragmentation into two Lager was accompanied by cooperation at elite level, 
which is characteristic of consociational democracies. The grand coalition governments 
from 1945 to 1966 were characteristic of the consociational period of Austria (Luther and 
Müller 1992). The League of Independents, later Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche 
Partei Österreichs, FPÖ) founded in 1956, represented a small non-pillar party in this time 
period. Less cohesive than the two large pillar-parties it combined German-nationalism and 
economically liberal values and found support among white-collar workers and bureaucrats 
(Andeweg et al. 2008). Its rhetoric created an antagonism to the “power cartel” of the pillar 
parties (Pelinka 2002). The party resembled the organizational form of a cadre party and 
assembled around six per cent of the votes in general elections up until the 1980s (Luther 
and Müller 1992). 
In the mid-1960s the identification and socialization of individuals within their Lager 
slowly declined (“de-pillarization”) (Müller et al. 1999). The link of pillar organizations, 
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e.g. employees or employers associations, and the pillar-parties continuously weakened. 
This resulted in more volatile voting behaviour and better access for non-pillar actors. 
However, in the time period from 1966 to 1983 single party governments still dominated 
the scene. The de-pillarization in Austria that had evolved over two decades only showed 
its full effect in the 1980s. ÖVP and SPÖ were confronted with a significant decline in 
voter support. The landscape of political competition changed (Andeweg et al. 2008). From 
1983 to 1986 neither of the pillar parties held an absolute majority of the vote and SPÖ 
entered into a coalition with the then still (partially) liberal oriented FPÖ. 
The two large pillar parties hold a generally pro-European attitude. Austria’s neutrality 
hindered an application for EU membership until after the fall of the iron curtain. The ÖVP 
understood itself as a motor of Austrian EU politics and pushed for membership (Khol 
1989: 230). The ÖVP underlines the relevance of Christian humanity and the principle of 
subsidiarity in European integration. The SPÖ was hesitant in the beginnings, but adopted a 
pro-EU position under party leader and chancellor Franz Vranitzky (1986–1997) (Pollak 
and Slominski 2002). The SPÖ demands a more democratic order within the EU and a 
strengthening of social aspects.  
With the end of consociationalism, non-pillar parties gained momentum. In 1986 the 
Austrian Green party was founded as a protest party with a strong focus on 
environmentalist issues (Dolezal 2016: 16). The Green party in Austria first entered to 
national parliament in 1986. It roots in two green parties founded in 1982, which evolved 
from the protest movements against nuclear energy. After several quarrels over leadership, 
cooperation and organization, the green movements were united and renamed to Die 
Grünen – Die Grüne Alternative in 1993. Throughout the 1990s the party stabilized and 
professionalized and continuously gained voter support of up to 10 per cent. The Greens 
have participated in government at regional and local level in coalition with either ÖVP or 
SPÖ. However, up to date they did not form part of federal level government (Dolezal 
2016). The party has a strong focus on post-materialist issues. It is placed in the centre of 
the socio-economic dimension.  
The Green party was highly critical of the current form of the European Union at the time 
of Austrian accession. They were the only party group that did not support the application 
for membership in 1989. They always supported the basic idea of cooperation among 
European states, yet disagreed with the form of implementation. To date they vehemently 
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support enlargement of the EU and the idea of a multi-cultural society (Grünen 2001: 55–
58).  
In 1986, the FPÖ changed its profile with the election of Jörg Haider as party president and 
a strengthening of the nationalistic wing within the party. This led to a split-off by the 
liberal faction of the party to the Liberal Forum in 1993. Ever since this transformation, the 
FPÖ is categorized as culturally conservative populist party (Pelinka 2002, Heinisch 2004, 
Aichholzer et al. 2014). It successfully attracted former pillar voters as increasing vote 
shares from 1986 (9.73 per cent) to 1999 (26.91 per cent) document. Despite its anti-
establishment character, the FPÖ entered in a government coalition with the ÖVP in 2000. 
The participation of a radical right party in government led to demonstrations in Austria, a 
Europe-wide outcry and sanctions from the other countries of the then EU-15. The 
international sanctions forced Haider to step down from the position of party leader 
(Bundesparteiobmann) in favour of vice-chancellor Riess-Prasser (Luther 2006: 9). The 
necessity to compromise as “party in government” stood in sharp contrast to the protest 
party’s rhetoric and created strong inner tensions within the party. Despite disastrous 
electoral results in snap-elections in 2002,50 the FPÖ continued to be the junior coalition 
partner of the ÖVP in the new government. In 2005, five members of the FPÖ party 
leadership, including Haider, split-off to form the Alliance for the Future of Austria 
(Bündnis Zukunft Österreichs, BZÖ). The BZÖ substituted the FPÖ as coalition partner of 
the ÖVP.51 In 2008 and 2013 the FPÖ gained back the strong electoral support pulling even 
with the two traditional pillar parties in the most recent general election in 2017. 
The BZÖ gained some electoral support at the general elections in 2008 (10.7 per cent) and 
is one of the parties under study.52 It is also categorized as populist party just like the FPÖ. 
However, it claimed to be more pragmatic and willing to cooperate with the ÖVP as 
coalition party in 2005–2008 (Urban Pappi 2007: 446, Onken 2013: 324). The party 
programme was quite similar to the one of the FPÖ (Luther 2009: 1052). With Haider’s 
fatal traffic accident shortly after the 2008 elections the party was deprived of its 
charismatic leader. When the regional party branch of the BZÖ of Carinthia, Haider’s 
former stronghold, reintegrated to the FPÖ, it further weakened the party. After the passing 
                                                 
50 The party lost 15 percentage points of votes leading to 10 per cent vote share. 
51 Possible as the agreement is with individual representatives, not parties. As person changes party 
membership, the coalition can be transferred to new party. 
52 The Team Stronach was excluded from analysis due to its short and marginal role within the period of 
investigation. It was founded in September 2012 and published a first party manifesto in April 2013.  
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away of Haider, the BZÖ tried to reposition itself as culturally conservative, yet 
economically right-wing party. A focus of its economic policy was the demand of a “slim 
state” with more efficient administrative structures. In public perception the party remained 
without a clear image or party programme. By the end of the legislative period under 
investigation, in 2013, it was mainly perceived as milder version of the FPÖ (IMAS 2013). 
It did not pass the four per cent threshold in the 2013 elections for the Nationalrat 
(Aichholzer et al. 2014).  
FPÖ and BZÖ both qualify as Euro-sceptic parties who, however, support the basic idea of 
European integration. The FPÖ sees Christian-occidental values as the core of Europe’s 
identity. The party demands a “Europe of Fatherlands” (“Europa der Vaterländer”) (FPÖ 
Wahlprogramm 2008). They are highly critical of the open border policy within the EU and 
see the cultural and intellectual essence of Austria endangered (Pollak and Slominski 
2002). The BZÖ supports the idea of a core-Europe. They demand more transparency, civic 
participation and more efficient administration.  
The FPÖ and the BZÖ comply with the three criteria of the anti-establishment party’s 
definition of the six parties under investigation (see 2.3.2). 1) Since its foundation in 1956, 
the FPÖ criticized the consociational features of the Austrian democracy where the two 
large pillar parties would form a “cartel” of power (Pelinka 2002: 283). 2) In line with this 
attack towards established parties, the freedom party clearly complies with the populist 
feature of framing the main line of conflict as “people” versus elite (Pelinka 2002: 283). 
Aichholzer et al. (2014) studied the attributes and attitudes of FPÖ voters to understand on 
which issues the party mobilized their electorate. On the traditional cleavage of the 
economic left-right and religion, the FPÖ voters share many qualities with those of the 
ÖVP and SPÖ. 3) Yet on “New Political Issues”, defined as immigration, EU integration 
and political discontent, the positions differ drastically from those of established parties. In 
so far, the FPÖ has succeeded in promoting new issues on the agenda and complies with 
the third criterion of the definition of anti-establishment parties (see also Abedi 2002, 
Pelinka 2002: 287).  
As the BZÖ is a relatively recent and short-lived phenomenon, research on anti-
establishment or radical parties often excludes this party from its analysis. It forms part of 
the sample of opposition parties of this study. Applying the three defining criteria of an 
anti-establishment party the BZÖ scores on all aspects. The BZÖ was initiated as a split-off 
from the FPÖ under the driving force of Jörg Haider who structured it in the same way as 
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the FPÖ. The ideological positions of both parties are very close. Both pushed for the issue 
of immigration on the political agenda of Austria (Luther 2009). The Alliance for the 
Future of Austria engages in the people versus elite rhetoric attacking the established 
parties. In the electoral programme of 2008 the concluding paragraph contains the 
following statement: „SPÖ und ÖVP haben kläglich versagt, stehen für neue Belastungen, 
eine unsoziale Politik und haben zwei Jahre Streit, Chaos und Stillstand in Österreich zu 
verantworten. Daher: Nie wieder Rot-Schwarz!“ [„SPÖ and ÖVP have failed miserably, 
stand for renewed burdens, unsocial policies and are responsible for two years of dispute, 
chaos and stagnation in Austria. Hence: Never again red-black!“ translation of the author] 
(BZÖ Wahlprogramm 2008). 
The conservative populist parties have altered the logic of political competition in Austria 
(Dolezal 2008a). Their strong emphasis of the cultural dimension, especially on the issues 
of immigration and European integration, forces the other parties to react. The Green party 
of Austria strongly opposes the culturally conservative of FPÖ and BZÖ and promotes the 
idea of open society and multi-culturalism. The former pillar-parties take less profiled 
positions on this dimension of political conflict (Aichholzer et al. 2014: 120). 
3.4.2. The party system of Germany 
The party system in Germany was for long characterized by the stable voting success of the 
two large mainstream parties, the Christian Democratic Union/ Christian Social Union 
(Christlich Demokratische Union/ Christliche Soziale Union, CDU/CSU) and the Social 
Democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD). Lees 
(2012: 550) divides the development of the German party system in two phases: one of 
concentration of votes and power in the hands of the two people’s parties (Volksparteien) 
from the 1950s to 1980s and a second of fragmentation beginning with the establishment of 
the Greens in 1983 and the PDS in 1990. In the elections from 1961 to 1987 the two main 
parties managed to continuously assemble over 80 per cent of the votes. Both parties are 
considered to have had a highly integrative and stabilizing function for German politics and 
society (Smith 1986). Yet, since the late 1980s a fluid five party system evolved 
(Niedermayer 2006). SPD and CDU/CSU had to face significant losses in electoral support 
since the new challenger parties entered the scene. Due to the declining voter support of the 
two large parties in the 1980s, the German party system has developed in broadly similar 
terms as the Austrian one, though not embedded in consociationalism.  
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The SPD roots in the “Allgemeiner Deutscher Arbeiter Verein” from 1863 and was a 
socialist oriented party representing working class interests.53 After Second World War, the 
SPD evolved to one of the two large people’s parties. In the Godesberger Programme of 
1959 the SPD turned away from a purely Marxist ideology towards a more moderate stance 
accepting the concept of a social market economy. With this transition, the SPD joined the 
CDU/CSU in the middle of the left-right spectrum why Kirchheimer (1966) termed both 
“catch-all parties” (see also Spier and Aleman 2013: 441). Under the party leadership and 
government of Gerhard Schröder (1998–2005), the SPD implemented the Agenda 2010 
reforms. This economically liberal reform of the German social system alienated the more 
leftist oriented members and voters within the party (Nachtwey 2007). The SPD is until 
today confronted with declining voter support – e.g. only 23 per cent in the 2009 general 
elections and an all-time low in 2017 with 20.5 per cent.  
The SPD holds a positive attitude towards EU integration due to its success to establish 
peace and prosperity and as symbol of emancipation and enlightenment (SPD 2014). Some 
social democrats criticize the EU as predominantly neo-liberal project that undermines the 
social welfare states. The SPD demands a harmonization of taxation and minimum 
standards for social and environment protection within the EU (Ostheim 2003). 
The Union parties base their ideological position on an inter-confessional Christian 
worldview and promoted a social marked economy since its beginnings (Zolleis and 
Schmid 2013: 416). The CDU was founded at federal level in 1950 linking several regional 
Christian-democratic movements (excluding Bavaria).54 In terms of time in office and voter 
support it has been the most successful party in Germany and terms itself the “people’s 
party of the middle” (Die Volkspartei der Mitte) (BPB 2016). With the increasing 
secularization of society, the CDU was confronted with the need for reform. Under the 
party leadership of Helmut Kohl (1973–1998) the party reformed from a party of 
notabilities to a programmatic membership party strengthening the social and liberal 
branches (Zolleis and Schmid 2013: 422). Under Angela Merkel (holding party leadership 
since 2000) the value system of the party was further modernized as in the conception of 
marriage and family or the strict anti-nuclear power policy following the Fukuyama disaster 
in 2011. 
                                                 
53 The predecessors of the SPD were forbidden under Bismarck for twelve years. After the overturn of the 
prohibition the party reorganised and settled for the name ”Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands” in 1890. 
54 The CSU, which is located in Bavaria only, is the permanent partner of the CDU. 
 107 
The Christian Social Union founded in 1946 is considered the “sister party” of the CDU in 
Bavaria as CDU and CSU cooperate as one joint party group in the Bundestag since 1949. 
The CSU is more culturally conservative, as in questions of family and migration policy. It 
combines social conservatism with an economically progressive stance.55  
The Union parties supported the idea of European integration from the start on. CDU/CSU 
were in government responsibility during major steps of European integration, such as the 
introduction of the Euro under Helmut Kohl and repeated treaty revisions. However, in 
recent years the CSU has become more critical of the European Union advertising the 
influence of regions in Brussels and the idea of a “Europe of Nations” (Weigl 2013: 481).  
As a third, yet smaller party, the Freedom Party of Germany (Freiheitliche Partei 
Deutschlands, FDP) was founded in 1948 and is the party with the longest time of 
government participation. In the decades from 1960s to the 1990s, the FDP was termed the 
“king maker” as it was often in a position where its decision to coalesce determined which 
of the large parties would take over government after elections (Vorländer 2013: 500). The 
FDP stands in the tradition of liberalism in the lineage of enlightenment. It traditionally 
embraced a social liberal and market-liberal position. The FDP strongly supports European 
integration as the party’s liberal economic views support it. The opportunity to repeatedly 
participate in government as a junior coalition party had high costs for the party. The 
required pragmatism in office led to significant volatility in voter support, internal conflicts 
and programmatic re-orientations (Vorländer 2013: 507). The party lost its unique 
negotiation position when the Greens entered parliament in 1983 and the PDS in 1990 who 
could potentially substitute the FDP as coalition partner of the two “people’s parties”.  
The second phase of fragmentation of the German party system (Lees 2012: 550), was 
initiated by the Greens entering into parliament in 1983. This first successful newcomer 
since the 1950s had evolved out of the social movements protesting for environmental 
protection (Raschke 1983). Formally founded as a party in 1980, the Greens promoted 
protection of the environment, civil and human rights and the democratization of society 
(Probst 2013: 520). The Green party in its early years was a protest party that successfully 
set post-materialist issues on the political agenda. After German reunification the Greens 
entered an alliance with the Eastern German Bündnis ‘90 in 1993 (since then Bündnis ‘90/ 
                                                 
55 The CSU held a single party state government in Bavaria since 1966 to date (with the exception of 2008 to 
2013 where it participated in a coalition). Its independent organization within the Union party group allows 
the CSU to be a strong voice for Bavarian interests at the federal level (Weigl 2013: 478). 
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Die Grünen).56 The continued success strengthened the pragmatic branch within the party 
with consequences for party organization and ideology (Poguntke 2010: 136). The Greens 
have in the past two decades frequently participated in government at state level and 
entered federal government in the coalition with the SPD from 1998 to 2005. The Greens 
strongly support European integration in that it is conceived to overcome nationalisms and 
cultural segregation (Probst 2013: 528). 
With the reunification of Germany in 1990, a fifth party entered the scene. As follow up to 
the governing party in the former DDR, the Party of Democratic Socialism (Partei des 
Demokratischen Sozialismus, PDS) was able to establish itself as a significant force in the 
new Länder. As a post-communist successor of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany 
(Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, SED), the PDS soon consolidated itself as 
representing “everything specifically East German” (Poguntke 2012: 4). The presence of 
the PDS in the new states marked a significant geographical diversity of the party system 
within Germany for some years. In 2007, the left parties of the new and old federal states, 
PDS and the WASG57, merged to Die Linke with nation-wide representation. The Left party 
is considered the direct successor of the PDS. 
The Left party supports the basic idea of cooperation and integration in Europe. However, 
they demand a fundamental change of the treaties and policies towards a more social, more 
democratic and more peaceful union. In their party programme of 2011 they see the 
consequences of the Euro crises as failure of the current system (Die Linke 2011). The Left 
party is the most Euro-critical party in the German party system in the period of 
investigation. Yet, they still support the idea of international cooperation. Their criticism is 
directed to the current form of “neoliberal” economic integration. 
Until the time period of investigation, no successful right wing party had evolved in 
Germany. In so far, the predominant cleavage structuring the German party system was the 
economical left-right dimension (Dolezal 2008b: 233). Overall, there is a strong pro-
European consensus at elite level up to the time period of investigation. 
                                                 
56 In the following I use the abbreviation 90/Grünen for the German Green party. The Austrian 
environmentalist party is termed Grüne in this thesis. 
57 The Agenda 2010 had alienated parts of the voters, members and leadership of the SPD, which formed the 
new voting alliance “Partei Arbeit und soziale Gerechgtigkeit – die Wahlalternative” (WASG) in 2005 
(Poguntke 2012: 4). 
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3.4.3. Operationalization of independent variables  
The previous section has laid out the historical development and ideological positions of 
the parties in Austria and Germany. This information is relevant for understanding the 
positioning of each party in the period of investigation. This section summarizes the party 
positions in comparative view. It starts out with an overview of the status and seat share of 
the Austrian and German party groups in the period from 2008/9 to 2013. Based on this 
information each party group is located towards its party type (anti-establishment or 
regular) and ideological distance on the socio-economic and cultural dimensions of conflict. 
The parties’ positioning is crosschecked with quantitative indicators of existing research.  
During the period of investigation from 2008/9 to 2013 the SPÖ and ÖVP formed a 
governing coalition in Austria and the CDU/CSU and FDP in Germany. Table 3 shows the 
strength of each party group in parliament in terms of seat share and per cent of votes. 
Chamber Status Party Group Seats  Per cent 
Nationalrat 
 
Government SPÖ 57 29.3% 
 ÖVP 51 26.0% 
Opposition FPÖ  34 17.5% 
 BZÖ 21 10.7% 
 Grüne  20 10.4% 
Bundestag Government CDU 194 31.2% 
  CSU 45 7.2% 
 FDP 93 15.0% 
Opposition SPD  146 23.0% 
 Linke 76 11.9% 
 90/Grünen  68 10.7% 
Table 3: Party groups in the Nationalrat and Bundestag from 2009 to 2013. 
The governing parties in Austria held a majority of 55.3 per cent vote share. The grand 
coalition had been the only option for a two party coalition in light of distribution of votes 
in the 2008 election. The FPÖ was the third strongest party with 17.5 per cent vote share. 
The BZÖ, which only split off three years earlier from the FPÖ, and the Grüne both formed 
significant opposition parties with over ten per cent of votes each. The German governing 
coalition from 2009 to 2013 held a similarly slim majority as the one in Austria with overall 
53.4 per cent vote share. It consisted of a dominant partner, the CDU/CSU, with 38.4 per 
cent votes and a junior coalition partner, the FDP, with 15 per cent. The SPD, one of the 
traditionally strong “people’s parties” with repeated government experience, was in 
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opposition in this legislative period with only 23.0 per cent vote share. Linke and 
90/Grünen both held a vote share of over ten per cent.  
Hypothesis 1 considers the party type of either regular or anti-establishment party an 
explanatory variable for opposition parties’ EU scrutiny behaviour. As explained in the 
theory section (2.3.2), an anti-establishment party is defined by three criteria: it presents 
itself as a challenger to established parties, expresses a fundamental divide between the 
established parties and “the people” in its rhetoric and challenges the status quo in terms of 
policy and political system issues (Abedi 2002: 555–557). The party type is operationalized 
as dichotomous variable (yes/no). In the sample under study, only FPÖ and BZÖ qualify as 
anti-establishment parties within the six parties under investigation (see Section 3.4.1). The 
categorization of the FPÖ is in line with the approach of the studies by Abedi (2002, 
Appendix I) and (de Vries and Hobolt 2012).58 
The second hypothesis concerns the distance between party positions on two dimensions of 
political conflict (socio-economic and cultural). Measuring party positions has triggered 
much debate in political science, as they form a crucial variable in research on political 
parties. Two of the most established publicly available databases are the Chapel Hill Expert 
Survey (see CHES 2016) and the Comparative Manifesto Project (see CMP 2016). Both 
have been used extensively in comparative politics studies. Though generally accepted and 
important for large-n studies, they are also frequently criticized to distort party positions in 
some countries including Austria and Germany (Pelizzo 2003). Appendix I provides a table 
with the data on the two party systems from various sources. This small-n study benefits 
from the possibility of in-depth analysis and can position the party groups in light of the 
information on the historical development of party systems. In view of the information 
from Section 3.4.1 and 3.4.2, the most plausible indicator for the economic left-right scale 
stems from Bakker et al. (2014) for the two countries under study. Here the authors used a 
vignette technique based on the CHES data to achieve better cross-country comparison of 
the socio-economic scale. Figure 4 visually represents the location of party groups on the 





                                                 







Figure 4: Party positions on the left-right dimension. 
The Austrian governing parties, SPÖ and ÖVP, range left and right of centre on the socio-
economic scale. This creates some positional distance between them. The opposition parties 
are also dispersed across this dimension of political conflict. The Green and the BZÖ are 
both slightly more extreme than either governing party towards the left and right 
respectively. Thus, they are close to one of the coalition partners, but quite distant to the 
other. The FPÖ is hard to grasp for the quantitative indicators (Bakker et al. 2015, CHES 
2016). Both anti-establishment, BZÖ and FPÖ, parties favour redistributive politics within 
Austria, as typical for left-oriented politics. Yet, they – especially the BZÖ – demand more 
efficient state structures and tax breaks in line with economically right-wing positions. In 
this study the FPÖ is placed centre of the scale and the BZÖ right of centre to account for 
this discrepancy. 
In the German parliament, the pattern of competition on the left-right scale is quite 
straightforward. Both governing parties range right of centre; the FDP is more extreme than 
the CDU/CSU. All opposition parties in the legislative period from 2009 to 2013 hold more 
left-oriented positions than the government. The SPD – similar to the SPÖ – stands mildly 
left of centre. The German Greens are placed in the centre of the scale. The Linke is on the 
extreme left of the political spectrum. There is more variation on the socio-economic scale 
than in the Austrian party system. 
Fewer indicators exist for the TAN-GAL dimension. The CHES dataset and the study by 
Franzmann and Kaiser (2006) cover the cultural dimension using a similar definition to the 
one of this study (see 2.3.2) (Franzmann and Kaiser 2006, Bakker et al. 2015). Their results 
for Austria and Germany only line up on half of the party groups: the two Green parties, the 
SPD, CDU and FDP (see Appendix I). For the other five parties, mainly Austrian ones, the 
quantitative indicators merely served as rough orientation for the placement of the parties 
on the TAN-GAL scale. They are weighed off in view of the qualitative analysis on the 
development of the party system (Section 3.4.1 and 3.4.2). Figure 5 locates the parties to 








Figure 5: Party positions on the TAN-GAL position. 
The location of party groups on the TAN-GAL scale shows a clear pattern in Austria. 
Opposition parties in the Nationalrat challenge the governing parties from both ends of the 
scale. The governing coalition holds more central positions (SPÖ in the centre, ÖVP leans 
more to the TAN-pole). The two anti-establishment parties have the most extreme positions 
on the TAN-pole; the FPÖ being more extreme than the BZÖ. The Austrian Green party is 
located at the other extreme of this dimension and is the most extreme one of all parties 
under study towards the GAL-pole. 
In Germany, the Green party is the only one with a decisive position on the cultural 
dimension. It is close to its Austrian counter-part. The other four German party groups 
range around the centre. The SPD locates in the very middle of the scale. The Linke and 
FDP, who show the strongest conflict on the left-right dimension, coincide on a slightly 
GAL-position. The CDU/CSU is the only one leaning towards the TAN-pole. The 
governing coalition, in consequence, does not have a uniform stance on the cultural 
dimension of conflict. The SPD is placed in between FDP and CDU/CSU holding a similar 
distance to both. The Greens are the only one with a clear distance to both governing 
parties. 
In both countries the coalition parties differ quite significantly on one of the dimensions of 
policy conflict. The study assumes that the position of government is represented by the 
mean of the positions of both coalition partners weighted according to the seat share of each 
party group. For the voting behaviour and other activities that document the outcome of a 
decision-making process the governing parties are most likely aligned. Yet, the discrepancy 
in positions among the coalition partners should show in discourse. 
The parties selected for analysis show significant variation on the two independent 
variables of party type and ideological distance (see Table 4). The differences between the 




 Table 4: Summary of parties’ positions on towards the independent variables. 
Hypothesis 1 on the role of the party type will be supported, if the two anti-establishment 
parties are significantly more competitive than all regular opposition parties. The definition 
of anti-establishment includes an element on policy competition. These party groups are not 
only determined through their anti-elite rhetorical style, but also the strong difference in 
terms of policy content on specific policy issues (see Abedi 2002). In consequence, the 
hypothesis on anti-establishment parties overlaps with the expectation on ideological 
distance as a driver for EU scrutiny. The case selection still enables to test the different 
logics of Hypotheses 1 and 2. If the party type is the predominant explanatory factor, BZÖ 
and FPÖ should differentiate clearly from all other party groups. Their competition would 
not be limited to certain policy fields. Where Hypotheses 2 on ideological distance has 
explanatory power, the intensity of competition corresponds to the variation on policy 
distance to governing party groups. The two anti-establishment parties are no outliers in 
terms of ideological distance. The Austrian Greens hold a more controversial position to 
their government on the cultural dimension of conflict. And the Left party is the most 
competitive one of the sample on the socio-economic dimension. The testing of Hypotheses 
2 a and b follows the logic of the method of concomitant variation (Mill 1890). 
Hypotheses 2a and b differentiate the competition along the cultural and the socio-
economic dimension of political conflict. The party groups under study vary clearly in their 
positions on these two dimensions. The distance on the socio-economic scale thereby does 
not correspond to the one on the cultural. The three Austrian opposition parties are overall 
more distant on the TAN-GAL dimension and the German ones on the left-right scale. 









FPÖ Yes Low  High  
BZÖ Yes Medium  Rather high  
Grüne No Medium  High  
SPD No Rather high  Low  
90/Grünen  No Medium  Medium  
Linke No  High  Rather low  
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of political conflict: the BZÖ is slightly less extreme on the TAN-GAL scale and more 
competitive on the left-right dimension. This difference between FPÖ and BZÖ should 
further help to distinguish the explanatory power of Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2.  
The two dimensions of political conflict are not equally relevant for each topic. Positions 
on issues, such as EU integration and migration, have been better explained through 
conflict on the cultural dimension (Hooghe et al. 2002, Hooghe and Marks 2009). 
Economic policy, however, usually corresponds more to the classic left-right divide. The 
explanatory value of the two hypotheses should in consequence vary according to the issues 
at stake.  
This Chapter 3.4 located the positions of party groups in view of the two independent 
variables of this study: party type and ideological distance. The most-similar system design 
requires variation on the independent variables. The six opposition parties in Austria and 
Germany under study allow clearly distinguishing the explanatory power of each 
hypothesis. There are two anti-establishment parties in the sample (H1). All party groups 
differ in their ideological distance to the governing parties, both on the cultural as well as 
on the socio-economic dimension. 
So far this Chapter 3 has demonstrated the institutional similarities between the two 
countries under investigation and the variation and location of party groups on the 
independent variables. The remainder of the chapter explains the methodological approach.  
3.5. The methodological approach 
Recent studies on national parliaments’ control over EU affairs identified a research gap on 
the actual practice of EU scrutiny at national level (Raunio 2009, Rozenberg and Hefftler 
2015). This thesis addresses this gap with a thorough analysis of opposition parties’ 
scrutiny activities in two EU member states. The central method of this thesis is the 
comparative approach with a small-n set of political parties as research subjects. The study 
investigates the activities of six party groups in opposition in Germany and Austria in the 
time period from 2008/9 to 2013.  
The advantage of this study is its holistic approach covering various aspects of parliaments’ 
EU scrutiny activities. Most research on legislatures and opposition assesses one channel of 
influence isolated from the other parliamentary activities. This study covers the legislative 
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work at committee level as well as the communicative action at plenary level. The dynamic 
perspective covering committee and plenary stage has several advantages. First, it will 
show whether the conflict arises along similar dimensions at committee and plenary stage. 
Second, the comprehensive approach can assess whether parties act coherently in the 
various venues or whether they focus on a certain type of activity. For example, is the 
legislative work of motions and votes in committee stage reflected in the communication to 
voters through plenary speeches? The limited number of cases under investigation allows 
an in-depth analysis of parliamentary EU scrutiny. 
The empirical analysis of the thesis is structured along the two parliamentary channels of 
influence: the committee level and the plenary level. The formal scrutiny instruments vary 
for each channel of influence. In consequence, it is necessary to adapt the methodological 
approach to each channel of influence. The precise methods and data sources are presented 
at the beginning of each empirical chapter for better readability (see 4.1, 5.1 and 6.1). The 
precise method and data is presented in direct proximity of the results. This Chapter 3.5 
gives a brief overview on the three methodological elements of this study. The common 
framework presented here assures that the results of each chapter feed into a “bigger 
picture” of opposition parties’ EU scrutiny.  
The analysis combines three methodological approaches for an encompassing 
understanding of opposition strategies on EU scrutiny: a quantitative analysis, content 
analysis and interview data. First, the investigation starts out with a quantitative overview 
on parliamentary activities in Germany and Austria. Recent studies on national parliaments 
and the EU as well as on opposition have started to assess the parliamentary activities 
quantitatively (Auel et al. 2015a, Finke and Herbel 2015, Gattermann and Hefftler 2015, 
Loxbo and Sjölin 2016). The data demonstrates the scope of EU scrutiny activities of each 
opposition party group. The study collected data on those activities that can be quantified, 
e.g. the frequency and types of (legislative) initiatives and opposition parties’ voting 
behaviour. Due to the limited number of cases (n = 6) the data are evaluated in descriptive 
terms. The low number of six cases impedes reasonable statistical analysis (Jahn 2013, 
Agresti and Finlay 2014). At the same time, the limited scope enables a qualitative analysis 
that is better suited to investigate the motivation of opposition parties’ scrutiny activities. 
The in-depth qualitative study seems more suitable since this study explores a new angle on 
EU scrutiny activities, which has been understudied to date (Levy 2008).  
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The second methodological element is content analysis, which explores the dimensions of 
conflict among party groups within the two parliaments. This approach is especially 
relevant to test Hypotheses 2 (a and b) on the two dimensions of political conflict (cultural 
or socio-economic). Content analysis is defined as ”the systematic objective, quantitative 
analysis of message characteristics” (Neuendorf 2002: 1) of text documents. The method 
aims at a transparent and inter-subjective way of analysing text. This study builds on the 
method of framing analysis (Chong and Druckman 2007, Daviter 2007). It investigates 
both, initiatives at committee level and debates at plenary level, in terms of the framing of 
EU issues. The EU-related initiatives in the committees under investigation (n = 351) are 
allocated to a pole of the two dimensions of conflict (TAN-GAL and left-right). The 
speeches at plenary level (n = 92) are analysed in-depth regarding the difference in framing 
EU affairs among party groups. The content analysis of initiatives and speeches shows in 
how far opposition parties present alternative visions on EU policymaking and polity 
design. In this, the study can contribute to the state of the art. Existing studies showed a 
lower participation of opposition parties in national parliaments’ plenary debates (Rauh and 
de Wilde 2017). Yet, the actual competition on different visions on EU integration 
remained an open question.  
Finally, interview data complement of the information from quantitative and content 
analysis, as they give access to the motivation for the use of these instruments. In each 
member state, members of parliament – in most cases with a specialization on EU issues – 
were interviewed as well as a number of parliamentary administrators and party groups’ 
staff working on EU affairs. Interviews were conducted with the assurance of the 
anonymity of the interviewee. References therefore follow the system of abbreviations for 
“country/ chamber/ political or administrative level/ number”, for example “DBTP01” for 
Germany, Bundestag, political level, first interview.  
The interviews were semi-structured. Parliamentarians, parliamentary administrators and 
party groups staff were asked about the inter-action of party groups in domestic and EU 
affairs, the motivation to support government initiatives and to participate in joint initiatives 
with governing parties. Members of opposition parties were questioned on own approach 
and the motivation to cooperate with other party groups. Parliamentarians from governing 
parties described their perception of opposition party groups and influence on the 
legislative agenda and government’s position. The interviews also served a better 
understanding of the implementation of formal scrutiny rights of minorities. 
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The interviews were partially conducted in the framework of the Observatory of 
Parliaments after Lisbon (OPAL) project in the time period between May 2012 and June 
2013. The information from the interviews from the project was complemented by two field 
trips to Vienna and Berlin in September 2016 and October 2016. These focused on the 
party political dynamic and potential cooperation across party groups, thus, focussing on 
the research question of this study. For the complementary round seven interviewees in the 
Nationalrat and five in the Bundestag kindly made time available. Overall, the study builds 
on 10 interviews with party representatives or staff from opposition parties and 6 with those 
from governing parties as well as 10 interviews with parliamentary administrators.  
In sum, this study addresses the research gap on empirical analysis of parliamentary EU 
scrutiny. It triangulates the results from qualitative and qualitative methodological 
approaches in an in-depth analysis of German and Austrian opposition party groups. This 
Chapter 3.5 explained the general methodological angle combining quantitative and content 
analysis as well as interview data. More detailed information on the data sources and their 













4. Cooperation at committee level? 
 
Committees are seen as the heart piece of parliamentary work, where detailed scrutiny by 
policy experts takes place (Laundy 1989). The committee level is generally understood to 
operate in a more fact-oriented and cooperative fashion than the floor level (Damgaard and 
Mattson 2004: 113). In this more enclosed environment – often without public access – 
lines of party conflict are usually less pronounced. It is considered especially relevant for 
opposition parties, as they may realize parts of their policy programme in the more 
confidential committee atmosphere. However, fundamentally competing party interests 
should clash at the committee level as well. This Chapter 4 investigates opposition parties’ 
parliamentary activities in the committee stage: the stage of document-based legislative 
scrutiny according to the model of opposition (Section 2.2.3). 
Research on national parliaments has primarily investigated formal rules of EU scrutiny at 
the committee level. A number of studies considered the historical development of 
European Affairs Committees and their special role and function in parliament (Bergman 
1997, Gattermann et al. 2015) Only few publications assessed the activities of parliaments 
in their analysis (for an overview see Gattermann et al. 2015). In consequence, this study 
introduces the methods from legislative and opposition studies to investigate parliaments 
activities on EU affairs. The focus is on two types of activities: legislative proposals or 
other formal initiatives at committee level as well as the voting behaviour of opposition 
parties.59  
Researching opposition’s activities at committee level starts out from a puzzle: Why do 
opposition MPs invest their time in drafting bills and motions that will be voted down by 
the majority? The direct policy effect is negligible. This study assumes that oppositions’ 
legislative activities at committee level are an attempt at influencing the legislative agenda 
(indirect policy influence) and indicating the own position (re-election benefits). Russell et 
al. (2016) have shown that parliamentary actors are motivated by more than just legislative 
influence when they draft bills or amendments. Initiatives from the opposition in the UK 
are attempts at information seeking, signalling the own position to the government or voters 
                                                 
59 Debates at committee level are not included in the analysis, as parts of the meetings are not public and the 
minutes were not accessible for the two chambers. Chapter 5 on plenary debates investigates the 
communicative dimension in-depth. 
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or demonstrating weaknesses of the government draft bill. Bräuninger and Debus (2009) 
see draft bills of opposition as an attempt of agenda setting. It is an opportunity to present 
the own policy alternatives to fellow MPs and the voters.  
Opposition parties take a proactive stance when they issue initiatives at committee level. 
There is a second crucial element of committee work, which is of re-active nature: voting. 
Opposition parties regularly support legislative bills from the governing parties. Here we 
are confronted with a similar puzzle as on opposition initiatives: Why do opposition parties 
vote in favour of governmental bills even though their votes are not necessary to build a 
majority? A range of studies has shown that legislation is regularly passed with broad 
support from opposition parties in European states (Damgaard and Mattson 2004: 121, 
Kaiser 2008, Andeweg 2013, Moury and de Giorgi 2015: 2). The support of opposition in 
votes on governing parties’ proposals is an important indicator of cooperation or consensus 
at committee level (Damgaard and Mattson 2004: 118, Curini and Zucchini 2015, Spreitzer 
and Timmermans 2015, Louwerse et al. 2016). Supportive votes may result from consensus 
or cooperation during the committee negotiations. Building on this research, this study 
assumes that votes against a government proposal signal competition by opposition parties.  
This Chapter 4 focuses on the research question: What factors determine in how far party 
groups in opposition cooperate or compete with governing parties in their activities at 
committee level? It tests the two hypotheses on the competitive or cooperative behaviour of 
opposition parties, which were developed in the theoretical chapter (see Section 2.3.2). 
These assume that parties with an anti-establishment stance and distant policy positions 
from the government use a more competitive strategy. Competition at committee level can 
take the form of motions and bills with alternative policy perspectives as well as a lack of 
support in votes. 
This Chapter is structured in four parts. The following Chapter 4.1 presents the 
methodological approach. Chapter 4.2 introduces the scrutiny logic in the committees in 
practice. Chapter 4.3 presents the results on opposition initiatives and voting. The 
quantitative analysis of opposition behaviour (4.3.1) is paired with qualitative investigation 
through content analysis (4.3.2) and interviews in both chambers (4.3.3). The final Chapter 
4.4 concludes. 
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4.1. Methods and case selection for the analysis of the committee 
level 
This Chapter 4 investigates competition by opposition parties at committee level. To do so 
it focuses on two types of activities of a selected number of committees in the Bundestag 
and Nationalrat between 2008/9 and 2013: motions and voting. The methods build on 
existing legislative and opposition studies. This Chapter first explains the methodological 
approach on the analysis of motions and voting (4.1.1). The chapter finally explains the 
selection of a few committees for the investigation (4.1.2). 
4.1.1.  Measuring scope, quality and motivation for EU scrutiny 
Committees are conceptualized as the first step in the parliamentary scrutiny procedure in 
the model on opposition in national parliaments (Section 2.2.3), as they engage in the 
detailed scrutiny work on incoming EU documents, bills and motions. This section explains 
the methods for measuring competition and cooperation at committee level. The analysis of 
EU scrutiny at committee level proceeds in three steps. First, the chapter provides a 
quantitative overview of initiatives and voting as an indicator for the scope of opposition 
activities. Second, the analysis assesses the policy areas and dimensions of conflict (socio-
economic or cultural) to indicate how opposition parties compete with the government. 
Finally, the chapter draws on interview data for both parliaments to better understand the 
extent of actual cooperation among party groups of different statuses. The qualitative 
analysis incorporates data on initiatives that were issued jointly by governing and 
opposition parties. Even though these are rare, they could indicate pre-negotiations ahead of 
committee meetings and true cooperation across the aisle. The remainder of this Section 
4.1.1 explains the three steps of analysis in greater detail. 
The starting point of the analysis is a database on the activities of selected committees in 
the two parliaments from 2008/9 to 2013 (for the selection please see Section 4.1.2). The 
first step of analysis grasps the extent of EU scrutiny activities. On the one hand, 
competition can be indicated by the frequency of motions (Finke and Dannwolf 2013, Auel 
et al. 2015a, Finke and Herbel 2015). The number of initiatives (of different document 
types) can indicate the attempt to influence the legislative agenda and to formulate counter-
visions to government initiatives. On the other hand, the database provides information on 
the voting behaviour of opposition parties. Here supportive votes are understood as 
indicator of cooperation or consensus (Damgaard and Mattson 2004, de Giorgi and 
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Marangoni 2011, Louwerse et al. 2016). The number and content of motions stemming 
from parties in opposition are accessible through the committees’ websites or parliamentary 
archives (Bundestag 2017, Nationalrat 2017). Activities in domestic affairs (in the 
committees on economy and on social affairs) serve as reference point for competition on 
EU issues for the two quantitative indicators. 
In both parliaments, all motions and legislative bills are voted upon in the committee. 
Records of voting behaviour were accessed through the committee reports on their 
proceedings (Bundestag 2017, Nationalrat 2017). Information on each initiative includes: 
the date, the parliament, the committee, the document type, the initiating party group, the 
voting behaviour of each party group,60 the outcome of the vote and whether it is related to 
EU affairs. The analysis of votes focuses on government legislative bills to understand the 
level of support for policymaking by the opposition parties. Table 2 (4.2) demonstrates that 
governing parties most often use the document type of legislative bills.61 Law making is 
arguably the most important activity in terms of policy influence. In the Nationalrat, MPs 
are required to vote in favour or against an initiative. In the Bundestag, they have the 
additional option of abstention.62  
The scrutiny of EU affairs is not confined to EACs only. Thus, the database needs to be 
sensitive to EU-related initiatives in all committees under investigation. The relation to EU 
affairs was coded manually for each initiative in view of the title and introductory five 
sentences of the motion. A motion with any reference to the EU level was coded as EU-
related in its introductory section. This can take the form of a request towards government 
to initiate legislation at EU level, implementation of EU legislation, a transposition or 
reaction to a judgement from the CJEU.  
Large-n quantitative studies often use frequencies of initiating scrutiny or legislative drafts 
as indicators for active parliamentary scrutiny (Bräuninger and Debus 2009, Finke and 
                                                 
60 Voting was coded in view of the document stemming from the original initiator of the motion. Often the 
actual vote is on the recommendation of the committee, not the motion itself. Where the committee 
recommended declining the motion, the votes were coded inversely. E.g. the committee recommends 
declining the motion by opposition party X. The recommendation was supported by the governing parties and 
opposed by the minority parties. In this case the database notes negative voting of government parties on the 
initial motion (0) and positive by the opposition parties (1).  
61 The Austrian governing parties also participate in opinions and reasoned opinions towards the European 
Commission. This format is not investigated in terms of oppositions’ voting behavior, as there is no matching 
information on the Bundestag. 
62 In Germany, the Bundesrat has the right to co-decide on almost 40 per cent of the legislation. If opposition 
has a majority in the upper house, it will be able to negotiate compromises that will be reflected by more 
supportive votes in the Bundestag. The opposition only achieved a majority in the Bundesrat towards the end 
of the legislative period, which should not influence the results much.  
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Dannwolf 2013, Auel et al. 2015a). This analysis starts out from the frequencies with which 
opposition parties engage in the committee activities. Following Hypothesis 1 and 2 we 
would expect more initiatives from anti-establishment parties and ideological distant ones 
(see 2.3.2). For this study, the small number of cases and limited time period require (and 
enable) a more in-depth analysis of parliamentary activities beyond mere frequencies. 
Frequencies form as a starting point (step 1 of the analysis), but do not represent a 
sufficient indicator for competition and cooperation of opposition parties. 
The second step of the analysis considers the topics and dimensions of conflict in 
initiatives. On which issues and angle does opposition challenge the governing parties? As 
a content analysis is a time intensive approach, the second step of analysis focuses on EU-
related motions. The text corpus for the content analysis of motions consists of the 351 
initiatives that have been manually coded as EU-related from all seven committees. The 
analysis employed computer-aided manually coding using the MaxQDA software. First, I 
coded the general policy field of each initiative. The policy areas inform on agenda setting 
activities of opposition parties and allow to understand whether Hypothesis 2a (left-right 
dimension) or Hypothesis 2b (cultural dimension) should become relevant in the framing 
activities of party groups. Section 2.3.2 has defined scope conditions for each hypothesis 
based on the policy area under scrutiny. The coding of policy fields was oriented at the 
European Parliaments committee structure to define an abstract reference point. Hypotheses 
2a and b argue that two dimensions of conflict are important to explain competition by 
opposition parties: their positional distance on the socio-economic as well as on the cultural 
dimension of policy conflict. Questions on the allocation of competences and enlargement 
of the EU should better be explained through the cultural dimension of conflict. The socio-
economic aspects of EU policymaking, however, should be driven by the left-right logic. 
To answer Hypothesis 2 (a and b) each EU-related initiative is allocated to the TAN or 
GAL as well as the left or right pole.63 At this stage of the analysis, the initiatives are only 
coded towards one of the poles without a more detailed frame analysis. The content 
analysis is too time intensive to analyse all initiatives in depth. The framing analysis 
follows the logic of the scheme of analysis of Chapter 5. Section 5.1.1 and the Codebook in 
Appendix IV explain the specific frames of each dimension of conflict in detail. Chapter 5 
investigates the communicative strategies in more detail.  
                                                 
63 Some initiatives are of rather technical nature or argue for policy solutions, such as energy security, that are 
of general nature and escape the logic of both dimensions. If a proposal could not be related to either 
dimension it was coded as “other”. 
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Finally, this chapter relies on interview data with parliamentarians and administrative staff 
in both parliaments (4.3.3). Only interviews shed light on informal cooperation and the 
nature of the preparation of committee sessions and joint initiatives.64 Section 4.3.3 on 
consensus or cooperation among party group is complemented with data on the few 
instances where party groups joined forces to initiate a motion. These joint initiatives are 
rare, but could be an important indicator of true cooperation before or during the committee 
stage.  
4.1.2.  Selection of committees  
Research on voting in parliaments has shown that decisions are very frequently made by 
consensus (Moury and de Giorgi 2015: 2). It is therefore difficult to establish in abstract 
terms what the reference point for a “normal” level of consensual decision-making would 
be on EU affairs in the Bundestag and the Nationalrat. The thesis will use domestic affairs 
within the same parliament as the reference point. The following Section 4.1.2 explains the 
case selection of the committees within each parliament. 
The empirical analysis focuses on seven committees in Austria and Germany: the European 
affairs committees (two in the Nationalrat, one in the Bundestag), the Committees of 
employment and social affairs and the committees dealing with economic questions. The 
choice of the three types of committees is based on the idea to cover those committees, 
which are affected to varying degrees by EU integration. The EACs obviously focus 
exclusively on EU affairs, the Committees of Economy are strongly affected by EU law 
making, while the policy area of Employment and Social Affairs is predominantly under 
domestic control (see Section 4.1.2). As the Nationalrat has a main and a sub-committee on 
EU affairs, the study includes a total of seven committees for the empirical analysis (see 





                                                 
64 Please see Chapter 3.5 for the number of interviews and the line of questioning. 
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No. Chamber Committee 
1 Nationalrat Hauptausschuss 
2 Nationalrat Ständiger Unterausschuss in Angelegenheiten der Europäischen 
Union 
3 Nationalrat Ausschuss für Arbeit und Soziales 
4 Nationalrat Ausschuss für Wirtschaft und Industrie 
5 Bundestag Ausschuss für die Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union 
6 Bundestag Ausschuss für Arbeit und Soziales 
7 Bundestag Ausschuss für Wirtschaft und Technologie 
Table 5: Committees selceted for investigation. 
The case selection balances out the difficulty, which arises from the different ways of 
processing EU affairs within the two parliaments. In the Nationalrat a main committee and 
an EU sub-committee hold the sole responsibility to scrutinize EU affairs ex-ante. In the 
Bundestag, EU affairs are “mainstreamed” to regular specialized committees and the EU 
affairs committee has only a coordinative function. The Bundestag’s economy, budget and 
legal committee were involved in the decision-making on the Euro crisis (Höing 2015b). 
Thus the case selection of this study covers one of the committees that played a central role 
in crisis management. Major conflicts on EU integration should also translate into the EAC. 
4.2. The practice of EU scrutiny at committee level 
This Chapter 4.2 sets the scene with a descriptive overview on initiatives in the committees 
under study. The practice of EU scrutiny in national chambers has not been investigated 
thoroughly yet. This section precedes the analysis of individual party groups strategies to 
understand the context of opposition parties’ activities. It starts out with a quantitative 
assessment of scrutiny activities and then complements these findings with interview data. 
Figure 6 shows how many initiatives in each committee were issued and how many of these 
were related to EU issues. It includes all types of initiatives, such as legislative bills and 
statements, and covers all party groups of the two parliaments. 
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Figure 6: Number of initiatives in the seven committees under investigation from 2009 to 2013.  
In the legislative periods from 2008/9 to 2013 party groups issued a total of 1044 initiatives 
in the seven committees of the two chambers under investigation. 351 initiatives thereof 
concerned EU issues. 
There are strong differences in the frequency of initiatives received by committees: Their 
number ranges between 39 motions in the German EAC to 277 initiatives in the Austrian 
Committee for Employment and Social Affairs. The two EACs deal exclusively with EU 
issues. Both economy committees are confronted with some EU issues, whereas the social 
committees largely focus on domestic affairs. Figure 6 reflects the different styles of 
processing EU affairs in the Bundestag and the Nationalrat (Gattermann et al. 2015). In 
Austria, sectoral committees are less affected by EU issues than in Germany. Even the 
committee for economy only receives 21 initiatives with a link to EU matters over the 
course of four years, despite the fact that its policy field is object to strong interference 
from EU level. For the Bundestag, the model of mainstreaming shows in the EU-related 
motions on the agenda of the committee for economy (with 53 initiatives). The German 
Committee for Economy is confronted with a higher number of EU-related initiatives than 
its EAC. The mainstreaming of day-to-day EU policymaking shows its effect.65 The 
different styles of processing have an important consequence for the involvement of the 
                                                 
65 We can assume that most EU-related initiatives in the Nationalrat are covered in this analysis. For the 
Bundestag, the results are limited due to the case selection. A significant share of EU scrutiny is taking place 













plenary on EU affairs: The Austrian EAC uses its right to vote on EU-related issues in 
place of the plenary. Day-to-day EU policymaking, in consequence, does not arrive on the 
plenary agenda (see also Chapter 5.2.1).  
Table 6 disaggregates the overall frequency of initiatives by document type and status of 
the initiator (government or opposition).66 The different use of the parliamentary 
instruments explains the focus in the analysis in Chapter 4.3.67 It differentiates between the 
ex-ante control over the own government, the ex-post stage of transposition and the ex-ante 
involvement with the Commission (opinions and reasoned opinions) (see Section 3.3.2). 
The data informs on two aspects: The ex-ante or ex-post involvement of each committee 
and which instrument is used by the governing or opposition party groups.   
  Austrian Nationalrat German Bundestag 
 
 
EAC main EAC sub Economy Social EAC Economy Social 







7 68 12 38 – – – – – – 2 3 – 1 
Statement 
or motion 








– – – – 17 – – – 7 1 15 – 1 3 
Internat’l 
agreement 




Opinion 2 1 12 – – – – – – – – – – – 
Reasoned 
opinion 
– – 2 – – – – – – – – – 1 – 
Total  12 110 47 115 19 21 1 1 15 42 20 53 2 16 
Table 6: Types of documents of EU-related initiatives in the Nationalrat and Bundestag from 2009 to 2013. 
Gv = government, op = opposition, Com = Commission *For Austria the catergory codes mandates; for 
Germany, resolutions. 
The differentiation by document type shows that governing and opposition parties use 
instruments to varying extent. It also emphasizes the different roles of each committee 
within the two chambers. All opposition parties focus on the ex-ante scrutiny of the own 
government. In Austria, the ex-ante scrutiny of the government – mainly in form of 
mandates (Stellungnahmen) and other statements – takes place mostly in the two EACs. 
                                                 
66 Table 6 does not differentiate initiatives whether government or governing majority in parliament initiated a 
motion. It is not relevant for the analysis of opposition parties’ competitive or cooperative strategies.  
67 The data collection ignores the acknowledgement of a report (Kenntnisnahme) or a declined motion 
(abgelehnter Antrag) and government decree (Verordnungen), as they either repeat a prior decision or are of 
little relevance for party competition. 
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The Main Committee on EU Affairs, which holds the responsibility for the European 
Council, receives more frequently the most binding form of mandates than its sub-
committee. Opposition actively uses the Main Committee as a forum for their initiatives. In 
the Bundestag, most of the initiatives in the ex-ante stage of the parliamentary work are 
motions (Anträge) by opposition parties. The more binding form of a resolution is barely 
used. All three Bundestag’s committees under investigation are involved in this form of ex-
ante EU scrutiny; the EAC and the Economy Committee both to an equal amount with 34 
and 35 motions respectively.  
For the ex-post stage we see an almost reversed logic in the processing of EU affairs. In the 
Nationalrat, the Economy Committee and the Employment Committee deal with 
implementation of EU decisions into national law. They dealt with specific legislative 
proposals and a few approvals of international agreements that touched upon EU issues (see 
Table 6). Neither of the EACs faced actual legislative initiatives in the ex-post stage during 
the period of investigation. In the Bundestag, the economy committee dealt with most 
legislative proposals, followed by the European Affairs Committee. Opposition parties do 
not attempt to promote alternative legislative proposals in this stage of the policy cycle. The 
lack of competition by opposition in the ex-post stage underlines the relevance of 
parliamentary involvement in the ex-ante stage of EU scrutiny (see Auel and Benz 2005). 
Finally, parliaments have the opportunity to directly address the European Commission 
through either the Early Warning Mechanism or the Political Dialogue. Table 6 shows that 
the contact to the European Commission is in the hands of the governing parties. The 
Nationalrat sent 14 opinions in the Political Dialogue and two reasoned opinions. The 
Bundestag sent one reasoned opinion in this channel of communication in the time period 
from 2009 to 2013. This channel of influence is not relevant for an analysis of opposition’s 
strategies.  
The quantitative assessment of committee activities is complemented with the qualitative 
analysis through interviews regarding the practice of EU scrutiny. This study chose the time 
period post-Lisbon, as both parliaments revised their formal rules on EU scrutiny in 
reaction to the reformed EU treaty (see Chapter 3). This section analyses the interview data 
for a more detailed account of information access and agenda stetting by opposition parties 
post-Lisbon. The focus is on the scope of influence for opposition parties. 
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Interview partners in both countries have acknowledged the impact of the institutional 
innovations in consequence of the Lisbon Treaty on the scrutiny of EU affairs (see Section 
3.3.2). In the Nationalrat, members of a government party explain that the minority rights 
in EU affairs have an anticipatory effect. The majority parties act more cooperatively on 
agenda setting or information access in order to avoid the use of formal complaints by 
minority parties (AUNRP01). The EAC agenda is negotiated in a cross-party meeting. A 
weekly meeting of party advisors serves the clearance of organisational matters around the 
monthly EAC meetings (AUNRP01, AUNRP02). While the agenda is still a point of 
controversies and intense negotiations, opposition proposals are all included at some point 
in time. Often it requires about a three-month notice before an item is included on the EAC 
sub-committees agenda (AUNRP01, AUNRP02). Though opposition has an influence on 
the committee agenda, the initiatives filed here do not appear on the plenary agenda. The 
EAC regularly makes use of its right to vote instead of the plenary. 
One consequence of the Lisbon Treaty was the revision of the fully automatized online 
database where the government feeds in all EU-related documents that it is required to 
provide to parliament (see §31, EU-InfoG). The database became fully functional only 
towards the end of the legislative period under investigation (AUNRP02). Interview 
partners of an opposition party described a learning process by the ministries on the 
information they are now legally bound to include on the database and share with 
parliament. By the end of 2012 the information is readily available (AUNRP02). 
Interviewees from all party groups evaluated the database as very helpful for EU scrutiny. 
This information implies that information access was still challenging during the period of 
investigation. 
This positive evaluation of opposition parties’ rights in EU affairs stands in stark contrast 
with the evaluation of government-opposition relations to domestic issues in Austria. 
Opposition MPs from the committee of economic affairs showed frustration with their 
limited influence on the committee agenda. According to them, most committees of the 
Nationalrat often adjourn (vertagen) motions by opposition. In consequence, the initiatives 
by opposition are neither addressed in the committee reports nor do they make it to the 
plenary where they could gain public attention (AUNRP03, AUNRP05). The data reflected 
this lack of influence for opposition in the low number of opposition initiatives in the 
Committee of Economy (see Figure 6 above). The adjournment undermines the formal 
agenda setting power of minorities in the Nationalrat.  
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In the Bundestag, MPs witness a de facto strengthening of the parliament vis-à-vis the 
government since the court judgement from June 2009 (Bundesverfassungsgericht 2009). 
The government is more attentive to the position of the Bundestag. Due to the increased 
salience of EU issues and a learning process among MPs, the parliament more frequently 
uses resolutions on EU matters (DBTP04, DBTP10). The data collection of this study 
showed still rather limited involvement with six resolutions on EU issues during the period 
of investigation (see Table 2, Chapter 4.2). However, not only issuing resolutions or 
statements increased, but also the information access important to opposition parties 
(DBTP07).  
The EAC is described as “a victim of its own success” (DBTP07). Through mainstreaming 
of EU affairs, the committee has lost influence within the Bundestag. Some members of the 
EAC regretted this development in the decision-making processes on the Euro crisis where 
the budget and legal committees took main responsibility (DBTP07). One MP of the 
governing parties describes the EAC as a weak committee with little influence on policy 
outcomes (DBTP12). On the other side, the European Affairs Committee still enjoys a 
relatively high status due to its respect and access to the international level. MPs in the 
EAC have an additional travel budget and frequently receive visits from other parliaments. 
According to one interview partner, this recognition and access to international networks is 
attractive to some MPs (DBTP10). 
The agenda of the Bundestag’s EAC is negotiated in a cross-party meeting of the 
parliamentary secretaries (Fraktionsgeschäftsführer) similar to the arrangement in Austria. 
Opposition parties may threaten to use minority protection rights in order to push an issue 
onto the agenda (DBTP10). Interview partners describe the atmosphere in the EAC as 
trustful and constructive though proper cooperation across parties is rare. There is a high 
consensus on basic principles on EU integration among all five party groups in the period 
of investigation (DBTP12, DBTP04).  
Both parliaments experienced better opportunity structures for EU scrutiny in the aftermath 
of the Lisbon Treaty. For opposition parties, the access to agenda setting in the European 
Affairs Committees is an important benefit of the revisions of secondary legislation and 
parliamentary rules of procedures after Lisbon. The access to information was also 
evaluated positively now. In Austria, opposition’s influence on the plenary agenda is very 
limited though.  
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The review on the practice of EU scrutiny in the committees of the Nationalrat and 
Bundestag delivers three important context factors for the analysis of party strategies. First, 
the analysis needs to be sensitive to the document type. Governing parties regularly use 
legislative bills; yet, opposition mainly issues initiatives of less binding nature. The ex-ante 
scrutiny of resolutions, statements and motions is the most important for an analysis of 
proactive initiatives by opposition parties. Opposition does not use ex-post control or the 
EWS. Second, the EACs in Austria are the focus of EU scrutiny, whereas the German 
parliament diffused the activities of government and opposition parties to sectoral 
committees. Initiatives on EU affairs do not arrive on the plenary agenda, as the EAC often 
uses its right to vote instead of the plenary. Third, the Early Warning Mechanism and the 
Political Dialogue do not qualify as a channel for voicing opposition concerns and are 
largely excluded from further analysis.  
4.3. Results on cooperation and competition at committee level 
This Chapter 4.3 presents the results on competition and cooperation at committee level in 
the German and Austrian parliaments. The first Section 4.3.1 shows the scope of opposition 
parties’ activities in initiatives and voting (4.3.1). The motions from opposition parties on 
EU issues are further investigated by content analysis (4.3.2). Finally, the information from 
interviews with MPs and clerks at both chambers complements the analysis of the 
committee level (4.3.3).  
4.3.1. The scope of opposition parties’ activities 
The prior section assessed the processing of EU affairs at committee stage in the two 
parliaments under investigation. In this Section 4.2.2 the interest is in the initiators of these 
motions, the actors driving the scrutiny process. As a first step of the analysis, this section 
shows the results on the scope of activities in quantitative terms. It considers the number of 
motions on domestic and EU issues per party group as well as the voting behaviour of 
opposition parties. The first step of the empirical analysis tests the expectations formulated 
in Hypotheses 1 and 2: Do anti-system parties and positional distant ones show an 
increased frequency of motions and less support in votes?  
Studies have used the frequencies of initiatives as an indicator of active parliamentary 
scrutiny (Finke and Dannwolf 2013, Auel et al. 2015a). This study considers a high number 
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of initiatives from opposition parties as a first indicator for competition in EU scrutiny. 
Figure 7 gives an overview of the share of EU-related motions compared to those on 
domestic issues in the committees of economy and social affairs. The domestic initiatives 
and those stemming from governing parties are included as a reference point for opposition 
activities on EU matters (see Section 4.1.1). The figure includes legislative bills as well 
mandates, resolutions, statements and motions. The coalition parties initiated all legislative 
proposals and motions jointly in both chambers.68 The activities of the governing coalitions 
are included in Figure 7 as a reference point. Did opposition parties issue more or less 
initiatives than the government within the committees under investigation? Comparing 
opposition activities to each government renders the results more comparable between the 
two chambers than variation in absolute numbers. 
Figure 7: Number of initiatives per party group in committees from 2009 to 2013. 
Figure 7 shows quite some variation among party groups on their scrutiny activities 
towards domestic and EU issues. Thus, do opposition party groups show different patterns 
of activity on EU than on domestic issues? As the analysis covers the committees on 
economy and social affairs, the domestic issues in these two committees should show 
competition along the left-right dimension (see 2.3.2). For EU affairs, the issues debated 
                                                 
68 All other motions with more than one initiator were excluded from this Figure 7, as they cannot be allocated 













might relate to socio-economic or EU integration and identity-matters. The competition of 
opposition parties could thus oscillate between left-right and TAN-GAL dimension of 
conflicts. The second step of the content analysis identifies the policy areas that the EU 
initiatives address. 
Overall, the quantitative analysis does not render clear-cut results towards either 
hypothesis. However, one can see a few tendencies. Most opposition party groups roughly 
match the level of activity of their governing coalition on domestic issues. The German 
Left party outnumbers the government initiatives in these committees. And the BZÖ 
initiated significantly less domestic motions than any other party group. This reflects the 
strong focus of the Left on social and economic affairs. They hold the most extreme 
position of the sample on the left-right dimension. The BZÖ, on the other hand, locates 
close to the governing parties on the socio-economic scale. 
The frequency of EU initiatives shows less variation within each chamber than on the 
domestic domain. The difference of the Left and the BZÖ on domestic issues is not 
reflected in their activities on EU affairs. Interestingly, the two anti-establishment parties 
do not differ significantly from the regular party groups in terms of numbers. They do not 
make a strong case to push EU issues on to the agenda through a high number of initiatives 
in the European Affairs committees. Hypothesis 1 expected a more competitive approach 
on EU issues. 
The results on the frequency of initiatives on EU affairs relate more to Hypothesis 2b on 
competition on the cultural dimension. The Austrian Green party, the BZÖ and FPÖ all 
three initiate more motions than the governing parties. The three opposition parties of the 
Bundestag in reverse initiate fewer motions than the coalition partners. All three Austrian 
parties are significantly more distant to their government on the TAN-GAL dimension than 
their German counter-parts. The content analysis in Section 4.3.2 will shed light on the 
policy areas addressed in the initiatives and explain the relevance of the dimensions of 
conflict. 
The second aspect of committee work evaluated in this Section 4.3.1 is the voting 
behaviour of opposition parties. Voting differs from initiatives due to its reactive nature. 
Opposition parties are forced to take position towards other party groups propositions in 
votes. Many authors have documented a high level of consensual decisions in formal votes 
in parliament (Kaiser 2008, Moury and de Giorgi 2015). The support of opposition for 
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government proposals is an indicator for collaboration among opposition and governing 
parties. The analysis of voting behaviour of this study focuses on the initiatives of the 
government. The information on the voting behaviour on domestic issues serves as 
comparative measure to understand the difference to EU-related scrutiny (see Section 
4.1.1).  
Figure 8 shows the share of supportive votes by parties in opposition for government 
proposals on domestic issues (Austria: n = 68, Germany: n = 54) and on EU-related draft 
legislation (Austria: n = 16, Germany: n = 23).  
Figure 8: Supportive votes on government legislative bills in domestic and EU affairs. 
Consensus is present but ranges “only” around 50 per cent in the overall average of all 
party groups. In both chambers the votes indicate conflict with the governing parties for a 
significant share of legislative proposals.  
Hypothesis 1 on the relevance of the party type does not find support in the analysis of 
voting behaviour. Hypothesis 1 expected that anti-establishment parties would vote less 
supportive as they employ a principled competitive strategy towards the governing parties. 
Despite the fact that anti-establishment parties build their electoral vehicle around the 
vehement criticism towards the incumbents, BZÖ’s and FPÖ’s voting behaviour does not 
differ from that of other party groups. The two anti-establishment parties do not withdraw 













The variation on support in voting roughly reflects the difference in positions on the two 
dimensions of conflict (H2). In the social and the economic domestic issues, the Left party 
is the most distant to the government and the most competitive in voting. The three 
Austrian opposition parties, close to the governing coalition on the left-right scale, are 
much more supportive on these domestic issues. For EU affairs, the TAN-GAL dimension 
is more relevant to explain the voting behaviour. Here the Austrian Greens are the most 
distant and competitive ones. All three Austrian opposition parties are less supportive on 
EU affairs than on domestic issues. The SPD and German Greens are more supportive on 
EU issues than on domestic ones.  
In a nutshell, the results on motions and voting do not lend support to Hypothesis 1. 
Competition on EU affairs is better explained by the cultural dimension of conflict for the 
frequency of initiatives as well as voting behaviour (H2b). The overall frequencies are 
useful as background information, but cannot answer the research question yet. Overall, the 
mere scope of activities gives only limited account of the opposition strategies at committee 
level. The numbers do not inform whether opposition delivers alternative policy proposals 
with a qualitative difference to the government. The following Section 4.3.2 proceeds to 
investigate the quality of the positional differences for this reason. 
4.3.2. The dimensions of conflict of opposition initiatives 
This Section 4.3.2 investigates the content of opposition initiatives on EU affairs for a 
better understanding of the quality of competition on EU affairs. The content analysis of the 
motions identifies the lines of political competition within each parliament (Hypotheses 2 a 
and b). The section proceeds in two steps: First, each motion is assigned a topic; second, it 
is allocated to a dimension of conflict. This more detailed analysis of motions focuses 
exclusively on EU-related initiatives.  
In a first step, the content analysis gives a brief overview of the topics that were addressed 
in the committees. This information is necessary to understand whether Hypothesis 2 a or b 
should become relevant for the explanation of opposition activities. Socio-economic issues 
should be explained by the left-right scale (H2a); EU integration and identity-related topics 
by the cultural dimension (H2b). Furthermore, the policy fields inform on agenda setting 
approaches by opposition. If an opposition parties is significantly more active on a policy 
area than the government or other opposition parties, this indicates an approach to advance 
this topic on the legislative agenda. Table 7 (for the Nationalrat) and 8 (for the Bundestag) 
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inform on the five most frequent policy issues that were addressed in motions in each 
chamber (for a complete list see Appendix II). All types of documents are included in the 
analysis. 




1 Crisis 6 19 16 15 2 58 
2 Migration 6 8 10 6 0 30 
3 Energy 7 11 5 0 2 25 
4 EU integration 2 1 13 6 1 23 
5 EU budget 0 3 4 5 1 13 
6 Other 39 16 11 19 15 100 
 Total 60 58 59 51 21 249 
 Table 7: Number of initiatives by party group and policy area in the Nationalrat from 2008 to 2013. 
Table 8: Number of initiatives by party group and policy area in the Bundestag from 2009 to 2013.  
In Austria, the financial and debt crisis (total of 58) and migration (total of 30) are 
important topics in the four committees under investigation. The opposition parties tabled 
many motions on these issues (50 on crisis, 24 on migration), whereas the coalition parties 
show limited activity. Opposition addresses most of the policy fields more frequently than 
governing parties. A few issues are actually emphasized mostly by an opposition party 
indicating an agenda setting effort. The Green parties’ policy focus on environment is 
reflected in its frequent motions on “energy”. The BZÖ (13) and the FPÖ (6) drive the topic 
of “EU integration”. This category encompasses specific proposals on treaty revision as 
well as abstract visions on the future or the EU political system. Overall, Austrian 
opposition proactively invests in counter-proposals on topics that are most likely linked to 
the cultural dimension of conflict (H2b). Crisis, migration, EU integration and the EU 
budget concern identity matters or questions of the allocation of competences. Topics 
related to socio-economic policy making receive less attention from the Austrian 
opposition.  
 Policy field CDU/FDP SPD 90/Grünen Linke Total  
1 Energy 5 5 3 3 16 
2 Enlargement 4 3 5 1 13 
3 Infrastructure 2 3 1 5 11 
4 Social 1 4 1 4 10 
5 Internal market 5 1 2 1 9 
6 Other 19 10 9 9 47 
 Total 36 26 21 23 106 
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In the Bundestag, the logic of conflict on the two dimensions seems to be reversed. All of 
the top five topics, except enlargement, are most likely related to socio-economic policy. 
The topic “social” includes the demand for a Social Europe by the SPD and the Left party 
who demand that workers’ protection and social rights are established at EU level. Overall, 
opposition does not make a strong effort to place any single EU-related topic on the 
legislative agenda. The Euro crisis and migration – the two most salient issues among 
Austrian motions and very urgent political problems at the time – range significantly lower 
in the Bundestag. They are so few that they were subsumed in the “other” category in Table 
8. The motions of the three committees of the Bundestag demonstrate a much more 
technical approach to EU issues than in the Nationalrat.  
The second step of the content analysis investigates the framing of EU issues in these 
motions. The framing in the Austrian parliament should pronounce the cultural dimensions 
more, as the policy topics on the agenda refer frequently to matters of EU integration or 
identity. For the Bundestag, one would inversely expect a stronger emphasis of the socio-
economic dimension due to the policy issues on the agenda. Each motion was coded 
towards a pole of the two dimensions of policy conflict (cultural and socio-economic). 
Motions were double-coded, if their frames related to both dimensions. The figures show 
the share of weighted frames on left or right of all codings per party group. The following 
Figure 9 and Figure 10 show the results of the framing analysis on each dimension of 
conflict. 
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Figure 9: Competition on the socio-economic dimensions through initiatives at committee level. 
For the socio-economic dimension the results on the framing of initiatives on EU affairs 
correspond to party positions on the left-right scale (see Section 3.4.3). As expected, the 
competition on socio-economic dimension is more pronounced among the German party 
groups than in Austria. Forty per cent of the legislative initiatives and motions from the 
German governing parties were framed in terms of an economically right-wing position. 
Opposition reacts with strongly diverging framing on a left-wing perspective. The intensity 
roughly matches the positional difference of each party group to the government. 
The Austrian grand coalition is less decisive and closer to the centre of the scale. The Green 
party, which has a clearly more left-oriented position than the government, does challenge 
the government on EU affairs with a left-leaning framing. The BZÖ and FPÖ barely score 
on the socio-economic scale. This corresponds to their, especially the FPÖ’s, mid-position 
on the left-right scale. With exception of the Greens, none of the party groups locate clearly 
on the socio-economic scale or holds a strong position.  
The two anti-establishment parties, however, challenge the governing majority on the 
cultural dimension of conflict as the following Figure 10 shows. 
 












Figure 10: Competition on the cultural dimensions through initiatives at committee level. 
The results show a clear correspondence to party positions on the cultural dimension 
(Figure 10). None of the governing parties score high on this dimension. However, various 
opposition parties frame their initiatives towards either pole of the cultural scale. The 
Alliance for the Future (BZÖ) and the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) stand out with their 
authoritarian and nationalist framing in motions on EU affairs. The large majority of their 
initiatives score on the cultural dimension (67 per cent for BZÖ and 89 per cent for the 
FPÖ). This finding corresponds to the increased number of initiatives on EU integration 
(see Table 3, Section 4.3.2). The intensity of this perspectivation exceeds the expectations 
of Hypothesis 2b. The Austrian Greens hold a more distant position towards the governing 
coalition, than the BZÖ and FPÖ; yet, they score lower than them. Here, the anti-
establishment stance seems to enhance the competitive strategy on the cultural dimension 
of conflict.  
The two Green parties and the Left actively communicate an alternative and libertarian 
perspective in the committee documents. Despite the fact that the Linke and 90/Grünen 
issue a rather low number of initiatives on EU matters (Linke with 18 and 90/Grünen with 
17 initiatives), a significant share of these initiatives is coded as green-alternative-
libertarian. Hypothesis 2 b did not expect a strong involvement of the Linke, which locates 
close to the junior coalition partner (FDP) on this scale. For this party group the left 
extreme mixes with the GAL dimension: They strongly support a transfer of competences 












to the EU level in order to establish workers rights at the higher level of governance. 
Overall, the conflict on the cultural dimension is less pronounced in the German 
parliament. 
The results from the content analysis explain the findings from the quantitative assessment. 
The analysis of the scope of initiatives from opposition on domestic and EU affairs 
suggested that the cultural dimension of conflict is more important for oppositions’ 
competition. The opposition parties more distant on the TAN-GAL dimension – that is the 
Austrian opposition parties – issued more EU-related initiatives and voted less supportive 
compared to domestic issues (see Section 4.3.1). The content analysis showed some marked 
differences between the committee agendas of the two parliaments. The EACs in the 
Nationalrat deal with the issues of the crisis, migration and EU integration. The committees 
under study in Germany do not frequently address these highly salient issues. The Austrian 
committees thereby face a large number of initiatives from the BZÖ and FPÖ, which frame 
EU affairs in terms of traditional and authoritarian values. The sole focus on this one 
perspective is unique to the two anti-establishment parties. As it goes beyond the intensity 
that Hypothesis 2b would expect (and they remain behind what Hypothesis 2a would 
expect on the socio-economic dimension), this finding lends support to Hypothesis 1 on the 
relevance of the party type. Thus, the party type did not influence the scope of activities – 
the number of motions on EU affairs and the support in votes on government proposals. But 
the anti-establishment stance shows in the framing of initiatives. 
The cultural dimension less pronounced within the Bundestag. The committees deal more 
frequently with topics related to the socio-economic dimension. This is partially owed to 
the mainstreaming of EU affairs and the selection of the committees of economic and social 
affairs for study. Opposition parties could advance initiatives related to EU integration and 
national identity onto the agenda of the EAC however. The pro-European consensus seems 
to hinder competition on these matters. The three German opposition parties challenge the 
governing parties more on the socio-economic dimension than their Austrian counter-party. 
Thus, competition on EU affairs occurs mainly on the cultural dimension and less 
according to left-right matters in Austria, and vice-versa in the German parliament. 
4.3.3.  Consensus or cooperation at committee level 
This study is interested in the level of cooperation or competition around EU affairs in 
national parliaments. The model of opposition on EU affairs in national parliaments 
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described different developments on the strategy of competition and cooperation 
throughout the parliamentary process (Section 2.3.2). It identified the status of consensus of 
conflict as potential starting points. If party groups hold conflicting views on a policy issue 
when it enters the parliamentary procedure, they could negotiate a compromise. Only this 
form of cooperation implies a true impact of opposition on policy outcomes. Where 
consensus prevailed the support of opposition, it does not change the policy outcome. The 
governing parties would most likely have enacted a decision in the same from without 
opposition support. The indicators of this study, so far, capture the output only. Both of the 
empirical data sources on parliamentary activities (voting on joint motions) cannot 
differentiate whether the common activities result from consensus or actual cooperation. 
The key interest of this chapter is in cooperation among government and opposition. Were 
positions aligned from the start or did opposition party groups negotiate a compromise?  
This Section 4.3.3 complements the findings with interview data about the processes 
leading to common activities. It analyses in how far supportive voting behaviour and joint 
motions represent a pre-existing consensus or actual cooperation between governing and 
opposing party groups. It builds on two data sources: interview data and document analysis 
of motions initiated by governing and opposition parties together. The results from 
interviews contextualize the findings from the data analysis on motions and votes. 
Interview partners from both chambers indicate that there is little exchange across party 
groups ahead of the committee stage (DBTP05, AUNRP03, AUNRP05). In the regular 
legislative process, no informal meetings take place ahead of formal parliamentary 
procedures. Interview partners from the governing parties in both chambers explain that the 
process of finding a position on an issue is cumbersome in the negotiations within the own 
party group or among the coalition partners. The contact to opposition parties is 
uncomplicated compared to these internal processes (DBTP12, AUNRP01). With exception 
of the rare moments where a two-third majority is needed for constitutional revisions, 
opposition simply lacks the power of vote that would make it a relevant partner in the 
legislative process. 
Opposition parties regularly vote in support of governing proposals at committee level (see 
Figure 8, Section 4.3.1). Interview partners explained that supportive votes are motivated 
by the content of a policy initiative (AUNRP03, AUNRP05, DBTP13). They vote in favour 
when the proposed legislation or statement coincides with the own policy preferences. 
Neither strategic considerations on potential future coalitions or cooperation play a role, nor 
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do prior negotiations take place. The pro-votes indicate a pre-existing consensus among 
party groups and are not the result of exchange or cooperation among government and 
opposition. 
Joint motions are rare in both chambers. Of the overall 588 motions under investigation for 
the Nationalrat 33 were issued in cross-party collaboration of governing and opposition 
parties. In the Bundestag, only two of overall 456 motions were initiated in collaboration 
among governing and opposition parties. The joint motions in the Nationalrat revolve 
around a) social protection, b) energy and environmental protection and c) crisis 
mechanisms (see Appendix III for a complete list of joint motions). The social protection of 
“weaker” segments of society found regular support by all party groups in Austria. On EU 
affairs, the Greens were involved in 12 joint motions, whereas the BZÖ and all-party 
motions were limited to 4 each. In the German Bundestag, the draft of the EUZBBG is the 
only one that was initiated in cross-party consensus among all five party groups.69  
For the Bundestag, joint motions and consensual voting are described as a rather 
coincidental product (DBTP13). There is no regular exchange among the party groups. 
They are not informed on other parties’ plans ahead of committee meetings in consequence. 
Some information may be exchanged among the parliamentary secretaries 
(Fraktionsgeschäftsführer), who are in contact with their counter-parts in the other party 
groups (DBTP13). The CDU party group does not cooperate in principle with the Left party 
in joint motions (DBTP13, DBTP12). They fear attacks on their credibility and 
authenticity, if there is any form of formal collaboration with the former socialist party 
(DBTP12). The reform of the parliamentary rights was the exception from this rule 
(EUZBBG, see Appendix III). Governing parties attempt to arrive at a consensus for the 
reform of parliamentary rules to demonstrate a fair and democratically legitimate self-
organisation of parliament (DBTP15). 
Draft motions are circulated among the party groups of the Nationalrat, if they address 
uncontroversial topics (AUNRP01). This gives an opportunity to jointly issue a motion 
where it coincides with the own party preferences. The governing coalition decides 
pragmatically and issue based with whom to engage in cooperation (AUNRP02). 
For the Austrian parliament, interview partners indicated four occasions where cross-party 
collaboration takes place in the regular legislative process. Two indicate consensus among 
                                                 
69 A second joint legislative draft addressed financial support for unemployed persons. Here the SPD joint 
forces with the governing coalition in the Committee of Employment.  
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party groups and the other two evolve from proper cooperation among government and 
opposition. First, some MPs experience joint motions as window dressing, where irrelevant 
and inconsequential topics are addressed (AUNRP03, AUNRP05). The interviewee gives 
the example of a motion that would demand the better protection of dolphins and whales in 
the oceans (AUNRP03). All party groups support this idea in principle and no 
consequences for action arise for the governing parties, as Austria is a land-locked country.  
Second, joint motions occur on policy issues that reflect a high national consensus. Anti-
nuclear motions or those on prohibition of genetically modified organisms (GMO) are the 
best example for this logic.70 The data on joint motions also shows that the policy area of 
energy and environmental protection was strongly promoted by the Green party and 
included BZÖ and FPÖ as initiators (see Appendix III). The joint initiatives on national 
consensus point to an interesting approach of opposition parties. They support the 
government in exporting the “Austrian model” to other EU member states through EU 
negotiations. Even the rather Euro-sceptical parties support stronger EU control 
mechanisms on these policy issues. 
Joint motions as a result of symbolic politics or a nationally uncontested topic indicate 
consensus among party groups, not cooperation. These two logics driving joint motions 
also apply to supportive voting activities.  
Third, the Green party explained some joint motions in EU affairs by the desire of the 
government to strengthen its negotiation position in Brussels (AUNRP02). The support of 
an opposition party could make claims of the Austrian government more credible in the 
(European) Council negotiations.71 This third occasion of joint motions is mainly relevant 
for highly salient issues. It is the opposite of the rather accidental joint motions of the first 
and second occasions where consensus is pre-given. In this third form, there is an honest 
attempt of finding a compromise and a process of negotiations among governing and 
opposition parties. 
                                                 
70 The Nationalrat demanded repeatedly that the EU turns away from nuclear energy. Austria outlawed 
nuclear production in 1978 in consequence of a public referendum on a nuclear power plant in Zwentendorf; 
there is a high national consensus against nuclear energy. 
71 The interview partners gave an example that occurred after the actual period of investigation of this study: 
the negotiations on CETA (AUNRP02). The Green party has made strong efforts to influence public opinion 
on the free trade agreement of the EU and Canada. The governing parties approached the Green party and 
attempted to gain the Green’s support for a draft motion. However, the Green party did not see enough of its 
demands on CETA included in the motion and withdrew its support (AUNRP02). 
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Fourth, at the rare incidents where decision-making requires a two-thirds majority, 
opposition parties face the opportunity to exert real influence on the output in exchange for 
their votes. The crisis mechanisms installed in 2012 represented a rare occasion where 
power was diffused towards opposition party groups. The revision of Article 136 (TFEU) 
required a two-thirds majority in both parliaments. 72 In Germany, a two-thirds majority 
was also necessary for the installation of the ESM and the Fiscal Compact (Höing 2015b).73 
The Greens in Austria and the SPD and Green party in Germany negotiated for policy input 
on the crisis solution in exchange of votes in both chambers. The occasions of a two-third 
majority are not exemplary of the ordinary legislative processes and the normal relationship 
among governing and opposition parties throughout the legislative period. Opposition 
parties used the support for the revision of Art. 136 to negotiate policy influence, for 
example a pro-active approach towards establishing a Financial Transaction Tax. These 
negotiations, therefore, resulted in cooperation in other policy fields. A government 
proposal on working towards an EU Financial Transaction Tax would, for example, find 
support by the opposition. The three parties who did not support the revision of Art. 136 are 
the Left party within the German context and of the BZÖ and FPÖ in Austria. This explains 
to some extent their more extreme position. 
Summing up, joint motions could be an important indicator for party cooperation. They are 
very rare in the Bundestag and do not occur often in the Nationalrat either. Despite more 
frequent joint motions in the Nationalrat, these barely represent a closer link between 
government and opposition parties. Supportive votes mostly do not indicate cooperation 
either. Most of the lower salience issues addressed together by majority and minority party 
groups reflect a pre-existing consensus. However, at times the Austrian government intends 
to find support by opposition parties to increase its negotiation potential in Brussels. In both 
chambers, a constitutionally required two-third majority can be an important tool for 
opposition parties on very relevant decisions in a country. 
In sum, inter-party cooperation is rare in the Bundestag and Nationalrat. The “power of the 
vote” is an important prerequisite to have an influence on policy output in the legislative 
                                                 
72 In order to install the European Stability Mechanism, Article 136 TFEU was reformed using the simplified 
revision procedure (Art. 48(6) TEU) to provide the legal basis of the stability mechanism in the EU treaties 
(Council 2011). The national ratification of the simplified revision procedure is specified under Art. 23i (4) in 
the Austrian constitution and Art. 23(1) of the German Basic Law. In Austria, a minimum of 50 per cent of 
MPs need to be present for the vote where a two-thirds majority needs to be achieved (Art. 50(4) B-VG). In 
Germany, a two-thirds majority in absolute terms is required (Art. 79 (2–3)). 
73 Ratification of the legal basis of the ESM and the TSCG differed in the two countries. In Austria they were 
classified as international agreement, which can be passed with simple majority. In Germany, two-thirds 
majorities applied for these two legal bases (European Parliament 2013).  
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processes. By and large, opposition has little opportunity to exert policy influence. The 
good minority protection of the two consensus democracies in domestic (Lijphart 2002) and 
especially in EU affairs (see Section 4.1.1) does not translate to opportunities for policy 
influence by opposition in the day-to-day policymaking. However, it leads to a more 
cooperative atmosphere and efficient exchange of information. 
In Germany, the CDU defined a principled exclusion of formal cooperation with the Linke. 
The centre-right party fears criticism, if it would formulate joint motions with the Left 
party. This principle is not violated when the two party groups have consensus on a policy 
issue. The governing parties in Austria do not preclude any opposition party from 
collaboration in joint motions. On EU issues the Green party is more involved possibly also 
due to the support on Art. 136; BZÖ and FPÖ criticise government initiatives on EU affairs 
harshly. On social issues or migration the coalition parties cooperate at times with the 
culturally conservative parties. The accessibility of the government parties for the anti-
establishment parties might also explain their support in voting and overall regular 
behaviour within the committee setting. 
 
4.4. Conclusions: Consensus or competition  
The committee level is often presented as a fact-oriented cooperative space where lines of 
political conflict among party groups are less pronounced than in the plenary (Damgaard 
and Mattson 2004). This Chapter 4 aimed at understanding cooperation and competition on 
EU issues in committees in the Nationalrat and the Bundestag in the legislative period form 
2008/2009 to 2013. The focus of the analysis was on the use of motions and the voting 
activities of opposition parties. This data was complemented by content analysis and 
information from interviews with MPs and administrators in both chambers. Overall, the 
empirical investigation did not find support for actual cooperation across the aisle. Policy 
influence of opposition is reserved to votes, which require two-third majority as the 
revision of Art. 136 TFEU. The committee level is, thus, characterized by either consensus 
or competition. 
Table 9 summarizes the results on the scrutiny activities at committee stage.  
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(AU: all PPG 
participate topic 
dependent, DE: rare 
and Linke excluded) 
+ 
(AU: all PPG 
participate topic 
dependent, DE: rare 












except see H1) 
Table 9: Summary of results on the committee stage. 
The evaluation on a four-point scale (++, +, –, – –) indicates in how far the expectations of 
the hypothesis found support. Shaded fields imply that the indicator was not applicable to 
test a specific hypothesis. Hypothesis 2 is not listed as it is implied in H2a and H2b. 
Hypothesis 1a on outright competition towards government personnel was not tested for the 
committee level. 
This chapter shows an astonishing lack of support for the first hypothesis of this study that 
expected principled competition from anti-establishment parties at committee level. In the 
use of formal instruments at committee level (frequency of motions, voting behaviour and 
participation in joint motions) neither FPÖ nor BZÖ presented a radically different 
approach from regular parties. BZÖ and FPÖ support government proposals in 50 to 75 per 
cent of the cases; they even participated in about 15 joint motions with the governing 
parties each. In the use of parliamentary instruments at committee level, the anti-system 
parties do not show any different behaviour from regular parties. Their framing of EU 
affairs, however, emphasized the TAN-perspective more than Hypothesis 2b expected. 
The second hypothesis of the study concerns the ideological positions of party groups. The 
difference between the two chambers in framing EU issues supports the relevance of 
Hypothesis 2. The Austrian parties are more distant on the cultural dimension and strongly 
 146
compete over questions of EU integration, national sovereignty and migration. The topics 
on the EACs agenda are more likely to trigger competition on the cultural dimension, as 
they often address identity-related issues and EU integration. The FPÖ and BZÖ spur a 
very critical and fundamental debate over the future of EU integration. The Green party 
reacts to this with a strong counter position to the culturally conservative parties. In the 
Bundestag, the scrutiny of EU issues of high and low salience takes place in a more 
pragmatic and technical way. The German parties largely abstain from topics of integration 
or identity matters, which reflects the overall consensus on EU integration in the Bundestag 
and the proximity of party groups on the TAN-GAL dimension. German opposition – 
especially the SPD and Left – more frequently addresses workers’ rights and social 
protection in their EU scrutiny (H2a). Overall, EU scrutiny was framed more according to 
the left-right logic within the Bundestag. Within each chamber one dimension of conflict is 
predominant and the other one rather neglected. 
Two important institutional differences could limit these findings. It concerns the ex-ante 
control of the European Council in the Nationalrat and the mainstreaming of EU affairs in 
the Bundestag. The Nationalrat hears the chancellor in the Main Committee on EU Affairs. 
Highly salient issues are, thus, included in the analysis above. The Bundestag installed the 
ex-ante scrutiny of the European Council at plenary level. This organisational aspect could 
explain the difference between the two chambers, such as the higher salience of the crisis 
and migration in the Austrian committees. The analysis of plenary debates on European 
Council meetings will allow drawing final conclusions in this regard (see Chapter 5). 
Furthermore, the scrutiny of day-to-day policymaking takes place in the EU Sub-
Committee in Austria but is “mainstreamed” to other sectoral committees in Germany. Due 
to the selection of committees for analysis, not all EU issues under parliamentary scrutiny 
are captured for the Bundestag. The case selection might have influenced the predominance 
of left-right dimension, as the committees for economy and for social affairs were covered. 
However, questions of EU integration are dealt with in the EAC and were not addressed in 
competitive fashion there either.  
Chapter 4 has shown that actual cooperation is rare in the Bundestag and Nationalrat, even 
at the committee level. Despite the good minority protection – especially on EU issues after 
Lisbon – opposition does not have much policy influence in the regular legislative process. 
Common activities often result from a pre-existing consensus among party groups.  
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This has important implications for how the parliamentary activities contribute to the 
legitimacy of the EU decision-making process (see Section 1.1.3). Communication of 
political alternatives remains partial in both chambers due to the focus on a single 
dimension of political conflict. In the German committees, a more fundamental debate is 
prevented by the high consensus on basic principles of EU integration. EU issues are dealt 
with in a pragmatic and technical way. The presence of strongly Euro-sceptic parties in the 
Austrian parliament sparks a much more principled discussion that present different 
solutions to a problem are present. For legitimacy in the sense of alteration, the critical 
debates in the committees of the Nationalrat are valued positively as they provide a much 
broader range of alternatives to the Austrian voters. The EU scrutiny in the two EACs in 
the Nationalrat is, however, dominated by the cultural dimension of conflict. Less attention 
runs towards the policymaking on the socio-economic dimension.   
If legitimacy is defined by a lively debate of alternatives in public discourse with the 
potential alteration of the policy programme after elections, both parliaments score well on 
only one dimension of conflict.  
The following Chapter 5 investigates the communicative strategies of opposition parties in 













5. A voice of opposition in plenary debates? 
 
The role of parliament combines the control of the government behind closed doors with 
public justification of the policy process. Chapter 4 analysed the legislative scrutiny at 
committee level, which is conceptualized as a first preparatory step in the parliamentary 
process in the model on opposition in national parliaments (see Section 2.2.3). This Chapter 
5 investigates the second step of public justification in the plenary. Debates in the plenary 
are the most important forum for opposition to voice critique and propose policy 
alternatives and for governing parties to justify their decisions (Auel and Raunio 2014b: 21, 
Proksch and Slapin 2015, Rauh 2015). One aim of the exchange of conflicting views could, 
in theory, be the persuasion of the other participants. However, for plenary debates in 
modern parliaments the element of persuasion across party groups is negligible, since 
majorities are not formed ad-hoc during public debate. Party discipline and pre-negotiations 
structures the voting behaviour. In consequence, the main purpose of plenary debates is the 
justification of MPs policy positions towards their fellow party members and voters. 
Speeches on the floor are therefore understood as strategic action with the long-term goal of 
re-election in this thesis (see Proksch and Slapin 2015: 9).74 
Lively and conflictive plenary debates – sparked by party competition – have an important 
democratic function of informing the electorate. Through justification of party positions, 
the voters can allocate responsibilities and take a deliberate choice of whom to support at 
the next election. Opposition should offer policy alternatives to the electorate so that voters 
have a choice (Mair 2007). In perspective of politics as a “chain of delegation”, continuous 
monitoring of the “agent” (members of parliament) is an important ex-post control 
mechanism for the “principal” (the voters) (Bergman 2000, Bergman et al. 2000). Plenary 
debates are a tool of justification and monitoring throughout the legislative period.  
The EU has been criticized for the weak development of the reverse “chain of 
accountability” from decision-makers to the voters (see Section 1.1.3). A lack of an open 
and controversial debate is seen as key element of the EU democratic deficit (Mair 2007, 
Auel and Raunio 2014b). Voters can only make an informed choice on EU integration, if 
                                                 
74 Parliamentarians thereby rely on the transmission of debates by the media. The extent of media reports on 
the plenary debates cannot be tested in this study. Research has shown that especially media does react to 
debates on European Council meetings (but also other?) (de Wilde und Wonka 2016). Moreover, MPs must 
assume that their speeches are documented and accessible to voters and journalists over time.  
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parties make their diverging views accessible and reflect the citizens’ interests. National 
parliaments are in a central position to contribute to this form of EU legitimacy. Only they 
can “translate” the EU decision-making process to their national public sphere. The 
European Parliament cannot serve 28 national public spheres that are to date still only 
loosely linked to each other (Eriksen 2005, Risse 2010). The level of politicization of EU 
issues in national parliaments, that is their salience and polarization, is an important 
element of democratic legitimacy of this supranational polity (de Wilde 2011). 
The communicative function of parliaments has for a long time been understudied (Auel 
and Raunio 2012, Proksch and Slapin 2012, Bächtiger 2014). Bächtiger (2014) argues that 
parliamentary debates did not receive much attention, because they have been disqualified 
as “cheap talk” in the conventional view. After the “argumentative turn” in the social 
sciences, parliamentary communication started to receive more attention (Fischer and 
Forester 1993). With the digital revolution, parliamentary documents have become more 
easily available in the past decades and computer-aided technologies of text analysis 
advanced significantly (Proksch and Slapin 2014). This has allowed researchers to address 
new research questions in the study of parliamentary communication. In relation to EU 
affairs, studies have addressed their salience (quantity) and contestation (quality) in 
parliamentary debates (Auel and Raunio 2014a, Closa and Maatsch 2014, Maatsch 2014, 
Auel 2015, Rauh 2015, Wonka 2016, Rauh and de Wilde 2017). This chapter links to this 
body of literature. It focuses on the contestation among political parties. 
A few publications have investigated the salience of EU affairs in national plenary debates. 
Auel et al. (2016) find that contestation over EU integration in parliament has a 
constraining effect on the extent of explicitly EU-themed debates in seven countries. Rauh 
and de Wilde (2017) assess the share of references to EU issues in all plenary debates in 
four countries over 20-years. Their central finding is an “opposition deficit” in debates in 
lower chambers in Germany, the UK, the Netherlands and Spain. The governing parties 
spent significantly more time on EU issues in their speeches than the opposition. The 
authors argue that the limited time of opposition arguing about EU issues is problematic for 
the accountability of supranational governance: Voters are not offered a balanced discourse 
covering diverse points of view. While the study of salience provides interesting findings 
on the motivation of MPs to address EU issues, only qualitative analysis can show whether 
opposition expresses alternative policy positions. Opposition might shy away from 
criticism, as they do not want to appear disloyal to national interests (Auel and Benz 2005). 
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Or former governing parties might be held (co-)responsible for structural difficulties of EU 
integration. This Chapter 5 investigates the qualitative differences among the 
argumentations around EU integration between party groups. 
Qualitative analyses have investigated plenary debates about the EU budget (de Wilde 
2014), the Euro crisis (Closa and Maatsch 2014, Maatsch 2014, Wonka 2016) and EU 
treaty change (Wendler 2011, 2014). These studies identify the policy positions and 
framing approaches of speakers or parties on different dimensions of political conflict. 
Findings are mixed. In debates on the Euro crisis the main divide runs between challenger 
and mainstream parties (Closa and Maatsch 2014, Maatsch 2014, Wonka 2016). On treaty 
change, the government is pitched against the opposition in line with the classical divide in 
legislatures (Wendler 2014: 563). The EU budget is discussed in an increasingly diversified 
and policy-oriented debate in three parliaments (Denmark, Ireland and the Netherlands) (de 
Wilde 2014: 1089). 
This chapter links to the state of the art to explain in how far opposition parties employ 
different strategies in communicating EU affairs. In this it is interested in the actually 
communicated speech acts in the plenary. Many content analyses aim at understanding the 
policy positions of parties towards EU issues. Where this is the case they analyse a latent, 
not directly observable variable that is potentially only partially represented in MP’s 
speeches (Proksch and Slapin 2014). This study is interested in how far conflicting views 
over EU issues are communicated to the electorate. This is a directly observable variable.  
In general it is difficult to measure cooperation in plenary debates. Only at rare instances do 
opposition parties explicitly support the government. The speaking time is usually used to 
criticize and sharpen the own profile. Opposition parties often address just a few issues 
from the government agenda. Policy issues, which are consensual, will not be explicitly 
supported. 
This chapter tests the two main hypotheses of this thesis for the communicative dimension. 
The first hypothesis considers how an anti-establishment stance of a party group influences 
the strategies of cooperation or competition on EU issues. Research on plenary debates on 
EU issues has addressed the difference between mainstream and those parties challenging 
the establishment. It has not yet investigated the special role of anti-establishment parties. 
The party type should play an important role in the communicative competition of 
opposition party groups. Abedi (2002) identified three elements that define anti-
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establishment parties: they present themselves as challengers to established parties, express 
a fundamental divide between the established parties and “the people” in their rhetoric, and 
challenges the status quo in terms of policy and political system issues. The “people versus 
elite” rhetoric should lead to a strong attack of government personnel who is considered to 
represent the “old elite”. The anti-establishment stance should furthermore result in a 
fundamental critique of policy content and political system design. This is indicated by the 
difference in framing of a policy issue between governing and opposition parties. 
Not only the intensity of competition, but also its style should differ for anti-establishment 
parties. An important strategy of this party type is the expression of a fundamental divide 
between people and elite. This should reflect on the interaction with the governing parties. 
This study expects a more personalized critique of government personnel from anti-
establishment than from regular opposition parties. In the sense of a more outright critique, 
the personal attack against characteristics of the opposing party dominates the content-
related discussion. 
The second hypothesis of this study accounts of the relevance of positional distance among 
opposition and government parties for competition and cooperation. The second hypothesis 
is specified along two dimensions of political conflict: the economic left-right and the 
TAN-GAL dimension (see Section 2.3.2). Existing research on the framing of EU issues in 
national parliaments has considered the influence of party positions on these two 
dimensions. It has not been analysed in terms of the relative distance to the government, but 
in absolute terms (Closa and Maatsch 2014, Maatsch 2014, Wendler 2014) and in the 
division of mainstream versus extreme parties (Wendler 2014, Wonka 2016).  
The following Chapter 5.1 explains the methodological approach to content analysis of 
plenary debates of this study, before Chapter 5.2 turns to the results. Chapter 5.3 concludes. 
5.1. Methods selection of texts for analysis of the plenary level 
Content analysis is defined as ”the systematic objective, quantitative analysis of message 
characteristics” (Neuendorf 2002: 1) of text documents. The method aims at a transparent 
and inter-subjective way of analysing text. The specific requirements towards the exact 
design of a content analysis depend on the research question and text format. In this study, 
the degree of competition or cooperation by opposition parties on EU affairs forms the 
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dependent variable. Party type and positional differences between governing and opposition 
parties are potential explanatory factors. This Chapter 5.1 lays out the method of the 
content analysis, operationalizes the hypotheses and explains the selection of the text 
corpus. The method contains two elements: framing analysis and a measure for anti-elitism. 
5.1.1. The method of frame analysis 
This study builds on framing analysis, which is a well-established method in political 
science (Chong and Druckman 2007, Daviter 2007). Frames are “schemata of 
interpretation” (Goffman 1974: 498, Helbling et al. 2010). Any position or issue can be 
addressed from a multitude of perspectives. Entman (1993) points to the relevance of 
framing as it means “to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more 
salient in a communicating text“. In the process of “framing” an actor contextualizes a 
single event or issue within a larger dimension of conflict or within an ideology. As they 
are abstract concepts, frames are comparable across issues and time. The various 
perspectives on a policy issue can significantly influence the perception in public and has 
consequences for how political actors should (re)act. Political actors compete about the 
framing of events and try to mobilize their supporters by accentuating certain aspects of a 
policy (Chong and Druckman 2007: 106). Plenary debates are an important forum where 
MPs justify their position in direct antagonism to the other party groups. Framing thereby 
indicates the policy preferences of the speakers (Closa and Maatsch 2014: 830). The format 
of plenary debates is ideal for measuring the level of competition between government and 
opposition parties. The speeches from governing parties are included in the analysis, as 
they are the point of reference for the level of competition by opposition.  
The content analysis of this study uses a computer-assisted manual coding method utilizing 
the software MaxQDA. Automated computer coding could deal with significantly larger 
amounts of text than manual coding and is less prone to subjectivity once the coding 
scheme has been installed (Chong and Druckman 2007: 108). Manual coding may be less 
reliable during the coding process, yet, delivers more valid results. Automated text analysis 
turns words into data and cannot assess the complexity that this research question requires. 
The recent study by Rauh and de Wilde (2017) showed an opposition deficit in terms of 
speaking time on EU issues in the German Bundestag. They came to the conclusion that 
only qualitative analysis of the debates could test whether this lower presence of opposition 
MPs goes along with a lack of alternative proposals and political competition.  
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The unit of analysis of this framing analysis is not necessarily a grammatical sentence. A 
coded statement may include several grammatical sentences, which form a logical unit. 
Frames may also be referred to in passing with just a few signal words. Since the unit of 
analysis is not defined rigidly, I assign a weight to each coded frame to measure the 
intensity with which the speaker argues for it (see Table 10). If a frame is referred to only 
superficially in one sentence or less, the weight is assigned at 1. Where a proper argument 
is formulated, the weight scores 2. When special emphasis or a longer explanation occurs, 
the frame is weighted at score 3. Using these weights allows grasping the complexity of the 
debating situation. It is not necessary to disregard certain framing attempts, as a rigid 
definition of the unit of analysis would do. The intensity with which a party group 
addresses a frame is measured by the frequency and weights. For each coding, the 
following categories were noted: chamber, date, the speaker, the party group, citation, 
frame(s) and its weight. Table 10 gives an example for the three different weights using the 
coding scheme at the example of the “Anti-Austerity” frame. 
Parlia
ment 












SPD „Wir brauchen eine Wirtschaftspolitik, die die 














Grüne  „Es gibt eine ausschließliche Fokussierung und 
ein ausschließliches Hinstarren auf die 
Haushaltspolitik, auf das sogenannte Sparen. 
Sie sehen aus dieser Perspektive die gesamte 
große Lösung der Finanzmarktkrise überhaupt 
nicht mehr, weil Sie sich ausschließlich auf die 
Merkel‘sche Sparpolitik konzentriert haben, die 
unterm Strich Europa in eine noch größere 











Linke „Wenn Sie mir das nicht glauben, dann glauben 
Sie doch wenigstens Ihrer heiligen 
amerikanischen Ratingagentur. Jetzt zitiere ich 
einmal das, was Standard and Poor’s sagen, die 
nun wirklich auf der anderen Seite stehen: 
Während sich die europäische Wirtschaft 
abkühlt, erwarten wir, dass ein Reformprozess, 
der allein auf der Säule von Sparanstrengungen 
ruht, zwecklos ist, wenn die Sorgen der Bürger 
um Jobs und Einkommen wachsen, die 
Nachfrage schrumpft und die Steuereinnahmen 




Table 10: Coding scheme with examples for different weights. 
Several frames may be coded for a single statement. Previous research has shown that 
actors refer to several frames in one sentence to build stronger support for their argument or 
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to attract a larger group of supporters (see Helbling et al. 2010: 508, Lerch and Schwellnus 
2006: 307). An indifference to this real world complexity of multiple frames would distort 
the results. Where statements were double coded to different frames, the weights were 
assigned so that the overall weight of that statement would reasonable reflect the relevance 
of that statement. 
The weights for each frame are aggregated per party group for the analysis. Speaking time 
in parliament is allocated according to seat share in both chambers (§ 57, GOG-NR, 
Chapter 7.11, Datenhandbuch des Bundestages 2016). Thus absolute numbers would distort 
the results in favour of larger party groups. The results are presented in form of the share of 
aggregated weights on each frame of the total of a party group. The relative score 
represents the emphasis on the framing by the respective party group. Plenary time is 
precious. If a party group argues for a certain frame, as anti-austerity, with e.g. 20 per cent, 
it is key to their communicative strategy.  
The coding scheme for the frame analysis was developed both deductively and inductively. 
The deduction ensures that the categories link to the theory. The inductive approach assures 
that the full complexity of the parliamentary debates is acknowledged. The deductive 
approach involves the two dimensions of political contestation developed in Section 2.3.2 
(socio-economic and cultural dimension). Existing content analyses of EU debates did not 
directly use these two dimensions. However, a number of studies have worked with 
Habermas’ (1993) definition of three basic types of arguments: utilitarian ones, moral-
universalist justifications and identity-related arguments (Sjursen 2002, Helbling et al. 
2010, Statham and Trenz 2013, Wendler 2014). These three dimensions link closely to the 
two dimensions of political competition relevant for the differentiation of Hypothesis 2 (see 
Section 2.3.2). Utilitarian arguments deal with the material welfare of the member states 
and their citizens as a consequence of EU integration. The utilitarian dimension relates to 
the socio-economic line of political conflict (left-right). 
Both moral-universalist and identity-related arguments are associated with the cultural 
dimension of conflict (TAN-GAL). Moral-universalist and identity-related arguments are 
opposite ends of the cultural dimension of conflict. Values and questions of identity are 
answered differently along this line of controversy. In terms of identity, the TAN-end of the 
dimension defines the “ingroup” along the borders of the nation state. The libertarian 
worldview goes along with an understanding of open borders and, for the topic under study, 
the inclusion of all EU citizens as “ingroup”. Coding schemes of existing studies on EU 
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issues were carefully taken into account (Wendler 2011, 2014, Maatsch 2014, Closa and 
Maatsch 2014, Helbling et al. 2010). 
The actual frames – at the lower level of abstraction – were developed inductively. The 
frames were tested and developed inductively in a pilot study on five speeches from each 
parliament (see Codebook in Appendix IV). The intention of this study is to measure the 
intensity of competition by opposition parties. To do so, I developed a scheme of analysis 
that indicates the extent of conflicting views among the party groups. Individual frames 
were structured as pairs of opposing framing approaches. The relative frequency and 
intensity with which the party groups use opposing frames indicates the competition around 
a topic. Research on party positions has intensely discussed the allocation of single issues 
to dimensions of political conflict, especially the left-right scale (Franzmann and Kaiser 
2006). The pairs of counter-positions of this thesis’ scheme of analysis built on the insights 
from these studies.  
The following example demonstrates this approach. Parties addressed two contradictive 
solutions when they were confronted with the Euro crisis: On the one hand, the financial 
crisis should be solved through reduced public spending (frame: “Economic orthodoxy”). 
On the other hand, parties advertised public overspending to induce growth (frame: “Anti-
Austerity”) (see also Maatsch 2014). The two frames of the topic “Public spending” stand 
in direct contradiction to each other. Not all pairs of frames provide such clear-cut 
opposites. The frame “Protect national sovereignty”, for example, is not matched by an 
argument for protecting EU sovereignty. As the EU is a polity in the making, no-one 
expresses a concern of the EU’s sovereignty being undermined. Much more, the “Protect 
national sovereignty” frame is matched with a more general appeal to supporting the 
integration project (frame “More EU”). A strengthening of the EU corresponds to an 
increase in its autonomy (or sovereignty). All frames were matched with counter-
arguments. The definition of each frame is explained in the results Chapter 5.2 (see also 
Appendix IV: Codebook). 
Table 11 and Table 12 show all opposing pairs of frames in relation to the two dimensions. 
The opposing frames help identifying the degree of competition amongst the party groups 
in parliament.  
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Topic Left  Right 
Purpose of EU 
integration 
Social Europe Economic prosperity 
Global Competition 
Budget policy Anti-austerity Economic orthodoxy 
Role of the state Regulation Deregulation/ Efficiency 
Roots of the crisis MS responsible for own fate Social injustice 
Economic policy Labour and social protection Economic incentives  
Table 11: Frames on the socio-economic dimension. 
Topic TAN GAL 
The EU polity  Intergovernmental More EU, supranational 
Identity  Defend national interest 
Protect national sovereignty 




No EU transfer payments 
 
EU transfer payments / Solidarity 
 
Table 12: Frames on the cultural dimension. 
The framing analysis is designed to answer Hypothesis 1 and 2, as well as Hypothesis 2a 
and 2b. Hypothesis 1 will be supported, if the anti-establishment parties are significantly 
more competitive than all regular opposition parties. Competition is measured by the 
frequency and weights and presented in form of the relative share of the overall weights of 
a party group. Hypothesis 2 finds support, if the degree of competition is associated with 
the positional distance of opposition party groups to the government. If positional distance 
is the main explanatory variable, the difference in framing should correspond to it. For 
Hypotheses 2a and 2b the emphasis on frames is split up according to the two dimensions 
of political conflict.  
5.1.2. Measuring anti-elitism in plenary debates 
The content analysis of this study includes a second dimension, which measures the level of 
anti-elitism in the parliamentary debates in Austria and Germany. Hypothesis 1a assumes 
that anti-establishment parties use a more outright competitive strategy towards the 
government than regular parties (see 2.3.2). To measure this specific communicative 
strategy, this study integrates a methodological approach of research on populism (Jagers 
and Walgrave 2007, Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011). These studies consider anti-elitism as 
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one element of populism.75 They measure the share of statements that address any type of 
elite (political, media or business) and the intensity of the critique towards the elite.76 The 
method is adapted by this study to fit the focus on opposition strategies and definition of 
anti-establishment (not populist) parties relevant for this study.  
In this step of the analysis, I assess how frequently oppositional MPs explicitly refer to the 
governing party groups in their speeches. The codings for references to other actors were 
also attributed a certain weight (1, 2 or 3) depending on the length and emphasis of the 
statement (see above Table 10).  
This step of the analysis distinguishes, most importantly, between different qualities of 
statements addressing the government to test Hypothesis 1a. Focusing on two key elements 
of Jagers and Walgrave’s (2007) scale, this study distinguishes content-related rebuttals 
from critique of personal attributes of government personnel. The element of personalized 
critique also builds on the work of Steenberg (2003), who argues that respect towards other 
speakers in a debate is important for the overall discourse quality. This study integrates this 
element as it is interested in the effect on democratic legitimacy of parliamentary debates 
on EU affairs. 
In consequence, the coding scheme has two values for references to other actors: content-
related or personalized. Table 13 presents examples of a content-related and personalized 








                                                 
75 The other two elements of populism are references to ”the people” and the exclusion of certain segments of 
society according to Jagers and Walgrave (2007). 





Date Speaker Party 
group 













SPD „Frau Kanzlerin, das passt zu den 
verheerenden Signalen, die Ihre Regierung 
in Deutschland selbst setzt: Die Förderung 
der erneuerbaren Energien wird von heute 
auf morgen reduziert, und die Investoren 











BZÖ „Das war nach dem Herrn Bundeskanzler, 
das ist natürlich klar, denn der war schon 
vorher dort. Das heißt, der hat gehört, der 
Bundeskanzler ist bei der Frau Merkel, 
und es hieß: Hangar 7 aufmachen, ich 
brauche einen Privatjet! Diese 
Regierungsmitglieder fliegen ja immer mit 
dem Privatjet. Also mit dem Privatjet zur 
Frau Merkel, damit er auch schöne Fotos 
bekommt und heute im Parlament der 
Bevölkerung und den Abgeordneten stolz 
mitteilen darf: Ich war auch bei der Frau 
Merkel!“ 
Personalized Gov 
Table 13: Coding scheme with examples for references to other actors. 
The two examples of Table 4 fit clearly into the scheme of analysis. The first statement by 
Angelica Schwall-Düren directly addresses the German chancellor with criticism of her 
policy proposals. The second citation of Peter Westenthaler is dedicated exclusively to find 
fault with the quality of government staff. They are presented as weak, off-hook and self-
centred. The personal criticism does not link to any policy content. Not all statements in the 
debates under analysis can be allocated as clearly to one of the two categories of references 
to other actors. Some personalized attacks reflect criticism of policy content as well. In the 
case that statements operated in a grey zone, they were always coded to the category that 
was predominant. References to other actors were not double coded to several categories.  
To sum up, the coding scheme for the content analysis covers a framing analysis and 
measure on anti-elitism. The framing analysis measures the extent of competition by 
opposition parties towards the government. This is relevant to test Hypothesis 1 and 2 (a 
and b). Measuring anti-elitism identifies content-related and personalized critique towards 
the government. This approach answers Hypothesis 1a on the special communicative style 
of anti-establishment parties. 
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5.1.3. The selection of the text corpus 
After laying out the methodological approach of this Chapter 5, I explain the selection of 
text for the analysis before we turn to the results (see 5.2). This study performs a qualitative 
content analysis. The analysis is based on a careful selection of a limited number of 
debates, which are sufficient to identify different framing strategies by opposition party 
groups. In-depth qualitative analysis is too resource intense to include a large text corpus 
(see de Wilde 2014).77 This thesis focuses on six explicitly EU-related plenary debates.  
The selection of the text corpus faces several challenges. First, how exactly can we define 
EU-related debates? Second, the contributions of opposition parties in Austria and 
Germany need to be comparable to each other. Third, the debates need to provide data that 
corresponds to the research question. The selection process of the texts for analysis 
addressed these three challenges as explained in the following.  
First, all debates on EU affairs were identified in the two chambers in the period of 
investigation (see Appendix V). Only debates with an explicit EU-related topic were taken 
into account. One of the key words ”European Union”, ”Europe” or ”European integration” 
was in the title or the key words allocated by the parliamentary services (on the 
parliamentary website). The results of the key word search were matched and amended 
through the list that the German parliamentary website provides (Bundestag 2017) and by 
search for the specific formats, such as Aktuelle Europastunde in the Nationalrat. Overall, I 
identified 145 debates with a focus on EU issues for the Bundestag and 89 for the 
Nationalrat between 2008/09 and 2013.78  
Second, it is important that the debates took place simultaneously in both chambers so that 
results are comparable for all six opposition parties, as policies and political challenges 
change over time. On the basis of this comprehensive list it became apparent at what 
instances both chambers debated the same EU policies or developments at the same 
moment in time. Due to institutional difference, both chambers discussed only twelve 
topics more or less simultaneously.79  
                                                 
77 Studies using automated text analysis can retrieve all statements by MPs referencing EU affairs from all 
debates in the Bundestag (see Rauh 2015, Rauh and de Wilde 2017). The measurement of all EU references is 
important for researching the salience of EU issues. 
78 In the plenary debates of the Bundestag a share of the speeches is not acutally performed on the floor, but 
only provided in the minutes. The debates only protocolled were excluded from this overview. For the 
purpose of reaching out to the citizens only actually preformed debates are relevant. 
79 Of the twelve parallel debates, three relate to meetings of the European Council. Four debates concerned 
questions of the installation or application of the European Stability Mechanism. Two dealt with enlargement 
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The institutional prerogatives on the role of the plenary on EU affairs differ significantly 
between the two houses (see Chapter 3.3). The Bundestag regularly debates before 
European Council meetings. The plenary is involved in the ex-ante EU policymaking and 
transposition on continuous ground due to mainstreaming. In the Nationalrat, the Main 
Committee votes on EU-related statements in place of the plenary. The regular EU 
policymaking is therefore rarely debated on the floor. The Austrian chamber, however, 
institutionalized “topical EU debates” (Aktuelle Europastunden, GOG-NR § 74b) where 
party groups alternate in agenda setting of the approximately one-hour long debates. 
Finally, the Nationalrat’s plenary is involved irregularly in the ex-post control of European 
Council meetings.  
In consequence, the institutional practices of both chambers have one parallel element: 
debates on European Council meetings. I chose one European Council-related plenary 
debate from the beginning, middle and end of the period of investigation. This choice 
follows the logic of a most-likely case selection. Only highly conflictive and salient issues 
are negotiation within the European Council. Analysing parliamentary debates ex-post or 
ex-ante to these summits assures that only matters of “high” politics are addressed. These 
should trigger the strongest conflict among party groups. Debates on issues of lower 
salience could be more consensual than the ones chosen for analysis. Finally, the European 
Council is not focussed on a single issue, but provides some variety within a clearly limited 
text selection. In the period of investigation the European Council meetings under 
investigation addressed the following topics: the EU 2020 strategy, the Multi-Annual 
Financial Framework, the Euro crisis and briefly touched upon some matters of foreign 
policy. These topics provide adequate variation to research the dimensions of conflict as 
they touch upon important socio-economic questions as well as the purpose and role of the 
European Union itself. This study analyses six debates in two parliaments (three per 





                                                                                                                                                     
of the European Union (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia). Three more issues were debated in both chambers: 
the Financial Transaction Tax, Privatization of Water and freedom of movement. 
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 Table 14: Plenary debates selected for investigation. 
Overall the sample covers 92 speeches and an overall speaking time of 12.5 hours in the 
two chambers. Each debate follows a similar structure in both parliaments. It is opened by a 
government declaration of the chancellor or foreign minister. The party leadership of all 
party groups is involved as well as some backbenchers. This format is well suited to 
analyse the conflict between government and opposition.  
5.2. Results on the dimensions and type of conflict in plenary 
debates 
This Chapter 5.2 presents the results of the content analysis of six plenary debates in the 
Bundestag and Nationalrat to measure the extent and type of competition by opposition 
parties. It starts out with descriptive analysis of the frequency and topics of EU-related 
plenary debates in both parliaments in Section 5.2.1. This information serves to 
contextualize the three debates chosen for analysis. The section also informs on the content 
of the debates under analysis and giving an overview of the frequency of all frames. The 
remainder of the chapter is structured according to these expectations: the first section 
analyses topics that should be framed along the cultural dimension (5.2.2), the second 
section those relevant for the left-right dimension (5.2.3). For each topic, I briefly explain 
the content of the various frames and the government position before I turn to the 
opposition strategies. The quantification of the intensity of the use of frames is useful for 
comparison and a simplification of the complex situation of the debate. Section 5.2.3 
presents the findings on anti-elitism by opposition party groups. This step of the analysis is 
Chamber Date No.  Title 
Bundestag 25 Mar 2010 34 Regierungserklärung durch die Bundeskanzlerin zum 
Europäischen Rat am 25./26. März 2010 in Brüssel 
Nationalrat 24 Mar 2010 57 Erklärung Dr. Spindelegger: aktuelle Fragen der 
österreichischen EU-Politik 
Bundestag 14 Dec 2011 148 Regierungserklärung zu den Ergebnissen des Europäischen 
Rates am 8./9. Dezember 2011 in Brüssel 
Nationalrat 14 Dec 2011 139 EU-Erklärungen Faymann und Dr. Spindelegger: Ergebnisse 
des Europäischen Rates am 9. Dezember 2011 
Bundestag 21 Feb 2013 222 Regierungserklärung zu den Ergebnissen des Europäischen 
Rates am 7./8. Februar 2013 in Brüssel 
Nationalrat 19 Feb 2013 190 EU-Erklärungen Faymann und Dr. Spindelegger: Ergebnisse 
des Europäischen Rates vom 7. und 8. Februar 2013 
 162
important to distinguish the communicative strategy of anti-establishment parties (H1 a). 
Section 5.2.4 concludes. 
5.2.1. The practice of EU plenary debates  
This Section 5.2.1 starts out with a brief analysis of the overall number of plenary debates 
and their link to the committee stage. This overview helps to understand the EU scrutiny 
approach of the two chambers. A rough idea of the salience of EU affairs in each chamber 
contextualizes the framing analysis below. 
Overall, I identified 145 debates with a focus on EU issues for the Bundestag and 79 for the 
Nationalrat in the time period from September 2009 to September 2013.80 The German 
chamber held almost twice as many debates with an explicit EU theme. In the plenary 
debates of the Bundestag a share of the speeches is not actually performed on the floor, but 
only provided in the minutes. The debates protocolled only were excluded from this 
overview. For the purpose of reaching out to the citizens only actually preformed debates 
are relevant. If the debates protocolled were included the overall number of debates were 
even higher. 
The plenary debates in both chambers cover a broad range of topics from CFSP, the Euro 
crisis, energy, social affairs to migration. They take the form of government declarations 
reporting on the Council and European Council, topical hours and debates on urgent or 
regular motions. The Nationalrat holds specific “topical EU hours” four times a year, 
where party groups take turn to decide on the agenda item. These often concern broad 
topics, as the crisis or the EU 2020 strategy. The debates in the Bundestag also cover these 
“big questions” of the future of Europe and major political decisions. The on the floor 
debates in the German chamber, however, also cover a number of specific legislative 
proposal from the EU Commission. These more policy oriented debates result from the 
strategy of “mainstreaming” EU affairs and holding the final vote at the plenary level.  
This study traced the plenary procedure for the EU-related motions from the three 
committees under analysis (EAC, economy and social affairs). The Nationalrat did not 
debate the EU initiatives in the plenary, as the EAC used its right to vote instead of the 
plenary. Thus, the day-to-day policymaking on EU issues, which the sub-committee on EU 
                                                 
80 Ten debates in the Nationalrat took place in the period from September 2008 to September 2009. These 
were excluded for this comparison of the activities of the two chambers, as they occurred before the 
legislative period of the Bundestag began. 
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affairs is responsible for, does not arrive at the plenary. The Bundestag involves the plenary 
for final votes.81 Almost one-third EU-related motions (32 of 108) from the three 
committees of the Bundestag were debated in a first reading in the plenary. Close to two-
thirds (54 of 108) were debated on the floor in second and third reading.82 The different link 
of the committee and plenary stage in the two chambers explains the difference in overall 
salience of EU issues in plenary debates. The “mainstreaming” of EU affairs in the 
Bundestag leads to a regular involvement of the plenary on EU affairs and more policy-
oriented debates.  
This study selected three debates of each chamber for content analysis. This introductory 
section on the practice of EU scrutiny provides an overview on the content of these debates.  
The financial and debt crisis was a dominant issue in the debates on the EU in the period of 
investigation from 2008/9 to 2013. The crisis presented a threat for the economic wellbeing 
of the Euro zone countries and put the basic premises of EU integration into question. The 
first debates dealt with the European Council meeting on the 24 and 25 March 2010, where 
heads of state and government reacted to the dramatic developments in Greece in early 
2010. It became more and more apparent that Greece would not be able to refinance itself at 
the markets. At the European Council meeting, the heads of state or governments agreed to 
support Greece with bilateral loans and through the International Monetary Fund (IMF). At 
this point of time Greece was still the only EU member state unable to refinance at the 
private markets. The debates were coined by the so called “no bailout clause” (Art. 125, 
TFEU) according to which member states would not be liable for others debts. The 
uncertainty on how a financial bankruptcy of a small state like Greece would affect the rest 
of the Euro zone and the EU was omnipresent.  
A second set of debates included in analysis, both on 14 December 2011, concerned the 
Euro group and European Council meetings on 8 and 9 of December 2011. The context of 
debate had changed significantly since March 2010. The heads of state and government had 
reacted to the crisis by installing the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) in May 
2010. Not only Greece depended on external aids. Ireland and Portugal both found 
                                                 
81 Party groups in the German lower chamber follow the voting behaviour in committees in close to 100 per 
cent of the cases. Only on six occasions did an opposition party alter its behaviour from committee to plenary 
stage. These alterations were limited from a shift from abstention to support or to a negative vote and only 
concerned initiatives from other opposition party groups, not the government. 
82 Debates regularly covered several of these initiatives at a time. The initiatives from committees under 
analysis, in consequence, fed into overall 21 debates in first reading and 20 debates in second and third 
reading.  
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themselves in need of financial support from the EFSF (in November 2010 and May 2011 
respectively). In November 2011, the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers 
had decided upon the “Sixpack” legislation that intended to address the problems of the 
Euro crisis in more structural, not just symptomatic, level.  
The plenary debates in Austrian and Germany on 14 December 2011 dealt with the most 
recent developments of the Euro crisis. The French and German leaders had advanced the 
proposal to change Art. 136 TFEU to enable a permanent “European Stability Mechanism” 
(ESM) that would follow upon the temporary Euro rescue fund, the EFSF. The Euro group 
decided on a number of items on more coordinated economic governance at EU level. 
Stronger budget control should be achieved through (quasi-)automatic sanctions for a 
member state with a deficit over three per cent of the GDP. It was further decided that the 
functioning of the ESM should be preponed to July 2012 and an urgent use of this rescue 
fund be possible with qualified majority vote (85 per cent of the votes). Yet, these changes 
could not be integrated into EU law, since the United Kingdom did not support the 
agreements. The decisions were thus implemented through an intergovernmental treaty 
among the other 26 EU member states. The strongest lines of conflict in the debates in 
December 2011 were about the appropriate reactions to the Euro crisis: In how far should 
the EU create transnational liabilities? And is austerity a way out of the financial and debt 
crisis?  
The third set of plenary debates on 19 and 21 February 2013 had the multiannual financial 
framework (MFF) of the EU as subject of discussion. The MFF defines the maximum 
amounts of annual EU spending on different policy fields for a seven-year period (here 
2014 to 2020). It reflects the political priorities of the EU. This long-term budgetary 
planning intends to create reliable and predictable structures for all member states. Annual 
EU budgets are adopted based on the MFF. Both countries under investigation are net-
contributors into the Union. The governments are thus under pressure to justify the 
investment to the EU budget. De Wilde (2014: 1076) argues that the EU budget is a focal 
point of political contention as long as treaty reform is de facto inhibited. The budget 
concerns socio-economic issues as much as identity issues on cross-border financial 
transfer. Conflict arises on how much and for which political priorities a member state 
should contribute to the EU budget. The Euro crisis casts its shadow over the MFF debates. 
On the one hand, the perception of most urgent problems in Europe is influenced by the 
crisis, e.g. youth unemployment. On the other hand, MPs compare the contributions to the 
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MFF to the expenditures for financial guarantees under the EFSF and ESM. The “cost of 
Europe” is a focal point of political contention.  
The content analysis condenses the lines of conflict of the extensive text corpus. In the 92 
speeches under investigation, I coded 1,520 framings and 700 references to other 
parliamentary actors. Figure 11 presents an overview of the framing in the six debates as 
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Figure 11 demonstrates the overall presence of individual frames in the six debates under 
analysis. It shows the frequency of each of the 22 frames as share as share of all codings. 
Eleven of these frames show some presence in the debates (between 4 and 8 per cent). An 
equal number of frames are used with relatively little frequency (below 4 per cent). Two 
frames stick out with a high share of over ten per cent of all codings. The relatively 
unspecific frame termed “More EU” and the request for more “Economic orthodoxy” are 
the two most vehemently argued frames in the time period under investigation.  
The following section presents the opposing frames on the nine topics that evolved from the 
analysis. The presentation of the results includes the framing by opposition as well as the 
governing parties. The party groups in government are the point of reference to measure 
competition by opposition parties. Their framing also indicates where competition by 
opposition parties is successful. Where governing parties fear the attacks from opposition 
they justify their actions and positions more thoroughly. Both governments were coalition 
government. In Germany, the CDU/CSU formed a centre-right coalition with the junior 
partner FDP. In Austria the two largest parties, SPÖ and ÖVP, coalesced in a grand 
coalition as typical for consociational democracies. Official statements or final decisions 
indicate only one position for the government parties. In discourse, the difference in 
positions between the coalition partners becomes apparent. Results of the framing analysis 
are therefore not aggregated to a single government position, but indicate the position of 
each governing party separately. The difference of position between opposition and 
governing parties has to be taken into account towards each coalition partner in case their 
positions differ.  
The theoretical chapter (Section 2.3.2) developed the scope conditions for each of the two 
dimensions of political conflict relevant for Hypothesis 2. The positional distance of an 
opposition party to the government on the left-right dimension should predominantly 
influence competition on socio-economic issues. The cultural dimension of conflict is 
expected to influence party competition on the identity matters and proper EU integration 
(allocation of competences and enlargement). 
5.2.2. The cultural dimension of conflict 
This Section 5.2.1 presents the results for those topics, where the theoretical chapter argued 
for the relevance of the cultural dimension of political conflict. In the context of EU affairs, 
two main issues are expected to be framed predominantly along the TAN-GAL dimension: 
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identity-matters and EU integration. It starts out with issues closely related to collective 
identity, that is the in-group whose interests are propagated, the question of national 
sovereignty, the polity design of the EU and cross-border redistribution in times of the 
crisis or the general budget debates. The frames that concern identity-matters relate closely 
to the overall support or critique of European integration by a party group. Who is 
considered a member of the in-group? Who is excluded from the national or European 
“imagined community” (Andersen 1993)? How permeable should national borders be?  
The first aspect related to identity juxtaposes “national interests” against “EU interests” 
(Figure 12). 
Figure 12: Framing on collective interests. 
The two frames were coded only at those instances where national or EU interests are 
addressed in the sense of either-or-options in a zero sum game. The frame “EU interests” is 
for example used to pitch national egoisms against the European common interest: 
“Sie [die europäischen Institutionen] sind im Zweifel der bessere Hüter des 
Gemeinschaftsgedankens, als wir es sein können, die wir häufig in nationalen Interessen denken 
müssen. Deswegen: Mehr Mut zu mehr Europa.” (Werner Hoyer, FDP, 14 Dec 2011) 
The governing parties in both countries use the frames of national interest with less then 
five per cent of their speaking time (SPÖ with 2.6 per cent, ÖVP with 3.0 per cent, CDU 
with 2.2 per cent and FDP with 2.5 per cent). The defense of national interests has some 
presence in government discourse, though limited in scope. All government parties had to 
justify the net-contributions to EU level under the crisis measures and the MFF. Their 
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statements under the “national interests” frame appear as justifications for these significant 
burdens for the national budgets. The contribution to the EU level would be in line with 
national interests. In the German debates the governing coalition focused more on the 
justification of the crisis measures. In the Austrian debate the justification of the MFF 
commitments receives equal attention as the crisis measures.  
The most important finding regarding the “collective interest” topic is the exceptionally 
strong reference to the frame “Member state interests” by the FPÖ and BZÖ. The two anti-
establishment parties spend about a fourth of the coded weighted frames on the defense of 
national interests in debates on the Euro crisis and the EU budget (BZÖ 23.8 per cent, FPÖ 
26.9 per cent). None of the other parties positions that strongly on the interest-related 
frames or any other individual frame. The BZÖ and FPÖ are the only parties in the sample 
that position clearly towards the TAN-pole of the cultural dimension. However, the Green 
party is more distant to the government towards the other extreme on that same dimension. 
Thus, Hypothesis 2b can only partially explain the results on this topic. The two anti-
establishment parties much more fervently support the national interest frame than their 
position on the cultural dimension would explain. The use of the frame “national interest” 
can better be explained by Hypothesis 1: Both parties use it as fierce critique of the 
governing parties “selling-out” Austrian interests at EU level during the Euro crisis and in 
the MFF negotiations, e.g.:  
“Wie können Sie den vielen Arbeitslosen in Österreich klarmachen, dass Sie hier, voller Stolz, diese 
Milliardenversprechungen machen? – Das verstehe ich nicht! In Österreich suchen 400 000 
Menschen, die nicht einmal eine Perspektive haben, Arbeit. Die Jugendarbeitslosigkeit steigt. 60 000 
Jugendliche in Österreich haben keinen Job, Herr Bundeskanzler! Sie machen sich Sorgen um die 
Spanier und die Portugiesen. Sie sind Bundeskanzler von Österreich! Kümmern Sie sich endlich 
einmal um die Menschen hier in unserem Land, wenn Sie gewählt werden wollen!” (Josef Bucher, 
BZÖ, 19 Feb 2013) 
The citation demonstrates how the BZÖ positions itself as the defender of the interests of 
the “Austrian people” against an ignorant government. The defense of Austrian interests 
takes central stage in the competition of these two parties with the incumbents. It closely 
links to their anti-establishment approach. Members of government are attacked personally 
and depicted as corrupt, weak and incompetent in these international negotiations.83 The 
following quotation demonstrates this link and the perception of an incompatibility of EU 
and national interests:  
“Herr Faymann, Ihnen sei eines zum Abschluss gesagt: Ein Bundeskanzler des Volkes sind Sie nicht. 
Ein Abkanzler des Volkes, das sind Sie!  
                                                 
83 The results of the anti-elitism approach of the analysis in Section 5.2.3 further support this argument. 
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(Abg. Strache: Das ist es!)  
Und damit sind Sie ein Kanzler der Kommissare.” (Herbert Kickl, FPÖ, 14 Dec 2011) 
The last sentence of this statement implies that the interests of European Commissioners 
are not in line with those of the Austrian people. The chancellor is asked to defend Austrian 
interests in Brussels. EU negotiations are understood as zero-sum game following the logic 
of exclusive national identities. The strong emphasis on national interest is at the core of the 
communicative strategy of the BZÖ and FPÖ. The “Collective interest” frame scores 
highest of all individual frames in the debate and influence the perspective on several other 
issues in the debates on the Euro crisis and the MFF. 
Figure 13: Framing on sovereignty. 
The identity issue covers a second group of opposing frames: “Protect national 
sovereignty” versus the “European idea”. The national sovereignty frame reflects the 
perception that the national community is the first reference point for a collective identity 
(see Risse 2010 on exclusive national identities). The frame covers expressions on the need 
to protect national institutions and the autonomy of the member states (see Helbling et al. 
2010). The “Protect national sovereignty” frame has a sub-category, “Protect national 
democracy”. It is differentiated as it demonstrates important differences in the use of the 
sovereignty frame across party groups. The democracy frame covers statements that argue 
for protecting the national institution of democracy, which is threatened due to the EU. The 
frame “European idea”, on the other hand, includes all statements in appraisal of 
international cooperation: MPs may demand European unity or argue for a shared history 
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and values and a community of peace. The frame implies identification with the European 
community as a whole (Risse 2010, Kantner 2016). How are the different sets of frames 
used by the party groups? 
All regular parties – governing and opposition – address the broad frame „European 
idea“ with similar frequency (of 6 to 8 per cent). The governing parties often use it as a 
general references in the concluding paragraph of the speech that somehow refers to the 
value of European unity. 
“Auch wenn kein Grund zu übertriebenem Jubel besteht, es kann und darf keinen Zweifel daran 
geben, dass die Europäische Union ein unverzichtbares Projekt zur Sicherung von Frieden und 
Wohlstand in Europa ist. Und dieses Projekt muss uns auch etwas wert sein.” (Karlheinz Kopf, ÖVP, 
19 Feb 2013) 
This approach reflects a general pro-European consensus among the regular parties.  
There are four party groups that score on the opposing “Protect national sovereignty” 
frame: the BZÖ and FPÖ as well as the SPD and Linke. As the sub-category on protecting 
democracy demonstrates, there is a qualitative difference between the culturally 
conservative and the economically left-oriented parties in the use of this frame. 
The FPÖ questions the general consensus on EU integration with the strong focus on 
national sovereignty (with 22.6 per cent). It is the only party that does not support the frame 
“European idea”. The FPÖ uses equal emphasis on the “National sovereignty” frame as on 
“National interests” presented above (Figure 12). That implies that almost half of the coded 
framings for this party deal with national interests and sovereignty. FPÖ vehemently 
propagates a more intergovernmental and state-centred approach to EU integration. The 
framing of the BZÖ runs qualitatively in the same direction yet does not put such extreme 
emphasis on sovereignty as the FPÖ.  
Both anti-establishment parties also argue for the protection of democratic institutions at 
domestic level within the sovereignty frame (FPÖ with 8.5 per cent, BZÖ with 1.8 per 
cent), for example: 
“Genau das ist der entscheidende Punkt: Wir Freiheitliche haben immer darauf aufmerksam gemacht 
und gesagt, dass es doch eine Selbstaufgabe des Nationalrates ist, was da [durch den Lissabon 
Vertrag] stattgefunden hat. Und genau das wollen wir nicht! Wir Freiheitliche wollen keine 
Selbstaufgabe des Nationalrates!” (Heinz-Christian Strache, FPÖ, 24 Mar 2010) 
The FPÖ links the democracy frame to the critique of the Lisbon Treaty. The FPÖ 
frequently presents the current form of EU integration as threat for national sovereignty. It 
is closely linked to the sovereignty of the nation state. Both anti-establishment parties 
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regularly demand referendums to enhance the democratic legitimacy of EU-related 
decisions. Both, the loss of autonomy through the Lisbon Treaty and the lack of 
referendums, are perceived as a significant reduction in national sovereignty. They express 
a lack of influence over the design of the EU polity by the national representatives and the 
people.  
Protecting democracy is also of concern of the SPD (with 8.3 per cent) and the Left (with 
4.9 per cent). A recurrent theme in debates on the Euro crisis was the critique of executive 
dominance in crisis managing and the undermining of parliamentary budget power (see also 
Crum 2013): 
“Und jetzt wieder etwas Neues: Wieder keine Entscheidung im Parlament, aber deutsches Steuergeld 
geht jetzt über die Bundesbank an den IWF und fließt von da aus wieder nach Europa zurück.  
(Jürgen Trittin [BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN]: Das nennt man Geldwäsche!)  
Diese Konstruktion hat offensichtlich nur einen einzigen Zweck: diesen Bundestag zu umgehen, und 
das geht eben nicht – ganz einfach.” (Frank Walter Steinmeier, SPD, 14 Dec 2011) 
These arguments present decision-making at EU level as a threat for national democratic 
institutions. However, they do not question the fundamental logic of EU institutions or the 
allocation of competences to the EU level.84  
The identity topic is clearly related to the cultural dimension of conflict as Hypothesis 2b 
expected. The mainstream party groups share a vision on common “European interests” and 
support the broad frame of the “European idea” on shared values and unity. However, these 
pro-European frames remain unspecific and do not formulate a clear design of or vision for 
deeper EU integration. The two anti-establishment parties disrupt this pro-European 
consensus. Especially the FPÖ vigorously demands the protection of national sovereignty 
and national interests. Half of its frames concern the national identification. The positional 
distance on the cultural dimension does not correspond to the extremity of this competitive 
strategy. The use of these frames is paired with fierce critique of government staff (see 
below Sector 5.2.3), which supports the expectations of Hypothesis 1 on the relevance of 
the anti-establishment party type.  
                                                 
84 Both Green opposition parties do not score on the ”protect natioanl democracy” frame. This does not mean 
that they were not concerned abou the democratic quality of the decision-making around the crisis 
mechanism. Much more, they suggested an increase in the democratic quality at EU level, either through 
strengthening of the European Parliament or referndums at EU level, as a solution. 
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Figure 14: Framing of the EU Polity. 
The six debates on European Council meetings under investigation triggered intensive 
discussions on the design of the EU polity. The Euro crisis and the EU budget concerned 
such fundamental questions of EU integration that they spark reflections about the purpose 
and goals of the integration project. A significant share of speaking time was dedicated to 
arguments on the design of the EU polity (15.3 per cent, see Figure 11, Section 5.2.1). The 
extent to which member states should or should not compensate economic recessions across 
borders is a question of EU integration. The two topics of the crisis and the EU budget are 
expected to trigger competition along the cultural dimension of conflict similar to the 
identity topics (collective interest and sovereignty, Figure 12 and 13) (H2b). Overall, the 
results show a similar pattern as on the two identity-related topics. The mainstream parties 
show a relatively unspecific pro-EU consensus, which is challenged by the anti-
establishment parties. Yet, there are some different approaches by the Green and left-
oriented party groups regarding EU integration.  
The most frequently recurring frame in the topic of the EU polity is the rather unspecific 
request of “More EU”. This frame and the support by mainstream parties is similar to the 
“European idea” framing in Figure 13 above. The overview on the frequency of all frames 
(Figure 14) demonstrated that the claim for “More EU” was the second most frequently 
used frame in the debates under analysis. All generally pro-European parties argue for 
“More EU” as solution for the crisis or other policy problems. This frame is coded when no 
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further specification of the kind of EU activity is envisaged. For example, in this statement 
by an MP of the German liberal party: “Wir werden uns dabei nicht auf Deutschland 
beschränken, sondern auch auf europäischer Ebene Initiativen ergreifen.“ (Birgit 
Homburger, FDP, 25 Mar 2010) or by an Austrian SPÖ-MP: “Wir sind für klare Ziele. Wir 
sind für gemeinsames Arbeiten innerhalb der EU.“ (Christine Muttonen, SPÖ, 14 Dec 
2010) The CDU/CSU also frequently argued for stronger control at EU level within this 
frame. All governing parties use this vague pro-European frame quite frequently (SPÖ with 
14.1 per cent, ÖVP with 19.1 per cent, CDU with 16.1 per cent and FDP with 9.3 per cent). 
The two Green parties (with 14.6 per cent in Austria and 9.7 per cent in Germany) and the 
SPD (with 12.8 per cent) rejoice in the same general call for Europe as solution for the 
crisis and to other policy problems. A clear vision of the design of this deepened EU 
integration remains a desideratum. 
Only in a rather limited number of statements, MPs specified how integration should be 
strengthened coded as supranational. Overall, party groups scored rather low on this frame. 
The two Green parties are the strongest supporters of a more supranational institutional 
setting, e.g. more competences for EU institution or more qualified majority voting in the 
Council (with 5.6 per cent in Austria and 4.3 per cent in Germany). The FDP also scored on 
the “Supranational” frame. However, this is owed entirely to a fervently pro-European 
speech by Werner Hoyer at his ultimate speech in the Bundestag. His contribution 
represented more of a personal statement than the ordinary party competition on this special 
occasion and was applauded by MPs from all party groups. The stronger support for a 
supranational organisation of the EU polity from Green parties is in line with its positional 
distance to the government and lends support to Hypothesis 2b. 
Three parties, BZÖ, FPÖ and Linke, do not or only barely engage in the call for “More 
Europe”. The German Left is the only party that abstains from any proposal on the design 
of the EU polity. The lack of support of either intergovernmental or supranational logic 
does not disrupt the general pro-European consensus.  
Similar to the identity topics, BZÖ and FPÖ are disrupting the pro-EU consensus on this 
topic. The two Austrian anti-establishment parties use the occasion to present an alternative 
intergovernmental vision of the EU. Though all government parties support a more 
intergovernmental Europe (mainly arguing for subsidiarity), the BZÖ and FPÖ are the only 
ones who formulate a clear counter-vision on a “Core Europe” or “Europe of Fatherlands”. 
This frame focuses on the competences and autonomy of the member states within the EU. 
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They question the necessity to include all member states in a „one-speed Europe“, for 
example: 
“Daher sage ich Ihnen, wir müssen über ein Kerneuropa nachdenken. Wir müssen über ein Europa 
nachdenken, in dem zunächst einmal Länder zusammenarbeiten, die sich an Spielregeln halten.” 
(Ewald Stadler, BZÖ, 24 Mar 2010) 
The Euro-scepticism of the two anti-establishment parties does not result in the demand of 
an Austrian withdrawal from the European Union. They both propagate an 
intergovernmental vision of a core-Europe of net-payers. During the Euro crisis this 
translates to the demand to exclude the crisis countries from the common currency, as the 
following quotation shows: 
“Staaten wie Griechenland, deren makroökonomische Kennzahlen einen Verbleib in der 
gemeinsamen Währungsunion nicht rechtfertigen, davon auch ausgeschlossen werden können. 
Darüber müssen wir nachdenken und diskutieren; sonst werden wir nämlich auch in diese Krise 
hineingezogen, ja hineingerissen! Die gesamte Eurozone in der heutigen Art und Weise, wie sie 
besteht, ist schon auch zu hinterfragen.” (Heinz-Christian Strache, FPÖ, 24 Mar 2010) 
FPÖ and BZÖ differ from all other party groups with their claim of a partial disintegration 
or fragmentation within the EU. Their alternative vision of core-Europe disrupts the overall 
consensus on the current form of EU integration. 
The culturally conservative parties in the Austrian parliament develop a distinct vision of a 
core-Europe of net-payers. This presents a unique competitive strategy within the sample of 
opposition parties under investigation. They disrupt the pro-EU consensus that the 
mainstream parties express in the support of the very vague frame “More EU”. The German 
Left is silent on the issue, neither supporting nor contradicting the governing parties. Both 
Green parties develop a positive vision on a more supranational order, however, not with 
the same emphasis as FPÖ and BZÖ regarding a “Core Europe”. In sum, the results point to 
the relevance of the cultural dimension to explain framing on the design of the EU polity 
(H2b). 
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Figure 15: Framing of cross-border transfer. 
Cross-border transfer was an extremely contentious topic in the period of investigation. 
Figure 15 shows the results on the clear juxtaposition of the frames “transfer” and “no 
transfer” payments to the crisis state or economically less developed regions in the EU. 
There was no clear-cut legal regulation on the liabilities across borders within the Union. 
On the one hand, Article 125 TFEU states that EU member states should not be held liable 
for the commitments by another government (“no-bailout clause”). On the other hand, a 
significant amount of the EU budget has always been redistributed through structural and 
regional funds. During the period of investigation on 25 March 2011, Article 136 (3) of the 
TFEU was amended by the following statement: "The Member States whose currency is the 
euro may establish a stability mechanism to be activated if indispensable to safeguard the 
stability of the euro area as a whole. The granting of any required financial assistance under 
the mechanism will be made subject to strict conditionality". The extension to Article 136 
enabled a permanent mechanism for cross-border support in urgent cases (see Section 
4.3.3). 
The results on the topic of cross-border transfer are expected to follow primarily the 
cultural dimension (H2b). However, the question of shared transnational financial liabilities 
links aspects of economic policy with those of identity. Is redistribution from richer to 
poorer regions a useful tool of economic policy? Is there a sense of community within the 
EU that suffices to justify redistribution across borders (see Risse 2010)? Thus, the topic 














relates to the broader conception of the EU as construct for mutual benefit or community of 
shared fate (see above in this Section 5.2.1 on “collective identity”). 
The governing parties range somewhere in the medium support level for transfer payments. 
The governing parties need to justify their decisions at EU level, which burden national 
budgets dramatically, for example: 
“Die Frage, die sich aber aktuell stellt, ist, ob wir jetzt, in diesen schwierigen Stunden, Wochen und 
Monaten, einander unterstützen, den Zusammenhalt stärken oder ob wir ein Konzept verfolgen, das 
in Wirklichkeit die Eurozone und die Europäische Union begraben würde.” (Werner Faymann, SPÖ, 
14 Dec 2010) 
The Austrian chancellor presents his decision in light of the future of the common currency 
and the survival of the EU. The depiction of the Euro crisis as an existential threat was 
termed “the European rescue discourse” by Puntscher Riekman and Wydra (2013). Their 
study showed that it served forging majorities for EU and government proposals for the 
crisis mechanisms. Governments were required to find support from a two-third majority in 
parliament for the revision of Art. 136 and struggled to justify the potential burdens of 
national budgets by the crisis measures towards the citizens. 
Yet, the strongest supporters of cross-border financial support are the two Green parties. 
Both demand an increased budget and solidarity across borders. The fiercest critique stems 
from the FPÖ, followed by the BZÖ. This first finding clearly supports the relevance of the 
cultural dimension for framing of cross-border transfer (H2b). The two Green parties 
demand more support for the crisis countries. The Austrian Greens are especially concerned 
with youth employment in Southern Europe. Their Universalist perspective leads them to 
argue for empathy and support across national borders. 
The two culturally conservative parties in Austria take the opposite stance and vehemently 
criticize transnational financial support. FPÖ and BZÖ frame the payments as running 
counter to Austrian interests. They argue it would take several generations to pay of the 
incredibly high liabilities provided during the Euro crisis. The incumbents would, thus, 
jeopardise the future of Austrian citizens. However, the frame of “No transfer” is not 
necessarily argued by a nationalist perpective, as the TAN-position of the two party groups 
would lead to expect. Much more, the criticism of the political elite is in focus of the 
BZÖ’s and FPÖ’s position. Both party groups argue in favour of supporting the ordinary 
people in Greece, Spain or Portugal. However, they see the Southern-European political 
systems as corrupt and inefficient. The support by net-contributors would therefore not 
 177 
arrive at those in need. The following statement exemplifies the scepticism towards the 
success of transfer payments: 
“Ich komme zum Schluss: Gesundes Geld in ein kaputtes System zu pumpen, das ist nicht Rettung, 
das ist fahrlässig. Und genau diese Fahrlässigkeit, die darf man einfach nicht mehr so unkommentiert 
stehen lassen, da muss man sich auch dagegen wehren!” (Heinz-Christian Strache, FPÖ, 14 Dec 
2011) 
This argumentation links to the anti-establishment stance of the party group. As on all 
topics of the cultural dimension, the logic of Hypothesis 2b is enhanced by the competitive 
strategy of an opposition party with an anti-establishment character (H1).  
Finally, the left leaning opposition parties support transnational redistribution. The SPD 
and Linke do not put a lot of emphasis on the need for European solidarity. However, they 
support the measure and argue in line with the redistributive logic of their left wing 
ideology.85  
The topic of “cross-border transfer” links foremost to the cultural dimension of conflict 
(H2b). The Green parties are the strongest supporters of trans-national solidarity. Both 
Green parties think in terms of one European community, where exclusive national 
identities should be overcome. The Austrian and German Greens criticize the governing 
parties for their conditionality in transnational support. The BZÖ and FPÖ attack the 
coalition parties from the opposite side. They argue fiercely against transfer payments 
among European member states. Their negative position on transnational liabilities is 
strengthened by the distrust towards established parties and the perception of the 
ineffectiveness of existing structures lending equal support to Hypothesis 1 on the party 
type. 
The results on identity issues and EU integration all corresponded clearly more to the 
cultural dimension than the socio-economic one (Hypothesis 2b). The governing and some 
of the mainstream parties develop an unspecific but clearly positive vision on more EU 
integration. Yet, barely delineate how a stronger role for the EU should be implemented. 
The anti-establishment parties are the only ones addressing a radically different vision on 
Europe (“Core Europe”). The Austrian Euro-critical parties disrupt the pro-European 
consensus and present a clear alternative of a core-Europe of net-contributors. The strongly 
divergent approach and the expression of distrust towards political actors supports the 
                                                 
85 One could argue that the SPD is supportive, because it supported the revision of Art. 136 and installation of 
the ESM. However, the Left party did not cooperate with the government on the crisis measure and abstains 
from criticism as well. The positional distance – or proximity in this case – therefore appears as the better 
explanatory factor. 
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expectations of Hypothesis 1. The results on topics related to the cultural dimension show 
that the two anti-establishment parties strongly emphasize those frames that can be linked 
to the criticism of political elites (see Section 5.2.3).  
5.2.3. The socio-economic dimension of conflict 
This Section 5.2.2 investigates the framing related to the socio-economic issues in the 
plenary debates of the Bundestag and Nationalrat. The following five topics took centre 
stage in the debates on the Euro crisis and the MFF. The presentation of results in this 
Section 5.2.2 starts out from the “Purpose of EU integration” as it connects best the cultural 
dimension of conflict. The chapter continuous to investigate two socio-economic topics that 
clearly link to the Euro crisis (budget policy and the roots of the crisis). The final two topics 
review classic e questions of the left-right dimension: the (de-)regulation of the economy 
and redistribution within a society. 
Two debates in each parliament dealt almost exclusively with the crisis where the concepts 
of austerity and a “transfer union” sparked intense debates. The two themes also impacted 
the third set of debates on the MFF. The Multiannual Financial Framework requires that 
member states commit to a specific contribution to the EU budget and redistribution of this 
budget among the member states. Figure 16 shows the use of framing on the social-
economic goals of the EU, Figure 17 assesses budget policy, before Figure 18 turns to 
cross-national transfer. Finally, the chapter presents the results on the two topics “role of 
the state” (Figure 18) and “economic policy” (Figure 19), which concern classic elements 
of the socio-economic dimension of political conflict. 
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Figure 16: Framing of socio-economic goals of the EU. 
Three frames were included under this heading: “Social Europe”, “global competition” and 
“economic prosperity”. The frames represent demands towards the EU and do not 
necessarily imply a positive evaluation of the status quo. They indicate ideals that party 
groups formulate towards EU integration. “Social Europe” represents a classic left of centre 
frame, which claims that social and labour standards should be installed at EU level to 
safeguard the achievements of the left (Hooghe et al. 2002). The frames of “global 
competition” and “economic prosperity” on the other hand correspond more to an 
economically right-wing ideology. The European Union is justified as a body that can 
enhance the competitiveness of European economies in face of global competition, e.g. by 
China, Brazil and the United States. The EU’s purpose is therefore argued in terms of 
utility and an increase in material welfare of EU member states. Following Helbling (2010) 
the frame “economic prosperity” is classified as a typical right-wing argument and 
therefore positioned as counter-argument to “Social Europe”. 
Overall, the results on the goals of EU integration correspond to the left-right dimension 
(H2a). All four governing parties justify EU integration through “global competition” and 
“economic prosperity”. On both issues, the Euro crisis and the MFF, Austria and Germany 
appear as net-contributors. For the governments who are responsible to decide on these 
contributions to the EU level, the “Economic prosperity” frame is an important 
justification. It is typically used by referring to the indirect wealth of the internal market for 
Austrian and German economy; for example: 
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“Eines muss uns doch klar sein: Das ist nicht zu unserem Schaden! Österreich hat von der 
Mitgliedschaft in der Europäischen Union seit dem Jahre 1995, seit wir Mitglied sind, 
massiv profitiert.  
(Abg. Dr. Belakowitsch-Jenewein: Wer sagt das? Sie?)  
Wir verzeichnen jährlich ein zusätzliches Wirtschaftswachstum von 0,6 Prozent. Wir haben 
jährlich 14 000 zusätzliche Arbeitsplätze in Österreich, dank der besseren Chancen die wir 
durch die Mitgliedschaft in der EU haben.  
(Abg. Dr. Graf: Teilzeitjobs!)  
– Das kann sich doch sehen lassen!” (Karlheinz Kopf, ÖVP, 19 Feb 2013) 
The citation by Karheinz Kopf demonstrates the justification for Austrian net contributions 
to the MFF, which are argued in terms of a larger indirect economic benefit of the member 
state. The interjections by other MPs demonstrate the high level of contestation in the 
chamber. 
None of the governing (or mainstream) parties developed a clear vision of EU integration 
that could have been captured by frames corresponding to the cultural dimension of conflict 
(see above 5.2.1) They supported vague pro-EU frames as “More EU” or “European idea”. 
However, more specific positive arguments in favour of EU integration are delivered in the 
framings on the socio-economic dimension. The two parties of the governing coalition in 
Austria stress the economic benefits of EU membership through the two frames more than 
any other party group. This behaviour can be understood in relation to the attacks by 
opposition parties who question the purpose of EU integration altogether. The governing 
parties in Austria more vehemently argue for the social and economic benefits of EU 
integration than any other party group in the sample.  
The two anti-establishment parties in Austria, BZÖ and FPÖ, barely use any frames in 
justification or EU integration. The two parties are not straight out against EU integration 
as such, but propose a vision of a “Europe of the fatherlands” (see EU Polity, Figure 14, 
Section 5.2.1). Their vision of the EU does not correspond to any of the two traditional 
centre-left and centre-right framings of EU integration. The conflict over Europe among 
party groups is represented by the lack of support of any of these three frames by the BZÖ 
and FPÖ. In the German party system, the Linke is more hesitant to use the “Social Europe” 
frame than the other left-oriented parties even though its positional distance on the left-right 
scale is the strongest. Yet, this party group does not compete with the government on the 
cultural dimension either.  
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The variation among the pro-European parties corresponds to the left-right divide. The use 
of frames on the socio-economic benefits of EU integration generally follows the logic of 
positional distance that Hypothesis 2a formulates. The Austrian Green and the ÖVP 
develop clearly distinguishable visions in accordance with Hypothesis 2a (left-right scale). 
Within the German party system, the framing of the party groups mainly reflects the left-
right conflict over the benefits of EU integration. The use of the framing “Social Europe” 
corresponds closely to a left of centre position of party groups. The two Social democratic 
parties argue strongly in favour of social and labour protection at EU level, followed 
closely by both Green parties. The Linke is the only party with a strong positional distance 
on the socio-economic dimension that abstains from framing on the socio-economic 
benefits of EU integration. 
Figure 17: Framing on budget policy. 
The adequate approach to budget policy during and after the crisis sparked the strongest 
conflict among party groups in the debates under analysis. 16.6 per cent of all frames 
concerned this topic (see Figure 11, Section 5.2.1). On the one hand, the governing parties 
– especially the economically right wing ones – argued for economic orthodoxy to combat 
the economic crisis.86 On the other hand, the left-oriented opposition parties argued against 
austerity, as reduced public spending would only intensify the recession. These left-leaning 
party groups argued in line with classic Keynesianism against a reduction of public 
                                                 
86 The BZÖ (with 12.1 per cent) and the FPÖ (with 3.5 per cent) support this frame as well. 
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investments (Maatsch 2014). Party groups position clearly on one or the other side of the 
spectrum of framing budget policy.  
Budget policy relates to three objects within the plenary debates under investigation: the 
own national budgets (national), the financial support for crisis states (transnational) and 
the EU budget (European). The justifications by governing parties and critique by 
opposition parties stresses different aspects of these three interlinked dimensions of 
budgetary policy lending support to Hypothesis 2b. In the following, I first present the 
justifications by the governing parties before we turn to the critique and counter-positions 
of opposition parties. 
As to the first object, both governments stress the need for economic orthodoxy in times of 
the Euro crisis. They defend their decision-making on European budgetary issues through 
the exceptionally high relevance and urgency of the crisis situation, for example: 
“In unserer Generation wird entschieden, ob die Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion ein Erfolg bleibt 
oder ob sie daran zugrunde geht, dass einige Staaten über einen längeren Zeitraum weit über ihre 
Verhältnisse leben, in Bezug auf ihre Wirtschaftsleistung immer gewaltigere Defizite aufbauen und 
sich dann, wenn es nicht mehr weitergeht, hilfesuchend an Dritte wenden. Das kann so nicht 
funktionieren. Solidarität braucht und setzt Verantwortung voraus.” (Michael Link, FDP, 25 Mar 
2010) 
A member of the junior coalition partner in the German government, Michael Link, links 
economic orthodoxy to the survival of the common currency in this statement.87 Support for 
crisis countries is conditional upon reforms and reduced public spending in those states (see 
also Figure 18 on Conditionality).  
Apart from this key argument, both governments stress different aspects of budgetary 
policy. In Austria, the SPÖ and ÖVP argue for their efforts towards a balanced national 
budget and the installation of a constitutional ”brake” on deficit making (national level). In 
Germany, the governing parties do not get tired to stress their attempts in maintaining a 
stable European currency and achieving stability for the EU (transnational level). Deficit 
spending is marked as irresponsible for Germany itself and for all other EU member states. 
The position of the governing parties matters to understand the opposition parties’ 
reactions, which are of key interest in this study. 
Within the Austrian party system, there are two lines of conflict between the government 
and opposition. The BZÖ and FPÖ score on the “economic orthodoxy” frame (Figure 17). 
They do not side with the government, but are their fiercest critics. The two anti-
                                                 
87 See European rescue discourse, Puntscher Riekmann and Wydra 2013. 
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establishment parties do not address austerity towards the crisis states. Their focus is on the 
national arena. They demand that the government be more responsible with taxpayers’ 
money. The BZÖ expresses this argument more frequently than the FPÖ, as in the 
following quotation: 
“Die [EU Institutionen] haben zu Ihnen, Herr Faymann und Herr Spindelegger, gesagt: Was Sie in 
Österreich unter einer Schuldenbremse verstehen, das ist keine Schuldenbremse! Eine 
Schuldenbremse ist das nicht, so wie es Sie verstanden haben, dass wir vielleicht, möglicherweise, 
wenn alles gut geht, im Jahr 2017 zu sparen anfangen und dann noch ohne Sanktionen, nach dem 
Motto: Wenn wir schon sparen, dann sparen wir nicht, sondern dann nehmen wir den Leuten einfach 
mehr Geld aus der Tasche! – Einen Rüffel dafür hat Ihnen selbst die Europäische Kommission, der 
Europäische Rat gegeben, indem sie gesagt haben: Mit diesem Papier können Sie sich wieder nach 
Hause schleichen!” (Gerald Grosz, BZÖ, 14 Dec 2011) 
The quotation of Gerald Grosz from 14 December 2011 also demonstrates the complexity 
of EU multilevel politics. The opposition argumentatively uses the critique from EU level 
towards the own government’s budget proposal. A fierce opponent in other contexts turns 
into an ally on this argument. The two parties install themselves as watchdogs over 
taxpayers’ money. They argue against a balanced budget through increased revenues. 
Instead, reformed and more efficient state institutions should avoid public debt (see Figure 
19, Role of state). They strongly critique the government deficit, especially the new 
borrowings and guarantee the Austrian state engages in towards the EFSF/ ESM. This 
framing of the budget issues links closely to the defense of “national interests” discussed 
above (see Figure 12). BZÖ and FPÖ position themselves as defender of the Austrian 
interest, a role they see the government incapable of. This result supports both, the 
hypothesis on the relevance of the cultural dimension (H2b) as well as party type (H1). 
They overshadow the general left-right logic of the framing on budget policy.  
The Green party aligns with the BZÖ and FPÖ in the criticism of the government’s national 
budget. They are similarly sceptical of overspending in the current annual budget while 
installing a formal constitutional debt brake for the coming years. The following quote 
exemplifies this critique: 
“Sie haben nicht vergessen, dass wir vor vier Wochen das Budget für 2012 hier in diesem Raum 
beschlossen haben, nämlich Sie und die SPÖ – und was ist dort mit der Schuldenbremse, bei den 10 
Milliarden € an zusätzlichem Defizit?” (Alexander van der Bellen, Grüne, 14 Dec 2011) 
The Austrian Green party criticizes this ambivalence of the government’s behaviour. Their 
focus is on international dimension, where they do not propagate economic austerity as 
solution to the Euro crisis. Much more, they strongly criticize economic austerity as a 
solution to the Euro crisis, just like the left-leaning German opposition parties. The “anti-
austerity” frame often refers to the Euro crisis, but may also relate to the EU budget. The 
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debate on austerity as potential solution for the Euro crisis revolves around a fundamental 
dispute of left versus right economic policy: Is a reduction or increase in public spending 
the adequate response? Both sides deliver a number of arguments and examples and cite 
divers sources, supporting their own position.  
In Germany, the lines of conflict run mainly along the (economically right wing) governing 
and the (economically left wing) opposition parties. Except for the Green party, the 
variation in positional distance to the government corresponds to the framing on budget 
policy. The German Greens focus more on the international dimension and argue against 
austerity in the crisis countries. They share this approach with their Austrian counter-part. 
In Austria, the strongest difference lies between the ÖVP and the Green party, similar to the 
framing on the socio-economic benefits of the EU (see this Section 5.2.1 above). The FPÖ 
and BZÖ do not engage in this discussion. Their focus is on the national arena. 
The basic line of argument of the left-wing opposition is that an economic recession cannot 
be overcome with austerity measures alone: 
“Es gibt völlig unverdächtige Institutionen wie die OECD, den Internationalen Währungsfonds oder 
auch den „Economist“, die den europäischen Sparkurs in den einzelnen Ländern ganz massiv und 
heftig kritisieren. Das ist auch nachvollziehbar: Wenn alle Staaten gemeinsam überzogen sparen, 
dann besteht die Gefahr einer wirtschaftlichen Rezession umso mehr.” (Eva Glawischnig-Piesczek, 
Grüne, 19 Feb 2013)  
At several instances the left-leaning opposition parties use conservative sources to 
underline their arguments. Citing opponents lends the own argument a more objective 
appearance. Public overspending in times of crisis is a classic left-oriented argument. The 
Green parties embrace this frame to a larger extent that Hypothesis 2a would expect. Their 
international and universalist approach explains this emphasis and again lends some 
support to the logic of Hypothesis 2b. They focus on the social consequences of the crisis, 
for example: 
“Wer anfängt, aufgrund einer Identifizierung der falschen Krisenursache in Europa das Wachstum 
kaputtzusparen, der wird Folgendes erleben:  
(Zuruf von der FDP: Sie wollen doch kein Wachstum!)  
ein Europa, in dem massenhaft junge Leute arbeitslos sind. Ein Europa der Massenarbeitslosigkeit ist 
aber keine Stabilitätsunion. Dieses Europa fliegt auseinander. Dagegen haben Sie nichts getan.” 
(Jürgen Trittin, 90/Grünen, 14 Dec 2011) 
In this statement Jürgen Trittin shares the perception that the future of the EU is at stake 
due to the Euro crisis with the governing parties, as in the above citation of Michael Link, 
FDP, from 25 March 2010. However, the Green MP stresses the threat of social upheaval 
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and declining legitimacy of EU governance. Cuts in social welfare spending in southern 
European member states would undermine the legitimacy. The Austrian Greens argue 
similarly in the MFF debate: youth unemployment in Southern member states would risk 
the long-term support for the current political order, which cannot provide positive 
perspectives for it’s as young citizens. 
Figure 17 covers two more frames on the transnational aspect of budget policy (“reduce 
imbalances” and “accept imbalances”), which are closely linked to the conflict over 
austerity and the transnational perspective of the topic of “budget policy”. They further 
strengthen the results on the relevance of Hypothesis 2a. Party groups discuss whether 
macro-economic imbalances among countries of the Euro zone augment the problems. The 
governing parties justify the German and Austrian current account surpluses by inter-
dependence and mutual benefit that would not show in the final numbers, e.g.: 
“Die Statistik trügt natürlich, denn hinter jedem Export, den deutsche oder österreichische 
Unternehmen machen, stecken ja mindestens 50 Prozent Importanteil.” (Wolfgang Schüssel, ÖVP, 
14 Mar 2010) 
The left-leaning opposition consistently argues against this perspective.  
“Es ist festgestellt worden, dass wir in Deutschland im Vergleich zu allen anderen Euro-Staaten die 
niedrigsten Lohnstückkosten haben. Das wird durch Lohndumping erreicht, was übrigens auch den 
Handel der anderen Länder deutlich erschwert.” (Gregor Gysi, Linke, 25 Mar 2010) 
The left-right dimension of political conflict best explains the opposing arguments on the 
relevance of macro-economic imbalances (H2a).  
The third object of the topic “budget policy” is the debate on the MFF. The lines of conflict 
run parallel to those on the national budget and crisis solutions. The four governing parties 
justify the outcome of the negotiations on the MFF by an overall reduced EU budget. A 
reduced European budget would be appropriate since all member states need to reduce 
spending. The left-oriented opposition parties criticized the cuts, as they would aggravate 
the economic recession in Europe and inhibit counter-measures to the crisis. The FPÖ and 
BZÖ, on the other hand, fiercely attack the government for selling out Austrian interests at 
the “EU altar”. The two parties are again motivated by protecting national interests and 
behave according to the logic of an anti-establishment party.  
Overall, we can see a strong left-right divide on the issue of “budget policy”. In the German 
party system, all (left-wing) opposition parties align against the (right-wing) governing 
coalition. The picture is more complex in the Austrian party system due to the grand 
coalition. The left-right conflict is contained in the coalition of the two parties that are quite 
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distinct on the left-right scale. The centre-left SPÖ is less enthusiastic about “economic 
orthodoxy” than the ÖVP but needs to support the measures at EU level due to its 
government participation.  
Both Green parties focus on the international dimension of budget policy. The Austrian 
Greens take a clear left-oriented argumentative stance demanding more public spending 
(“Keynesiansim”) and a reduction of macro-economic imbalances (“Reduce imbalances”). 
The FPÖ and BZÖ score on “Economic orthodoxy”, however, do not support the governing 
coalition. For these two party groups the logic of competition on the cultural dimension of 
political conflict dominates the left-right logic: they focus exclusively on the benefits of the 
national audience and criticize the government for wasting taxpayers’ money. Both, the 
culturally conservative and progressive ones, framing on socio-economic issues is 
influenced by their extreme positions on the cultural dimension.  
Figure 18: Framing on the roots of the crisis. 
The topic of “roots of the crisis” is closely linked to the solutions to the crisis. The content 
analysis rendered two frames as opposing poles on the responsibility for the crisis. Some 
MPs argued for the “social injustice” of the crisis, which was ultimately caused by actors of 
the financial sector. The banks and speculators are understood to have triggered the Euro 
crisis, whereas taxpayers are compensating the results. This frame demands that the 
financial sector be held responsible for the crisis, e.g. by means of a financial transaction 
tax. Other parliamentarians saw the crisis countries responsible for their own fate 
(“conditionality”). Their debt would result from corruption, inefficient state structures and 
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exaggerated welfare spending. The two frames do not exactly mirror each other, as one 
identifies a group across societies as responsible (banking and financial sector) and the 
other one territorially defined entity of a state. In consequence, a number of parties address 
both frames. However, there are significant differences among party groups in the 
frequency and intensity with which they use these frames. The framing is expected to 
reflect the left-right logic, where social protection is juxtaposed to self-dependency. 
However, the topic could also be influenced by the cultural dimension, e.g. prejudices 
towards the political efficiency of Southern European member states. 
Within the German party system, the frames link clearly to a left-right contestation in 
parliament. The governing parties point to the self-responsibility of the crisis states. The 
opposition denounces the social injustice of the crisis. The vigour with which German 
opposition parties address the “social injustice” frame thereby reflect the extremity of their 
position on the left-right scale. The Linke addresses this frame by far with the strongest 
emphasis (H2a).  
For the Austrian party system the results are not as clear-cut. The most unmistakable 
difference of position is among the governing parties themselves. All three opposition 
parties address both frames with some emphasis. The pattern does not correspond to the 
economic left-right divide. Alexander van der Bellen, as the voice of the Green party on 
this issue, reflects at length on the difficulties of the Greek state in the Euro crisis. He 
argues clearly for a self-inflicted loss of sovereignty of a debtor state based on his 
knowledge as a Professor for Economics. The Green party also uses the “Social injustice” 
frame, though to a lesser extent than BZÖ and FPÖ. 
The two anti-establishment parties score high on both frames “social injustice” and 
“conditionality”. The two frames are not used as either-or arguments here. In the framing 
approach of the FPÖ and BZÖ both frames appear as a threat for Austrian interests. Neither 
the financial sector nor Greece should receive any of the Austrian taxpayers’ money, as the 
following quotations show: 
“Kein weiteres österreichisches Geld für eine politische Kaste, wie die griechische Politikerkaste, die 
seit Jahrzehnten getürkte Haushaltsdaten nach Brüssel meldet!” (Gerhard Kurzmann, FPÖ, 24 Mar 
2010) 
The scepticism towards Greek elites by Gerhard Kurzman is met with the self-enrichment 
of elites in the financial sector in a speech by Ewald Stadler: 
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“Das hat nicht direkt mit der Finanzkrise zu tun, aber diese Denkweise von Managern und 
Bankdirektoren, die glauben, solange es gut läuft, streifen sie ein, und wenn es schlecht läuft, streifen 
sie weiter ein, weil der Steuerzahler alles bezahlen muss, diese Denkweise, meine Damen und 
Herren, wird von der Bevölkerung quer durch alle Mitgliedsländer nicht mehr verstanden werden!” 
(Ewald Stadler, BZÖ, 24 Mar 2010) 
The left-right divide is dominated by the focus on the protection of the national interest and 
the anti-establishment stance in these examples. Both frames are used clearly as argument 
against corrupt elites, be it Greek government members of speculators on the financial 
markets. The use of this frame by BZÖ and FPÖ clearly refects their party type lending 
support to Hypothesis 1. 
To sum up on the “roots of the crisis”, the results for the German party groups support the 
logic of Hypothesis 2a of the left-right divide. However, in the Austrian case the governing 
coalition is conflicted and the opposition does not take a clear-cut angle. The two culturally 
conservative parties act upon a national perspective and their anti-establishment stance in 
the logic of Hypothesis 1.  
Figure 19: Framing on the role of the state. 
The two topics “role of the state” (Figure 18) and “economic policy” (Figure 19) concern 
classic elements of the socio-economic dimension of political conflict. Their use within the 
debates under analysis was strongly influenced by the Euro crisis. It does not necessarily 
reflect the general party position on the left-right scale. The specific circumstances of the 
dramatic effects of the instability of the financial sector cause party groups to embrace 
more left-oriented frames.  
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The frame “regulation” (Figure 19) is to a large extent dedicated to the demand for stronger 
regulation of the financial markets. This explains that all parties demand more regulation, 
after the devastating experience of the vulnerability of the political order in the Euro crisis. 
This frame includes the demand for a Financial Transaction Tax. The left-oriented 
opposition party groups in both countries asked the government to come through for a 
Financial Transaction Tax at EU level, if they support the revision of Art. 136 TFEU. The 
strongest supporters of the “regulation” frame are therefore the classic left wing parties: the 
two social democratic parties (SPÖ 8.3 per cent, SPD 11.7 per cent) and the Left (12.8 per 
cent). The Austrian Greens (4.2 per cent), the CDU/CSU (3.0 per cent) and the BZÖ (4.0 
per cent) address the frame a few times, but remain under the five per cent level.  
The frame termed “deregulation/ efficiency” covers different aspects of economically right-
wing ideology: the deregulation in economic policy and a more efficient public 
administration. All these frames are linked by a basic idea of an achievement oriented 
economic order. The statements cited on this frame are not always related to the crisis, but 
address different aspects of economic policy. All four economically right-wing parties 
address this frame to some extent: those in government (ÖVP with 5.9 per cent, CDU with 
3.0 per cent and FDP with 2.5 per cent) as well as the one in opposition (BZÖ with 4.4). 
They both combine the demand of a slim state (right-wing) with claim for redistribution 
(left-wing). The idea of an efficient public administration is linked to the scepticism 
towards the established parties who would create unecessary positions for their own 
benefit. Yet, the overall presence of the “deregulation/ efficiency” frame is rather low in the 
six debates under analysis (see Figure 11, Section 5.2.1). 
The “role of the state” is primarily framed according to the left-right logic, as Hypothesis 
2a expected. The financial crisis confuses the left-right scheme to a certain extent. Most 
party groups demand a better regulation of the financial and banking sector, e.g. through a 
financial transaction tax. 
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Figure 20: Framing of economic policy. 
The final set of frames indicates the contestation on economic policy between the two poles 
of “social protection” and the idea that economic growth and employment is stimulated by 
“incentives” for businesses. The two frames represent the classic divide on the socio-
economic scale over redistribution in a society (see Helbling et al. 2010). The frame “social 
protection” covers all statements that demand to reduce poverty, unemployment or other 
means of social protections. This frame also includes the demand of redistributive measures 
in favour of citizens with lower income. It does not cover redistribution across borders, but 
only among „classes“ e.g. through higher taxation of wealthy people.88 
The topic does not attract too much attention in the debates under analysis (see Figure 11, 
Section 5.2.1). Only a few party groups, especially the Left (with 20.6 per cent for social 
protection) and the FDP (with 10.6 per cent for “incentives”), spent some speaking time on 
the general questions of economic policy. 
The German governing parties argue for competitiveness as central goal of their economic 
policy, for example: 
“Auch durch sie [die Agenda 2010] wurde den Menschen viel abverlangt, aber sie hat dazu geführt, 
dass die Produktivität an jedem Arbeitsplatz in Deutschland höher als bei den Wettbewerbern in der 
Welt ist. Das ist der Grund für die Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und für die Leistungsfähigkeit, und dafür 
brauchen wir uns nicht zu schämen, sondern darauf kann dieses Land stolz sein.” (Hans-Peter 
Friedrich, CDU, 25 Mar 2010) 
                                                 
88 The frame ” social protection” differs from the ”anti-austerity” frame. Social protection is explicitly about 
the weaker or less wealthy segments of society. The anti-austerity statements address economic policy in 
abstract terms. They may be linked to each other, but would be coded separately in this case (see Chapter 5.1). 
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Lower wages are noticed as a necessary contribution to Germany’s competitiveness and 
low rate of unemployment, as the quotation of Hans-Peter Friedrich exemplifies. The 
German liberal party argues passionately for the support of high performers who need to be 
encouraged to remain productive. The argumentation of the Linke and the SPD is 
diametrically opposed to this perception, e.g.: 
“Wenn wir die Binnenwirtschaft stärken wollen, dann brauchen wir endlich höhere Löhne, höhere 
Renten und höhere Sozialleistungen,  
(Norbert Barthle [CDU/CSU]: Mehr Schulden!)  
und wir müssen die gesamte prekäre Beschäftigung überwinden. Es gibt keinen anderen Weg.” 
(Gregor Gysi, Linke, 14 Dec 2011) 
Both of these classic left-wing parties argue for higher wages and better working 
conditions, which would boost domestic demand and the overall economic prosperity of the 
country. This frame links closely to the “reduce macro-economic imbalances” frame 
discussed above, where higher wages are linked to reducing the German current account 
surplus.  
In Austria, the two centrist parties disagree in their framing of economic policy despite the 
fact that they coalesce. The SPÖ holds up the flag for labour and social protection, whereas 
the ÖVP is largely silent on the topic. All three opposition parties compete using the 
“labour and social protection” frame. The FPÖ is the strongest defender of this perspective 
among the opposition (with 4.9 per cent). There is a difference in the types of arguments 
among the anti-establishment parties and the Greens: BZÖ and FPÖ argue for national 
redistributive politics, while the Green parties’ strongest concern is youth employment all 
over Europe. The apparent left-wing consensus within the Austrian party system is thus 
tainted by the identity question (H2b). 
The topic “economic policy” overall supports Hypothesis 2a on the relevance of positional 
distance on the left-right scale. Only parties coded as right of centre support the “incentives 
frame”. However, the financial and debt crisis disturbs the usual left-right conflict. All 
parties utter some concern about adequate social protection during the debates on the Euro 
crisis and the MFF. This does not come as a surprise as the crisis had dramatic 
repercussions on European societies, especially in the Southern member states. 
To sum up, the topics associated to socio-economic questions were mainly framed along 
the left-right dimension as Hypothesis 2a expected. The pattern of competition is more 
clear-cut in the German party system, where all opposition parties held left of centre 
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positions competing with an economically right-wing government during the time of 
investigation. The grand coalition in Austria contains some of the left-right competition in 
this member state. However, the two coalition partners often differ and use frames of the 
socio-economic dimension more frequently than the opposition parties. On the cultural 
dimension, the Austrian opposition party groups would often score more extreme than the 
governing ones in line with their more extreme positioning.  
The overall left-right logic is tainted by competition on the cultural dimension and the party 
type at certain instances. The framing of budget policy (Figure 17) showed a national focus 
by the culturally conservative parties (BZÖ and FPÖ) and international perspective by the 
post-materialists (Austrian and German Green parties). The anti-establishment character of 
the Freedom Party and the Alliance for the Future of Austria dominated the framing on the 
roots of the crisis: The financial sector and corrupt political elites of Southern member 
states were held responsible for the crisis.  
5.2.4.  Anti-elitism in plenary debates 
The second dimension of the content analysis of this thesis investigates the extent of direct 
references towards the government party groups as a measure of anti-elitism. The aim of 
this approach is to understand whether the explicit competition among party groups differs 
in accordance to the party type. The analysis differentiates content-related and personalized 
critique of government actors. The anti-establishment stance of the FPÖ and BZÖ leads to 
expect that they embrace more personalized criticism towards the political elites in their 
communicative style than regular parties (see 2.3.2).  
Figure 21 presents the results on the explicit references to government party groups. Results 
present the absolute numbers of the sum of all weighted codings on statements mentioning 
government staff. The analysis needs to take the seat share of each opposition party into 
account, as speaking time is allocated according to the strength of a party group in both 
chambers. 
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Figure 21: Results of the content analysis on anti-elitism. 
All party groups under investigation refer very regularly to the position of their 
competitors. For most opposition party groups, the frequency and intensity of content-
related criticism of the government relates to their share of speaking time in parliament. 
The only two parties that outdo the others are the two anti-establishment parties. Especially 
the BZÖ uses a large share of her speaking time to criticize the coalition parties. Direct 
references that mainly address policy contents are not an indicator of anti-elitism yet. The 
findings of this study show that content-related references to other actors are common 
among all party groups. 
Personalized critique in reference to the government, however, measures the anti-elitism of 
a party group (Jagers and Walvers 2007). The results in Figure 21 demonstrate a strong 
discrepancy between the activities of the two anti-establishment parties and all regular party 
groups. The statements coded under the category of personalized critique all emphasize 
negative attributes of the political elites’ characteristics.  
This strong critique of the governing parties by the BZÖ and FPÖ links to the results from 
the framing analysis (see 5.2.2). The content-related criticism of government actors often is 
a critique of the chancellor and vice-chancellor selling out Austrian interests in Brussels.  
“Herr Bundeskanzler und Herr Vizekanzler, Sie tun ja so, als hätten wir keine Probleme. 410 000 
Österreicherinnen und Österreicher sind ohne Arbeit! Ich hätte mir erhofft, dass Sie in diesem 
Zusammenhang Geld bereitstellen und die Nettobeiträge reduzieren, in Richtung einer Halbierung 
der Nettobeiträge [zur EU] verhandeln, weil wir Probleme in unserem Land haben.” (Heinz-Christian 












The criticism of the government position is linked to perceived negative results for Austria 
in negotiations on the MFF. At other times the criticism of the governing parties pertains 
the lack of direct democracy, the enduring crisis in Europe and costly crisis measures. This 
finding on a more explicit content-related criticism by anti-establishment parties lends 
support to Hypothesis 1 that expects a more competitive communicative strategy from BZÖ 
and FPÖ. 
The largest share of personal attacks stems from the BZÖ (93) and FPÖ (74). They 
predominantly address the government staff, preferably the chancellor and vice-chancellor 
and paint a picture of a self-absorbed elite that is too weak and incompetent to govern the 
country in the best interest of the people. This depiction of the established parties is in line 
with the literature on the rhetorical style of anti-establishment parties (Pelinka 2002, Jagers 
and Walgrave 2007). The following citation by Josef Bucher of the BZÖ demonstrates this 
type of personal attack: 
“Aber Sie sind ja planlos, Sie sind orientierungslos und Sie sind auch visionslos, Sie haben überhaupt 
kein Konzept! Sie haben ja nicht einmal einen Handlungswillen, Herr Bundeskanzler! Sie sind nicht 
einmal bereit, die Problemzonen zu erkennen, um die es geht, vor denen die Menschen in der 
heutigen Situation geradezu verzweifeln, weil sie Angst haben, was die Zukunft betrifft.” (Josef 
Bucher, BZÖ, 14 Dec 2011) 
The chancellor, Werner Faymann, is addressed explicitly and criticized for his lack of 
leadership capability. This incapacity to act in regard of the challenges of the Euro crisis is 
clearly a personalized form of criticism. The criticism of a decadent and incapable elite 
becomes even more apparent in the following quotation by Gerald Grosz, BZÖ:  
“Um zu dokumentieren, wie dieser Bundeskanzler unter Mithilfe des champagnisierenden 
Opernballbesuchers Spindelegger gescheitert ist – denn das gehört ja immer dazugesagt; die 
Österreichische Volkspartei, die jetzt hier den Bundeskanzler kritisiert, es aber in dieser Nacht der 
Entscheidung nicht der Mühe wert gefunden hat, in Brüssel bei den Verhandlungen die 
österreichische Position mit Rückgrat zu stärken, sondern lieber ordenbehangen wie die Christbäume 
am Opernball aufgetreten ist, diese Österreichische Volkspartei hat bei diesem Thema auch versagt –, 
(Beifall beim BZÖ) 
um dieses Verhandlungsungeschick des österreichischen Bundeskanzlers und dieser 
Bundesregierung zu dokumentieren, bringe ich jetzt die Zahlen, die die EU-Kommission bei den 
Rabatten der einzelnen Länder vorgeschlagen hat.” (Gerald Grosz, BZÖ, 19 Feb 2013) 
The BZÖ MP ridicules the vice-chancellor of Austria as a self-absorbed „Christmas tree“ 
hung with decorations and drinking champagne at the Vienna Opera Ball instead of 
fulfilling his duties of the office. The citation holds both parties of the governing coalition 
responsible for the perceived negative outcome of the negotiations of the MFF. The frame 
of defending “member state interests” that received strong support by both anti-
establishment parties is here extended by the personal attack towards a weak and decadent 
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elite. The linkage of anti-elite with the lack of defending Austrian interests in Brussels is 
apparent in all three debates under analysis. This result strongly supports Hypothesis 1 a on 
the outright competitive communicative style of anti-establishment parties.  
None of the regular opposition parties use this discursive strategy in similar extent as the 
BZÖ and FPÖ. The small parties, Linke, Austrian and German Greens, barely engage in a 
personalized critique towards the governing parties. The SPD used personalized references 
towards the governing coalitions to a certain extent (score of 30). Their critique is mainly 
addressed towards the chancellor, Angela Merkel, and her hesitation to react to the Euro 
crisis, as the following example shows: 
“Sie, Frau Bundeskanzlerin, sind eine Last-Minute-Kanzlerin. 
(Lachen bei Abgeordneten der CDU/CSU) 
Sie haben eine Neigung zum Nicht-Handeln, Noch-nicht-Handeln, Später-Handeln. Das merkt man 
Ihnen sehr genau an.” (Peer Steinbrück, SPD, 21 Mar 2013) 
This statement clearly criticizes the character of the German chancellor and does not 
address a content-related issue. Chancellor Merkel is presented as hesitating and indecisive 
during the Euro crisis in the attacks from the SPD. There is a parallel to the critique towards 
the Austrian chancellor’s lack of vision in this difficult political situation. However, the 
SPD’s frequency of criticism does not come close to the anti-establishment parties’ style of 
outright criticism. 
The analysis of personalized forms of critique among party groups lends strong support for 
Hypothesis 1a on the stronger competition by anti-establishment parties in these terms. The 
two anti-establishment parties focus much stronger on personal attributes as well as policy 
positions than regular opposition party groups. The findings on anti-elitism link to the 
results from the frame analysis: Both anti-establishment parties emphasized those frames, 
as national interests and national sovereignty, that link to personalized critique of 
government staff. 
5.3. Conclusions on the communication on EU affairs 
The communicative element of parliamentary EU scrutiny has the important function of 
“translating” EU developments to the national political agenda. Opposition party groups 
can use the public forum of plenary debates to challenge (or support) the approach of the 
governing parties. Through critique of the governing parties, they sharpen their own profile 
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and provide alternatives to the voters. Parliamentary debates on European Council meetings 
in the time period from 2008/9 to 2013 covered extremely important and far-reaching 
decisions for Europe and its member states. The two major issues, the Euro crisis and the 
EU budget, triggered intense conflict among the party groups in the six debates under study 
in Austria and Germany. Repeatedly MPs discerned that the decisions on the crisis and the 
budget were essential for the survival and future of the European Union (see also Puntscher 
Riekmann and Wydra 2013). This study asked whether competition from opposition parties 
follows the logic of positional distance among party groups (H2) and/ or the party type 
(H1).  
The overall intention of this thesis is to better understand national parliaments’ contribution 
to EU democratic legitimacy (Section 1.1.3). Plenary debates should ideally present 
diverging perspectives and clear policy alternatives to the voters (Mair 2007). Research on 
election campaigns has argued that EU integration is not sufficiently present in party 
competition. Prior studies on parliamentary debates on Euro crisis mechanisms argued for a 
lack of conflict among mainstream parties (Miklin 2014b, Wonka 2016). The results of this 
thesis on the six plenary debates on European Council meetings in the period from 2009 to 
2013 delivered ambivalent findings on this aspect. 
Table 15 summarizes the results on the content analysis of plenary debates. The evaluation 
on a four-point scale (++, +, –, – –) indicates in how far the expectations of the hypothesis 
found support. Shaded fields imply that the indicator was not applicable to test a specific 
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Table 15: Summary of results on the plenary stage. 
The empirical analysis showed that the impact of the explanatory factors depends much on 
the topic under debate. The study expected that the cultural dimension would best explain 
identity matters and EU integration. The classic left-right divide, however, would structure 
conflict over EU economic governance, over the degree of regulation and redistribution in 
society. The results of the frame analysis generally support these assumptions. The 
competition on EU issues reflects existing patterns of conflict within each party system. 
The topics of the definition of a collective interest, national sovereignty, design of the EU 
polity and cross-border transfer triggered competition on the cultural dimension. Budget 
and economic policy as well as the benefit the EU in socio-economic terms were mostly 
framed according to the left-right divide.  
The party type has a strong impact on a few topics in the debates. The two anti-
establishment parties focus on those frames that serve the critique of the political elite in 
their contributions to plenary debates. BZÖ and FPÖ are the only parties that position 
clearly towards the TAN-pole of the cultural dimension of conflict. In consequence, 
Hypothesis 2b expected them to emphasize the protection of national interests and 
sovereignty more than any other party group. The intensity with which they employ these 
two frames by far outweighs their positional distance to the Austrian governing parties. 
Only the party type can explain the vehement defense of national interests. The second 
element of the content analysis, measuring anti-elitism, showed that these frames were 
closely linked to the criticism of the government personnel by both anti-establishment 
 198
parties. The incumbents were attacked as self-absorbed, corrupt and weak political elite. 
They are judged incapable of defending the interests of the Austrian citizens in Brussels. 
This populist communicative strategy was relevant only for the identity-related topics of the 
cultural dimension. EU affairs appear as a topic where anti-elite discourse easily “sticks to”.  
Existing research has argued that challenger parties alter the dimensions of competition 
within a party system (Kriesi et al 2008, Minkenberg 2001). This would explain the 
predominance of the cultural dimension in Austria. The anti-establishment stance is highly 
problematic in terms of democratic legitimacy: The delegitimization of all other political 
actors enhances distrust in established actors and institutions. Müller (2016) argues that the 
self-representation as the only “true” representatives of citizens’ interests undermines 
democratic principles where interests of various groups are communicated and represented 
without prejudice.  
One specific topic within the cultural dimension was EU integration. This topic is of special 
interest for this study as it touches the democratic legitimacy of the EU. The mainstream 
parties claimed repeatedly that “More Europe” would be necessary to overcome the crisis 
and embrace the “European idea”. Both frames remain very vague and do not formulate a 
clear vision for the future development of the political system. How do these parties intend 
to advance EU integration? Within this consensus in favour of the EU, mainstream parties 
do not formulate clear policy alternatives in their plenary speeches.  
The two anti-establishment parties disrupt this unspecific pro-European framing of 
mainstream parties with a clear counter-proposal: Both argue for a “Core Europe” of net-
contributors to the EU budget and limited range of competences. The analytical framework 
on democratic legitimacy developed in Section 1.1.3 formulated the communication of 
clear policy alternatives as one way to enhance legitimacy through potential alteration of 
government. In this sense, the communication of alternative prospects for EU integration 
could be valued positively for democratic legitimacy. This framing activity is, however, 
system-related not policy-oriented. The position of the FPÖ and BZÖ is not properly anti-
system (“principled”), but they do argue for a devolution of competences towards the 
national level. Mair’s (2007) argument seems to hold true: The opposition formulated by 
the anti-establishment parties turns against the polity to restore policy choice at national 
level. They do not contribute to EU legitimacy through competition towards EU policy 
proposals.  
 199 
Finally, the analysis needs to take its limitations into account. The content analysis of this 
study focused on six debates on European Council meetings. The decisions at stake were 
extremely urgent, relevant and contested. The findings cannot necessarily be generalized 
beyond the period of investigation. Less controversial issues or more technical matters of 
“low politics” are most likely debated less conflictive. The debates on EU affairs always 
contain an element of foreign policy, where national interests should be defended towards 
external actors. Opposition parties may not risk undermining the own government on day-




















EU integration has been argued to enhance a process of “de-parliamentarization” (Maurer 
and Wessels 2001) of political decision-making procedures and to contribute to a “waning 
of opposition” (Kirchheimer 1957). This thesis set out to critically test these assumptions 
by empirical analysis of opposition parties’ parliamentary EU scrutiny activities. The study 
contributes to a better understanding of national parliaments’ role in the EU political 
system. It addresses two research lacunas on national parliaments’ EU scrutiny (Raunio 
2009, Rozenberg and Hefftler 2015). First, it goes beyond a merely institutional analysis by 
investigating the use of formal opportunity structures. Second, the political dynamics 
between governing and opposition parties were theorized and tested as explanatory 
variables for active EU scrutiny. The inter-actions between government and opposition 
have been largely understudied in relation to EU affairs (for an exception see Holzhacker 
2002, 2005, Finke and Dannwolf 2013). The thesis posed the following research question: 
Which factors explain opposition parties’ EU scrutiny activities in national parliaments? 
This study integrated concepts from opposition and legislative studies to the research field 
of national parliaments and the EU. Research on opposition parties has, similarly to 
legislative studies, long focused on institutional prerogatives. Only some recent approaches 
assessed political factors driving opposition activity (Steinack 2011, de Giorgi 2015). This 
study built on the ontological background of rational choice institutionalism. The simple 
assumptions of rational choice provided a clear structure for an explorative investigation of 
opposition parties’ EU scrutiny activities. Actors’ motivation was determined by means-
ends calculations on their cost and benefits. The “thick” version of rational choice 
concentrates the definition of rationality to this logically consistent behaviour and allows 
for several competing goals (Elster 2016 (1983): 11). For party groups, this implies the 
goals of office and policy as drivers’ for their activities (Müller and Strøm 1999). 
Opposition party groups can achieve these goals by two key strategies: cooperation or 
competition (Steinack 2011, Moury and de Giorgi 2015). Opposition is by nature a reactive 
power that must position itself towards issues that governing parties place on the agenda. 
Their strategies are therefore conceptualized as reactions to the government position and 
agenda. The dependent variable of this study was opposition parties’ parliamentary 
activities that are allocated to one of the strategies of cooperation or competition. The 
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strategies differ in how they contribute to EU legitimacy: Cooperation increases the 
inclusion of societal actors on the input side, whereas competition contributes to the 
politicization of EU issues. 
The theoretical Chapter 2 developed a model of opposition in national parliaments. It is 
difficult to find a “one size fits all” conceptualization as legislative procedures vary 
significantly from one member state to another. Thus, the model concentrated on two 
essential steps of parliamentary scrutiny: the legislative scrutiny at committee level and the 
justifications towards the electorate at the plenary level. The model assumed that 
committees prepare the document-oriented parliamentary work for the plenary decision. 
The plenary serves as a communicative channel towards the citizens. The two steps of 
committee and plenary work are relevant for all channels of influence on EU affairs: the 
control over the own government, the ex-post transposition of EU directives as well as 
issuing (reasoned) opinions within the Early Warning Mechanism. The committee acts as 
the body that prepares in more detail a final vote in the plenary within each channel of 
influence. The model allows conceptualizing the temporal aspect of cooperation and 
competition. If party groups’ positions conflict on a certain issue, opposition can seek to 
cooperate before or at the committee stage to achieve policy influence. Or they can compete 
with the government in committee and plenary to gain attention and potential benefits in 
future elections.  
The theoretical Chapter 2 brought forth two hypotheses on the causal link between the 
motivation of party groups and competitive or cooperative scrutiny activities. The first 
assumption was derived from research on increasingly relevant party types, which have 
been termed “populist”, “niche parties” or “challenger parties”. This study built on the 
definition of anti-establishment parties, which integrates several definitional elements of the 
other concepts.89 A party with an anti-establishment stance was expected to act more 
competitive towards the governing parties (H1).90 This specific party type should also 
trigger more outright competition towards the government personnel, which was measured 
by an anti-elitist communicative style (H1 a). The second hypothesis related to Blondel’s 
(1997) argument that ideological distance enhances competition among parties. I expected 
                                                 
89 Abedi’s (2002) definition has the advantage to apply different definitions for established and anti-
establishment parties. Established parties are those with government experience or serious government 
aspirations. Anti-establishment parties are defined through their communicative style and unique policy 
position. Thus, the definition is sensitive to the possibility of ”established anti-establishment parties” that is 
parties with government experience challenging the establishment. For the cases under study this fine grained 
definition is necessary to grasp the special cases of the FPÖ as well as BZÖ. 
90 For an overview of the hypotheses guiding this study, please see Table 1, Section 2.4. 
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more competitive behaviour for opposition parties whose party positions are more distant to 
the governing parties (H2). This should hold true for the traditional left-right (H2 a) as well 
as the cultural dimension of political conflict (traditionalist-authoritarian-nationalist and 
green-alternative-libertarian values; TAN-GAL) (H2 b).  
The empirical analysis investigated opposition parties in the lower chambers of Austria and 
Germany based on the comparative method (see Chapter 3). Selected case studies in the 
logic of comparative research deemed most appropriate for the explorative nature of this 
study. The limited scope allowed a more in-depth analysis that is more suitable to identify 
potential causal mechanisms. The results of the empirical analysis should lead to a 
refinement of the hypotheses (Levy 2008). Research objects are the six opposition parties in 
Germany and Austria in the legislative period after the enforcement of the Lisbon treaty 
(2008/9 to 2013). The case selection intended to hold institutional factors constant and 
provided sufficient variation on the independent variables in the logic of the most-similar 
system design.91 Germany and Austria are two EU member states with very similar political 
institutions and a similar historical background. Whereas the party system of Austria is 
characterized by the presence of a strong anti-establishment party (the FPÖ), there was no 
counter-part to this party type in the Bundestag within the period of investigation. The 
opposition parties of the sample varied in their positional distance to the government on the 
socio-economic and on the cultural dimension of political conflict. Within potential pairs of 
institutionally similar countries within the EU, Austria and Germany present least likely 
cases for competition as both are considered rather consensual democratic regimes. 
The study covered the legislative scrutiny at committee level (Chapter 4) as well as the 
communicative practice at plenary debates (Chapter 5) in line with its model on opposition 
in national parliaments. The empirical investigation combined three methodological 
approaches for an in-depth analysis of the opposition parties’ EU scrutiny practices. First, 
the scope of activities was measured in form of a quantitative assessment, e.g. on EU-
related initiatives at committee level and voting behaviour. Second, the quality of 
opposition parties’ scrutiny activities was investigated through content analysis of 
initiatives and plenary speeches. Third, interviews with members of both parliaments gave 
access to the motivation and organisational aspects of parliamentary EU scrutiny. 
                                                 
91 The upper houses function differently in the two countries. The German Bundesrat has a much stronger role 
within the system, as it is involved in almost 40 per cent of the legislative procedures.  
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This concluding Chapter 6 summarizes the results of the two empirical Chapters 4 and 5. It 
relates the findings to the state of the art and points out limitations and avenues for future 
research in Chapter 6.1. The final Chapter 6.2 interprets the findings of this study in view 
of national parliaments’ contribution to EU democratic legitimacy. It links to the review of 
the debate on an EU democratic deficit of the introduction of this thesis (Chapter 1.1).  
6.1.  Results on opposition to EU affairs in national parliaments and 
contribution to the state of the art 
The empirical analysis of this study, first, recorded the activities of party groups in the 
Bundestag and Nationalrat between 2008/9 and 2013. And second, it searched for an 
explanation for variation between EU scrutiny activities of opposition parties. This Chapter 
6.1 accordingly presents the descriptive results on the scope and types of activities (6.1.1.), 
before it assesses the explanatory value of the two main hypotheses (6.1.2). The chapter 
locates the research results of this study in the broader universe of research on national 
parliaments and EU affairs and suggests avenues for future research. 
6.1.1. The practice of EU scrutiny  
The literature on national parliaments and the EU has investigated the formal rules of EU 
parliamentary scrutiny in-depth. An analysis of the use of these rules can test the 
assumptions behind the investigation of institutional settings. In how far do parliamentary 
party groups use their institutional prerogatives? Do the expectations on the impact of 
formal setting hold true? 
In line with the most-similar system design of case selection, this study held most political 
system factors constant by investigating Austria and Germany. The detailed EU scrutiny 
procedures, nevertheless, vary in two important aspects: the degree of involvement of 
sectoral committees in EU scrutiny and the ex-ante debates to European Council meetings. 
The data on EU scrutiny at committee level showed a notable impact of the two different 
scrutiny approaches of the Bundestag and the Nationalrat. The findings can contribute to 
studies that considered the effect of processing EU affairs within a parliament. The findings 
of this study showed that they have an impact on parliament’s strength vis-à-vis their 
government. This chapter also critically reflects the model of opposition in national 
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parliaments of this thesis (see 2.2.3) and develops ideas for further development of the 
model. 
The impact of “mainstreaming” EU affairs 
The Bundestag “mainstreams” (see Gattermann et al. 2015) EU affairs to sectoral 
committees, whereas the Nationalrat centralizes the parliamentary involvement in its two 
European Affairs Committees.92 The data on the number of EU-related initiatives showed 
accordingly that other sectoral committees more frequently address EU issues in the 
Bundestag than in the Nationalrat. The sectoral committees of the Austrian lower house 
were, more importantly, involved only in the transposition stage of EU directives to 
national legislation. This finding implies that the ex-ante scrutiny and the ex-post 
transposition of EU legislation take place in different committees within the Nationalrat. 
The chamber risks an incoherent assessment of the government’s behavior in the Council. 
The Nationalrat, however, gives MPs from sectoral committees the opportunity to 
substitute for a party member at EAC meetings on policy issues under their area of 
expertise (Miklin 2015, Pollak and Slomiski 2003). The personnel link between the EAC 
and sectoral committees could thus compensate for the formally detached ex-ante and ex-
post scrutiny.  
The “mainstreaming” of EU affairs to sectoral committees in the Bundestag had an effect 
on the involvement of the plenary (see also Gattermann et al. 2015: 103). The EACs in both 
parliaments have the special right to vote in place of the plenary (Höing 2015, Miklin 
2015). No other committees have this power. The Austrian EAC processed all EU issues 
and actively used the right to vote in place of the plenary. EU issues were, in consequence, 
not continuously debated on the floor. EU-related plenary debates in Austria mainly deal 
with issues of very high salience. The results of this study show that the plenary of the 
Austrian Nationalrat is less involved in day-to-day EU policymaking than the Bundestag. 
Avoiding plenary involvement is not possible under “mainstreaming” as installed in the 
Bundestag. If sectoral committees scrutinized all EU issues relevant to their policy areas, 
the EACs special voting right remained of limited effect. EU issues scrutinized by sectoral 
committees had to be voted upon at the plenary. The Bundestag’s plenary debates treated, 
in consequence a more diverse set of EU issues. 
                                                 
92 The Main Committee considers matters of proper EU integration and hears the foreign minister or 
chancellor before European Council meetings. The day-to-day scrutiny of EU legislative proposals is 
delebated to the sub-committee on EU affairs.  
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The reduced involvement of the plenary in Austria was partly compensated by 
parliamentary debates in preparation of European Council meetings, which took place 
within the more disclosed environment of the Main Committee in the Nationalrat. The 
debates with the Austrian chancellor in the Main Committee prior to European Council 
meetings have the advantage that the head of government could more openly explain the 
negotiation logic at EU level to the parliamentarians. The German chamber, on the other 
side, regularly debated on the floor before European Council meetings take place (see also 
Wessels et al. 2013). Floor debates can potentially enhance the awareness among 
parliamentarians for developments at EU level. They also enable party groups to 
communicate their positions to the voters. The centralized EU scrutiny approach of the 
Nationalrat thus provided better access to information, but less opportunity for a 
politicization of day-to-day EU policymaking. 
Implications for the model on opposition 
The processing of EU affairs within the parliament has implications for the model of 
opposition in national parliaments of this study (see 2.2.2). 
If the EAC voted instead of the plenary, the two-stage model of opposition’s behaviour of 
this thesis applies to a limited extent only. The strategies of cooperation and competition 
were assumed to evolve on individual policy items throughout the parliamentary process. 
Spreitzer and Timmermans (2015) have argued that competition by opposition parties at 
committee level is at times accommodated before the issue arrives in the plenary in 
Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. This study did not find cooperation across the 
aisle within the formal structures of parliament in either of the two countries under study. In 
Austria, the day-to-day scrutiny of EU politics did not arrive at the plenary. In Germany, a 
development in the opposition strategies was not possible either. The voting behavior of 
party groups in the Bundestag’s plenary was almost 100 per cent identical to the voting in 
committees. The votes in the committees represent the final decision in both parliaments. 
The strategy of cooperation does not occur past the committee stage. It is nevertheless 
important to research both elements of parliamentary work, as they demonstrate different 
aspects of oppositions’ EU-related work. The results of this study showed different 
strategies for party groups in the committee and the plenary. 
In countries where the plenary is involved in the final vote on EU decision-making and in 
case of repeated committee involvement, future research could investigate the evolution of 
single issues throughout the legislative process. Which items are debated in a first reading 
 206
and receive plenary time after negotiations at the committee level? Which issues are just 
formally voted upon in the plenary without any actual debates? Russell et al. (2016) 
investigated the process of parliamentary scrutiny on twelve legislative proposals in 
Westminster. The twelve bills received over 4.000 suggestions for amendments from the 
opposition and governing majority. The authors could show how opposition amendments 
were formally voted down, but influenced later amendments by governing parties. A 
similar issue-based study with a focus on EU issues would further consolidate and expand 
the temporal aspect of the model of opposition of this study.  
The impact of minority protection on EU scrutiny 
The theoretical chapter of this thesis emphasized that it is important to understand whether 
collaboration among governing and opposition parties resulted from a prior consensus 
among party groups or an actual search for compromise during the legislative process. Only 
the latter implies policy influence by opposition parties and a contribution to democratic 
legitimacy in form of inclusion of larger segments of the society. The quantitative 
assessment of parliamentary activities only grasped the final result of the scrutiny process, 
e.g. the voting behavior. The qualitative analysis by interviews, however, investigated the 
process leading up to these outputs. A main finding of the interviews was that common 
activities of governing and opposition parties, e.g. voting and joint motions, resulted from a 
pre-existing consensus. It was rare that they are the product of actual cooperation. 
Governing parties might attempt to strengthen their own negotiating position in Brussels 
through opposition support. Rare exceptions for policy influence by opposition parties were 
also moments when the governing parties needed a two-thirds majority, such as 
constitutional revisions. All opposition parties, who supported the government in the two-
thirds majority to reform Art. 136 TFEU, negotiated trade-offs in favor of their policy 
positions. Without the power of the vote, cooperation “across the aisle” was extremely rare 
in the parliaments under study.  
This finding challenges the assumptions on a partial policy influence by opposition parties 
in consensus democracies (Helms 1997, Moury and de Giorgi 2015). Austria and Germany 
both have rather good minority protection rights within parliament. These minority rights 
did not result in policy influence, but facilitated a stronger impact on the legislative agenda. 
In both countries interview partners explained that the enhanced EU scrutiny rights for 
opposition parties allowed them to place their issues on the EAC agenda at some point in 
time.  
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Overall, this study detected elaborate and well-functioning EU scrutiny mechanisms in both 
parliaments. In the Bundestag day-to-day EU policymaking involved the plenary more 
frequently than in the Nationalrat. Especially for the German lower chamber, the 
characterization of parliament as a “sleeping beauty” is not accurate anymore.  
The descriptive element represented the first step of the analysis. The remainder of this 
Chapter 6.1 assesses the results on explaining variation among opposition parties’ EU 
scrutiny activities. 
6.1.2. Explaining opposition parties’ EU scrutiny activities 
The empirical analysis of this thesis intended to explain variation among opposition groups 
to gain a better understanding of their motivation for EU scrutiny. This Section 6.2.1 
reviews the findings in view of the two hypotheses of this study. The first hypothesis 
expected that parties with an anti-establishment stance are more competitive towards the 
government. The second hypothesis of this thesis assumed that a larger positional distance 
of opposition party groups to the government leads to a more competitive approach to EU 
scrutiny (H2). Each hypothesis was qualified by specifications to their basic logic. 
Hypothesis 1a concerned the style of competition by anti-establishment parties and 
expected outright competition in form of anti-elitism. Hypothesis 2a focused on the left-
right dimension of political conflict and assumed that it was especially relevant for socio-
economic aspects of EU policymaking. Hypothesis 2b expected that the cultural dimension 
of political conflict (TAN-GAL) had a stronger impact on topics related to EU political 
system design and identity. 
Some comparative large-n studies did not find support for an effect of government-
opposition dissent on EU scrutiny rules or activities (Raunio 2005, Winzen 2012, Auel et 
al. 2015a, 2015b). Other studies were able to grasp the impact of party political dynamics 
for EU scrutiny activities (Auel et al. 2015a, Finke and Herbel 2015, Gattermann and 
Hefftler 2015, Williams 2016).93 This study lends further support to the relevance of the 
party competition for active EU scrutiny at the national level. The content analysis was 
better able to grasp this political dynamic between governing and opposition parties than 
the quantitative assessment of EU scrutiny activities in committees. 
                                                 
93 The Early Warning Mechanism was not investigated as opposition parties did not use this instrument for 
competition with the government. All proposals on reasoned opinions were initiated by the governing 
majority. 
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Table 16 provides an overview of the results in view of the different indicators (see Chapter 
4.1 and 5.1). The evaluation on a four-point scale (++, +, –, – –) indicates in how far the 
expectations of the hypothesis found support. Shaded fields imply that the indicator was not 
applicable to test a specific hypothesis. Hypothesis 2 is not listed as it is implied in H2a and 
H2b. 
  Hypothesis 1 
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Table 16: Overview of results of this study. 
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The party type (H1) of an anti-establishment party (BZÖ and FPÖ) showed surprisingly 
little effect on the EU scrutiny activities at committee level (the number of initiatives, 
voting, agenda setting and joint initiatives with the government). At the same time, BZÖ 
and FPÖ clearly differed in their framing from regular party groups. They strongly 
emphasized those topics on the cultural dimension of conflict that were conducive to 
criticize the elite. The anti-elitism measure showed a strong difference in the 
communicative style of the two parties, who depicted the government as self-absorbed and 
incapable (H1a). 
The second hypothesis on the role of positional distance found clear support in this study. 
Again, the content analysis was better able to grasp the variation among party groups due to 
their positional distance to the government than the committee activities. The results 
showed that the framing on EU affairs was clearly dependent on the topic at hand, in line 
with the expectations of H2a and H2b. For the cultural dimension, the correspondence of 
positional distance to EU framing activities was disrupted by the overemphasis of certain 
topics by the two anti-establishment parties.  
The remainder of this Chapter 6.1.2 provides more detailed information to this first 
overview on the results based on Table 1. It starts out with the results on Hypothesis 1 and 
1a and continuous to assess the relevance of Hypotheses 2 for opposition parties’ EU 
scrutiny activities. 
EU scrutiny by anti-establishment parties: Bark but don’t bite? 
The first hypothesis expected that anti-establishment parties are more competitive towards 
EU affairs than regular party groups. Their fundamental criticism towards the political 
elites should make cooperation with governing parties – “the establishment” – less likely 
throughout the legislative process. Two anti-establishment parties were under study within 
the sample of opposition parties: the Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ) and the 
Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ). The BZÖ, which split-off from the FPÖ in 2008, was 
considered the slightly “milder” version of the Freedom Party. Yet, both built their party 
strategy around fierce criticism of the existing political elites as well as traditional and 
nationalist policy positions. Four regular parties served as points of comparison to evaluate 
whether the party type causes a particular pattern of competition on EU issues. 
Surprisingly, the anti-establishment stance did not affect the legislative scrutiny activities 
on EU affairs. Both anti-establishment parties show quite discrepant behavior: They 
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regularly acted within the scope of legislative scrutiny activities at committee level, but 
attacked the governing parties fiercely in plenary debates. BZÖ and FPÖ support 
government initiatives in the committee setting. Neither one made a strong effort to push 
EU issues onto the legislative agenda. Their voting behavior, the number and topics of 
initiatives did not show a strongly different approach compared to other party groups. The 
FPÖ supported 43 per cent of government’s EU-related legislative proposals and the BZÖ 
supported 50 per cent. Both parties participated in several joint motions on EU-related 
issues with the government. They only slightly emphasized matters of proper EU 
integration more than other party groups at the committee level.  
However, the party type had a clear impact on the communicative dimension of the party 
groups. The framing analysis of committee initiatives and plenary debates showed that the 
BZÖ and FPÖ differ in their perspective of EU affairs from regular party groups. The 
framing largely corresponded to the ideological distance to the government (see Hypotheses 
2, 6.1.3). Yet, on certain issues this pattern was disrupted. Those topics, which could be 
linked to the criticism of the government, were overemphasized by the Freedom Party and 
also partially by the Alliance of the Future (H1a). Especially, the frame on national interest 
was strongly linked to the fierce critique towards government personnel. The current 
political leadership was depicted as weak and corrupt, selling out the national interest and 
undermining national sovereignty through EU integration. The FPÖ is the strongest critique 
of the government in this regard. There are three topics where the FPÖ is much more 
competitive than regular parties: collective interests, sovereignty and cross-border transfers. 
The Freedom Party argued vehemently for the protection of national interests and the 
protection of Austrian sovereignty on all three issues. Two-thirds of the weighted frames of 
the FPÖ were devoted to the protection of Austrian interests and sovereignty. The BZÖ is 
equally extreme on the frame “national interests”. Yet, it proved to be the “milder” version, 
as it was less aggressive regarding the topics “protecting sovereignty” and “cross-border 
transfers”. The anti-elitism measure of the content analysis showed that this frame was 
most often combined with a quite personal attack against the government staff. This finding 
is in line with studies of populism (Jagers and Walgrave 2007, Pauwels 2014). With regard 
to these selected issues, the regular pattern of party competition was disrupted. 
The anti-establishment parties combined the fierce attack of the government personnel in 
public communication with supportive behavior in the legislative scrutiny at committee 
level. This ambivalent behavior leads to ask whether they show their teeth in public debate, 
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but do not bite. Supportive votes and joint motions with the government characterized the 
legislative scrutiny at committee level. Section 6.2 will discuss the negative effect of anti-
elitism for democratic legitimacy.  
The party type proved to be important in explaining the strategy of opposition parties 
towards EU scrutiny. The definition of anti-establishment parties linked three elements (a 
unique policy focus, the self-conception as challenger and the communicative style). The 
most important element of the definition for the analysis of EU scrutiny activities was the 
discursive one. The content analysis was essential to detect the different patterns of 
competition from parties challenging the mainstream parties. Future research should be 
sensitive towards the communicative element when researching national parliaments’ EU 
scrutiny efforts. 
Limited variation in committee activities 
The expectation of the second hypothesis (on positional distance) found support in this 
study especially in analysis of communicative action. 
The first indicator of the quantity of EU-related initiatives and voting at committee level 
did not deliver clear-cut results in this small-n study. The general trend seemed to indicate 
that the cultural dimension of conflict was more relevant to explain the activities in the 
committees. Party groups more distant to their government on the TAN-GAL dimension 
issued more EU-related initiatives and supported government proposals less frequently. 
These were the three Austrian opposition parties, which are noticeably more distant on the 
cultural dimension than the German ones. These differences between the two chambers are 
also linked to the different committee agendas (see below on the role of the legislative 
agenda). 
The content analysis of legislative proposals, motions and other statements delivered more 
specific results on the direction of competition of opposition parties. It analyzed the topics 
and framing of the 351 EU-related initiatives in the two chambers. The findings showed 
that the committees in each chamber address quite different topics. The motions in the 
Nationalrat related to matters of EU integration, the Euro crisis and national sovereignty. 
Initiatives in the Bundestag barely addressed the big questions of the crisis and the future of 
the Union, but concerned topics of economic, social affairs and energy more often. The 
different agendas explain why positional distance on the TAN-GAL dimension related to 
the frequency of EU motions. The framing of EU affairs largely corresponded to the 
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ideological distance on both dimensions (H2a and b). This means that opposition parties in 
Austria emphasized the cultural dimension, while the socio-economic dimension dominated 
in Germany. One exception was the extremity of the traditionalist-nationalist framing of the 
two anti-establishment parties (see above).  
A lively debate on EU affairs 
The analysis of plenary debates further unraveled the individual frames that party groups 
used on EU affairs. The content analysis of this study covered three debates on European 
Council meetings in each parliament. The selection of the text corpus intended to cover 
highly salient issues without focusing on a single issue. Large segments of the analyzed 
debates concerned the Euro crisis, but they also covered the Multi-annual Financial 
Framework and some aspects regarding CFSP and the EU 2020 strategy. Issues of high 
salience should trigger more competition than rather technical matters. 
Rauh and de Wilde (2017) attested an “opposition deficit” in plenary debates due to the 
lower frequency of EU-related statements by oppositional actors. This study followed up on 
this expectation by analyzing the polarization of around EU issues in a few selected debates 
in depth. The findings of this study show a lively debate on EU affairs and clear 
communication of policy alternatives by opposition parties. In terms of the quality of the 
debate one cannot attest an “opposition deficit”. In general, the content analysis found 
support for Hypothesis 2, as greater positional distance corresponded to the communication 
of different approaches to EU affairs. 
Moderate and mainstream opposition parties debated EU issues with quite diverging 
perspectives. The German Social Democrats, for example, repeatedly criticized the 
democratic deficit and embraced a vision for a more social Europe. They strongly criticized 
the personal characteristics of the chancellor during the Euro crisis. In Austria, the Greens 
strongly embraced a libertarian counter-position to the government and other opposition 
parties. They argued for a universalist humanitarian perspective, where solidarity does not 
end at national borders. Thus, the established and mainstream parties engaged on critical 
debate over the crisis in plenary debates.  
This general support for Hypothesis 2 has to be qualified in view of the role of anti-
establishment parties and the effect of the legislative agenda. 
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Established versus anti-establishment in plenary debates? 
The differentiation of two dimensions of political conflict (H2 a and b) and the sensitivity 
to the party type (H1) addressed the lines of competition within the debate on EU affairs. 
Existing studies on the polarization around EU affairs link political actors to certain types 
of framing on EU affairs (Helbling et al. 2010, Wendler 2011, Closa and Maatsch 2014, 
Maatsch 2014, Wendler 2014, Wonka 2016). The categories of frames are termed 
differently in each study but are based on a similar logic. In line with this study, they 
usually cover a value- and a utility-related dimension of framing, which makes these 
studies comparable. Prior studies of plenary debates showed different patterns of 
polarization depending on the topic of the debate. On the one hand, Wendler (2014) argued 
that conflict over EU integration in debates on the Lisbon Treaty is “domesticated” and best 
explained by pre-existing lines of conflict. Similar results stem from de Wilde (2014) on 
the EU budget and Maatsch (2014) on crisis measures in creditor states. On the other hand, 
content analyses of debates on the installation of crisis mechanism have demonstrated a 
main divide between mainstream and challenger parties. Established parties aligned on the 
necessity to “save the Euro” leaving the competition to parties on the ideological fringes 
(Puntscher Riekmann and Wydra 2013, Closa and Maatsch 2014, Wonka 2016).  
This study accounts for both lines of division within parliament through the effect of 
positional distance on common political cleavages and the special role of anti-establishment 
parties. The results of this study show that the patterns of competition are issue dependent 
(Hypothesis 2 a and b). Socio-economic questions, such as the internal market, public 
spending in light of the crisis or the level of regulation, followed the domestic pattern of 
competition on the left-right scale (H2a). Matters of EU integration, cross-border 
redistribution within the EU and other identity-related issues generally followed the 
positional distance on the cultural dimension (TAN-GAL, H2b). Topics related to the 
cultural dimension were, however, dominated by the fierce competition by anti-
establishment parties. 
On the one hand, results on the socio-economic issue lend further support for Wendler’s 
(2014) and Helbling’s et al. (2010) finding of a “domesticated” framing of EU issues. In 
both countries under study, the scrutiny of EU issues was integrated into the major lines of 
conflict between governing and opposition parties on most topics. This was especially true 
for issues pertaining to the socio-economic dimension of conflict (H2a). The topics 
associated with the left-right dimension were clearly policy-oriented. 
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The two anti-establishment parties, however, diverted from the regular pattern on those 
frames that are conducive to criticize the competence of the current political elite. For 
example, the frame of national interests received significantly more support from the BZÖ 
and FPÖ than their ideological distance on the cultural dimension could explain. The main 
divide ran between established parties and challengers especially on questions of EU 
integration (see 6.2). These issues are predominantly related to the question of the design of 
the political system. Depending on the issue at hand the divide in parliament ran between 
governing and opposition parties or between mainstream and anti-establishment parties.  
The results of this study point to the importance of differentiating both dimensions of 
conflict (socio-economic and cultural) for a comprehensive understanding of competition 
on EU affairs. Future research could expand this approach with an explicit measure for 
Euro-scepticism. The role of anti-EU sentiments, which have been shown to relate to an 
extreme position on either the left-right or the cultural dimension, has not been investigated 
here. The Linke, BZÖ and FPÖ are often classified as Euro-sceptic. This study 
demonstrated different approaches of these party groups: The left party remained rather 
silent on topics on EU integration. It did not bring forward a clear counter-proposal for the 
course of EU integration. The BZÖ and FPÖ criticized the current approach and argued for 
a Core Europe, which safeguards the sovereignty of the nation states. Recent studies on 
Euro-scepticism have applied elaborate typologies on different kinds of resistances to EU 
integration and could grasp the different approach by the left and the culturally conservative 
parties (Conti and Memoli 2012, Halikiopoulou et al. 2012, Saurugger 2013). These could 
benefit future studies of national parliaments and EU affairs. 
The role of the legislative agenda  
The literature on challenger parties has argued that they alter the logic of party competition 
within their party system (Dolezal 2008a, de Vries and Hobolt 2012, Loxbo and Sjölin 
2016). Other party groups would react to the emphasis of the cultural dimension. This study 
cannot answer this question, as it did not investigate the development over time. However, 
the results of this study show noticeable differences between the two chambers. The 
presence of a Eurosceptic challenger party in the Nationalrat (and its absence in the time 
period of investigation in the Bundestag) could account for the differences between the two 
chambers.  
The content analysis of this study showed that different topics triggered the framing on 
either the left-right or the cultural dimension of conflict. The findings showed marked 
 215 
differences between the two parliaments though. In Germany, the opposition mainly 
competed on the socio-economic dimension. All three opposition parties held more left-
oriented positions than the CDU/FDP government in the period of investigation. The 
cultural dimension was only addressed to a limited extent. In Austria, the opposition party 
groups differed strongly on the value dimension (TAN-GAL). The government did not take 
a strong position on this line of conflict. Much more, the Greens offered strongly divergent 
policy propositions to the BZÖ and FPÖ. The socio-economic dimension remains 
underexposed. 
These topic-related framing activities of the party groups, in consequence, strongly 
depended on the parliamentary agenda. If energy or unemployment rates are debated, party 
groups most likely frame the issues in terms of the traditional left-right cleavages. If treaty 
reform or intra-EU migration is on the agenda, the framing will span between the TAN-
GAL poles. Agenda setting is therefore of major relevance for the communication on EU 
affairs.  
The research design set out for a first test and subsequent refinement of the hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 2 focused on individual opposition parties. The explanations for EU scrutiny 
activities appear more complex than the bipolar relationship between an opposition party 
and the government. The hypothesis should account for the contestation of EU affairs 
within a chamber. All party groups compete and react to each other within a political 
system irrespective of their status as governing or opposition party.  
Party competition has been explained by two central theories: spatial theory and issue 
competition. Hypothesis 2 of this study is more closely related to spatial theory, with a 
focus on the positional distance between party groups. For a refinement of the hypothesis, 
the logic of issue competition should be accounted for, as it emphasizes the role of agenda 
setting for electoral success. The theory accounts for agenda setting effect. Each party 
group tries to promote issues where it deems itself closest to the voters interests and which 
are unfavorable for the other party groups. Future research should extent Hypothesis 2 by 
measuring the salience of individual issues to better understand the role of issue 
competition among opposition parties.  
Generalizability of research results 
This study chose a small-n research design as it explored a rather understudied topic on 
national parliaments and EU affairs. The findings of the analysis need to be taken with 
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some caution in view of their generalizability to other EU member state. This applies in 
view of the time period and the selection of member states for study. 
The content analysis of this study focused on plenary debates on highly salient issues. The 
Euro crisis and the EU budget had strong effects on the re-ordering and re-distribution 
across borders and the future of the EU. The findings on these issues are not necessarily 
generalizable to other areas of EU policymaking. The crisis triggered strong competition 
among all party groups. EU issues of lower salience are most likely less contentious. A 
refined operationalization of salience could help explaining the logic of competition by 
opposition parties in future research. It would also be interesting to understand in how far 
the strong presence of EU issues due to the Euro crisis altered the salience and perception 
of EU issues in the longer run.  
This study focused on two member states: Austria and Germany. These two countries were 
chosen, as their institutional setting and cultural background are quite similar. The case 
selection further followed the logic of least likely cases for strong party competition among 
the EU-28. Both countries are classified as rather consensual democratic systems (Lijphart 
2002). Parties in minority benefit from better minority protection measures in consensual 
systems and should be less inclined to opt for public competition. Nevertheless, the results 
on the six opposition parties in Austria and Germany showed that EU issues were very 
present in the two parliaments and contested in view of policy and polity design.  
To answer the question on the generalizability of the findings of this study, we would first 
need to answer the question of the impact of the institutional design on opposition parties’ 
behavior. The formal rights on minority protection did not result in actual policy influence 
in either chamber, but in better influence on the EACs agenda. The institutional 
prerequisites might therefore not have such a strong effect that findings cannot be 
generalized beyond the two countries. The limited variation in committee activities within 
each chamber and the strong contestation of major events, such as the Euro crisis and the 
EU budget negotiations, might apply to a wider range of EU member states.  
6.2. Relevance for EU democratic legitimacy 
Parliaments are considered the “living symbols” of democracy. A study of parliament is, in 
consequence, a study of democracy. This study aimed at contributing to a better 
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understanding of the democratic legitimacy of the EU by studying national parliaments’ 
involvement. This Section 6.2 briefly reviews the argument on the EU democratic deficit 
and interprets the results of this study in view of national parliaments’ contribution to EU 
legitimacy. 
The legitimacy of the European Union used to be defended through its output by some 
scholars (Majone 1998, Moravcsik 2004). With the increased competences of the EU and 
the strong impact of the Euro crisis on citizens’ lives, the justification over output alone 
have ceased (Majone 2016). In its current form, EU decision-making has to be justified 
through input legitimacy as well. The EU has two channels of electoral legitimacy. On the 
one hand, the European Parliament co-decides on all issues under the Ordinary Legislative 
Procedure. On the other hand, national parliaments oversee their governments’ activities in 
the (European) Council in the Ordinary Legislative Procedure and intergovernmental 
coordination. This study follows the line of argument that sees national parliaments 
responsible for scrutinizing EU affairs effectively. They should proactively control their 
own government’s position ahead of EU negotiations. Only national parliaments can 
“translate” the developments at EU level to their national public spheres, as to date there 
still does not exist a coherent European public sphere (Risse 2010).  
The focus on input legitimacy for the EU links to the question of how much national 
parliaments engage in EU affairs? Can legislatures balance the power of executive in EU 
affairs or are they mere rubber-stamping bodies? Their institutional capacity and the active 
involvement in the pre-decisional stage to (European) Council negotiations matter to 
answer this question. This study found that both parliaments set up elaborate EU scrutiny 
procedures. The governing and opposition party groups used their scrutiny rights to engage 
in ex-ante control over the government. The “mainstreaming” of EU affairs in the 
Bundestag involved a larger range of MPs within the parliament and lead to more regular 
policy-related plenary debates. In view of the overall scope of involvement both 
parliaments the Bundestag scores better in terms of policy-oriented scrutiny among a larger 
number of MPs. The Nationalrat provides better access to information to EU specialists.  
Within the realm of input legitimacy to EU decision-making, the introduction (Section 
1.1.2) defined two logics: First, the acceptance of a political regime can be achieved by the 
inclusion of large segments of the society in the decision-making processes. In this study, 
the logic of inclusion was linked to the strategy of cooperation by opposition within a 
domestic legislature. The second type of input legitimacy was termed alteration and 
 218
followed the logic of majoritarian democracy (see Kaiser 2002, Lijphart 2012). Party 
competition is, here, the motor for a critical public debate on potential policy solutions. It 
provides a choice of various policy programs to the voters for upcoming elections.  
Research on democratic legitimacy of the EU has argued that it is mainly built around the 
principle of inclusion: The political system is characterized by multiple veto-players and a 
consensual decision-making mode among the EU member states (Gabel 1998). If the EU is 
assessed in terms of alteration, however, it is considered to lack the politicization of 
policymaking. “Policy without politics” (Schmidt 2006) is argued to undermine the 
acceptance of the political system itself. A lack of a choice over EU policy content for the 
voters would result in dissatisfaction with the polity (Mair 2007). The current 
dissatisfaction with EU integration, indicated by increasing vote shares of Euro-sceptic 
parties, seems to be better explained by the lack of majoritarian democratic principles. 
This study took the argument on an “opposition deficit” as a starting point to empirically 
investigate the extent of opposition to EU policy-making and EU integration in national 
parliaments. Domestic legislatures not only control their own government in the Council, 
they also act as “gate-keepers” of EU integration due to their ratification rights on treaty 
reform and enlargement of the EU. National parliaments should, therefore, be forums to 
discuss policy alternatives and avenues for future EU integration. This study investigated 
opposition parties, as they are the “natural” agent for the critical debate on EU affairs 
within their legislatures. 
The analysis of committee initiatives and plenary debates showed that all opposition parties 
competed on EU policymaking or polity design (6.1.2). Within the period of investigation, 
the assumption of a lack of politicization of EU affairs does not hold. Yet, competition on 
EU affairs is not all encompassing in either parliament. The lines of competition on EU 
affairs generally corresponded to the usual patterns of competition by the opposition parties 
in both parliaments. Each chamber focused on one dimension of political conflict though. 
Competition in the Bundestag focused on socio-economic EU issues. In the Nationalrat, the 
cultural dimension dominated the debate. Ideally, the debate would link both dimension of 
political conflict. EU policy contents would be paired with a critical discussion on the 
purpose of EU integration among all party groups. Competition is partial in both 
parliaments due to the focus on one dimension only. 
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It is important to differentiate the role of policy- and polity-oriented competition in this 
respect. Competition on the left-right scale corresponds to policy-oriented rivalry. On the 
cultural dimension, the topics related more to the question of polity design. Opposition 
studies have argued that the contestation of the polity undermines legitimacy. The positive 
effect on democratic legitimacy would stem from “classic” opposition on different policy 
option (Kirchheimer 1957, Sartori 1966). The argument needs to be more differentiated on 
EU affairs. The European Union is a system in the making, whose finalité has never been 
determined. It is therefore important to discuss the purpose and goals of EU integration. An 
outright anti-system view may undermine EU legitimacy, as expressed by parties favouring 
an exit from the EU. A critical debate on different avenues of the future of integration 
could, however, be valued positively. 
The topics relating to the cultural dimension are of special interest to understand the debate 
on the EU system making. The regular parties in both countries claimed repeatedly that 
“More Europe” would be necessary to overcome the crisis and embrace the “European 
idea”. Both frames remain vague and did not formulate a clear and contestable vision for 
the future development of the political system. How do the mainstream parties intend to 
advance EU integration? The two anti-establishment parties disrupted this unspecific pro-
European framing of regular parties with a clear counter-proposal: Both argue for a “Core 
Europe” of net-contributors to the EU budget and a limited range of competences for EU 
institutions. On the one hand, they encourage a more fundamental debate on the purpose of 
EU integration. On the other hand, they do not contribute to EU legitimacy through 
competition towards EU policy proposals but question the system factors.The position of 
the FPÖ and BZÖ is not entirely anti-system (“principled”, see Sartori 1966), but they do 
argue for a devolution of competences towards the national level. Mair’s (2007) argument 
seems to hold partially true: The opposition formulated by the anti-establishment parties 
turns against the polity to restore policy choice at national level. On topics less directly 
related to EU integration, all opposition parties competed on policy-contents. 
Within each parliament one dimension of political conflict dominated the scrutiny and 
debates on EU affairs. Existing research has argued that challenger parties alter the 
dimensions of competition within a party system (Minkenberg 2001, Kriesi et al 2006). 
Miklin (2014) has argued that the cultural dimension dominated the debates on EU affairs 
in Austria due to the presence of the Eurosceptic BZÖ and FPÖ. It would inhibit 
controversies among mainstream parties along the left-right dimension. This study cannot 
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directly answer to this debate, as it does not investigate the development over time. It notes 
a clear difference between the parliament with an anti-establishment party and the one 
where no challenger to the mainstream is present.  
The difference between the two parliaments may be enhanced by the different styles of 
processing EU affairs. The Nationalrat centralizes EU scrutiny mainly at the committee 
level. Only highly salient EU issues are debated at the plenary. The focus on highly salient 
issues might be contra-productive in terms of politicization of EU policy. The debates focus 
on issues of polity design and less on policy content. The “mainstreaming” of EU affairs in 
the Bundestag favoured a more regular and policy-oriented involvement of the plenary. 
Overall, it appears rather unfortunate to leave contestation on the future of EU integration 
to the anti-establishment parties. The framing analysis of this study showed a link of topics 
of EU integration to anti-elitism. BZÖ and FPÖ presented themselves as protecting 
citizens’ interests and national sovereignty against a weak and corrupt government, which 
sells out Austrian national interests in Brussels. The anti-establishment stance is highly 
problematic in terms of democratic legitimacy: The de-legitimization of all other political 
actors enhances distrust in established actors and institutions. Müller (2016) argues that the 
self-representation as the only “true” representatives of citizens’ interests undermines 
democratic principles according to which the interests of various groups should be 
represented equally. A broader debate among all political party groups would reduce the 
“niche’ness” of the anti-establishment parties and could reduce the electoral advantage of 
this strategy.  
This study has shown that actual cooperation is rare in the Bundestag and Nationalrat, even 
at the committee level. Despite the minority protection – especially on EU affairs after 
Lisbon – opposition parties do not have much policy influence in the regular legislative 
process. Common activities often result from a pre-existing consensus among party groups. 
During the period of investigation, the only instance where governing and opposition 
parties negotiated over policy content, was before the two-thirds majority votes on the 
reform of Art. 136 TFEU. In terms of legitimacy, the inclusion of minority on a 
constitutional change is the most important. Parties in opposition will have to face the 
consequences of a rather irreversible decision after they take over government. At this 
crucial moment of EU integration, opposition parties in both countries had an influence. 
When it comes to regular EU policymaking, the strategy of cooperation did not play a role. 
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Competition on EU affairs might alter in the Austrian chamber in the future, since one of 
the anti-establishment parties entered the government with the ÖVP in late 2017. The FPÖ 
has to live up to the challenge of being a part of the very establishment, which it has 
excessively criticized. Van Spanje (2011) showed that the electoral cost is high for anti-
establishment parties who entered government. The communicative strategy of anti-elitism 
can only with difficulty be maintained towards the government personnel, now that the 
Freedom Party shares government responsibility. This could calm the criticism towards a 
lack of defending national interests in EU negotiations. Alternatively, the EU institutions 
and leaders could serve as the valve for the FPÖ, if it maintains the anti-elitism as its 
electoral vehicle.  
Competition on EU affairs is subject to change in the Bundestag as well. In the period 
under investigation, there was no Euro-sceptic, culturally conservative party in the 
Bundestag. With the last elections in September 2017 the Alternative for Germany has won 
parliamentary representation. Following the argument of Kriesi (2006) and Miklin (2014), 
the cultural dimension of conflict could become more relevant for party competition in 
Germany and gain salience. It will be interesting to see whether these assumptions hold 
true. Since the German party system is characterized by stronger left-right competition to 
begin with, the development might differ from the Austrian experience. 
Overall, opposition parties in the Bundestag and Nationalrat contributed to a lively debate 
on EU affairs in the period of investigation. The role of opposition in national parliaments 
has to be evaluated in context of the EU multi-level system. Their influence should not be 
overestimated in its impact on EU democratic legitimacy. The consensual decision-making 
mode and multiple veto players within the system, leave a single member states position 
with limited impact. The effect of successful advertising of policy alternatives by 
opposition parties would be limited to the one member state. Several channels of input and 







Apenndix I – Party positions 
Table 12 provides an overview on positioning of Austrian and German parties from various 
sources in the period of investigation. The Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES 2010) use a 
scale for the left-right dimension (lrecon), which ranges from 0 = extreme left over 5 = 
centre to 10 = extreme right. The Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) developed an 
index on left-right (rile) where negative scores indicate a position towards the left and 
positive to the right. The table also shows the positioning according to the index developed 
by Franzmann and Kaiser (2006). They use the CMP data, but account for valence issues, 
which are dealt with consensually in a country. They also differentiate a social or value 
dimension (lrsoc). The galtan-scale from the CHES database uses a scale from 0 = GAL, 5 
= centre to 10 = TAN (see Codebook, CHES 2016). 
 CHES 
2010 





 lrecon rile lrecon lrecon galtan lrsoc 
SPÖ 2.64 -17.87 3.19 -.09 3.93 2.90 
ÖVP 6.86 -1.15 3.66 .08 7.21 4.65 
Grüne 2.21 -9.47 2.87 -.10 1.5 1.61 
BZÖ 7.29 -8.70 3.91 .10 7.79 6.98 
FPÖ centre -1.30 5.79 -.00 8.71 5.34 
CDU 6.00 8.72 6.31 .06 6.25 6.39 
CSU 5.50 5.50 6.31 .06 7.13 6.39 
FDP 8.19 4.27 7.93 .15 3.53 3.25 
SPD 3.00 -18.30 2.86 -.08 4.50 4.41 
90/Grünen 3.88 -13.57 2.76 -.02 1.88 1.94 
Linke 1.00 -24.49 0.81 -.17 4.62 1.97 




Appendix II – Results of the content analysis of motions: 
Policy areas 
The following table summarizes the results on all policy areas coded in the content analysis 
of motions. Each motion was allocated to only one policy field. Where it touched upon 
several aspects, the predominant one was coded. 
 Table 18: Policy areas addressed in motions. 












Crisis 6 19 16 15 2 3 1 1 3 58 8 
Migration 6 8 10 6 – 1 2 1 2 30 6 
Energy 7 11 5 – 2 5 5 3 3 25 16 
EU integration 2 1 13 6 1 1 1 – 1 23 3 
Budget – 3 4 5 1 1 1 1 – 13 3 
Econ 10 – – – – – – – – 10 – 
Social 2 1 1 2 3 1 4 1 4 9 10 
JHA 3 1 2 2 – – – – – 8 – 
Internal market 2 2 1 1 1 5 1 2 1 7 9 
Future agenda – 5 – 1 1 1 2 1 – 7 4 
Family 4 1 2 – – – – – – 7 – 
Finance 3 1 – – 3 – – – – 7 – 
Infrastructure 4 – – – 2 2 3 1 5 6 11 
Agriculture – 2 1 2 1 – – – – 6 – 
Enlargement – – 1 4 – 4 3 5 1 5 13 
Free trade 3 – – 1       – 2 – – 2 4 4 
Data protection 1 2       – 1 – – – – – 4 – 
Food safety 1 – – – 2 – – – – 4 – 
Gender 1 – – 1 – – – – – 4 – 
Environment 3 – – – – – – – – 3 – 
EU staff – 1 – 2 – – – – – 3 – 
CFSP – – – – 2 1 – 2 1 2 4 
Culture 1 – – 1 – – – – – 2 – 
Education 1 – – 1 – – – – – 2 – 
EU institutions       – – – – – 5 1 2 – – 8 
Econ 
governance 
– – – – – 1 2 – – –    3 
EU democracy – – – – – – – 1 – – 1 
Nat Parl rights – – – – – 1 – – – – 1 
Standardization – – – – – 1 – – – – 1 
Tourism – – – – – 1 – – – – 1 
Total 60 58 59 51 21 36 26 21 23 249 106 
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Appendix III – List of joint motions  
The following table lists all initaitives that were issued by more than one party group 
indicating the originators and topics of the matter. 
Nationalrat, September 2008 to September 2013  
Committee for Employment and Social Affairs 
 Date Name EU-
related 
Initiator Supported by 
1 02 Dec 2009 Evaluierung und 
Weiterentwicklung der 
Behindertenanwaltschaft 
No All All 
2 12 May 2010 Service- und Signalhunde No All All 
3 05 Oct 2010 Anerkennung von Taubblindheit als 
eigenständige Art der Behinderung 
No All All 
4 15 Mar 2011 bundeseinheitliche Regelungen 
betreffend Persönliche 
Assistenz 1098 d.B.) 
No All All 
5 28 Jun 2011 pflegende Kinder und Jugendliche  No All All 
6 06 Oct 2011 Vereinfachung des Zuganges zu 
benötigten Hilfsmitteln für Kinder 
No All All 
7 06 Oct 2011 Vereinheitlichung der 
Begutachtung für die Ausstellung 
von Parkausweis und 
Behindertenpass 
No All All 
8 14 Oct 2009 Umsetzung eines 
Maßnahmenpakets für freiwillige 
Helferinnen und Helfer  




9 11 Oct 2012 Reform des 
Behindertengleichstellungsrechts 
No SPÖ, ÖVP, 
Grüne, FPÖ 
All 
10 11 May 2011 Erstellung eines Berichtes über die 
Lebenssituation älterer Menschen 
in Österreich 
No SPÖ, ÖVP, FPÖ SPÖ, ÖVP, 
Grüne, BZÖ  
11 11 May 2011 Erhöhung der Nettoersatzrate in 
der Arbeitslosenversicherung  
No SPÖ, ÖVP, 
BZÖ 
SPÖ, ÖVP, 
Grüne, BZÖ  





13 23 Nov 2011 Überführung der Architekten und 
Ingenieurkonsulenten in das FSVG  





14 27 Jun 2012 Allgemeine 
Sozialversicherungsgesetz 










Initiator  Supported by 
1 26 Mar 2009 Klimaschutz, Atomenergie Yes SPÖ, ÖVP, 
BZÖ 
All 










4 18 Jan 2011 Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspakt Yes SPÖ, ÖVP, 
Grüne 
SPÖ, ÖVP, 
Grüne, BZÖ  
5 18 Jan 2011 Europäische 
Menschenrechtskonvention 
Yes SPÖ, ÖVP, 
Grüne 
SPÖ, ÖVP, 
Grüne, BZÖ  
6 10 May 2011 Fukushima, radioactive food Yes SPÖ, ÖVP, 
Grüne 
All 












10 13 Dec 2011 Basiskonto Yes SPÖ, ÖVP, 
Grüne, BZÖ  
All 
11 13 Dec 2011 Europäischer 
Globalisierungsfond 
Yes SPÖ, ÖVP, 
BZÖ 
SPÖ, ÖVP, 
Grüne, BZÖ  
12 31 Jan 2012 Roaming Kosten, Mobilfunknetze Yes All All 
13 17 Apr 2012 Humanarzneimittel, 
Krankenversicherungssysteme 
Yes All All 
14 01 Jul 2013 Pflanzenvermehrungsmaterial Yes SPÖ, ÖVP, 
BZÖ 
All 
15 25 Jun 2013 Infrastruktur Yes All All 
Main Committee for EU Affairs 
 Date Name EU-
related 
Initiator  Supported by 
1 28 Oct 2009 Lisbon treaty implementation, EU 
Bürgerinitiative 




2 28 Oct 2009 FTT Yes SPÖ, ÖVP, 
Grüne 
SPÖ, ÖVP, 
Grüne, BZÖ  




4 21 Mar 2013 Klimaschutz, Atomenergie nicht 
low carbon 
Yes All All 
Committee for Economy and Industry 
 Date Name EU-
related 
Moved by Supported by 
1 27 Nov 2012 Stromnetzanpassung für die 
Energiewende 
No Grüne, BZÖ, 
FPÖ 
vertagt 
Bundestag, September 2009 to September 2013    
Committee for Employment and Social Affairs 
 Date Name EU-
related 
Moved by Supported by 
(abstention in 
brackets) 
1 16 Jun 2010 Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur 
Weiterentwicklung der 
Organisation der Grundsicherung 
für Arbeitsuchende 
No CDU, FDP, 
SPD 
CDU, FDP, SPD 
(90/Grünen, 
Linke) 
Committee for European Affairs 
 Date Name EU-
related 




1 17 Apr 2013 Entwurf eines Gesetzes über die 
Zusammenarbeit von 
Bundesregierung und Deutschem 
Bundestag in Angelegenheiten der 
Europäischen Union 
Yes All All 
2 13 Jun 2012 Ehrlicher Dialog über europäische 
Grundwerte und Grundrechte in 
Ungarn 
Yes SPD, 90/Grünen SPD, 90/Grünen 
(Linke) 
3 20 Feb 2012 Das ungarische Mediengesetz – 
Europäische Grundwerte und 
Grundrechte verteidigen 
Yes SPD, 90/Grünen SPD, 90/Grünen, 
Linke 
Committee for Economy and Industry/Technology 
 Date Name EU-
related 
Moved by Supported by 
(abstention in 
brackets) 
1 20 Jan 2011 Am Ausbau der hocheffizienten 
Kraft-Wärme-Kopplung festhalten 
No SPD, 90/Grünen SPD, 
90/Grünen, 
Linke 
2 13 Jun 2012 Presse-Grosso gesetzlich verankern No SPD, 90/Grünen SPD, 90/Grünen 
(Linke) 
3 07 Mar 2013 Keine Bürgschaft für den Bau des 




















Appendix IV – Codebook for the frame analysis 
The unit of analysis of this framing analysis is not necessarily a grammatical sentence. A 
coded statement may include several grammatical sentences, which form a logical unit.  
Each statement is assigned a weight to measure the intensity with which the speaker argues 
for it (1, 2 or 3). 
Weight of 1:  When a frame is referred to only superficially in one sentence or less, 
the weight is assigned at 1.  
Weight of 2:  Where a proper argument is formulated and a statement has more 
than one sentence.  
Weight of 3: When special emphasis or a longer explanation of more than two 
sentences occurs.  
The following list covers all nine topics and their frames that formed the categories for the 
content analysis of this study. It explains the meaning for each frame. 
Topic 1) Collective interests 
National interest  
This frame is coded when a speaker argues for member state interests in the sense of a zero 
sum game. That means that the interests of the own country are conceptualized as 
incompatible with EU interests and other member state interests. This frame often takes the 
form of an MP demanding to contribute less to the EU level or to defend the national 
interests in negotiations in Brussels against the wishes of other member states. 
EU interest 
The frame includes all statements that refer to a European common interest. The EU 
interest needs to be independent from the own national interest. It is not coded when EU 
interest are presented as identical to national ones, but when a European common good 
stands “above” national interests.  
Topic 2) Sovereignty 
Protect national sovereignty 
This frame includes all statements that argue for protection of national institutions and 
national sovereignty. 
Protect national democracy 
The frame covers all statements that address a lack of democratic legitimacy due to or 
within the EU. It is only coded when the argument focuses on the national sphere. The 
frame is a sub-frame of protecting national sovereignty, since the lack of following national 
democratic procedures is a concern for protecting the sovereignty.  
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European Idea 
Statements that address Europe as a community of values or refer to the unity of Europe as 
a value in itself. It includes statements that allude to peace as a goal or achievement of 
European integration. Arguments that correspond to the idea of mutual dependence among 
member states form part of this frame as well, as they imply a European shared fate. 
Topic 3) The EU polity  
Intergovernmental 
The frame covers all statements arguing in an intergovernmental logic, thus, focussing on 
competences of the member states. It includes arguments for unanimous decision-making in 
the Council of Ministers and the importance of subsidiarity. 
Core Europe 
This frame conceptualizes a desintegration in form of exclusion of certain member states of 
certain aspects of EU integration. It can take various forms, such as the vision of a „core 
Europe“, or the demand for exits from the Euro zone.  
More EU  
The frame includes statements that conceive of Europe as the solution for the Euro crisis or 
other policy problems. It is of general nature. Statements coded under this frame do not 
develop an intergovernmental or supranational vision of EU integration. It includes the 
statements on EU unity as success of supranational decision-making processes, one-speed 
Europe, no exits from the EU or the Euro zone and the demand for stronger control 
mechanisms at EU level. 
Supranational  
This frame codes statements in support of the supranational mode of governance in the EU. 
It includes the demand for qualified majority voting and an increase in formal competences 
for the EU institutions. 
Topic 4) Cross-border transfer 
No transfer 
All statements are coded under this frame that argue against cross-border financial support 
or collective debt in the EU. The frame also covers the arguments against net-payments to 
EU level. Net-payments imply that the some of the member states contribution is in parts 
allocated to invest in another member state. Arguments against Euro-bonds and against the 
ESM are included in this frame. 
Transfer 
This frame includes all statements that support the idea of financial support across borders 
within the EU. These include arguments on „solidarity“ towards crisis countries. It also 
covers statements that argue for a responsibility of the richer countries to contribute more 
towards the EU and the increase of the EU budget or regional and structural fonds. 
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Topic 5) Socio-economic goals of the EU 
Social Europe 
The frame includes all statements that imply that labour and social protection is a goal the 
EU integration. It includes the establishment of laws on worker protection at EU level as 
well as the demand that the EU tasks is e.g. the fight against poverty and unemployment. 
Global competition 
This frame covers statements that argue for EU integration as a means to compete with 
other countries or regions on the world, e.g. China, Brazil or the US. The frame is also 
coded when a speaker demands more competitiveness of the EU, as it implies competition 
by other actors. 
Economic prosperity  
All statements are coded with this frame that refer to economic prosperity as a reason for in 
European integration. General statements of increased welfare are included as well as the 
specific benefit of the own member state. Speakers using this frame argue for a material 
benefit of the member state from EU member ship.  
Topic 6) Budget policy 
Anti-austerity 
The frame covers all statements that criticize austerity as solution of the Euro crisis. It also 
includes demands for an increased EU budget, which would be necessary to invest more in 
the crisis countries. 
Economic orthodoxy  
The frame includes statements that argue for reducing public debt and the necessity of 
austerity. It can be related to national budget of the own member state, other member state 
budgets, e.g. of crisis countries, or the EU budget. Arguments in favour of stability – 
understood in terms of fiscal responsibility – were included in this frame. 
Reduce imbalances 
The frame covers all statement that address macro-economic imbalances across EU 
member states and point out to the role of Germany or Austria as export countries with low 
wages. 
Accept imbalances  
This frame includes statements which defend macro-economic imbalances within the EU. 
Often speakers claim that member states with current account deficits would still benefit by 




Topic 7) Roots of the crisis 
Social injustice 
The frame is coded for statements that address any form of social injustice. This mainly 
comes in form of critique towards business or political elites who ignore the citizens’ 
interests and needs. The frame is not coded when only a specific social group, e.g. farmers, 
are argued to be disadvantaged.  
Conditionality  
This frame covers the idea that each nation state is responsible for its own fate. It includes 
any statement that addresses some EU member states not having behaved responsible, 
through public overspending or manipulating economic indicators to enter the Euro zone. It 
also includes those arguments that address conditionality for receiving support in times of 
crisis. 
Topic 8) Role of the state 
Regulation 
The frame includes statements that demand a more regulated economy. It covers the request 
for stronger regulation of the finance sector. 
Deregulation/ Efficiency 
This frame covers statements favouring less regulation of economy. It also includes 
demands for more efficient public administration and statements in favour of free trade. 
Topic 9) Goals in economic policy 
Labour and social protection 
The frame includes all statements that address labour and social protection as a political 
goal or necessity. It covers demands to reduce poverty and unemployment (irrespective of 
EU purpose). This frame also includes the demand of redistributive measures in favour of 
citizens with low income. It does not cover redistribution across borders, but only among 
„classes“, e.g. higher taxation of wealthy people. 
Incentives  
The frame is coded for statements that allude to setting incentives to encourage economic 
activity and growth. This may include lower taxes for businesses. 
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Appendix V – List of plenary debates on EU issues 
This list presents all EU-related debates in the Nationalrat and Bundestag in the legislative 
period from 2008/9 to 2013. It indicates the number of the plenary debate, the topic and the 
date.  
No. Nationalrat/ Topic Date Bundestag/ Topic No. 
8 Finanzkrise, Konjunkturentwicklung, 
Energie- und Klimapolitik in der EU 
10 Dec 08    
10 Erklärungen zur österreichischen EU-
Politik 
21 Jan 09    
10 Gleichberechtigte Verwendung der 
deutschen Sprache als EU-
Verfahrenssprache neben Englisch und 
Französisch 
21 Jan 09    
14 EU-Finanzstrafvollstreckungsgesetz - 
EU-FinStrVG 
26 Feb 09    
14 Europa-Wahlordnung, Europa-
Wählerevidenzgesetz 
26 Feb 09    
23 Europäische und internationale 
Angelegenheiten 
20 May 09    
27 dringend notwendigen ökologisch-
sozialen Umbau Europas und die 
Unvereinbarkeit dieser Reformen mit 
einer zweiten Amtszeit von 
Kommissionspräsident Barroso sowie 
mehr Transparenz in der 
österreichischen Europapolitik  
17 Jun 09    
31 Stabilisierungs- und Assoziierungs-
abkommen zwischen den Europäischen 
Gemeinschaften und ihren 
Mitgliedstaaten einerseits und Bosnien 
und Herzegowina andererseits samt 
Schlussakte 
09 Jul 09    
32 Einsatz gegen die Zulassung von 
"Gigalinern" auf europäischer Ebene 
10 Jul 09    
37 das Bundesgesetz über die 
Geschäftsordnung des Nationalrates 
(Geschäftsordnungsgesetz 1975) 
geändert wird (EU-Hauptausschuss, 
Europastunde, Aktuelle Europastunde, 
EU-Erklärungen)  
23 Sep 09    
45 Das völlige Versagen (Bundeskanzler) 
Faymanns in der aktuellen EU-Politik  
18 Nov 09     
   02 Dec 09 Durchwinken des SWIFT-Abkommens durch 
die Bundesregierung und Umgehung des 
Europäischen Parlaments 
8 
   03 Dec 09 Die EU-Perspektive der südosteuropäischen 
Staaten Albanien, Bosnien und 
Herzegowina, Kosovo, Makedonien, 
Montenegro und Serbien verstärken 
9 
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   16 Dec 09 Fortsetzung der Beteiligung bewaffneter 
deutscher Streitkräfte an der EU-geführten 
Operation Atalanta zur Bekämpfung der 
Piraterie vor der Küste Somalias (…) // 
Fortsetzung der Beteiligung bewaffneter 
deutscher Streitkräfte an der EU-geführten 
Operation "Althea" zur weiteren 
Stabilisierung des Friedensprozesses in 
Bosnien und Herzegowina (…) 
11 
   17 Dec 09 Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht des 
Auswärtigen Ausschusses (3. Ausschuss)  
zu dem Antrag der Bundesregierung 
Fortsetzung der Beteiligung bewaffneter 
deutscher Streitkräfte an der EU-geführten 
Operation Atalanta zur Bekämpfung der 
Piraterie vor der Küste Somalias auf 
Grundlage des Seerechtsübereinkommens 
der Vereinten Nationen (…) 
12 
   17 Dec 09 Herstellung des Einvernehmens über die 
Aufnahme von Verhandlungen über den 
Beitritt der Republik Island zur 
Europäischen Union 
12 
   17 Dec 09 Regierungserklärung durch die 
Bundeskanzlerin zum Europäischen Rat am 
10./11. Dezember 
2009 in Brüssel und zur UN-Klimakonferenz 
vom 7. bis 18. Dezember 2009 in 
Kopenhagen 
12 
   18 Dec 09 Fortsetzung der Beteiligung bewaffneter 
deutscher Streitkräfte an der EU-geführten 
Operation "ALTHEA" zur weiteren 
Stabilisierung des Friedensprozesses in 
Bosnien und Herzegowina (…) 
13 
   25 Feb 10 Ausführungsgesetzes zur Verordnung (EG) 
Nr. 1060/2009 des Europäischen 
Parlaments und des Rates vom 16. 




   04 Mar 10 Europa 2020 - Strategie für ein nachhaltiges 
Europa Gleichklang von sozialer, 
ökologischer und wirtschaftlicher 
Entwicklung 
27 
57 Erklärung Dr. Spindelegger: aktuelle 
Fragen der österreichischen EU-Politik 
24 Mar 10     
59 Bericht über den Antrag 994/A(E) der 
Abgeordneten Lutz Weinzinger, 
Kolleginnen und Kollegen betreffend 
Möglichkeit des Ausschlusses aus der 
Währungsunion 
25 Mar 10 Regierungserklärung durch die 
Bundeskanzlerin zum Europäischen Rat am 
25./26. März 2010 in 
Brüssel 
34 
60 Die Krise überwinden - mit sozialer 
Gerechtigkeit und einer neuen 
Finanzmarktarchitektur 
21 Apr 10     
62 Verlängerung der Übergangsfristen zur 
Öffnung des öst. Arbeitsmarktes für 
neue EU-Mitgliedsstaaten der  
22 Apr 10 Einvernehmensherstellung von Bundestag 
und Bundesregierung zum Beitrittsantrag 
der Republik Island zur Europäischen 
Union und zur Empfehlung der EU-
Kommission vom 24. Februar 2010 zur 
Aufnahme von Beitrittsverhandlungen  
37 
 233 
   05 May 10 Regierungserklärung durch die 
Bundeskanzlerin zu den Maßnahmen zum 
Erhalt der Stabilität der Währungsunion 
und zu dem bevorstehenden Sondergipfel 
der Euro-Länder am 7. Mai 2010 in Brüssel 
39 
   06 May 10 Übergangsmaßnahmen zur 
Zusammensetzung des Europäischen 
Parlamentes nach Inkrafttreten des 
Vertrages von Lissabon  
40 
   07 May 10 Gesetzes zur Übernahme von 
Gewährleistungen zum Erhalt der für die 
Finanzstabilität in der Währungsunion 
erforderlichen Zahlungsfähigkeit der 
Hellenischen Republik (Währungsunion-
Finanzstabilitätsgesetz – WFStG) 
41 
66 Stabilisierung der gemeinsamen 
europäischen Währung und den Lehren 
aus der Griechenland-Krise 
19 May 10 Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Übernahme von 
Gewährleistungen im Rahmen eines 
europäischen Stabilisierungsmechanismus 
42 
   20 May 10 Europa 2020 – Die Wachstums- und 
Beschäftigungsstrategie der Europäischen 
Union braucht realistische und verbindliche 
Ziele 
43 
   10 Jun 10 Einen effizienten und schlagkräftigen 
Europäischen Auswärtigen Dienst schaffen 
46 
   10 Jun 10 Europa 2020 – Die Wachstums- und 
Beschäftigungsstrategie der Europäischen 
Union braucht realistische und verbindliche 
Ziele 
46 
   10 Jun 10 zu dem Vorschlag der Europäischen 
Kommission für eine Verordnung des 
Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates 
über die Bürgerinitiative 
46 
69 Europäisches Übereinkommen über die 
Hauptbinnenwasserstraßen von 
internationaler Bedeutung (AGN) 
16 Jun 10     
69 Naturkosmetik und Biokosmetik - 
Täuschungsschutz auf EU-Ebene 
16 Jun 10    
69 Überarbeitung und Verschärfung der 
EU-Spielzeugrichtlinie 
16 Jun 10    
    01 Jul 10 Für eine soziale Revision der 
Entsenderichtlinie 
51 
72 Bundesgesetz, mit dem ein 
Bundesgesetz über das Wirksamwerden 
der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1060/2009 
des Europäischen Parlaments und des 
Rates vom 16. September 2009 über 
Ratingagenturen (ABl. Nr. L 302 vom 
17.11.2009, S. 1) 
(Ratingagenturenvollzugsgesetz – 
RAVG) erlassen wird sowie das 
Finanzmarktaufsichtsbehördengesetz 
geändert wird 
07 Jul 10    
73 Lissabon-Begleitnovelle 08 Jul 10 Legislativ- und Arbeitsprogramm der 
Europäischen Kommission für 2010 
55 
73 Volksabstimmung über den Ausstieg 
Österreichs aus dem Euratom-Vertrag 
08 Jul 10    
77 Aktuelle Entwicklungen der Asyl- und 
Migrationspolitik auf europäischer 
Ebene 
22 Sep 10     
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   01 Oct 10 Energiekonzept umsetzen – Der Weg in das 
Zeitalter der Erneuerbaren Energien 
63 
   07 Oct 10 Ausländische Bildungsleistungen 
anerkennen – Fachkräftepotentiale 
ausschöpfen 
65 
   07 Oct 10 Vorschlag für eine Richtlinie …/…/EU des 
Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates 
über Einlagensicherungssysteme 
[Neufassung] (inkl. 12386/10 ADD 1 und 
12386/10 ADD 2) (ADD 1 in Englisch) 
65 
   08 Oct 10 Beitrittsantrag der Republik Serbien zur 
Prüfung an die Europäische Kommission 
weiterleiten 
66 
   27 Oct 10 Regierungserklärung durch die 
Bundeskanzlerin zum Europäischen Rat am 
28./29. Oktober 2010 
in Brüssel und zum G-20-Gipfel am 11./12. 
November 2010 in Seoul 
67 
   28 Oct 10 Gesetzes zur Anpassung des deutschen 
Rechts an die Verordnung (EG) Nr. 
380/2008 vom 18. April 2008 zur Änderung 
der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1030/2002 zur 
einheitlichen Gestaltung des 
Aufenthaltstitels für Drittstaatenangehörige 
68 
   12 Nov 10 Kinderspielzeug – Risiko für kleine 
Verbraucher 
72 
85 Amtssitzabkommen zwischen der 
Republik Österreich und der Agentur 
der Europäischen Union für 
Grundrechte 
18 Nov 10     
85 Bericht des Bundesministers für 
Landesverteidigung und Sport 
betreffend Arbeitsprogramm der 
Europäischen Kommission für 2010 
18 Nov 10    
85 Stabilisierungs- und 
Assoziierungsabkommen zwischen den 
Europäischen Gemeinschaften und 
ihren Mitgliedstaaten einerseits und der 
Republik Serbien andererseits samt 
Schlussakte einschließlich der dieser 
beigefügten Erklärungen 
18 Nov 10    
85 Verhandlungen der Bundesregierung 
auf europäischer Ebene zur Erreichung 
einer restriktiven Einwanderungspolitik 
und einem Ausbau der EU-Agentur 
Frontex 
18 Nov 10     
   02 Dec 10 EU-Operation ALTHEA in Bosien und 
Herzegwina 
78 
   02 Dec 10 EU-Operation Atalanta vor Somalia 78 
   02 Dec 10 Irland unterstützen und 
Steuerharmonisierung vorantreiben 
78 
   15 Dec 10 Regierungserklärung durch die 
Bundeskanzlerin zum Europäischen Rat am 
16./17. Dezember 
2010 in Brüssel 
80 
93 Kein Euro-Haftungsschirm ohne 
Volksabstimmung, Herr Bundeskanzler 
20 Jan 11 Arbeitsprogramm der Europäischen 
Kommission für das Jahr 2011 
84 
93 Protokoll zur Änderung des Protokolls 
über die Übergangsbestimmungen, das 
dem Vertrag über die Europäische 
20 Jan 11 Standpunkt und Konsequenzen der 




Union beigefügt ist 
   27 Jan 11 Auf dem europäischen Sondergipfel zur 
Energiepolitik am 4. Februar 2011 
verbindliche Maßnahmen vereinbaren 
87 
   27 Jan 11 Gemeinsame Europäische Agrarpolitik nach 
2013 – Förderung auf nachhaltige, 
bäuerliche Landwirtschaft ausrichten 
87 
   10 Feb 11 Gesetzes zu dem Stabilisierungs- und 
Assoziierungsabkommen vom 29. April 2008 
zwischen den Europäischen Gemeinschaften 
und ihren Mitgliedstaaten einerseits und der 
Republik Serbien andererseits 
90 
   25 Feb 11 Gegen das Zwei-Klassen-Internet 94 
96 Ausstieg Österreichs aus dem Euratom-
Vertrag  
01 Mar 11     
   17 Mar 11 Einvernehmensherstellung von Bundestag 
und Bundesregierung zur Ergänzung von 
Artikel 136 des Vertrages über die 
Arbeitsweise der Europäischen Union 




   18 Mar 11 Europäische Strategie zugunsten von 
Menschen mit Behinderungen 2010–2020: 
KOM(2010) 636 endg 
97 
   18 Mar 11 Gemeinsamen Standpunkt der EU für 
Waffenausfuhren auch bei Rüstungsexporten 
97 
98 Aktuelle Perspektiven der 
österreichischen und europäischen 
Energiepolitik nach Fukushima 
22 Mar 11     
   24 Mar 11 Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur strikten 
Regulierung der Arbeitnehmerüberlassung 
99 
   24 Mar 11 Regierungserklärung zum Europäischen Rat 
am 24./25. März 2011 in Brüssel 
99 
99 Bundesgesetz, mit dem ein 
Bundesgesetz über bestimmte Aspekte 
der 
grenzüberschreitenden Mediation in 
Zivil- und Handelssachen in der 
Europäischen Union erlassen sowie die 
Zivilprozessordnung, das IPR-Gesetz 
und das Suchtmittelgesetz 
geändert werden 
30 Mar 11     
100 Kein Euro-Haftungsschirm ohne 
Volksabstimmung, Herr Bundeskanzler 
31 Mar 11    
100 dringliche Maßnahmen gegen Armut 
und soziale Ausgrenzung im 
Europäischen Jahr gegen Armut und 
soziale Ausgrenzung 
31 Mar 11    
100 Verlängerung der Übergangsfristen zur 
Öffnung des österreichischen 
Arbeitsmarktes für neue EU-
Mitgliedstaaten 
31 Mar 11    
101 Genug gezahlt für Pleitestaaten – von 
der Europhorie zur Euroslerose 
01 Apr 11     
   07 Apr 11 Entwurf eines Zweiten Gesetzes zur 
Änderung des Europäische Betriebsräte-




   07 Apr 11 Telekommunikationsmarkt 
verbrauchergerecht regulieren 
102 
   14 Apr 11 Für einen Neubeginn der deutschen und 
europäischen Mittelmeerpolitik 
105 
   14 Apr 11 Gesetzes zur Koordinierung der Systeme der 
sozialen Sicherheit in Europa und zur 
Änderung anderer Gesetze 
105 
   14 Apr 11 Pläne der EU Kommission zur stärkeren 
Besteuerung von Diesel-Kraftstoffen 
105 
   14 Apr 11 Strategie der Europäischen Union für den 
Donauraum effizient gestalten 
105 
   15 Apr 11 Keine Vorratsdatenspeicherung von 
Fluggastdaten – Richtlinienvorschlag über 
die Verwendung von Fluggastdatensätzen  
106 
   12 May 11 Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Änderung 
telekommunikationsrechtlicher Regelungen 
108 
   12 May 11 Europäische Nachhaltigkeitsstrategie 108 
   12 May 11 Gestaltung der zukünftigen europäischen 
Forschungsförderung der EU (2014–2020) 
108 
   12 May 11 Vereinbarte Debatte zum Hilfsantrag 
Portugals 
108 
    13 May 11 Arbeitnehmerfreizügigkeit sozial gestalten 109 
105 Abkommen zwischen der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaft und ihren 
Mitgliedstaaten einerseits und der 
Republik Südafrika andererseits zur 
Änderung des Abkommens über Handel, 
Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit 
17 May 11    
105 die Errichtung einer europäischen 
Transferunion (im Zusammenhang mit 
der Schaffung eines Europäischen 
Stabilitätsmechanismus ("Euro-
Rettungsschirm")  
17 May 11    
105 Rahmenabkommen zwischen der 
Europäischen Union und der Republik 
Korea 
17 May 11    
107 Die Eurolüge - Genug gezahlt für 
marode Banken und bankrotte 
Euroländer! 
18 May 11    
107 Entwicklung von Alternativszenarien 
zum Eurorettungsschirm  
18 May 11     
   26 May 11 Den friedenspolitischen und 
krisenpräventiven Auftrag des Europäischen 
Auswärtigen Dienstes je  
111 
   09 Jun 11 Finanztransaktionsteuer in Europa 
einführen – Gesetzesinitiative jetzt vorlegen 
114 
   10 Jun 11 Stabilität der Euro-Zone sichern - 
Reformkurs in Griechenland vorantreiben 
115 
109 Zahlungsstopp jetzt – genug gezahlt für 
marode Banken und bankrotte 
Euroländer! 
15 Jun 11     
109 Änderungen der Arbeitszeitrichtlinie  15 Jun 11     
   01 Jul 11 Zu den Legislativvorschlägen der 
Europäischen Kommission 
"Wirtschaftspolitische Steuerung in der EU 
118 
 237 
112 Maßnahmen zur Einführung einer 
Finanztransaktionssteuer  
06 Jul 11     
112 Verfolgung von religiösen Minderheiten 
in Afghanistan und notwendigen 
Einsatz der EU für Minderheitenschutz 
06 Jul 11    
113 EU-Erklärung Mag. Dr. Fekter: 
Europäischer Stabilitätsmechanismus 
("Euro-Rettungsschirm") und die 
Folgen der Griechenland-Finanzkrise  
07 Jul 11     
   08 Sep 11 Gesetzes zur Änderung des Gesetzes zur 
Übernahme von Gewährleistungen im 
Rahmen eines europäischen 
Stabilisierungsmechanismus 
124 
118 Genug gezahlt für EU-Pleitestaaten, 
Banken und Spekulanten! 
Volksabstimmung jetzt!  
21 Sep 11 Geordnete Insolvenz - Die Haltung der 
Bundesregierung 
126 
118 Korruptionsbekämpfung in der EU 21 Sep 11     
   22 Sep 11 Europäische Strategie zugunsten von 
Menschen mit Behinderungen 2010–2020 
127 
   29 Sep 11 Gesetzes zur Änderung des Gesetzes zur 
Übernahme von Gewährleistungen im 
Rahmen eines europäischen 
Stabilisierungsmechanismus 
130 
124 "EU-Informationsgesetz" und 
Geschäftsordnungsgesetz  
19 Oct 11 Umsetzung der Abschiebungsrichtlinie der 
Europäischen Union und die Praxis der 
Abschiebungshaft 
  
126 "Veto jetzt, Herr Bundeskanzler!" 
(möglicher Schuldenerlass für 
Griechenland und Erhöhung des 
Volumens des Euro-"Rettungsschirms")  
20 Oct 11     
   26 Oct 11 Regierungserklärung zum Europäischen Rat 
und zum Eurogipfel am 26. Oktober 2011 in 
Brüssel 
135 
   27 Oct 11 Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Umsetzung des 
EuGH-Urteils (C-555/07) 
136 
   27 Oct 11 Für eine ambitionierte Effizienzstrategie der 
deutschen und europäischen 
Energieversorgung 
136 
   27 Oct 11 Netzneutralität im Internet gewährleisten 136 
128 "Zukunftssicherungsschirm" für 
Österreich statt "Rettungsschirme" für 
EU-Pleitestaaten und marode Banken  
28 Oct 11     
   10 Nov 11 Fortsetzung der Beteiligung bewaffneter 
deutscher Streitkräfte an der EU-geführten 
Operation "ALTHEA" zur weiteren 
Stabilisierung des Friedensprozesses in 
Bosnien und Herzegowina (...) 
139 
   10 Nov 11 Stagnation beim Bürokratieabbau 
überwinden – Neue Schwerpunktsetzung für 
den Mittelstand umsetzen 
139 
   10 Nov 11 Weißbuch Verkehr – Auf dem Weg zu einer 
nachhaltigen und bezahlbaren Mobilität 
139 
   11 Nov 11 Effektive Regulierung der Finanzmärkte 
nach der Finanzkrise 
140 
   11 Nov 11 Euratom-Vertrag ändern – Atomausstieg 
europaweit voranbringen – Atomprivileg 
beenden 
140 
130 Die besten Chancen für Europas 
Jugend - Beschäftigung als Schlüssel 
15 Nov 11     
 238
   23 Nov 11 Fortsetzung der Beteiligung bewaffneter 
deutscher Streitkräfte an der EU-geführten 
Operation Atalanta zur Bekämpfung der 
Piraterie vor der Küste Somalias  
142 
   24 Nov 11 Der Mehrjährige Finanzrahmen der EU 
2014–2020 – Ein strategischer Rahmen für 
nachhaltige und verantwortungsvolle 
Haushaltspolitik mit europäischem 
Mehrwert 
143 
   01 Dec 11 Fortsetzung der Beteiligung bewaffneter 
deutscher Streitkräfte an der EU-geführten 
Operation "ALTHEA" zur weiteren 
Stabilisierung des Friedensprozesses in 
Bosnien und Herzegowina  
146 
   01 Dec 11 Fortsetzung der Beteiligung bewaffneter 
deutscher Streitkräfte an der EU-geführten 
Operation Atalanta zur Bekämpfung der 
Piraterie vor der Küste Somalias 
146 
   02 Dec 11 Regierungserklärung zum Europäischen Rat 
am 9. Dezember 2011 in Brüssel 
147 
139 EU-Erklärungen Faymann und Dr. 
Spindelegger: Ergebnisse des 
Europäischen Rates am 9. Dezember 
2011 
14 Dec 11 Regierungserklärung zu den Ergebnissen 
des Europäischen Rates am 8./9. Dezember 
2011 in Brüssel 
148 
139 "Die besten Chancen für Europas 
Jugend - Beschäftigung als Schlüssel" 
14 Dec 11    
139 Beendigung der Vereinbarung über die 
Bereitstellung und den Betrieb von 
Flugsicherungseinrichtungen und –
diensten durch EUROCONTROL 
14 Dec 11    
139 EU-Informationsgesetz (EU-InfoG) 14 Dec 11     
    15 Dec 11 Entwurf eines … Gesetzes zur Änderung des 
Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuchs (§ 622 Absatz 2 
Satz 2 BGB) 
149 
140 Außen- und Europapolitischer Bericht 
2010 
18 Jan 12    
140 Was bedeutet die derzeitige 
Schuldenkrise für die Zukunft Europas? 
18 Jan 12     
   19 Jan 12 Finanzmarktstabilisierungsgesetz 152 
   19 Jan 12 Regierungserklärung zum 
Jahreswirtschaftsbericht 2012 
152 
   09 Feb 12 EU-Fiskalpakt - Auswirkung auf 
Demokratie und Sozialstaat 
158 
   10 Feb 12 Für einen Neubeginn der deutschen und 
europäischen Mittelmeerpolitik 
159 
   27 Feb 12 Regierungserklärung zu den Finanzhilfen 
für Griechenland und zum Europäischen 
Rat am 1./2. März 2012 in Brüssel 
160 
144 Europäische-Bürgerinitiative-Gesetz – 
EBIG 
29 Feb 12     
   01 Mar 12 EU-Richtlinie zum Wertpapierhandel 162 
   01 Mar 12 Hochqualifizierten-Richtlinie 162 
   02 Mar 12 Gesetzes zur Änderung des Bürgerlichen 
Gesetzbuchs zum besseren Schutz der 
Verbraucherinnen und Verbraucher vor 
Kostenfallen im elektronischen 
Geschäftsverkehr 
163 
   08 Mar 12 Für eine Strategie zur europäischen 




   09 Mar 12 Arbeitsprogramm der Europäischen 
Kommission für das Jahr 2012 
166 
   09 Mar 12 Zur Situation von Roma in der 
Europäischen Union und in den 
(potentiellen) EU-Beitrittskandidatenstaaten 
166 
   22 Mar 12 Ehrlicher Dialog über europäische 
Grundwerte und Grundrechte in Ungarn 
168 
   29 Mar 12 Europäische Finanzaufsicht stärken und 
effizient ausgestalten 
172 
   29 Mar 12 Gemeinsame Sicherheits- und 
Verteidigungspolitik (GSVP) 
weiterentwickeln und mitgestalten 
172 
   29 Mar 12 Gesetzes zu dem Vertrag vom 2. März 2012 
über Stabilität, Koordinierung und 
Steuerung in der Wirtschafts- und 
Währungsunion 
172 
153 Kooperationsabkommen über 
Satellitennavigation zwischen der EU 
und ihren Mitgliedstaaten und dem 
Königreich Norwegen 
19 Apr 12     
   26 Apr 12 Fortsetzung der Beteiligung bewaffneter 
deutscher Streitkräfte an der EU-geführten 
Operation Atalanta zur Bekämpfung der 
Piraterie vor der Küste Somalias  
175 
   27 Apr 12 Gesetzes zur Änderung des 
Stabilisierungsmechanismusgesetzes  
176 
   27 Apr 12 Umsetzung der EU-Hochqualifizierten-
Richtlinie 
176 
   10 May 12 Antrag der Bundesregierung: Fortsetzung 
der Beteiligung bewaffneter deutscher 
Streitkräfte an der EU-geführten Operation 
Atalanta zur Bekämpfung der Piraterie vor 
der Küste Somalias 
178 
   10 May 12 Neuausrichtung der Europäischen 
Entwicklungspolitik für mehr Kohärenz und 
wirksame Armutsbekämpfung 
178 
   11 May 12 Europas Weg aus der Krise: Wachstum 
durch Wettbewerbsfähigkeit 
179 
155 Nachhaltig investieren statt aus Europa 
einen Sparverein machen 
15 May 12     
157 Bericht der Bundesministerin für 
Finanzen betreffend EU-
Jahresvorschau 2012 
16 May 12     
   23 May 12 Keine Vergemeinschaftung europäischer 
Schulden – Euro-Bonds-Pläne der SPD: 
Haftung für deutsche Steuerzahler? 
180 
159 Eurokrise 13 Jun 12     
161 Bundesgesetz über die 
Geschäftsordnung des Nationalrates 
(Geschäftsordnungsgesetz 1975) 
geändert wird (Mitwirkungsrechte des 
Nationalrates an der innerstaatlichen 
Willensbildung in Hinblick auf die 
laufende Tätigkeit des Europäischen 
Stabilitätsmechanismus)  
14 Jun 12     




   27 Jun 12 Regierungserklärung zum Europäischen Rat 
am 28./29. Juni 2012 in Brüssel 
186 
   29 Jun 12 Regierungserklärung zur Schaffung einer 
Stabilitätsunion 
188 
    29 Jun 12 Regierungserklärung zur Stabilitätsunion- 
Fiskalververtrag und ESM 
188 
164 Beschluss des Europäischen Rates vom 
25. März 2011 zur Änderung des Art. 
136 AEUV hinsichtlich eines 
Stabilitäts-mechanismus für die 
Mitgliedstaaten, deren Währung der 
Euro ist 
04 Jul 12    
164 Bundesgesetz, mit dem das Bundes-
Verfassungsgesetz und das 
Zahlungsbilanzstabilisierungsgesetz 
geändert werden (ESM-Begleitnovelle) 
04 Jul 12    
164 Protokoll zu den Anliegen der irischen 
Bevölkerung bezüglich des Vertrags 
von Lissabon 
04 Jul 12    
164 Gemeinsam Europas Zukunft gestalten - 
mit Beschäftigung, Wachstum und 
Stabilität 
04 Jul 12    
164 Vertrag über Stabilität, Koordinierung 
und Steuerung in der Wirtschafts- und 
Währungsunion  
04 Jul 12    
164 Vertrag zur Einrichtung des 
Europäischen Stabilitätsmechanismus 
04 Jul 12    
164 Vertrag zwischen Mitgliedstaaten der 
Europäischen Union und der Republik 
Kroatien über den Beitritt der Republik 
Kroatien zur Europäischen Union  
04 Jul 12    
216 Bundesgesetz über die justizielle 
Zusammenarbeit in Strafsachen mit den 
Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen 
Union 
05 Jul 12    
    19 Jul 12 Sicherung der Stabilität der Euro-Zone – 
Finanzhilfen für Spanien 
189 
169 Keine Schuldenunion ohne 
Volksabstimmung, Herr Bundeskanzler! 
19 Sep 12     
   26 Sep 12 Ratifizierung des Vertrages vom 2. Februar 
2012 zur Einrichtung des Europäischen 
Stabilitätsmechanismus 
194 
   27 Sep 12 Gesetzes zur Ausführung der Verordnung 
(EU) Nr. 236/2012 des Europäischen 
Parlaments und des Rates vom 14. März 
2012 über Leerverkäufe und bestimmte 
Aspekte von Credit Default Swaps (EU-
Leerverkaufs-Ausführungsgesetz) 
195 
   18 Oct 12 Achten Gesetzes zur Änderung des Gesetzes 
gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (8. 
GWB-ÄndG) 
198 
   18 Oct 12 Gesetzes zur Umsetzung der Richtlinie 
2012/…/EU über den Zugang zur Tätigkeit 
von Kreditinstituten und die Beaufsichtigung 
von Kreditinstituten und Wertpapierfirmen 
und zur Anpassung des Aufsichtsrechts an 
die Verordnung (EU) Nr. …/2012 über die 




   18 Oct 12 Regierungserklärung zum Europäischen Rat 
am 18./19. Oktober 2012 in Brüssel 
198 
   25 Oct 12 Chancen nutzen – Vorsorgende 
Wirtschaftspolitik jetzt einleiten 
201 
   09 Nov 12 Gesetzes zur Umsetzung des EuGH-Urteils 
vom 20. Oktober 2011 in der Rechtssache 
C-284/09 (freier Kapitalverkehr) 
205 
179 Einleitung eines 
Vertragsverletzungsverfahrens wegen 
europarechtswidriger Temelίn-UVP 
13 Nov 12     
179 Nein zu höheren EU-Beiträgen mit 
Faymanns Zustimmung - Österreich hat 
genug gezahlt! 
13 Nov 12     
   29 Nov 12 20 Jahre Zeichnung der Europäischen 
Charta der Regional- oder 
Minderheitensprachen 
211 
   30 Nov 12 Fortschritte beim Anpassungsprogramm für 
Griechenland 
212 
185 Außen- und Europapolitischen Bericht 
2011 
06 Dec 12     
   13 Dec 12 Regierungserklärung zum europäischen Rat 
am 13./14.Dezember 2012 in Brüssel 
214 
   16 Jan 13 50 Jahre Elysee-Vertrag - Zusammenarbeit 




   17 Jan 13 Ein neuer Anlauf zur Bändigung der 
Finanzmärkte – Für eine starke europäische 
Bankenunion zur Beendigung der 
Staatshaftung bei Bankenkrisen 
217 
217 Innerstaatliche Umsetzung des 
Fiskalvertrags 
17 Jan 13 Jahreswirtschaftsbericht 2013 - 
Wettbewerbsfähigkeit - Schlüssel für 
Wachstum und Beschäftigung in 
Deutschland und Europa 
217 
187 Für ein Europa mit mehr Wachstum, 
Beschäftigung, Gerechtigkeit und 
Nachhaltigkeit" 
30 Jan 13    
187 Genug gezockt: Strenges Verbot für 
Spekulationen mit Steuergeld jetzt! 
30 Jan 13    
187 Schutz des heimischen Wassers 30 Jan 13     
   31 Jan 13 Keine Rüstungsexporte als Instrument der 
Außenpolitik – Exportverbot jetzt 
durchsetzen 
219 
   31 Jan 13 Unternehmerische Pflichten zur 
Offenlegung von Arbeits- und 
Umweltbedingungen auf europäischer 
Ebene einführen 
219 
   01 Feb 13  Gesetzes zu dem Vertrag vom 9. Dezember 
2011 über den Beitritt der Republik 
Kroatien zur Europäischen Union 
220 
190 Ergebnisse des Europäischen Rates 
vom 7. und 8. Februar 2013 
19 Feb 13     
    21 Feb 13 Regierungserklärung zu den Ergebnissen 




191 Mitteilung der Kommission/ 
Jahreswachstumsbericht 2013 
27 Feb 13    
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191 Rahmenabkommen über umfassende 
Partnerschaft und Zusammenarbeit 
zwischen der Europäischen Union und 
der Sozialistischen Republik Vietnam  
27 Feb 13     
   28 Feb 13 Die Energiewende – Kosten für 
Verbraucherinnen, Verbraucher und 
Unternehmen 
225 
   28 Feb 13 Keine Privatisierung der Wasserversorgung 
durch die Hintertür 
225 
   13 Mar 13 Verhalten von SPD und BÜNDNIS 90/DIE 
GRÜNEN im Bundesrat beim Fiskalpakt 
227 
   14 Mar 13 Standpunkt der Bundesregierung zu den 
beschlossenen Verfassungsänderungen in 
Ungarn im Hinblick auf die Einhaltung 
europäischer Grundwerte 
228 
   15 Mar 13 Den Euratom-Vertrag an die 
Herausforderungen der Zukunft anpassen 
229 
   15 Mar 13 Finanzstabilität sichern – Regulierung 
systemrelevanter Finanzinstitute und des 
internationalen Schattenbanksystems 
229 
193 EU – Polizeikooperationsgesetz (EU-
PolKG) und BG über die Einrichtung 
und Organisation des Bundesamts zur 
Korruptionsprävention und 
Korruptionsbekämpfung 
20 Mar 13     
   21 Mar 13 Gesetz zu dem Handelsübereinkommen vom 
26. Juni 2012 zw EU und Peru und 
Kolumbien 
231 
   21 Mar 13 Sicherheit der Sparguthaben in Europa 231 
   22 Mar 13 Gesetzes über die Zusammenarbeit von 
Bundesregierung und Deutschem Bundestag 
in Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union 
(EUZBBG) 
232 
   22 Mar 13 Soziale Arbeitsbedingungen in der 
maritimen Wirtschaft fördern – 
Flaggenflucht verhindern 
232 
   18 Apr 13 Sicherung der Stabilität der Euro-Zone - 
Finanzhilfe für Zypern 
234 
198 Ermächtigung der österreichischen 
Vertreterin oder des österreichischen 
Vertreters im Europäischen 
Stabilitätsmechanismus (ESM) gemäß 
Art. 50b Z 1 B-VG 
22 Apr 13     
199 ESM-Erklärung Mag. Dr. Fekter: 
Gewährung von Finanzhilfe an die 
Republik Zypern  
25 Apr 13 Fortsetzung der Beteiligung bewaffneter 
deutscher Streitkräfte an der EU-geführten 
Operation Atalanta zur Bekämpfung der 
Piraterie vor der Küste Somalias 
237 
   25 Apr 13 Gesetzes zu dem Abkommen vom 29. Juni 
2012 zur Gründung einer Assoziation 
zwischen der Europäischen Union und ihren 
Mitgliedstaaten einerseits und 
Zentralamerika andererseits 
237 
   16 May 13 Fortsetzung der Beteiligung bewaffneter 
deutscher Streitkräfte an der EU-geführten 
Operation Atalanta zur Bekämpfung der 
Piraterie vor der Küste Somalias 
240 
   16 May 13 Gesetzes zu dem Vertrag vom 9. Dezember 
2011 über den Beitritt der Republik 
Kroatien zur Europäischen Union 
240 
 243 
   17 May 13 Gesetzes zum Vorschlag für eine 
Verordnung des Rates zur Übertragung 
besonderer Aufgaben im Zusammenhang mit 
der Aufsicht über Kreditinstitute auf die 
Europäische Zentralbank  
241 
203 Die Herausforderungen an den 
Wirtschaftsstandort Europa und 
Österreich 
22 May 13     
   12 Jun 13 Aktuelle Situation in der Türkei 245 
207 Entschließung 1487/2007 des 
slowakischen Nationalrats über die 
Unangreifbarkeit der Beneš-Dekrete 
13 Jun 13 Gesetzes zum Vorschlag für eine 
Verordnung des Rates zur Übertragung 
besonderer Aufgaben im Zusammenhang mit 
der Aufsicht über Kreditinstitute auf die 
Europäische Zentralbank 
246 
   14 Jun 13 Zu der Empfehlung für einen Beschluss des 
Rates über die Ermächtigung zur Aufnahme 
von Verhandlungen über ein umfassendes 
Handels- und Investitionsabkommen, 
transatlantische Handels- und 
Investitionspartnerschaft genannt, zwischen 
der Europäischen Union und den 
Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika  
247 
    27 Jun 13 Regierungserklärung zu den Ergebnissen 
des G-8-Gipfels und zum Europäischen Rat 
am 27./28. Juni 2013 in Brüssel 
250 
213 Abkommen mit der Europäischen 
Agentur für das Betriebsmanagement 
von IT-Großsystemen über den Sitz des 
Back-up-Systems der Agentur 











Appendix VI – Results of the frame analysis 
Table 19 shows the share of weighted frames for each party group orginaized by topic and 
indicating the expected dimension of framing. 
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